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DECOLONIZATION, NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND ORGANIZATION OF ALGERIAN WORKERS IN AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY: A STUDY OF PARTICIPATION AND DEVELOPMENT

by

©

MOHAMED HAGI ABUCAR

A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
AND RESEARCH IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

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The Undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled DECOLONIZATION, NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND ORGANIZATION OF ALGERIAN WORKERS IN AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY: A STUDY OF PARTICIPATION AND DEVELOPMENT submitted by Mohamed Hagi Abucar in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Arthur K. Davis
Supervisor

Carlo Caldarola

Jean-Guy Vaillancourt
External Examiner

Date: November 24, 1978

DEDICATION

This is dedicated to all those Algerians who have given their lives to establish an independent Algeria and to those who are struggling to establish economic independence for their countries.

ABSTRACT

The study focuses on the overall evolution of Algerian society from the Roman period to the present stage of Algerian national development, in an attempt to explain the socio-political and economic situation that over the course of a hundred years led to the underdevelopment of Algeria and the forces that led in turn to the uprising of Algerian nationalism, whose purpose was to change that situation.

Algerian society experienced several modes of production during the period of Turkish domination and colonial settlement. Each mode of production created its own contradiction and its social transformation. Political independence brought about large-scale social transformation. Unlike the colonial transformation brought about under Turkish domination and French colonialism in Algeria, the national development which was initiated at the outset of political independence and which assumed a new shape in 1967 has created social transformation on a scale not experienced in most post-colonial societies in Africa. Therefore, this study pays considerable attention to analyzing the process of decolonialization of Algeria's national economy, the development of a self-centered system, cultural development, and the organization of Algerian society, particularly in regard to the workers in agriculture and industry in their struggle for economic independence and the political and social consequences associated with this struggle.

Algerian national development is the outcome of class struggle between the workers, peasants, and intellectuals on the one hand and

the colonizers and bourgeoisie on the other hand. This struggle seems to be continuous: a new class relationship in the structure of Algerian society has appeared in recent years because of the patterns of Algerian national development. This suggests that national development in each case reflects the history of the society and creates its own contradiction.

In the present Algerian situation, the primary contradiction is between the public and private sectors, and the secondary contradiction is between the bureaucracy and the unity of workers/peasants. The study attempts to analyze the forces that have contributed and are contributing to the ongoing transformation of Algerian society. Because of these historical forces in Algeria, unlike many post-colonial societies, there has been a transformation of the colonial and neo-colonial relationship and the establishment of far-reaching social and economic changes for the benefit of the whole of society. However, the political, social, and economic changes that have taken place in Algeria in the last two decades are not free of contradictions. These contradictions will determine the future direction of Algerian socialist development.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

A. THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE PRESENT STUDY

Considerable studies have been published in recent years on the war of Algerian liberation and post-independence Algeria. In spite of this interest, little has been done to examine the various phases of Algerian social evolution as a whole so as to be able to comprehend the ramifications of Algerian development.

This study attempts to analyze the decolonization process, the development of a self-centered system, and the organization of Algerian workers in agriculture and industry. This provides us with the basis for understanding the underlying social processes in Algerian society, as well as its future development and the elements of contradiction that arise from national development.

The decolonization process is a dialectical process marked by struggle between the workers, peasants, and intellectuals on the one hand and the colonizers and the lumpenbourgeoisie on the other hand. National development is the outcome of this struggle and creates its own contradiction, which will bring about changes in post-independence society. With the present Algerian situation, the primary contradiction is between the public and private sectors; there is a secondary contradiction between the bureaucracy and the unity of workers-peasants. Development of the public sector leads towards the development of a secondary contradiction, due to the growth of the size of productive forces and the bureaucracy, each of which is interested in assuming economic power. By economic power is meant the control and management of resources. Political power is in the hands of revolutionary elites who have established an historical record in the Algerian struggle for political independence and the new, elected popular representation at various levels created by historical elites. In the present regime, the workers and peasants have a large share of the political power, more so than the petite and national bourgeoisies. By petite bourgeoisie is meant the intellectuals, the small merchants, and those in the liberal professions.

The aim of this analysis is to show that national development is not an end but a means to further change and transformation. At the same time, participation and self-management, which are the preconditions for national development, are not ends in themselves but promote the development of the national collectivity which will enhance self-sustained growth of the society.

This study is divided into three broad categories. The first part deals with the social evolution of Algerian society, from the Roman period to 1962. It analyzes external influences and changes, class structure, the dominant modes of production, the transformation of the pre-colonial economy and institutions, and the struggle for political independence.

The second part deals exclusively with the period from 1962 to 1977 and analyzes the problems of decolonization, national development, and the organization of Algerian workers, with particular emphasis on the primary and secondary contradictions associated with the Algerian option for national development and arising from the democratization of the national economy. The present Algerian government is committed to the principles of worker participation in socialist enterprises and worker self-management in agricultural enterprises. The study attempts to explain the Algerian experience of worker participation and the problems associated with it, such as popular and technical control.

The third part deals with the socio-economic conditions of Algerian workers in agriculture and industry and the transformation of Algerian social structures. It analyzes the problems of socio-economic inequality involved in the transition from a colonial economy to a self-centered system for socialist development. Particular emphasis will be given to the social process created by the Algerian option for national development and the changes that are associated with it.

B. PROBLEMS

Algeria did not have the same experience of political independence as Kenya, the Sudan, and Nigeria. The Algerian model of development is not even similar to that of Cuba and Viet Nam, where avant-guard parties represent the national collectivity.

These differences between Algeria and other post-colonial societies (particularly in Africa) are partly that Algeria has experienced a colonial settlement. The settlers in Algeria, whether they were French or other European groups, tended to preserve the union with the French rather than to seek independence. The dominant class within the colonial settlement conceived that their interest would be served better if they maintained the metropolitan relationship. In this sense, colonial settlement in Algeria was different from those colonial settlements existing in South Africa, for example. The Algerian case is very special in the history of colonial settlement, because political independence did not come from the settlers but from the indigenous inhabitants. This explains the fact that Algeria's problems in national development are not similar to those of many post-colonial African societies, because Algeria inherited a highly advanced capitalist colonial agrarian economy, dependent on metropolitan France. This led to the transformation of pre-colonial society and created conditions of social dislocation and marginalization. The main task of the Algerian government was to tackle such problems of the colonial legacy as uneven regional development, a regional export economy based on resources and agriculture, and weaknesses in industry.

Political independence was the pre-condition for Algerian national development; for the first time after 130 years the Algerian nation was re-established. However, political independence was not the end of colonialism in Algeria, because Africa inherited socio-cultural diversities, colonial methods of economic management, and the polarization of Algerian society into francophones and arabophones. These factors created obstacles to Algerian national development and the emancipation of workers and peasants.

The transformation of the means of production from private to public ownership which started in 1962 opened the way for Algerians to assume control of their destiny. However, the transformation of the economy and social institutions was not so easy; in fact, it was difficult. National development and worker participation started in the modern agricultural sector, in the hope that this would create the accumulation of capital necessary for industrialization, since that was an area in which Algerians had a long-established tradition. Unfortunately, the neo-colonial relationship in which Algeria became involved following her political independence made it impossible to succeed, due to the blockage the French government imposed on the export of Algerian agricultural products to French markets, and to the difficulties involved in obtaining agricultural machines and fertilizers from France. The modern agricultural sector was placed under autogestion in 1962; the head of the agricultural unit was a director appointed by the government. This promoted dissatisfaction and lowered the morale of the agricultural workers. The relationship between the worker and management continued to be a source of conflict until the whole structure of the enterprise was reformed in 1969. This secondary contradiction is still visible, although it seems that the government has taken steps to limit the power of the bureaucracy. A new structure was established and further reorganization was done in 1974, particularly in sharing benefits between the workers and the national collectivity, represented by the state.

The success of these transformations greatly depended on the upholding of the social dimensions of the Algerian revolution by the peasants and workers. The experiences Algeria gained in undertaking the decolonization process and the transformation of the means of production made it evident that, in order for such a radical policy for national development to succeed, they would have to accept in principle democratic participation by the producers in industry and agriculture, and cooperation between industry and agriculture. This would enable agriculture to become independent from the outside in terms of machines, fertilizers, and several other industrial aids, such as plastic gardens and energy for consumption and for production. Without this economic base, financed from the control of natural resources, Algeria would not have been able to create conditions for national development.

We are dealing in this study with problems associated with the Algerian decolonization process, and also with problems associated with Algeria's option for national development and the organization of Algerian workers.

The opening up of the economic resources of the country to the masses, previously denied, released the constraint imposed by colonialism on the social structure of Algerian society. In this sense, the new Algerian society is quite different from such neighbouring societies as Tunisia and Morocco. The marginalization commonly found in Morocco is almost disappearing in Algeria; the Algerian masses have obtained economic power enabling them to enjoy increasingly the cultural and economic production of their society. The gap between the masses and the educated elites in Algeria is narrowed, while in Tunisia the gap between the masses and the educated elites is very great. In both Morocco and Tunisia, the economic power of the masses is absent, and the masses are in conditions of marginalization. The differences between Algerians and their neighbours are explained by the fact that Algeria has oil and gas and has been able to regulate her national resources for the benefit of her people. Morocco and Tunisia have both agricultural land and livestock, but the structure that exists is not conducive to creating economic conditions favourable for their people, because of the nature of class relationships based on the ownership of the means of production.

However, this does not imply that Algeria is a classless society. The pre-colonial and colonial class relation is transformed in post-independence Algeria, but the Algerian option for national development has created a new class relationship based on the relationship to the means of production and on the position occupied in the political structure. The national economy is divided into public and private ownership, each controlling sixty and thirty percent, respectively. Only ten percent remains in the pre-colonial economy. The problems associated with this transformation will be examined in this study.

C. THEORY

The main research studies on Algerian society and its development have shown an interest in examining the Algerian revolution in a static perspective, turning their attention to certain characteristics associated with the transition of Algerian society from colonial settlement to a socialist state without paying much attention to the problems in Algerian society after political independence. The problem of the neo-colonial relationship with France has not attracted these writers, who have felt, rather, that the Algerian revolution was over and that the problems were solved which they observed at that time as associated with pre-colonial Algeria, as this quotation illustrates:

> . . . more fundamental reason for the failure of the Algerian revolutionaries was their lack of unity. With the liberation, the Algerian political and military clans allowed their thirst for power to overcome all other considerations. It was this terrible rivalry more than the inherent complexities of the post-independence task which brought about the downfall of the revolution. Even during the war observers had already noticed feuds among the Algerians but, not wishing to impede them in their struggle

> most had drawn a voluntary veil of silence over the matter. Serge Bromberger, however, observed: "These [internal quarrels] reappear at every phase of Algerian history and must be regarded as inherent in the Berber character. . . . In this Berberia can be likened to Corsica, where every village is divided into two clans, clans as old as the island itself, clans to which one belongs even before being born." (Humbaraci, 1966, p. 5)

The pre-colonial structure of tribal groupings was, according to Arlsan Humbaraci and Serge Bromberger, the main cause of the political problems Algeria encountered after independence. This, however, undermines the Algerian units. The pre-colonial structure never remained intact after 1830 because this structure was transformed by colonial settlement, which appropriated the tribal lands. The origin of individual personality in the conflict is taken in this analysis as representing certain clans—even individuals—divorced from their clan background. This analysis is simplistic and does not explain the problems of post-independence Algeria. The *Charte d'Alger* is the single document which, more than any other research study, so far has been able to analyze post-independence Algeria. The Algerian Charter states as follows:

> 3. Algeria has just emerged from colonial domination. The compromise peace of Evian* may block the revolution if the terms of the agreement are not refused in the national interest.
>
> The Evian Agreements are the mould which has shaped the rebirth of the Algerian nation and state.
>
> However, the presence of the French army+ and still more the nature of our financial and economic relations with France, limit our sovereignty and give particular emphasis to negative phenomena and to the activities of the national

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*The Evian Agreements, signed in March 1962, involved a cease-fire and provisions for a referendum on independence as well as stipulating the structure of relations after independence.

+Under the terms of the Evian Agreements the French were to keep a military presence in Algeria.

> exploitative stratum.* The national tasks laid down in the Tripoli Programme remain. Imperialism is still the major enemy of our country. The party must fight vigorously against those who wish to undermine our will to disengage ourselves from imperialism by submerging it under the weight of everyday problems; who wish to lull popular vigilance and make our dependence even greater. The struggle to consolidate independence and the struggle for the triumph of our socialist option are inextricably linked. To separate them is to encourage the growth and influence of forces hostile to socialism and to water down the leading role of the toiling mass of workers and peasants into a series of groups without any principles.
>
> 4. Algeria is characterized by the unequal development of its different regions. This situation, inherited from the past, gives a real significance to the phenomena of regionalism, survivals of feudalism and other forces opposed to progress. Equal rights for all Algerians would be an empty principle if no account were taken of the development of the material base. Only the increase of the general wealth of the country and the development of productive forces in the backward areas can lead to the removal of the obstacles to the integration of these areas and the establishment of the harmony necessary for the normal evolution of the country. (Clegg, 1971, pp. 211-12)

The problems of post-independence Algeria are, then, the colonial legacy and neo-colonial ties which existed within colonial settlement, and their consequences were felt at the outset of Algeria's political independence, rather than in the pre-colonial situation. These problems began to undermine Algerian unity, by fostering disunity and maintaining Algeria in a state of underdevelopment and in a neo-colonial relationship with metropolitan France. For example, the Kabyle revolt, which took place at the outset of Algerian independence, was due to the uneven regional development created by colonial settlement. From this region was drawn most of the human resources needed by the metropolis

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*The word in the original is *couche*, which is here translated as "stratum."

to work in their industries between World War I and World War II. This devastated the pre-colonial economy of the region. At the end of the colonial era (1962), this region was one of the poorest regions in Algeria.

The economic situation of post-independence Algeria has been subjected to similar analysis, as this quotation illustrates:

> Political instability in Algeria has so far had a significant effect on the economy. The fortunes of self-management rose and fell with political fluctuations; the coup d'état in particular marked the beginning of slow transformation of the economic system from self-management to state capitalism. It is, of course, a matter open to debate as to which system—self-management, state capitalism, or free enterprise—would best suit Algeria's needs. Few would contest, however, that any one system consistently followed would produce better results than would continuous changes and half-hearted measures. (Ottaway, 1970, p. 286)

Political instability is a factor in the economy; success and failure of self-management depends a great deal on political stability. The causes of instability lay in the developmental direction the country had to adopt. Ottaway furthermore suggests that any direction of development Algeria adopts—whether it be state capitalism, self-management, or free enterprise—is open to debate as to its serving Algerian interests. Then what is Algeria's interest? David Ottaway does not seem interested in looking at what processes cause political instability. Secondly, what were the relationships between politics and economics in the Algerian situation at that time?

At the outset of Algerian independence, it became obvious to the Algerian elites that an alternative approach was needed to overcome the problems of colonialism and neo-colonialism. This, however, did not involve the choice between state capitalism and self-management; rather, it involved choosing between the method of classical liberalism and

and state capitalism, as this quotation rightly puts it:

> In newly-independent countries a real transformation of society cannot be secured by recourse to the methods of classical liberalism. These aggravate the anarchy of the market, reinforce economic dependence on imperialism, make of the State an organism for the transfer of riches to the hands of place-seekers, and nourishes the activity of the parasitic social classes linked to imperialism.
>
> The local bourgeoisie gradually substitutes itself for the foreigner in the unproductive economic sectors and enriches itself. As for the people, these continue to live in misery and ignorance. The weakness of the national revenue and of private savings, the departure from the country of a large part of the benefits realized, and orientation of local capital towards speculative activities, the enormous resource constituted by unemployed labour are further factors that militate against the capitalist path of development. (Ottaway, 1970, p. 286)

State capitalism and self-management are not two separate entities, but rather one entity dealing with two different problems: the control of national resources and the emancipation of the labouring strata. State capitalism, necessarily, is an historical condition of Algerian development. In the absence of a genuine national bourgeoisie, the state assumes the role of social transformation and creates conditions for socialist development. The emancipation of the masses does necessitate an evolutionary line, but not characterized by conflict, and the evolutionary process occurs in zigzag lines, which gradually develop a leap forward. The development of the economy through state capitalism creates the necessary conditions for qualitative development, because more peasants are being detached from the land to industry; this, however, increases the size of the productive force.

It is the purpose of this study to analyze the underlying processes of Algerian national development. Arslan Humbaraci and David Ottaway analyze the Algerian post-independence situation from a static point of view and fail to examine the fundamental issues confronting Algeria in her attempt to disintegrate the colonial structure and break down neo-colonial ties. Both authors seem to adhere to the same approach, but yet they study different aspects of the post-independence Algerian situation.

Humbaraci is obsessed by the inability of the Algerian revolution to create a sense of national unity. The factor which undermined national unity was the conflict between the heads of the revolution. That conflict would pave the way to domination. It would have been easy if unity could have been created without conflict. The absence of dialectic analyses in Humbaraci's approach to the Algerian post-independence situation is obvious.

Similarly, Ottaway gives importance to studying the Algerian post-independence situation, and to political stability as a basis for development. According to him, political instability has determinant effects on the economy. On what economy, and what political instability? Does dependency promote development? It is common in the literature on Third World countries, particularly those in Africa, to view the post-independence situation as colonial replacement, which gives rise to the same structural situation that existed prior to political independence, as this quotation demonstrates:

> Analysis of the situation obtaining in recent years suggests that substitution took place on an extraordinary scale, probably in excess of all expectations. Some 450,000 new jobs were created outside agriculture: 180,000 workers, white-collar workers, small entrepreneurs, and executives in the urban economy (especially in the autonomous, self-managed sector); 150,000 civil servants; and 120,000 soldiers. These new layers of the population, together with the 100,000 or so colonist-employed workers who formed the nucleus of the self-managed agricultural

> cooperatives, have up till now been the ones to benefit most from independence and from the departure of the colons—much more than the peasants engaged in traditional agriculture or the less skilled or less well-placed urban working class. Indeed, they are practically the only ones to have benefited from the European exodus. (Amin, 1970, pp. 138-39)

This approach takes for granted that Algerian independence was able only to create the replacement of colonial settlement by indigenous settlers, and that the indigenous groups that have taken over the colonial structure represent the majority of indigenous society. The ability of the Algerian revolution to create conditions of institutionalization of society by and large was underscored. However, it is true that political independence brought replacement in regard to positions held previously by the colonizer and taken by the colonized. But that transformation cannot be viewed as static, because decolonization of political and economic institutions creates further conditions of change. These writers fail to see the transformation of post-colonial society *in itself*.

Ian Clegg's work on post-independence Algeria is available on the shelves of most North American universities and bookstores. Unlike other writers on the Algerian post-independence situation, it seems that Clegg pays attention to conflicts, as the following quotation demonstrates:

> The conflict that has most overtly determined the content of Algerian socialism has been over modes of economic organization and development. In this respect Algeria is similar to most newly independent countries seeking to free themselves from dependence on the colonial metropolis and from neo-colonialism as a whole. Class conflicts tend to gell round competing and opposed theories of economic development, rather than finding precise expression in the political sphere. However, these conflicting theories of economic organization are clearly related to social structure in terms of conflicting class interests. In

> Algeria this class conflict emerged in the shape of two solutions to the country's economic problems—autogestion and state capitalism, independence from international capitalism and reliance on it. (Clegg, 1970, p. 75)

According to Clegg, post-independence conflict arises from the lack of distribution of power, the inability of the Algerian elite to evaluate and accommodate various interest groups, and the lack of consensus over which kind of developmental direction Algeria should embark upon, because of the absence of political structure to articulate various political claims. At the heart of conflict over power is the class attitude of various Algerian classes. According to Clegg, these classes are:

> rural and urban sub-proletarian, agricultural and industrial working class, the traditional middle class and the new administrative middle class. (Clegg, 1970, p. 95)

Peasants and the rural and urban sub-proletariat, according to Clegg, do not possess class attitudes because they are not conscious of their class position in society, due to their socio-cultural outlook which relies on pre-colonial Algerian social structure. Unlike these two classes, the working and the new administrative middle classes have class attitudes. The struggle for power is between the workers and the new administrative middle class.

Clegg's study of the Algerian post-independence situation suffers from theoretical and methodological inadequacies in attempting to analyze the situation of Algeria after independence. Clegg attempts to isolate certain specific internal characteristics which became evident in post-independence Algeria as the sole factors creating conflict. For example, seventy-seven percent of the administrative staff which assumed responsibility for the management of the economy had previously held positions in the colonial administration. After independence they assumed responsibility as managers in self-management enterprises. The attitudes of this social category towards the self-management enterprises was the source of conflict. According to Clegg, the administrative staff is a class, because of the economic and social positions they occupy within the Algerian social structure. The interest of this class is to undermine socialist development in Algeria, which Clegg states would have been brought about by the self-management institution operated by the workers.

One of the inadequacies of Clegg's study is his approach to post-independence Algeria and the historical conditions in which Algeria was involved (namely, the neo-colonial relationship with France). Instead of considering the Algerian post-independence situation in terms of this relationship, which was the main cause of the problem, he relegates the problem Algeria encountered during the period 1962-1965 to the internal situation.

Yet this was not the only factor creating the conflict. In fact, the problem is more complex than Clegg describes. Self-management enterprises were not independent from the metropolis in terms of markets, agricultural products, tools, and fertilizers. These factors alone created constraints within the management of enterprises. The Algerian scholar Marnia Lazreg, in reviewing Clegg's book, makes the following comments:

> Although Clegg has accurately stated the dimensions of the problem, his approach raises the question of the adequacy of Western concepts and theoretical frameworks when applied to a non-Western social reality. A neo-Marxist explanatory scheme may indeed be more suitable to the Algerian social structure than a stratification approach. However, it

> still needs reformulating in order to embrace a different order of phenomena with a historically specific complexity. (Lazreg, 1974, p. 435)

The data that Clegg used to arrive at such generalizations and to substantiate his findings were taken from a study in Algeria carried out by Pierre Bourdieu during the colonial period. This study sought to define the attitude towards work and the conditions of work among peasants and workers in Algeria. The basic approach of that study undoubtedly is based on modernization theories, which hold the changing attitude of rural communities as a pre-condition for modernization. In the 1950s and 1960s, such theories were fashionable and dominant in most Western studies on non-Western societies. It is true, of course, that conflict was not over the question of policy or direction of development, or the choice between self-management and state capitalism. Such decisions are not made by the administrative staff or by the workers but by the political power (the government, the FLN, and the UGTA) in consultation with national organizations.

Clegg fails to comprehend that both self-management and state capitalism arose from the chaos created by the evacuation of colonial settlement and the neo-colonial situation in which Algeria was involved at the outset of independence. Self-management and state capitalism are not in a state of fundamental contradiction. It has become evident in recent years that, through state capitalism, the Algerian revolutionary government has been able to control its natural resources and that at the same time the Algerians have been able to develop an alternative approach to national development in which self-management and participation became the focal points of the system.

Clegg, unlike Fanon, dismisses the colonial struggle as being a struggle between two modes of production and views the colonial situation as a confrontation between two cultures, European and Moslem, each wanting to dominate the other. Because of this simplistic view of the colonial situation, Clegg was led to assume that the peasants or the sub-proletariat were not revolutionaries because both of these social categories lacked class consciousness, as this quotation demonstrates:

> In discussing the value systems and consciousness of the peasantry, sub-proletariat and working class of Algeria, I have attempted, in this specific case, to unmask the absurdity of this type of reductionism. Neither the peasantry, nor the truly "wretched"—the sub-proletariat—can be said to have played an objectively revolutionary role in Algeria. The involvement of the population of the traditional rural areas in the independence struggle must be clearly separated from their passivity in face of its revolutionary aftermath. The peasantry were fighting for what they regarded as their inheritance: a heritage firmly rooted in the Arab, Berber and Islamic past. Their consciousness was rooted in the values and traditions of this past and their aim was its re-creation. Revolution, as a concept, is alien to the peasant consciousness while their relationship to the environment remains one of passive endurance rather than active transformation. (Clegg, 1970, p. 180)

Peasant revolt has been common throughout Algerian history, against invaders, against landlords, and against colonial settlement. In each of these revolts, the peasants either waged a war alone or allied with other forces. When the country was invaded by outsiders, the peasants allied themselves with native rulers. There were times when the peasants had to face the struggle alone, or with the progressive sector, or with a religious leader. There have been several instances in Algerian history where constant alliance has developed between the landlord and the conqueror against the peasants. How can Clegg explain the alliance between the feudal landlord and the conquerors, such as the

Turkish and French colonial settlements? Fanon had historical reasons to state as follows:

> In fact the rebellion, which began in the country districts, will filter into the towns through that fraction of the peasant population which is blocked on the outer fringe of the urban centers, that fraction which has not yet succeeded in finding a bone to gnaw in the colonial system. The men whom the growing population of the country districts and colonial expropriation have brought to desert their family holdings circle tirelessly around the different towns, hoping that one day or another they will be allowed inside. It is within this mass of humanity, this people of the shanty towns, at the core of the lumpenproletariat, that the rebellion will find its urban spearhead. For the lumpenproletariat, that horde of starving men, uprooted from their tribe and from their clan, constitutes one of the most spontaneous and the most radically revolutionary forces of a colonized people. (Fanon, 1968, p. 29)

Fanon again:

> The shantytown sanctions the native's biological decision to invade, at whatever cost and if necessary by the most cryptic methods, the enemy fortress. The lumpenproletariat, once it is constituted, brings all its forces to endanger the "security" of the town, and is the sign of the irrevocable decay, the gangrene ever present at the heart of colonial domination. So the pimps, the hooligans, the unemployed, and the petty criminals, urged on from behind, throw themselves into the struggle for liberation like stout working men. These classless idlers will by militant and decisive action discover the path that leads to nationhood. They won't become reformed characters to please colonial society, fitting in with the morality of its rulers; quite on the contrary, they take for granted the impossibility of their entering the city save by hand grenades and revolvers. These workless less-than-men are rehabilitated in their own eyes and in the eyes of history. (Fanon, 1968, p. 130)

If we put this into historical perspective, Fanon's analysis is much more accurate than Clegg's concerning the peasant's role in the national struggle in Algeria. The peasants were the most devastated class in the colonial situation, in the sense that their land was expropriated and their social structures dislocated. Once the economic base was transformed from a communal mode of production to a quasi-feudal or capitalist mode of production, the whole social institution began gradually to disintegrate. The ruling elites of colonial settlements turned their attention to the feudal structure, first by attacking the Turks and then the indigenous aristocracy.

The backbone of the Algerian revolution was the peasants and the workers, although the peasants were in the majority. The indigenous aristocracy was divided between those who resisted colonial settlement and those who cooperated. The colonial struggle involved the negation of communal and tribute modes of production by capitalist agrarian colonial modes of production. This struggle was led by military commands, financial capitalists, and farmers of non-Algerian origin. These classes were more inclined to consolidate their interests in Algeria and maintain dependence status with metropolitan France; because of this relationship, the colonial class was incapable of creating an industrial capitalist class. How was the colonial settlement transformed? Who participated actively in the struggle?

Fanon has an inside view of the colonial situation in Algeria and of Algerian history in general. In his analysis of the Algerian revolution, he identifies the peasant and sub-proletariat as being the classes most affected by colonial settlement, removed from their economic base (the land) and given refugee status in their own country. Because of this, the peasant constitutes a revolutionary force. Therefore, the evolution of Algerian society from colonial settlement to independent state did not come from above but from below, that is to say, from the peasants and sub-proletariat who actually participated in the struggle for political independence.

The theoretical basis of analysis is to be found in the work of Romein (1935), who called this trend the "dialectics of progress." The movement of political and social revolution will arise from below rather than from above, because of "the law of the Retarding Lead." Similarly, Sahlin and Service (1960) called such trends "the leapfrog effect," because there are latent forces in the colonial situation—the "Law of Evolutionary Potential" whereby, if conditions are ripe, these trends will manifest themselves. Therefore, the peasant, being the majority in a colonial situation, is the principal and fundamental force of revolutionary struggle for transforming or negating the colonial structure. Through struggle, a new mode of production came into existence.

In the case of Algeria, state capitalism, or a non-capitalist mode of production as some people have referred to it, became the dominant mode of production. The non-capitalist mode of production creates a new situation hitherto non-existent in emerging nations, namely, a strong public sector led by the petite bourgeoisie. However, the political and social base of such models are the workers and the peasants. The first phase of non-capitalist development is characterized by alliance between the worker, the peasant, and the petite bourgeoisie, and to a lessee degree the national bourgeoisie. As the Algerian experience suggests, a non-capitalist mode of production, while negating the colonial mode of production and curtailing the economic and cultural influences of neo-colonial ties, gives rise to the development of a national bourgeoisie. Therefore, the fundamental internal contradiction is not social differentiation by social categories, associated with national development, but struggle between the private and public sectors. However, the private sector remains and develops within the context of state capitalism during this period of transition towards socialism.

There is also another fundamental contradiction between national development and imperialism. Once national resources are in the hands of the state, the position of imperialist power becomes weakened in the hinterlands in terms of obtaining raw materials and marketing the finished products. This has a drastic effect on the imperialist profit from underdeveloped countries. This is obvious in the Algerian option of national development, which emphasizes inward development, namely, the relationship between industry and agriculture, the setting up of processing industries, and the expansion of local markets. This is achieved by giving priority to heavy industry and exercising control over ownership of national resources, which creates the capital necessary for local investment.

However, non-capitalist development does not necessarily promote the severing of relationships with capitalist markets, at the present stage of Algerian development, but pursues a policy of diversification of the trade relationship between Algeria and developed countries. Still, the traditional trade ties between France and Algeria have weakened in recent years, and Algeria has established trade relationships with the USA, Japan, and West Germany (see Appendix J). Each of these imperialist countries tends to capture the growing market of the Algerian economy, which is interested in acquiring technology.

The present study tends to reject the ideal-typical index, the diffusionist, and the psychological approaches. These approaches are ahistorical and imply a unilinear evolutionary analysis which ascribes underdevelopment as due mainly to the existence of a pre-colonial structure. The latter allegedly creates an obstacle to the Western model of development in these developing countries.

On the contracy, we suggest, the underdevelopment of the emerging nations is caused by the relationship between the developed and the developing countries (Frank, 1966). The conditions of development of the latter require the breakdown of colonial and neo-colonial relations and the development of a self-centered system (Amin, 1974): "Development involves a structural transformation of the economy, society, policy and culture of the satellite that permits the self-generalizing and self-perpetuating use and development of the potential." This, however, occurs only through a general social transformation, and not through limited social change.

Another eminent Dutch scholar who has given thought to the study of social process is Wertheim. For him, social process consists of:

> . . . a combination of several, sometimes conflicting, trends, it is possible that certain tendencies which, at one given moment, are seemingly predominant, will not develop because they are overtaken by another tendency developing at a much faster rate. For example, at a given moment in a certain "underdevelopment" country a native rising bourgeoisie appears to aspire to a take-over of the dominant position of the former colonial rulers—yet, not long afterwards, this trend may be overtaken by a much more vigorous one in which the representatives of the rural masses take the initiative, and the bourgeoisie is put on the defensive.
>
> It is, moreover, the relative speed which decides whether a definite process should be included within the "normal" range of evolutionary change, or should rather be viewed as "revolutionary." (Wertheim, 1974, p. 34)

The African experience suggests that a quiet revolution or military coup has often become the fashionable style for changing political power. The military coup d'état is more common than quiet revolution. Quiet revolution occurred for the first time in Africa when the Algerian governing elite decided to oust the head of state. This was decided by members of the cabinet, regardless of the attitude of the masses. This explains the fact that the military and governing elite are the organized group most capable of upsetting political power. Students and trade union organizations, the peasantry, and women's organizations have genuine auxiliary political potential in emerging nations. Without their aid, the military and governing elite are incapable of running the country.

The process of political independence that took place in Africa after World War II cannot be taken as the final step of emancipation from colonialism and imperialism. The struggle between developing and developed countries will certainly continue as long as the world is divided into developed and developing regions. What is amazing about the increasing gap between developed and developing countries is that within the developed world there is a growing uneven regional development, unemployment, and a higher rate of functional illiteracy, which raises the question of the nature and direction of the development of the developed world.

The social process associated with the decolonization process is well analyzed by Cabral (1973), Nyerere (1973), Amin (1974), and Dos Santos (1973). Their approaches to the Third World constitute the theoretical framework of this study.

For Amilcar Cabral, the "conditioning situations" in developing countries are the resources for promoting new structures, productive forces, strategies, and struggles to liberate those countries from imperialism. It is essential to know whether imperialism has fulfilled its historic mission in those countries.

One way we may answer the question is by saying that imperialist capital has generally accomplished this mission at the economic, social, and cultural levels in the countries of accumulation. Because the purpose was to increase its surplus value in countries where capital was invested, and not to promote the growth of local productive forces, therefore "the historical capacity of the capital depends strictly on its freedom, that is to say on the degree of independence with which it is utilized" (Cabral, 1973, p. 80).

On the other hand, one is also tempted to say that imperialist capital has created conditions which subsequently increase the level of the productive forces by drawing away a number of people from the mainstream of life into urban centres created for the expansion of imperialist capital. It also permitted a minority of the local population to enjoy a rather high standard of living. In these senses, imperialist capital has contributed to the growth of contradictions in these societies by widening the class gap between the various social groups created by the growth of the national bourgeoisie (Cabral, 1973, p. 81).

In the first form of domination, the social structure of the dominated people can suffer the following consequences:

> (a) total destruction, generally accompanied by immediate or gradual elimination of the native population and, consequently, by the substitution of a population from outside; (b) partial destruction, generally accompanied by a greater or lesser influx of population from outside; (c) apparent conservation conditioned by confining the native society to zones or reserves generally offering no possibilities of living, accompanied by massive implantation of population from outside. (Cabral, 1973, p. 81)

The last two cases, (b) and (c), are prominent in bringing about political revolution in the colonial world. They provide sources of recruitment to the liberation or nationalistic movement. Such cases are commonly found in all developing countries and particularly in Africa and Asia. Items (b) and (c) were commonly experienced in the Algerian situation during colonial settlement; the social basis of Algerian revolution was the peasants and the sub-proletariat.

In the second form of domination, neo-colonialism, imperialist capital furthers the development of the local bourgeoisie or pseudo-bourgeoisie, some of whom are of native or foreign origin and allied with the ruling class of the metropolis. The French government attempted to exercise this form of domination over Algeria between 1962 and 1965, but the social dimension of the Algerian revolution was capable of defeating it by denouncing Franco-Algerian cooperation in 1965.

The two forms of domination provide us with the basis for an understanding of the Third World. In classical colonialism, there is a tendency to paralyze colonial society and to move towards stagnation, and even in some cases to regress without creating a process of historical change (Cabral, 1973, p. 81).

In neo-colonialism, however, we are provided with a different situation which gives rise to an historical process of social transformation (Cabral, 1973, p. 82). This process assumes, according to Cabral, the following characteristics:

> . . . the creation of a native pseudo-bourgeoisie which generally develops out of a petty bourgeoisie of bureaucrats and accentuates the differentiation between the social strata and intermediaries in the commercial system (*compradores*), by strengthening the economic activity of local elements, opens up new perspectives in the social dynamic, mainly by the development of an urban working class, the introduction of private agricultural property, and the progressive appearance of an agricultural proletariat. These more or less noticeable transformations of the social structure, produced by a significant increase in the level of productive forces, have a direct influence on the historical process of the socio-economic whole in question. (Cabral, 1973, p. 82)

The capitalist colonial agrarian economy which was established in Algeria after 1880 began to negate the feudal mode of production established by the Ottoman empire and to bring Algeria into the mainstream of capitalist development. Between 1830 and 1955, a distinctive class structure emerged with proletarization of the peasants. The largest of these classes were the peasants and the sub-proletariat. Unlike many African countries, Algeria was a colonial settlement. Alien bourgeois, consisting of settlers and French metropolitan capitalists, had control of the economy. They were a minority dominating Algerian society. The capitalist colonial agrarian economy transformed the peasant into proletariat and sub-proletariat, by means of dispossessing him of his land and destroying his social institutions. The system did not allow for development of an Algerian national bourgeoisie; it did, however, give rise to the development of a petite bourgeoisie, which sought alliance with the dominant class.

The Algerian historical experience suggests that the petite bourgeoisie, despite their attempts to join in colonial settlement economic exploitation, were not willingly accommodated, whether they were shopkeepers, middlemen, or from the liberal professions. The total negation of Algerian society by the settlers created the conditions necessary for alliances between the various strata of Algerian society and, more particularly, between the most progressive sectors: the petite bourgeoisie and the peasants and workers.

Furthermore, Cabral maintains that the major problem in these countries is how to free the development of the national productive forces, since any of the forms of domination discussed above essentially negates the historical development of the colonized people. Therefore, the objective task of the liberation movement is to free the development of the national productive forces (Cabral, 1973, p. 83). The Front de Libération Nationale performed an historical task in freeing the masses from the yoke of colonialism.

The role of the liberation movement before independence was to free the country from colonialism. In the post-independence situation, the struggle of the Algerian FLN was to break down the capitalist colonial agrarian economy—to place the state sector as the dominant mode of production and the relations of production. So the internal and external conditions are of paramount importance in creating a self-sufficient economy. My experience in Algeria suggests that when that country weakened her ties with the former colonizer, France, favourable conditions began to develop in terms of creating internal markets and diversifying her international trade.

However, the success or failure of the liberation movement depends upon understanding the objective and subjective conditions that prevail in each circumstance, particularly the present stage of world development. It is equally important "to know the type or types of struggle most appropriate for its realization" (Cabral, 1973, p. 84).

There are possibilities of favourable as well as unfavourable conditions for the national liberation movements. These conditions are noticeable at the international and at the internal levels.

According to Cabral, the factors that are unfavourable to national liberation movements are:

> the neo-colonial situation of a great number of states which, having won political independence, are now tending to join up with others already in that situation; the progress made by neo-capitalism, particularly in Europe, where

> imperialism is adopting preferential investments, encouraging the development of a privileged proletariat and thus lowering the revolutionary level of the working classes; the open or concealed neo-colonial position of some European states; the so-called policy of "aid for underdeveloped countries" adopted by imperialism with the aim of creating or reinforcing native pseudo-bourgeoisies which are necessarily dependent on the international bourgeoisie, and thus obstructing the path of revolution; the claustrophobic and revolutionary timidity which have led some recently independent states whose internal economic and political conditions are favourable to revolution to accept compromises with the enemy or its agents; the growing contradictions between anti-imperialist states; and finally the threat to world peace posed by the prospect of atomic war on the part of imperialism. All these factors reinforce the action of imperialism against the national liberation movements. (Cabral, 1973, p. 84)

To quote again:

> On the internal level we believe that the most important weaknesses or unfavourable factors are inherent in the socio-economic structure and in the tendencies of its evolution under imperialist pressure, or (to be more precise) in the little or no attention paid to the characteristics of this structure and these tendencies by the national liberation movements in deciding on the strategy of their struggles. (Cabral, 1973, p. 84)

Under such conditions, it is important to be conscious of the objective and subjective conditions in deciding the strategy to overcome domination. A classical colonial situation:

> offers the petty bourgeoisie the historical opportunity of leading the struggle against foreign domination, since by the nature of its objective and subjective conditions (higher standard of living than that of the masses, more frequent contact with the agents of colonialism, and hence more chance of being humiliated, higher levels of education and political awareness, etc.), it is the stratum which most rapidly becomes aware of the need to free itself from foreign domination. (Cabral, 1973, p. 88)

In contrast, in the neo-colonialist situation, the struggle is between the pseudo-bourgeoisie and imperialists on the one hand and the more educated sectors of the working class and the broad masses of the people on the other hand. In this situation the petite bourgeoisie plays an important role in fostering class struggle. However, the petite bourgeoisie is not alone; the progressive sector of the working class takes part in this struggle. What is decisive in each of these situations is not the petite bourgeoisie, because as a service class it "does not possess the economic base to guarantee the taking over of power [therefore] in the conditions of colonial and neo-colonial society this capacity is retained by two entities: imperialist capital and the working class" (Cabral, 1973, p. 89)

Present Algerian development is giving rise to the development of productive forces: the struggle is not so much between the petite bourgeoisie and the working class as between the national bourgeoisie and imperialist capital on the one hand and the working class on the other. The struggle between the petite bourgeoisie and the working class is a non-antagonist contradiction, while the struggle between imperialist capital and the national bourgeoisie, and the working class, is a fundamental contradiction.

The direction of development in post-independence society became a major concern to many scholars both in the developed and the developing countries. Two approaches became dominant in studying the developmental direction of post-independence society. The first approach holds the view that if a developing society wants to achieve modernization it must follow western civilization step by step and show the capability of internalizing the western value system. This implicit evolutionary approach is to be found in the work of Rostow (1960), Nash (1963), Foster (1962), and Lerner (1958). The second approach holds the view that if a post-independence society wants to overcome underdevelopment, it must break down the neo-colonial relationship and develop a self-centered system. The work of Frank (1966), Amin (1974), Dos Santos (1972), and Nyerere (1973) illustrates the latter point of view.

The developing countries are facing the problem of choosing between the capitalist and the socialist paths to development. According to Nyerere (1973), socialism offers better opportunities for development in the Third World than does capitalism. At the present stage of development in African countries, where resources are very limited, the socialist system provides an opportunity for all citizens to share in those resources, because socialism is geared towards humanistic concepts. Therefore the rational choice, according to Nyerere, is socialism.

For Nyerere, the dilemma of the Third World today is how to make a choice between the two systems. The big powers attempt to bring the Third World under their influence, and any resistance to that influence is considered unacceptable. If we are determined to overcome our recent and past difficulties in development, we must be able to move towards the growth of one system or the other within our society.

Furthermore, Nyerere sees that there is no real choice in accepting the capitalist system in the Third World nations. To accept capitalistic development in the Third World nations means "surrendering the reality of their freedom and accepting a degree of inequality between the citizens which would deny the moral validity of our independence struggle" (Nyerere, 1973, p. 3). This reasoning is based on the lack of a national bourgeoisie in the Third World nations, and particularly in Tanzania, who can invest in modern industry. Secondly, an infant industry will not be able to compete with the advanced capitalist countries in the international market. Even if the Third World nations accept the capitalist path to development, it means that these nations have to accept the inequality of their citizens.

The socialist system of development is the only alternative open to Third World nations to develop a society which will provide equality among its citizens. Nyerere says "our present poverty and national weaknesses make socialism . . . a rational choice for us" (Nyerere, 1973, p. 7).

Samir Amin (1974), in explaining the development of capitalist countries and the underdevelopment of the developing countries, distinguishes between two types of economic systems: the self-centered and the peripheral systems. In the former economic system he distinguishes four sectors: exports, mass consumption, consumption of luxury goods, and capital goods. This economic system has historically been characteristic of Western Europe and Japan. It generates a surplus that is distributed in wages and profit, wages being the source of demand for mass consumption goods, and profits being wholly or partly "saved" for investment purposes.

In contrast, the peripheral system exhibits a pattern of capital accumulation and economic development different from the one discussed above. Under this system, the process of development is imported from the centre by establishing an export economy. This economy consists of minerals and primary agricultural products. According to Samir Amin, the reason the centre wants to invest in the periphery is not that there is no outlet at the centre, but to obtain higher rates of profit and to "use the export of capital as a means to fight the trend of a falling profit rate" (Amin, 1974, p. 13). The peripheral economic system is shaped by the relationship between export and capital goods.

The causes of underdevelopment of the peripheral countries are:

(1) There is no equal exchange between the centre and the periphery; the products exported by the periphery are produced at a lower cost of labour than at the centre, so that the whole society is geared towards the function of the export economy in order to provide cheap labour.

(2) Because of the nature of the economic relationship, the periphery becomes dependent on the centre.

(3) Under such an economic relationship, it is hard to describe these societies as traditional, particularly because of these two reasons:

  (a) It is no longer a self-sufficient community, for it is in the embryonic stage of being brought into the mainstream of the capitalistic mode of production; and

  (b) In these societies, fertilized lands have been appropriated and the people are forced to emigrate to European centres of the colonial economy to be employed as cheap labour in plantations, mining, and services.

(4) The export economy has no impact on the rest of the country: the wage rate is low for economic, social, and political reasons.

(5) The local market functions along with the export economy, or rather it is subservient to the centre with a limited function. The foreign capital invested in the local markets explains their orientation towards mass-consumption goods, provided that there are low wage rates and high returns.

(6) The function of this economy increases the polarization between the centre and the periphery; therefore there is an increase in wealth at the centre and perpetual distortion of the economy at the periphery.

(7) This economic relationship is beneficial only to small groups at the periphery; because of their association with the export economy, luxury goods are sought within the local market, imported from the centre. They are latifundists in some places, Kulaks in others, comprador commercial bourgeoisie, state bureaucrats (Amin, 1974, pp. 13-14).

The evolution of Algerian society suggests that, since the fifteenth century, Algerians have experienced three modes of production: communal, tribute paying, and a capitalist colonial agrarian economy. In each historical period, one mode of production became dominant. For example, during the Turkish occupation, the tribute-paying mode of production was dominant, and from 1830 on the capitalist colonial agrarian economy became dominant. However, the other two modes of production did not cease to exist, but survived in certain limited areas. The capitalist colonial agrarian economy gave rise to a colonial settlement, which established a cultural hegemony over the indigenous population and brought various communities under its control. The self-sufficient community began to disintegrate, once their land was removed from them, releasing a large number of peasants from the land with no alternative possibilities, unless they emigrated to European centres of the colonial economy as cheap labour. The dominant class, the financial capitalists, who were alien bourgeois, sought alliance with industrial capital of the metropolis, local feudal landlords, and sometimes with local petit bourgeois. The cause of underdevelopment can be traced to relationships between these classes.

According to Samir Amin, Marx has indicated in his study of capitalist development in the West that what determined the process of accumulation and development of these countries was the relationship between mass consumption and the export sectors. Consequently, there is a relation between the rate of surplus value and the level of the productive forces. The latter is expressed in the division of labour between the two sectors mentioned above. In the centre pattern, there is for Amin an objective relationship between the wage rate and the level of development of the productive forces. But in the peripheral pattern, there is hardly such an objective relationship, simply because wages are kept low. With these considerations, the level of development of the productive forces, in each of these patterns, indicates different characteristics. This can be explained by the fact that in the peripheral economic system the export sector is advanced, while the rest of the economy is underdeveloped (Amin, 1974).

Seen from this point of view, does this model lead towards development? The answer is no. Then what is an alternative model for development?

The relationship between advanced industrialized capitalist countries and the developing countries, discussed above, indicates that many developing countries exhibit specific characteristics of underdevelopment. These characteristics are: internal inequality, distortion of resource allocation, marginalization, and dependency (Amin, 1974, p. 20).

In the peripheral patterns, increasing diversification of the national economy and industrialization reinforce dependency. Amin points out several types of dependence: the structure of ownership and economic management, cultural and political mechanisms, and technology (Amin, 1974, p. 15). Each of these factors increases underdevelopment rather than creating conditions for narrowing the gap between the industrialized and developing countries.

Is there an alternative road to development? There are two alternatives open to developing countries. Either they follow the peripheral patterns or they have to develop a self-centered model with an original composition different from that of the industrialized countries (Amin, 1974, p. 18). However, countries which have achieved a certain level of development have experienced a transitional period. Each of them adapts particular strategies to overcome the problems of developing countries, in many respects different from those of the industrialized countries.

For example, according to Amin, "at the beginning of the century, Russia was a peripheral country, but a backward central capitalist one. Her structures were different from those exhibiting underdevelopment, i.e. those of dependent capitalism; marginalization for example, was unknown" (Amin, 1974, p. 17).

Similarly, Amin argues that Western countries have not experienced marginalization or colonial dependency. Their strategies of transition are not equally applicable to the transitional problems facing the developing countries, which are neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism. He suggests strategies of transition, but first of all he defines transition:

> . . . by the gradual change of given, concrete, historical conditions—those of the present periphery already integrated into the world system and structured as a dependent periphery—and of the capitalist development-model, depending on a national, self-centered development which moves into socialism and transcending capitalism. (Amin, 1974, p. 17).

Amin asserts that both capitalist and post-colonial societies are in transition. The problem of transition for post-colonial societies is different from that of capitalist societies. Therefore, the method of capitalist development is not suitable for the development of post-colonial societies, because the gap between the two is already growing, due to the monopoly of technology on the part of capitalist societies.

The alternative open to post-colonial societies is to skip the capitalist stage and move towards socialism.

The basic problems of transition towards socialism in the developing countries, according to Amin, are: first, the disengagement from the neo-colonialist pattern of economic structure; second, overcoming marginalization; third, combining technology with immediate improvement of the condition of the masses; and fourth, assigning priorities between labour and capital-intensive projects.

For Amin, the strategies of socialist transition and the skipping of the capitalist path involve the problem of unbalanced resource allocation and marginalization. Both these problems are derived from the integration of these countries into the world market of capitalism. Therefore, it is essential to dislodge the ideology of capitalist development, which as a rule is based on maximization of profit and the tendency towards de-humanization.

Experience indicates that the continuation of a colonial relationship will lead the colonial countries to a higher level of marginalization, rather than overcoming their present situation. The transition towards socialism presupposes the need to restructure the allocation of resources in nutrition, housing, education, and culture. These needs are broadly considered outside of the realm of the capitalist market (Amin, 1974, p. 19). Emphasis should be given to sectors that have an immediate bearing on the life of the people; a balanced effort is needed in the various sectors of the national economy.

In order to obtain satisfactory results during the transitional period, from the outset a linkage of the various sectors of the economy should be worked out, such as between agriculture and industry, light and heavy industry, and labour and capital-intensive methods (Amin, 1974, p. 19). Consequently, these combinations will bring about a release of the productive forces, enterprise, and initiative and the mobilization of the masses in the usual sense of the word. The Algerian option for national development tends to create such a model.

A higher degree of democratic decentralization is desirable in order to obtain the optimum results of participation at every stage: in the village, the region, and the state. This will create favourable conditions for the mobilization of the masses, which is needed to meet the requirements of a labour-intensive economy, and an ideological orientation suitable for the transitional period.

The realization of an improved standard of living of the masses presupposes the need to evaluate modern techniques selected for this purpose through scientific and technological research. Therefore the emerging nations must develop an autonomous scientific and technological research base that is suitable to their conditions of development.

The underlying principles of development must be based on self-reliance. The self-reliance principle is many-faceted. For example, some areas of the emerging nations exhibit ethnic and cultural heterogeneity that must be respected and taken into consideration in creating democratic decentralization. In considering the several facets of self-reliance, it will become evident immediately that all facets cannot be dealt with simultaneously, but rather it will require a long period of time, so that in the transitional period attention should be given on a long-term rather than a short-term basis. The selection, as targets, of different facets of self-reliance is dictated by a particular situation manifesting itself as immediate (Amin, 1974, p. 20).

The present situation of economic disparity among nations in transition under the classical or the new form of colonialism has its expression in national, socialist, and popular democratic movements. Therefore, all these forms may appear at one and the same time.

A similar analysis is found in the work of André Gunder Frank. While Amin based his analysis on the experience of Africa, Frank's analysis of development is based on his experience in Latin American countries, particularly Brazil, Chile, and Argentina. For Frank (1966), the orthodox bourgeois theoretical approaches of modernization and industrialization fail to take into consideration the relationship between the past and present history of the underdeveloped regions of the world. In contrast, orthodox theories hold that the past and present of colonial regions resemble the early stages of the industrial countries of the West. Hence, they are not capable of explaining the origin of the underdevelopment of colonial regions, or they do so only in part.

Dos Santos (1973) sees the problem of underdevelopment as determined primarily by the internal processes of countries. Thus the international situation may appear to be the primary agent, but in fact it is the national process which raises the international situation. This national process creates a conditioning situation which he calls dependence: dependence occurs when "the economics of one group of countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of others" (p. 26). The international situation is the outcome of the national process.

The world trading system involves dependent relationships, wherein some countries can expand through self-impulsion while others can expand only as a reflection of the expansion of the dominant countries, which may have positive or negative effects on their immediate development. In either case, the basic situation of dependence causes these countries to be both backward and exploited (Dos Santos, 1973, p. 26).

Therefore, underdevelopment is due to the development and expansion of the economy of the industrialized capitalist societies. This development reinforces the gap between the industrialized and developing countries and intensifies dependence. According to Dos Santos, this is seen in technology, commerce, capital, and socio-political and military predominance. The origin of the dependence is to be found in the division of labour; this creates the conditions for industrial development in some countries and in turn restricts the development of other countries, because their growth is conditioned by and subjected to the power centre of the world (Dos Santos, 1973, pp. 76-77). By this he means that capitalism divides the world into the primary and agricultural producers and the producers of manufactured products, and this division creates inequality among the nations of the world.

The basic factor determining this inequality is the concentration of the ownership of capital, savings, and investment in the industrialized countries, thus forcing the developing countries into a role complementary to the advancing economy of capitalism (Dos Santos, 1973, pp. 76-77).

The conditions of dependence were not created without violence and conquest. Rather, the establishment of overseas colonies, which led to the development of the centre of capital, was undertaken to integrate the underdeveloped world into the capitalist world. For the undeveloped world, the way out of a relationship based on dependence consists in establishing self-sustaining economies, through which these countries "will cease to be simply a complement of an international system over which they have no control" (Dos Santos, 1973, p. 77).

According to Dos Santos, such a dependence relationship creates a situation which he calls the conditioning situation. "A conditioning situation determines the limits and possibilities of action and behaviour of men" (Dos Santos, 1973, p. 77). There are then two possibilities for further development of dependent economies. The first is that these countries, in order to improve their situation, may manipulate certain instruments within the structure of dependence and turn it to their own benefit. This involves selecting various alternatives open to them within the structural relation. The second possibility is to change the conditions of dependence completely.

In considering these two alternatives, the first will not eliminate the complementary role of these countries within the international system; if successful, it will bring about a qualitative change in the political economy of these countries (Dos Santos, 1973, p. 79).

The relationship between developed and developing countries is not static. The conditioning situation which limited the development of the underdeveloped countries is bound to change. Therefore, understanding the relationship presupposes a grasp of the dialectics between the two. If the developed countries change their strategies of dependence relations, this does not necessarily mean that they get rid of their imperialistic tendencies. On the contrary, the objective of imperialist power still remains the same: the continued dominance by the centre.

The success of the second alternative will come about only if the subservient countries "break off the relationship and seek to consolidate an independent economy, as in socialist countries in the third world like China, North Korea, North Vietnam and Cuba, despite the problems which they still face because of the heritage of past situations and structures" (Dos Santos, 1973, p. 78).

D. THE METHODS

The historical and empirical methods were employed in gathering information and material resources. The historical method was used in the first part of the study, and both the historical and empirical methods were used in the second and third parts. The empirical method was useful to substantiate certain arguments, but the historical method formed the foundation for the linkage between the macro and micro approaches to the problem undertaken by this research study. In the actual field work, four major approaches were used: participant observation, formal and informal interview, content analysis, and documentation study.

1. Participant Observation

During the course of my field work, I was constantly involved in two types of participation. The first I refer to as "learning participation." This type of participation occurs when the researcher is acquiring experience and knowledge about the client community, group, or individual. During this period, the researcher, while learning, sets up the strategy of his research. The second type is "research participation," by which, through observation and enquiry, the researcher pursues his research interest independently, while coexisting with the community or the group.

Between these two types of participation, there is yet a third type; this type occurs only when the community or the group with whom the researcher is working requests him to express his opinion on certain issues relevant to their life. Under this circumstance, the researcher assumes the role of "participant." I found in Algeria that the people I worked with were interested to know what I was thinking about their development and organization.

I found learning participation to be the key to researcher participation, because it provides the spiritual union between the researcher and the community or group. Further, the role of participant, which occurs occasionally, provides better exchange of information.

I have undertaken participant observation in selected enterprises both in agriculture and industry in two main regions of Algeria: Algiers and Annaba (see Table 1).

The field work was carried out in two regions of Algeria, Algiers and Annaba, between April 1976 and February 1977. Most agricultural and industrial enterprises are located around the coast, which was the

TABLE 1

FIELD WORK

	Wilaya	Baladia	Daira	Domaine	Unité	PA	PI
Algiers	x						
Rouiba			x		2		
Ostouali			x	2		1	
Annaba	x						1
El-Hadjar			x	2	2		

Note: PA = private agriculture
PI = private industry
Domaine = agricultural enterprise
Unité = industrial enterprise (branch)

centre of colonial development. Each of the villages around the area had several economic institutions, such as: (1) Gestion Socialiste d'Entreprises; (2) Autogestion Agricole; (3) agricultural cooperative (Réforme Agraire); and (4) Coopérative El-Moujahidine (Freedom Fighters). I carried on empirical and research participation at the Gestion Socialiste d'Entreprises and Autogestion Agricole. Occasionally I spent time with cooperative societies. I had a room and an office at the agriculture domaine or at the industrial units (they were within walking distance of each other).

The Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Industry selected the geographic locations for my field work. The Ministry of Industry established my contact with the Société Nationale and with SN Métal and SONOCOMBE, and the Ministry of Agriculture established my contact with Direction Development Régionale of Algiers and Annaba. The size of the agricultural units was between 90 and 150 workers.

I also spent some time in the private sector, in agriculture and industry. The size of these units was very much smaller than in the public sector. In the socialized agricultural sector I investigated four units, two in Algiers and two in the region of Annaba. Other institutions I interviewed are listed in Appendix B.

2. Formal and Informal Interviews

Appendix B indicates the nature of the questionnaire and the size of the sample. I interviewed 250 workers, of which 100 were agricultural workers in autogestion and 150 were industrial workers. The agricultural workers came from several regions, and they were attending training programmes at Annaba. With the help of the teachers and the director of the center, I was allowed to interview industrial workers drawn from the main regions, Algiers and Annaba. I administered the interview at the workplace (Société Nationale Métal in Annaba II and Hussein Dey in Algiers).

Individual or group interviews were also held in agricultural and industrial enterprises, at the main offices of the Société Nationale, the Ministries of Work, Planning, Agriculture, and Industry, the training and labour institute, and the marketing boards. The people interviewed were workers, cadres, coopérants, advisors, and medical doctors, as Table 2 indicates. Group interviews were conducted only with workers in factories—members of particular committees. Some of these interviews were formal, and others were informal. Most of the informal interviews took place during lunch hours and after working hours. The people interviewed were from different social categories, working in

TABLE 2

PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

	Ministry	Société Nationale	Industry Unité	Agriculture Domaine
Workers			x	x
Cadres	x	x	x	x
Coopérants	x	x	x	
Advisors	x			
Directors		x	x	x
Assistantes sociales			x	x
Teachers			x	x
Medical doctors			x	

different workplaces. Each of the participants had something to contribute to the discussion.

Individual interviews were limited to social assistantes, medical doctors, directors, coopérants, advisors, and cadres of the UGTA and the FLN. These were individuals occupying positions in certain branches of national enterprises or positions as experts or advisors at the main office of the Société Nationale or at the ministerial level. Some of the advisors interviewed were members of the National Commission for Socialist Enterprises. The workers interviewed were members of permanent committees of each economic unit. There are five committees at workplaces, and each committee has five members. The group that I met for an interview each time consisted of three to four members. Directors were not all from the economic units; some of the directors were responsible for training institutes for industrial and agricultural workers.

Unlike agricultural enterprises, most of the industrial enterprises have medical doctors and social assistants. Both of these are employed full time by the Société Nationale. The social assistant's position is normally occupied by a female Algerian, and she is responsible for looking after the health conditions of the workers and their families. Her job consists also of working out family problems that may exist between the worker and his family. I have visited more than forty-three institutions connected with Algerian national development. These institutions included marketing boards for internal and external markets, labour institutes, schools for rural animation, research groups at the factory level, planning institutions, and the FLN.

3. Content Analysis

Immediately when I arrived in Algiers, I subscribed to regional and national newspapers. In Algiers there are regional, national, and daily newspapers and several national periodical journals. The national news is in both French and Arabic. At present most regional newspapers are available only in Arabic. The items of information in Appendix F were taken from the following daily newspapers and periodicals:

(1) *El-Moujahid* (French; national daily newspaper)

(2) *Ashaab* (Arabic; national daily newspaper)

(3) *Anassar* (Arabic; regional daily newspaper)

(4) *Actualité Algérienne* (French; weekly newspaper)

(5) *El-Jadjch* (French; monthly periodical)

(6) *Révolutionnaire Africaine* (French; fortnightly periodical)

To read newspapers and periodicals is not enough; there also must be contact with other people who are interested in the particular problems that I was researching. After some weeks I began to look for such people. The first thing I did was to list the names of the authors of articles in newspapers and periodical journals, on subjects such as: socialist enterprises, agrarian revolution, distribution of benefits, cost of living, commercialization and economic cooperation, and labour migration (see Appendix E). I called on the headquarters of the newspaper and the political bureau of the Front de Libération Nationale and asked them how I could meet such people. With the help of the Departments of Sociology at the Universities of Algiers and Constantine-Annaba, I was able to meet them.

Most of the people in Algeria do read the national and regional newspapers; others rely on television and radio news. At the workplace it is often possible to find some newspaper readers, and whenever I had the opportunity to meet them I discussed with them what the newspapers had written about their unit.

4. Documents and Reports

Both national and local institutions I worked with made available to me reports written on the problems of labour and industrial and agricultural organization, and sometimes I requested to see the files of an individual worker whom I had interviewed.

Each Société Nationale has a documentation centre, and they publish a monthly bulletin covering the enterprise's activity, as well as national and some international information. I made use of these materials in this study.

5. Methodological Problems

One of the problems which I experienced during my field work was deciding which method to employ in asking questions. This involves several factors: what to ask, where to start, how to stimulate discussion, what to record, and how to control the discussion.

For any discussion in a formal meeting, I followed the sequence listed below.

Phase I:

I asked questions on:

(1) the history of Algeria;

(2) historical conditions of Algerian development;

(3) problems they have experienced; and

(4) how these problems were dealt with.

Phase II:

We discussed some specific problems, recorded from Phase I.

Phase III:

I concentrated on checking some of these problems with other enterprises or individuals in groups mentioned in *El-Jadjch* and *Révolutionnaire Africaine*.

After two months, I began to see certain problems relevant to my topic of research. I began to pursue these problems. Appendix E lists some of these issues. Once I had discovered the basic problems, the next step was improving the quality of information.

For this purpose, I started looking for: (1) students and professors who had done studies in the field, particularly the socialist enterprises; and (b) participation in discussion groups at the university, on participation.

I found ~~out~~ that students in the last year of Agricultural Engineering spend time in the field collecting information as part of their degree requirements. I met several such students in many parts of the country. This, of course, offered me the opportunity of exchanging ideas and information. I took part in a seminar on participation organized at the University of Algiers, attended by staff and graduates of the Faculty of Law and Economics.

At the end of my stay in Algeria, I was invited to give a talk at the University of Constantine, Annaba, about my personal experiences in Algeria in regard to participation and development. I accepted the invitation and spent a couple of days in each of these universities.

At the workplace, the starting point of my discussion was the history of the enterprise, the socio-economic conditions of the worker in the past and at present, and what kind of problems they have encountered. Such discussions took place in general meetings, in which twenty-five members of the Workers' Assembly participate. The discussions lasted two to three hours, after which we retreated for lunch. Then I had a meeting with the director of the enterprise and the president of the Workers' Assembly, to set up a timetable. In the industrial sector, in each enterprise there are five permanent committees:

- Economics and Finance;
- Social;
- Personnel;
- Discipline; and
- Hygiene and Safety.

Besides these committees, there are:

- an Administrative Council
- Director of Commerce

- Director of Training
- Director of Personnel
- Director of Production
- Director of the Enterprise

The permanent committees are led exclusively by the workers, although each of the above-mentioned directors participates in these committees. The president of each of these committees is automatically a member of the "Bureau Syndicale," presided over by the president of the Workers' Assembly.

The Administrative Council consists of two representatives of the workers and three representatives of the administration, presided over by the director of the enterprise.

I had several meetings with each of these committees and the directors. In some enterprises, there is a research group as well. The content of the information I have recorded appears in Appendix D, "Micro-Level Content and Information (Recorded)."

The difference between the macro- and the micro-levels of data collection is a matter of degree. At the micro-level the researcher has prolonged periods of interaction, where he becomes part of the group, while at the macro-level the interaction between the researcher and the group or the individual with whom he is participating is a short-lived relationship—for example, a few hours per week, per day, or per month. Therefore, of course, there are differences between the two: at the micro-level the researcher lives with the people, and his contact is more frequent and informal; at the macro-level the researcher operates on an individual basis, and the contact is very formal. According to my experience, personal conflict is much greater at the micro-level than at the macro-level, because, with the latter, contact is minimal. At the micro-level the intensity of interaction is much greater, and therefore the researcher is subject to observation. In other words, he is not the only one who observes, but he is also observed and commented upon. This two-way interaction determines whether he is accepted within the group.

My experience suggests that it is better to advance whenever the situation is favourable and retreat whenever tension is mounting. This depends on the ability of the researcher to sense the situation.

PART I

THE EVOLUTION OF ALGERIAN SOCIETY

CHAPTER 2

THE GEOGRAPHY OF ALGERIA

A. THE MAGHREB

What is known today as the Maghreb was divided during the Roman occupation of the area into four provinces, known as: Proconsular Africa (presently Libya and Tunisia), Numidia (eastern Algeria), Caesarian Mauritania (Mauritania), and Mauritania Tingitana (western Algeria and Morocco). (See Figure 1.)

In the third century A.D., the Romans controlled one-half of the Maghreb area. Along their frontiers, the Romans established a *fossa* (ditch), a defence post, and settlements. They developed agricultural exploitation by introducing systems of irrigation into the area, as well as better methods of farming.

The Berbers who came into contact with the Romans adopted their agrarian civilization and applied it outside the Roman borders. The spread of agrarian civilization to the entire Maghreb region was brought about by the settled Berbers, who displayed a remarkable talent for adapting new methods of agrarian exploitation. Agriculture flourished all over the country; the Berbers intensified their efforts in cultivating cereals, olives, figs, almonds, and grapes. Agricultural settlements marked the beginning of a polarization in Maghreb society between agricultural communities and nomadic herdsmen.

Because of differences in climate and geography, the Maghreb is divided into two zones, the northern and southern regions. The northern

FIGURE 1

ROMAN NORTH AFRICA



Source: Geoffrey Furlonge, 1966, p. 1.

region consists of the Tell Mountains and the eastern high Atlas Mountains in Morocco, the Saharan Atlas in Algeria, and the Gafsa range in Tunisia. This region stretches over 2,400 kilometres and runs from west to east. The Mediterranean Sea separates Europe from the northern region.

The northern region is a mountainous area and has an average altitude of more than a thousand metres. This is particularly true in Morocco and Algeria, where half the area is above this altitude. Over all the northern region, rainfall is irregular and unevenly distributed over the years. Climatewise, the winters are cool and the summers are hot.

The southern region of the Maghreb occupies two million square kilometres, Algeria taking up a large share of this region. The climate there is hot, and there is great variation between day and night temperatures, it being cool at night and hot in the day. The inhabitants of this region are settled around oases and depend a great deal on underground water. Rain is rare and uneven all over the region.

The Maghreb consists today of several states, which are, from the northwest to the northeast: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya (see Figure 2). The area is known also as North Africa, and as Northwest Africa.

Apart from differences in colonial experiences, the Maghreb society is homogeneous in ethnic and cultural background. Most of the inhabitants of the region are Berbers and Arabs in origin, and it is difficult at present to distinguish between Arabs and Berbers. Although Berber culture persisted in many rural areas, most of the Berbers became arabized.

FIGURE 2

THE MAGHREB



FIG. 1. North-West Africa: political and administrative boundaries

Source: R. M. Prother, ed., *A Geography of Africa*, 1919, p. 22.

The Atlas Mountains appear to be the salient feature of the Maghreb region. They expand in the northeast and northwest of Algeria to form a curved line penetrating the southern desert land; in this sense Algeria and its neighbouring countries bear resemblances to Mediterranean Europe.

Algeria has a strong affinity in culture and religion with Morocco and Tunisia. Algeria is located between Tunisia and Morocco and is the largest country in the Maghreb region. It occupies a total area of 2,331,000 square kilometres, with a Mediterranean coastline of almost 1,000 kilometres.

B. ALGERIA

Algeria is not isolated from the rest of the African continent (see Figure 3), sharing borders with Morocco on the northwest, Tunisia on the northeast, Mauritania on the west, Mali and Niger on the south, and Libya on the east. She shares a 1,085-kilometre border with Mali, 880 kilometres with Niger, and 900 kilometres with Libya.

The climate in Algeria varies from rainy and mild weather in the winter to hot and dry in the summer (see Figure 4). The rainfall in some parts of the coastal area is higher, particularly in the west and east, for example Oran, Algiers, and Kabyly. The rainfall increases from west to east. There is more rainfall in Algiers and Kabyly than in the west: Oran receives 38 mm, Algiers 66 mm, and Kabyly (in eastern Algeria) 152 mm.

The contrasting aspects of Algeria's physical geography are the mountains in the north and the desert flatland in the south. While

FIGURE 3

ALGERIA



Source: Richard F. Nyrop et al., 1972, p. xiv.

travelling from the coast to the hinterland, one notices these physical contrasts. One aspect leads to another; the end of the mountain features is the beginning of the desert flatland.

In the south, French colonization has left no trace at all, except

FIGURE 4

RAINFALL AND TEMPERATURE IN ALGERIA



Source: Richard F. Nyrop et al., 1972, p. 69.

for military posts established in the Algerian war of liberation to control the infiltration of the members of the Front de Libération Nationale. The way in which the houses are built and the architectural style are different from the coastal houses. The houses are conglomerates, forming a village similar to that found in many parts of agricultural communities in Africa. The roads within the village are narrow; some are made of cobblestone or gravel. The roads that lead from one town to another are paved, and on each side of the roads there are sand dunes. Between the towns, one finds villages completely submerged by the sand. Remnants of the old houses still stand, and they resemble ghost towns.

C. REGIONAL UNITS

Algeria is divided into three regional units: the Tell, the plateaus, and the Sahara (see Figure 5). Each of these units has its own geographical and climatic characteristics.

1. The Tell

Tell in Arabic means hills. The Tell Atlas varies in height from 460 to 230 metres. The mountains and valleys are separated from one another by coastal plains. They constitute self-contained typographic and economic units.

The land around the Tell is regarded as very useful for agriculture. It receives more than 41 millimetres of rain annually. The area is divided into small, discontinuous plains around the coast and a series of mountain valleys that embrace the Tell Atlas. There is a parallel line between the Tell Atlas and the coast; in many points the Tell Atlas meets the sea, and in other places it divides inland plains which exist among the lines of the Tell Atlas.

The Tell Atlas is not uniform along the coastline. Southwards from the coast, a few miles west of Algiers, the Tell shows a change in character. In the west, the hills are low and the coastal strips are narrow. These hills are scattered along the coast, and in some places the coast opens on the sea. The western Tell Atlas is estimated to be about 650 kilometres long and 160 kilometres wide. The Tell Atlas is between the Mediterranean coast and the high plateaus and is closed to the east by the Djurdjura massif and the Hodna chain. The coastal plain supports over fifty percent of the population of Algeria and covers only two percent of the area of the country. During French

FIGURE 5

GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS OF NORTHERN ALGERIA



Source: Richard F. Nyrop et al., 1972, p. 58.

colonialism, major agricultural exports originated from around this area, for example the plain of Milidja, which is 97 kilometres long and 16 kilometres wide.

The area has been cultivated extensively in the past, and at present a number of agricultural firms are situated there. The major crops of the coastal plain are vegetables, citrus fruits, and grapes. At present, agricultural enterprises around the coastal plain concentrate more on domestic crops, and most of the vineyards have been replaced with tomatoes, potatoes, and wheat.

The coastal plain contains the cities of Algiers, Bejaia, Annaba, and Oran. Population density along this coastal plain averages about 1,300 per square kilometre (3,400 per square mile), and there are over 2,500,000 urban residents.

Algiers is one of the most populated sites in Algeria; it has over two million inhabitants. Algiers is the capital of Algeria and the political centre of the government. It also is a major commercial and industrial centre and possesses one of the largest ports in Algeria. It is a cosmopolitan city and very much resembles European cities on the Mediterranean coast. The port of Algiers handles the major part of Algerian trade; it was estimated in 1968 that some three to four million tons per annum were handled. It is possible the volume of trade has increased since then, because Algeria is importing large amounts of industrial equipment.

On the coastal plain of Algiers are found large-scale agricultural enterprises and a wide range of industrial enterprises. These industries produce consumer goods (footwear, cement, agricultural implements, metal, automobiles, and paints and varnishes) and process local agricultural products (such as wine, tobacco, flour, and the like). Major cities around the coastal plains are similar to Algiers except in size and economic activity.

Eastern Algeria lies between the Tunisian frontier, the coast, and the high plateau. Unlike the western region, the eastern Tell Atlas has no coastal plain. The high plateau narrows towards the east and submerges under the mountains of the Tell and Saharan Atlas. The east is the meeting point of the coastal and desert chains of the Tell and Saharan Atlas, and the eastern end of the Hodna chain leads into the Aures Mountains. The mountains run generally southwest to northeast and create an impregnable refuge that has performed an important function in the history of Algeria from early times to the uprising of the national movement. This was the place where the natives sought refuge from the invasion of the Romans, and it was the cornerstone for the Algerian revolution of the 1950s. Like the Aures Mountains, the Djurdjura massif functioned as just an important refuge area for the inhabitants of Algeria during the periods of Roman and French colonization. Around the mountain and coastal area, there is a heavy rainfall amounting to over 100 millimetres each year. In the mountains, heavy snows usually occur, which remain all winter. Because of the sufficient amount of rainfall in the mountain valleys, several crops are cultivated, such as fruits and wheat.

The mountain area of the east provides water to adjacent areas (see Figure 6). Some rivers, such as the Abiod originating in the Aures Mountains, are dammed, and the water is carried out by long conduits into several oases situated in the northeast at Biskra. Such water supplies feed important underground sources.

FIGURE 6

RIVERS, IRRIGATED AREAS, AND DAMS OF NORTHERN ALGERIA



Source: Richard F. Nyrop et al., 1972, p. 60.

2. The High Plateau

The high plateau is situated between the Tell Atlas and the Saharan Atlas. It is 650 kilometres long and extends from the Moroccan border to the Char-el-Hodna. It is higher in altitude in the west and falls gradually to the north. It has an average altitude of 1,000 to 1,200 metres in the west and 400 metres at Char-el-Hodna. The high plateau covers an area of approximately 52,000 square kilometres. The area is dry and surrounded for the most part by intermittent salt lakes, salt marshes, and short-lived streams which run between the two Atlases, particularly during the wet season.

The population of the high plateau is very scattered and lives in isolated areas. They grow grain, particularly in the irrigated areas, and most people raise sheep, as alfalfa grows in the larger part of the high plateaus. Since 1972, cooperative societies have been created in the high plateau areas which provide jobs for the people who live there. These cooperatives are known as the third phase of the agrarian revolution; their intent is to raise sheep.

In the Saharan Atlas, unlike the high plateaus, there are abundant grazing lands and water, due to the existence of several streams in the area. These streams are the Touil, which flows across the high plateau to meet the Chélif, and which is available only during the wet season. The water of the Mzi, which lasts the whole year, is used for irrigation purposes.

The Saharan Atlas consists of three massifs: the Ksour, which is closer to the Moroccan-Algerian border; the Amour; and the Nail, south of Algiers. The Ksour is higher in the western and lower in the northeastern end and remains separated from the Amour. At the higher level, it is rugged, with vertical walls topped by semi-forested plateaus. The Amour is the second highest and forms a line of plateau with straight sides, topped by Aleppo pine, evergreen oak, scrub woodland, and pastures. The Oulad Nail emerges into the high plateau by forming a series of uplands separated by wide plains.

3. The Sahara

The Algerian Sahara (see Figure 7) consists of the northern Sahara and the southern Sahara. The northern Sahara is situated between the southern slopes of the Saharan Atlas and the Hamadas of Tedemait, Tinghert. The southern Sahara is between the Ahaggar and its related plateaus and the rocky areas of southwestern Algeria. The Algerian Sahara is one of the largest deserts in the world. It extends from the Atlantic Ocean to the Nile valley and covers 4,800 square kilometres from the Mediterranean coast of Libya to the west and central African forest, covering 1,600 kilometres. It occupies an area of over two million square kilometres. There are human inhabitants over the whole region of the Sahara, but it is less densely populated than other regions. There are settlement communities around the oases and semi-nomadic communities who wander across large areas of the desert. The settled communities depend on underground water, while the semi-nomadic communities remain in the northern part of the Sahara during the wet season, migrating in the hot season to other regions such as the high plateaus and the western Tell in search of pasture land.

The southern reach of the northern Sahara occupies two large sand deserts. These are separated by several plateaus, which tend to a north-south direction. These deserts are the Great Western Erg and the

FIGURE 7

GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS OF THE SAHARA



Figure 4. Algeria, Geographic Regions of the Sahara

Source: Richard F. Nyrop et al., 1972, p. 66.

Great Eastern Erg. The Great Western Erg is located around the ancient Saoura River. At present, this river and the remnants of the large streams carry water only during the rainy season. However, the underground water follows the same course of the river, creating a line of several oases and communication routes into the middle of the desert.

The Great Western Erg extends 640 kilometres northeast from the Saoura and terminates at the fort of Hamada of Tademait. At its terminal point there are several oases, which give rise to community settlements such as Gourara, Touat, and Tidikelt. In these areas a large number of palm trees grow, which in the past were owned by a few families and now have been turned into cooperative societies. A small portion of these palm trees have been left to their original owners, and the rest have been given to landless labourers. Dates for domestic consumption and for export are produced by these cooperative societies.

Similarly, the Great Eastern Erg is located around the ancient rivers of Igharghar and Chir, at the south end of the Aures Mountains. These ancient rivers carry underground water which provides the source for artesian wells from Zaouia el Kahla north up to eighty kilometres of Biskra. The existence of oasis cities such as Touggoirt and Quargla is due mainly to these wells. These cities form one of the major palm tree growing areas in Algeria. These palm trees, once owned by private families, have now been turned into cooperative societies run and operated by the peasants. A few kilometres away from these cities lie the oil fields of Hassi Messaoud.

One of the major problems which the Algerian government is facing in the Sahara, particularly in oasis areas, is that the palm trees release large amounts of salt, and this salt makes the groundwater unsuitable for human consumption and ruins the agricultural land. The government embarked on a long-term project run and operated by Algerian engineers and technicians, the purpose of the project being to remove the underground water around the palm trees by opening canals which will release the congestion of salt in the crater and stop the flow of salt-water into agricultural lands.

The southern Algerian Sahara consists of the Ahaggar massif and the high plateaus. The latter are associated with the Ahaggar massif. The Ahaggar contains a number of different mountains with skeletal points of volcanic origin. At the northern part of Tamarasset, the Ahaggar is uninhabited, has no particular shape, and exhibits irregular highlands averaging over 1,500 metres above sea level, with several points exceeding 1,980 metres. The Ahaggar is encompassed by a high sandstone plateau divided by the dry valleys of ancient riverbeds. There are the Tassili, both northern and southern. The northern Tassili are Ajjer, Moujdir, and the Ahnet highlands. The southern Tassili reach up to the border of Mali and Niger and are called the Ahaggar. Until a few thousand years ago, according to archaeological evidence, the Tassili used to be the centre of the area, and particularly Ajjer used to support a large population. All over Ahaggar, because of its high altitude, the weather is very cool compared with the lowlands of other parts of the desert; it has a relatively good rainfall and permanent and semi-seasonal streams which flow a short distance into the valleys. Most of the inhabitants of the Ahaggar are nomadic camel herders.

D. CLIMATE

The coastal plains and the Tell Atlas south of the margin of the high plateaus and the northern part of Algeria are of mediterranean climate, with a warm wet winter and a hot dry summer. In these zones, some areas enjoy more rainfall than others. The overall situation is that rainfall varies in amount from over 100 millimetres annually to less than 13 millimetres in sheltered zones; this occurs only during the winter, when the depressions passing through the western Mediterranean are most frequent. In the coastal plains, where it is mild and rainy in the winter and hot and rainless in the summer, the Mediterranean influence is greater in the winter. The temperature in January is between 10° C and 12° C. In the summer the temperature is 24° C to 26° C. The rainfall in the coastal plain is higher in the east and lower in the west, due to the concentration of mountain areas in the east.

In the Tell Atlas, the temperature ranges from 26° C to 31° C. The Mediterranean influence is less in the area, winter being cold and summer hot; the annual rainfall is less as well. The high plateaus and the Saharan Atlas are characterized by seasonal variation, cold in the winter and hot in the summer. This seasonal variation is due mainly to a higher-pressure area centered over the high plateaus in the winter, and a low-pressure area in the summer. The temperature ranges from 5° C in winter to 27° C in summer. The Sahara is hot and dry, with the exception of Ahaggar, which is cool in the winter because of its higher altitude. All over the area, there is variation in the temperature between day and night. Generally, nights are cool and the ground is cold; during the daytime when the sun is shining, daily temperatures range from 21° C to 49° C.

The Ahaggar has become the tourist centre of Algeria. Many people from all over the world spend their Christmas holiday in the Sahara. Sporadic rains take place all over the Sahara but are not sufficient for cultivation. The inhabitants of the area rely more on underground water and a nomadic pastoral way of life as a means of survival.

Similarities are drawn between Algeria and Syria in terms of geography, ethnicity, and climatic conditions, as this quotation indicates:

> Like Syria, the northern Maghreb is primarily a mountainous country—the Greeks called it "Land of the Atlas"; half of Morocco and Algeria is situated at an altitude of more than 1,000 metres. Like Syria, the rainfall is generally inadequate, irregular, and unevenly distributed: only one third of the country has more than 400 millimetres, which is the annual minimum required for dry cultivation of cereals and mediterranean produce. Again like Syria, it is a country with large minorities of highland farmers who have preserved their own traditions: Berbers in the Maghreb (also known as the Land of the Berbers, or Barbary), whose counterparts are the Maronites of the Lebanon, the Alawi and the Druzes. These are all peoples living entrenched in mountain fastness, which the nomadic invasions, that brought the faith of Islam to the land and progressively arabized it, found difficult to penetrate. And, as if to accentuate further the resemblance between these two extremities of the Arab world, both are regions which have recently and extensively been colonized by European settlers—French in North Africa, Israeli in the countries of the Syrian East. (Amin, 1970, p. 10)

However, the overemphasis of Algeria's having more similarity to the Near East and Mediterranean areas obscures the historical and geographical link between Algeria and the African continent. There are countries in Africa which have a climate, rainfall, and ethnic makeup similar to that of Algeria. These countries are Mali, Libya, Ethiopia, and South Africa. Each of these countries has at least one or more characteristics in common with Algeria. Similarly, it is as possible to draw a comparison between Algeria and Libya as between Algeria and Mali, as we have mentioned earlier. Libya and Mali share large common borders with Algeria and show an ethnic similarity, having populations of Berber origin (see Map 1). For example, the Tuareg, who are nomads, exist in large numbers in Mali. The Tuareg, as much as the Kabyle, are Berbers by origin. Both of these social groups of Berber stock are found in Algeria. Similarly, Libya has social groups of

MAP 1

MAN IN AFRICA



MAN IN AFRICA

Source: *The Atlas of Africa*, 1973, p. 53.

Berber origin of all shades, plus the Arab stock, which is also present in Algeria. In Algeria, the mountain Berber is different from the desert Berber in social organization; the mountain Berber is predominantly patrilineal, while the desert Berber is matrilineal. The Kabyle, who are lighter-skinned people than the Tuareg, live predominantly in the high plateau. The Tuareg, unlike the Kabyle, live exclusively in the southern regions, particularly south and southwest of Algiers. The Tuareg are rarely seen in coastal towns, especially the eastern and northern towns. The Kabyle, while preserving their tradition, did come into contact with nearly all the other peoples and cultures established in Algeria, such as the Romans, the Byzantines, the Vandals, and the Arabs. They have been well mixed with the latter group. The Tuareg remained completely isolated from this contact, which took place around the coastal areas and in some parts of the hinterland. This isolation of the Tuareg was accentuated even more during the colonial period, and in 1910 the Tuareg were pushed deep into the arid zone, near the borderline between Algeria and Mali. In fact, in the era of Algerian constitutional development, the French government suggested separation of the southern part from Algeria and the creation of two independent Algerian states.

Further comparison between Algeria and other African countries is possible, especially as related to the rainfall and climatic conditions. Ethiopia (see Map 2), although at a higher elevation, is similar to Algeria in terms of rainfall. It has a coastal rainfall of 800 to 1,000 millimetres. Around the coastline areas of Algeria, the rainfall is similar to that of Ethiopia. Seasonal differences exist between the two regions, because they belong to different temperate zones. Map 3

MAP 2

ETHIOPIA



Source: *The Atlas of Africa*, 1973.

MAP 3

MAJOR CLIMATIC ZONES



Source: *The Atlas of Africa*, 1973.

illustrates the similarity in rainfall between the two regions. Climatic conditions in Algeria and South Africa are similar in some respects. The two countries both have a mediterranean climate. The coastal area of Algeria is similar to that of South Africa, except that Algeria's mediterranean climate stretches from longitude 5° W to 10° E, whereas South Africa's coastal mediterranean climate is found between longitude 18° E and 22° E. However, there are ethnic and political differences between Algeria and South Africa.

CHAPTER 3

THE SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY OF ALGERIA

A. THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL FOUNDATION OF ALGERIAN SOCIETY

The native inhabitants of the entire North African region, commonly referred to as Berbers, have been found in the area since the Neolithic period. The origin of Algerian culture and society rests on a Berber foundation. Berber culture never remained intact but was subject to influences coming from the eastern Mediterranean and southwest Asia. Despite these influences, Berber culture has persisted up to now in the isolated mountains, with, however, some modification.

The social structure of ancient Berber society was based on a tribal structure. The smallest unit of the structure is the family, established during the Neolithic period, and since then a culture has been developed which maintains family ties. Social structure rests on a common ancient tradition referred to by the Kabyle as *takharout* (family tie).

Kabyles are different from other Berber tribes, being a patrilinear society: the family is organized on the basis of common descent through the male line. The extended family consists of several family units. The word "family" has a special meaning in patrilineal society; just as in ancient Berber and Arab society, it refers to more than the relationship between husband and wife. Thus *akham*, as it used to be called in Kabylie, meant the extended family, consisting of several family units.

The *akham* incorporates a number of interlocking communities, which form the *arch*, namely, the tribe. There is perpetual allegiance between the *akham* and the *arch*, and the allegiance creates the conditions of confederation between various *arch* who claim common descent from ancient ancestors. This form of confederation is called, in Kabylie, *Taghilt*. The underlying ethic behind such a social structure is that it regulates among various *arch* the honour embodied in each *akham* and maintains allegiances among them.

The basic task of the family is to provide essential human needs, such as shelter, food, security, and sex. The occupation of the family is geared towards providing basic necessities, and in such a society communal work prevails, which is intended to reward both family and relatives. The land is the property of the family or the *arch*, and each one of the male members of the *arch* is given an opportunity to work a plot of land. This does not entitle him to rights of ownership.

The father is the leader of the family, and he has the task of establishing a division of labour among the members of the family. He acts as judge and priest and assigns the position each household and each bachelor occupies in the community. Once each household is established, the father assumes the responsibility. The family is made up of several households. The eldest assumes the leadership of the family; his decision within the community is irreversible. He has an absolute power to make decisions on matters of inheritance, and he has the right to remove the right of inheritance from any member of his family; his deliberation is final. He also is invested with the power to maintain continuity of the tradition of the family and to utter a curse whenever a member of the family refuses to observe traditions and obligations that have been imposed upon him by the community.

Marital union between two persons is the responsibility of the community and not the individual. The choice of a spouse is made by the father of the family, and the marriage ceremony is presided over by the father; the couple have no other alternative than to accept his decision. For the mother, her role within the family is to act on behalf of her husband in running the affairs of the family, and she is in charge of all domestic tasks.

According to recent archeological studies, the whole North African region flourished during the Neolithic period and gave rise to a civilization comparable to that of ancient Egypt. Agriculture assumed primary importance as hunting and gathering became secondary; the sedentary community began to emerge. Berbers were the predominant sedentary farmers occupying land in the north and northeast of Algeria. Their villages were fortified and were close to each other; often such villages were located at the top of a mountain overlooking farmlands. Yet not all the Berber tribes were sedentary farmers; the central Sahara Berbers, particularly the Tuareg, were dedicated to a way of life comparable to that of nomadic pastoralism. However, some Berbers practised semi-nomadism; these were located between the Mediterranean littoral and the Sahara.

The changing way of life of the Berber tribes, from sedentary farmers to semi-nomadism, has been a great subject for discussion in this century. Four explanations are current in the literature on North Africa dealing with changes in the Berber tribes' way of life. The first explanation deals with the southwest Asian contact with North Africa which encouraged Berber tribes to adopt nomadic ways of life, since these southwest Asian tribes were from a nomadic background.

The second explanation relates to the climatic conditions; it holds that since the decline of the Roman occupation in North Africa (Figure 8 depicts Carthaginian and Roman North Africa) there has been a change in the climatic conditions of the area. During the Roman occupation, the area was wetter than some centuries before. The third explanation relates changing patterns of settlement with political disintegration and conquest as the main factors. The fourth explanation relates to colonialism, which turned North African society upside down. The effect of colonialism will be discussed in a later part of the study.

For Huntington (1919), the growth and decline of civilization in the past has been associated with climatic conditions; he mentions as examples the Greek and Roman civilizations. These civilizations flourished between 5000 B.C. and 200 A.D., which coincides with a period of higher rainfall; their downfall was characterized by the dry conditions prevailing at the time. Huntington suggests that the change from sedentary farming to nomadism among the Berber tribes was due mainly to changes in climate affecting the whole North African region. Arab records, says Huntington (1910), gave detailed descriptions of how several regions gradually became depopulated and how the conditions of some oases deteriorated, thus leaving a large part of these regions uninhabited.

Contrary to this theory, Gsel (1902) holds that depopulation of some of the oasis regions had nothing to do with the changing climate of the area, since Algerian and Moroccan rivers carry the same volume of water they were carrying during the Roman occupation of the area. In addition, the Romans made use of underground water to cultivate the land. They did not farm the land for domestic use only; large parts of

FIGURE 8

CARTHAGINIAN AND ROMAN NORTH AFRICA



Source: Jean-Jacques Despois et al, 1967.

their agricultural produce were shipped from North Africa to Rome. The North African province made available to Rome a large amount of grain, enough to support 350,000 people each year. Baradez (1949) believes that there is likelihood that these regions could export more than the Romans exported in the past.

Climate is relative to changing patterns of settlement in North Africa generally and in Algeria's experience particularly. Therefore, major transformations of patterns of settlement were brought about by conquest, disintegration of political power, and such other phenomena as droughts, epidemics, invasions by the Vandals, the Byzantines, the Arabs, and the Turks, and French colonialism. Figure 9 indicates the historico-cultural sequences of external influences and occupation.

At the time of the Arab invasion in 711, the Berbers were ruled by a queen called La Kahina. Her base was situated in the mountain of Aures. She resisted the Arab invasion, but, with the help of the Berbers from the coastal plain, the Arabs defeated the queen.

The political disintegration of the Berber became inevitable. Inter-tribal conflict and sectarian struggle broke out among the followers of Islam. The Khanji, who islamized the Berbers, rebelled against the caliphs of North Africa, who were from southwest Asia, and proclaimed their freedom from any direct control by outside forces. From this emerged in North Africa two separate Berber kingdoms, the Idrissite dynasty and the Fatimite dynasty (see Figures 10 and 11). These two dynasties emerged in the ancient cities of Punic and Roman civilization. During the transition period, of course, changes in settlement pattern were inevitable.

The Phoenicians' initial contact with Berber tribes was based on a

FIGURE 9

THE NORTHERN MAGHREB: THE CULTURAL SUCCESSION THROUGH HISTORICAL TIMES



Source: Harris, 1967.

FIGURE 10

STAGES OF THE FATIMID CONQUESTS, 902-921


Stages of the Fatimid Conquests, 902-921
Bougie
KOTAMA
Ikjan
Constantine
Setif
Mila
[904]
[902]
Béja
Tunis
Laribus
Kairouan
[909]
Sousse
Mahdiya [921]
Tlemcen
Tahert
Achir
Baghai
Belezma
[906]
Tebessa
Chott el-Hodna
Tobna
[906]
Gafsa
Djerid
Chott Djerid
Gabès
Tripoli
To Sijilmasa
[909]
ATLAS MOUNTAINS
913-914 and 920 expedition to Alexandria
Approximate western boundary of the Fatimid state in Ifriqiya 909-972. [The area of Western Algeria and Morocco was disputed between the Fatimids [until 972], Idrisids [until 985], Umaiyads in Spain and local Berber tribes]
Initial conquests [902]
Conquests [904]
Conquests [906]
Final stages of conquest and raids which established Fatimid suzerainty over Ifriqiya [909]
Subsequent expeditions into Egypt

Source: Charles André Julien, 1970, p. 54.

FIGURE 11

THE MEDITERRANEAN IN THE NINTH CENTURY



Source: Charles André Julien, 1970, p. 25.

trade relationship and later developed into a coastal settlement. The Berber tribes traded with the Phoenicians by selling skins, wool, ivory, and ostrich feathers. This contact offered the Berbers the opportunity to learn from the Phoenicians the art of horticulture, and they then practised small horticultural farming. The eastern Mediterranean influence in the area is traceable in the way in which the dwellers constructed their houses; stone is often used instead of mud. However, the eastern Mediterranean influence was confined to the coastline; the Phoenicians did not establish contact with the interior. The Romans, unlike the Carthaginians, overran the interior of North Africa and established settlements in Numidia. This consisted of the east and west part of what is now Algeria.

Roman influence in the area was greater than that of any other invader, such as the Vandals and the Byzantines, who replaced the Roman conquerors on the North African shore. The Romans, in order to meet the needs of the Roman market during their occupation of North Africa, increased areas of agricultural irrigation. In the exploitation of land, slaves, tenant farmers, and colons (landless labourers) were used to gain more profit from agricultural land. Wells and dams were used to provide additional water in dry land for cultivation and for human consumption. A water supply was provided for the residents of the settlements along the Roman lines, through aqueducts and cisterns.

For the first time, monocultures (based on the latifundium) were installed in all Roman settlements, such as olives, grapevines, wheat, and barley, for export to Rome. The new form of production replaced horticulture, small farms, and mixed farming. At the time of the Arab invasion of Algeria, the main way of attaining a livelihood was by horticulture and sedentary agriculture; this brought the country into contact with eastern Mediterranean civilization. This way of life was supplemented, following the Arab conquest in North Africa, by nomadism and semi-nomadic pastoralism. Changes took place gradually, due to resistance on the part of Berber tribes. A dual culture—nomadic pastoralism and sedentary agriculture—became dominant until Algerian society came into contact with Turkish and French colonialism.

This mode of livelihood was distributed unevenly. In some areas, particularly in the Algerian Sahara, pastoral nomadism is absolute when compared to the steppe zone, where nomadism has been given up for semi-sedentary ways of life. The persistence of pastoral nomadism is due partly to seasonal migration into the Tell zone in search of water and grazing land, supplemented by seasonal harvest labour in the latifundia. This was a very common phenomenon at the outset of French colonialism in Algeria. Later, it began to decrease due to the expansion of colonialization and of agriculture in the Tell zone. Pastoral nomadism became limited to the high Atlas, the Saharan Atlas, and the neighbourhood of the Azures Mountains. Following Algeria's political independence, the relationships of production were altered; a new mode of production came into existence. This will be examined in a later chapter of this study.

B. LANGUAGE GROUPING AND MIGRATION

The modern population of Algeria consists of Berbers and Arabs. The Berbers are the indigenous population of the area, yet large numbers of the Berber population have become arabized, and at present the Arab-speaking population is the largest ethnic group (about ninety percent). Prior to Arab immigration into the area, the northern and southern regions remained isolated, and the majority of the population was Berber. However, this isolation was not a permanent phenomenon; occasionally there was some contact between these regions. For example, the valley of the Chélif was the centre of an interpopulation contact within the Berber tribes, as well as for newcomers from southwest Asia. This contact, which was at the outset inter-Berber contact, developed into a major migration with roots within and outside Algeria. The valley possessed natural characteristics which facilitated internal immigration.

In the valley of the Chélif, several battles took place between 740 and 1349. The most remembered one was the Battle of the Noble, when the Arab army was defeated by the Berbers. An extraordinary intermingling took place between Berbers and Arabs at the valley Chélif. Within one or two generations the Arabic-speaking groups outnumbered the rest of Algeria's population. Historically, this intermingling between northern and southern Berbers and between the Berbers and Arabs took place before the great invasion of the Hillalians (about 700 A.D.). These Arab tribes immigrated from western Asia. At the time of intermingling, the Islamic religion penetrated Berber society.

Internal migration was not confined only to the northern and southern regions; between the west and the east, similar internal contact was established. Unlike other regions, the later internal contact (between west and east) generated a conflict between two major tribes, the Dahra and the Ouarsensis. It is important to note here that neither internal nor external migration into the areas modified internal divisions between Berber tribes, or replaced Berbers with Arabs, but only created a higher degree of cultural resemblance, of which the Berbers and the Arabs could claim the right to be a part. This, in fact, is true in the area of "communication" whereby the Arab-speaking group became dominant in Algerian society. Thus it is that the acculturation process occurred in both groups; Berbers and Arabs, within one generation, could claim with each other affinity of relationship. Arabs adopted the customs and traditions of Berber tribes, and vice versa.

The intermingling between various Berber tribes and Arab immigrants created the conditions for the development of similar cultural characteristics. Cultural resemblance was only relative to particular situations in which intercourse took place between different Berber tribes and the Arabs.

However, there were areas within Algeria which remained isolated from any outside influence. The mountain areas, inhabited by the Kabyle and the Chaouia, maintained their traditions, customs, and language; tradition remained intact. Although most Kabyles are Moslem, some of them have not adopted the Arabic language. It is very hard to distinguish between Berbers and Arabs, as far as physical characteristics are concerned; the only way to distinguish between them is by speech differences. These differences are of lesser importance, since most of these Arab-speaking people are not necessarily Arab in origin.

According to Pierre Bourdieu (1969), there are city dialects and village dialects in Algeria. City dialects are a type of language developed prior to the Hillalian invasion, during which time several Arab immigrants came into contact with Berber tribes. This intermingling created a dialect partly Arabic and partly Berber. Evolution of the city dialect occurred in the High Plains around Ouarsenis, the Dahra, and the Plains of Orania. These areas were inhabited by nomads and semi-nomadic people, and some of them were sedentary farming communities of Berber origin.

At present, all these areas are inhabited by Arab-speaking populations. Village dialects are spoken in areas inhabited by Berber tribes, such as the little Kabylia and the great Kabylia mountain in northeast and northern Algeria. Although these areas are predominantly Moslem, some of them adhere to Berber traditions rather than Arabic. For example, the traditional structure of Berber society, particularly in Kabylia, gives overriding rights of inheritance to the husband rather than to the wife; according to the custom of the Berbers, the wife has inheritance rights if her husband dies. This is contrary to Islamic law, which gives only some rights of inheritance to the woman. The islamization of the Berbers has not necessarily completely eliminated Berber tradition.

City dialects spread over areas where contact between Bedouins and sedentary Berbers was intense, such as in the high plains, where large waves of immigrants came to settle from western Asia. These later replaced the inhabitants, a sedentary population. Village dialects were restricted to higher mountain areas exclusively inhabited by Berber tribes.

Algeria is not the only country in North Africa where Berber culture has developed; a similar culture is to be found all over the Maghreb and on the Canary Islands. According to Harris (1967, pp. 49-50), "the Algerian Berbers occupy a much less extensive area, but they nevertheless make up about 30 per cent of the population." Berber dialects are spoken also in Morocco, where they constitute forty percent of the population. Figure 12 indicates the geographical distribution of the Berber and Arabic languages in Algeria.

FIGURE 12

DISTRIBUTION OF ARABIC AND BERBER LANGUAGES IN ALGERIA



Source: Richard F. Nyrop et al., 1972, p. 106.

The Berbers are not a homogeneous group in regard to physical characteristics, customs, and dialect. There is a marked difference in physical characteristics between the Kabyle and the Tuareg. The Kabyle are predominantly light skinned, while the Tuareg are predominantly dark and brown skinned. There is a relative contrast in custom and tradition between Kabyles and Tuaregs. Unlike Kabyles, the Tuareg women enjoy much greater freedom and responsibility than the Kabyles, the succession of inheritance being organized along maternal lines. Children inherit property from their mothers and gain social acceptance and status of leadership through maternal lines. In contrast, Kabyle women have no inheritance rights.

There are four major distinctive Berber-speaking groups. These are: the Kabyle, the Chaouias, the M'zabites, and the Tuareg. These groups live in separate mountain areas: in eastern Algeria, south of Constantine; southwest of Constantine; the northern Sahara; and the central Saharan Ahaggar massif, respectively. The Chaouias and the Tuareg Berber dialects are spoken in Tunisia and Libya also. The M'zabite Berber dialect is spoken also in the western mountains of Algeria, yet their numbers are small in relation to the inhabitants of the western region.

The Kabyle are the largest Berber group in Algeria: they constitute over two million inhabitants, the other three groups numbering less than one million. These groups remained isolated from each other and outside influence. This has led to the development of localized dialects of Berber origin. These groups are no longer isolated as in the past, a large number of them living in the urban centres of Algeria and abroad.

Some Berber dialects still persist, but the most common languages in Algeria are Arabic and French. Although the French language is decreasing in importance as a language at schools and in the universities, it still holds importance in the major administrative institutions of the country. However, the replacement of French by Arabic has taken precedence, and this trend is increasing in all aspects of Algerian society.

C. POPULATION GROWTH, URBANIZATION, AND EMIGRATION

The impact of colonialism on North Africa did not lead to rapid population growth in the region; the rate of change has been very slow. In Algeria, an estimate given in 1830 of three million inhabitants was not realized until 1880. North African regions maintained a low population growth rate until the sixteenth century. However, the impact of the war of conquest which began in 1830 and which was consolidated in 1848 reduced the population of Algeria tremendously, because the cost in human life was so great.

The insurrection of 1871 involved further devastation of life and expropriation of land from the peasants. This brought about enormous loss of life, total pauperization of the peasant, and the famine of 1868-1870, due to the restrictions imposed by the colonial regime on communal land.

Besides the colonial war and the interruption of communal life, the inhabitants of Algeria were affected by the plague (1784 to 1791, 1799, and 1817), smallpox, and cholera (1827 to 1837). In addition to these epidemic diseases, famine, which began initially in the

Constantine region in 1815-1816, affected the whole country. These problems encountered by Algeria during this period reduced population growth. From 1954 to 1962, during the national struggle for independence, again many Algerians lost their lives in the war of liberation: according to Algerian estimates, over two million lives were lost in a seven-year period.

The population all over the North African region has never been uniform. In Algeria, unlike Tunisia and Morocco, population increase began in 1880, while in the other two neighbouring countries, it started in 1910 and 1920, respectively. From 1880 to 1910 the Algerian population increased from 1.2 to 1.7 percent, and by 1920 the rate of population growth had decreased to 0.4 percent (see Table 3). This must be due to the slowdown of the European settlement and the immigration of Algerians to France.

TABLE 3

TOTAL POPULATION AND RATE OF POPULATION GROWTH IN ALGERIA, 1880-1964

	1880	1910	1920	1930	1955	1964
Total population (millions)	3.2	5.5	5.7	6.4	9.7	10.9
Rate of increase (percent)	1.2	1.7	0.4	1.4	1.8	1.4

Source: S. Amin, 1970, p. 33.

The rate of population increase never remained constant; it marks periods of decrease, such as that which showed up in the censuses of

1920, 1930, and 1964. The periods preceding these dates seem to indicate a very low rate of population growth. According to S. Amin (1970, p. 33), the population decrease which showed up in 1920 and 1930 is associated with a low immigration rate from Europe and the impact of World War I. At the same time, Algerians were recruited as a labour force in the metropolis (France), and during this period large numbers of Algerians left for Europe to be employed in the military and in industry.

In 1955-1964, the rate of population growth was also very low, due to the intensification of the war of liberation. Many settlers began to emigrate to France, and the numbers of war casualties upset the rate of population growth. In World War II, the number of Algerian emigrants increased, and between 1950 and 1962 there were, in France, 400,000 Algerians. This number doubled between 1962 and 1972 (Rousset, 1973, pp. 11-12). This explains the problem of neo-colonial relationships that Algeria has experienced in her early years of political independence. The relationship with France conditions the Algerian to migrate to France to enter into the capitalist metropolis as a labourer.

The year 1965 was the turning point in French-Algerian relations; the government began to review the Evian agreements, which gave the French government the right to exploit natural resources in the Sahara and co-own the oil resources exploited in the Sahara. Nationalization of French oil companies led to strained relations between France and Algeria (see Chapter 8). Due to the difficulties arising from political confrontation, the number of Algerian immigrants to France began to drop, and since 1966 the rate of population growth in Algeria has maintained a steady rate of increase of 3.2 percent of the total population—a relatively rapid increase. The population, which in 1964 was 10,900,000, rose by 1966 to 11,800,000; in 1973 the population was estimated at 14,900,000. From 1966 to 1973 there has been an increase in total population of 3,100,000. According to the World Population Data sheet, the Algerian population in 1976 was 17,300,000, with a rate of population growth of 3.2 percent. Table 4 indicates the breakdown of the population into age groups.

TABLE 4

STRUCTURE DE LA POPULATION PAR GRANDS GROUPES D'AGE

Age	1966	1973	1977 (est)	1980 (est)
0-17 ans	52,8	54,5	(54,2)	(54,2)
18-59 ans	40,7	39,3	(40,1)	(40,3)
60 ans et +	6,5	6,2	(5,7)	(5,5)
Total	100,0	100,0	(100,0)	(100,0)

Source: II Plan Quadriennal—1974-1977; République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire.

There are two crucial aspects of Algeria's population structure: the steady growth of the working age population and the slight increase of youth population. This implies that an enormous effort has been made to create jobs to meet the needs of the larger numbers of people of working age. Chapter 8 examines some aspects of this problem. Algerian options of national development seem to be geared towards accommodating the demographic growth. On the other hand, the older population is decreasing at this stage. This population structure seems to facilitate the innovative capacity of the society and reduce the tension between the old structure and the emerging one. This conflict of ideas and attitudes between old and new generations is commonly observed in most countries which are attempting to establish a new social and economic structure, particularly those countries which have a larger elderly population than Algeria.

The composition of the population will certainly have a direct impact on the expansion of schools and should bring a small increase in the working force. To cope with population growth, the Algerian government is committed, according to the development plan for 1974-1977, to create over 100,000 jobs every year; simultaneously schools and housing are continuing to expand.

Since 1972, when the agrarian reform began, socialist villages have been erected in agricultural areas all over Algeria, and, according to the current four-year plan, the creation of one thousand villages is envisaged during the plan period. These villages are built on the self-help scheme, undertaken jointly by the community and the military services. The 1976 World Population Data sheet indicates that fifty percent of the total Algerian population lives in urban centres. Nine years ago there was only four percent of the total Algerian population in urban centres. As Table 5 indicates, the economic and political transformation which Algeria has experienced may be the cause of urban development. The Algerians in exile established themselves in the urban centres upon returning home, without seeking to return to their original villages, and internal rural-urban migration occurred, due to the attraction of the economic activities within urban centres.

TABLE 5

COMPARATIVE URBAN GROWTH IN ALGERIA, TUNISIA, AND MOROCCO

	Growth Rate (in percent)		
	Algeria	Tunisia	Morocco
1880-1910	2.0	-	-
1910-1920	2.0	2.0	-
1920-1930	2.5	2.5	2.0
1930-1955	2.5	3.0	5.0
1955-1964	4.0	3.5	3.3

Source: S. Amin, 1970, p. 33.

The rate of urbanization in Algeria has been characterized by sudden increases between 1955 and 1964. This is due to two factors: the regroupment policy of French colonialism between 1955 and 1960; and, coinciding with this period, the intensification of the war of liberation, which began in 1954. During this period, many peasants were forced to leave their villages and were placed under administrative surveillance, according to Sayad and Bourdieu (1964). This affected large numbers of the Algerian rural population, as this quotation indicates:

> En 1960, le nombre d'Algériens regroupés atteignait 2.157.000 personnes, soit un quart de la population totale. Si, outre les regroupements on prend en compte l'exode vers les villes, on peut estimer à trois millions au moins, c'est-à-dire la moitié de la population rurale le nombre des individus qui, en 1960, se trouvaient hors de leur résidence coutumière. (Sayad and Bourdieu, 1964, p. 13)

The rate of urbanization in Algeria was sudden between 1955 and 1964, while Tunisia indicated a gradual increase and Morocco showed a decrease in the rate of urbanization. Algeria reflects the intensification of the war of liberation movement between 1954 and 1960. This, of course, was due to the sudden departure of settlers from Algeria and the mass immigration from rural areas into urban areas.

According to Benatia (1976, p. 28), in 1954, for example, the population of the city of Algiers was 355,040; of these, 192,890 were non-Algerian settlers, such as French, Italian, Maltese, and 162,150 were Algerian. In 1960 the population was 558,419 Algerians and 311,522 non-Algerians, and the total population of the city was 944,000. The non-Algerian population was seeking refuge in the city.

The replacement of a large percentage of the population from the rural milieu into an urban milieu took place under horrifying circumstances. The socio-economic consequences of the replacement scheme persisted in the major urban centres of Algeria. This has caused maladjustment and disintegration of Algerian society. As Benatia puts it:

> Causes économiques, dues à la colonisation des grands espaces agraires, causes sociales, dues à la désintégration de la société algérienne rurale, causes militaires, dues à la transplantation forcée de cette population, sont donc autant de motifs qui ont préludé au désarroi et à l'aliénation marquant encore actuellement une partie de la population algérienne, dont un exemple flagrant est la population des bidonvilles d'Alger. (Benatia, 1976, p. 68)

The higher rate of urbanization between 1955 and 1960 was determined by two factors: the colonization of all agricultural land, which anticipated the disintegration of Algerian society, and the forced transplantation of a large percentage of the Algerian population. This created the conditions in the major cities of Algeria for the slum areas which are now making their long-term consequences felt. The old colonial cities such as Algiers, Annaba, Oran, and Constantine are overcrowded and have fewer amenities. The housing and roads are incapable of coping with the present state of Algerian development.

Another element associated with the higher rate of urbanization between 1962 and 1964 is political independence. Major cities in Algeria are experiencing an increase in the rate of population growth, due to the sudden departure of settlers; many Algerians who were hiding in the remote mountains and outside Algeria have decided to return home. This phenomenon has occurred in nearly all African countries which have obtained political independence.

The population density is higher in the coastal strips than in the hinterland of the country (see Figure 13). The coastal strips have been the centre of foreign establishment for centuries. First the Romans then the settlers concentrated their economic activities in these areas more than in other parts of Algeria. One reason was accessibility to the sea, which became the main route of transportation for the import and export of goods between Europe and Algeria. The second reason was that most of the fertile land was located in the coastal strips. It was the centre or the backbone of the colonial economy. Because of the concentration of investment, it drew people from the hinterland to enter into the labour force. The population concentration is over ninety-four persons per square kilometre. Algerian national development tends to reduce the uneven population distribution by establishing other centres of development 200 kilometres outside the coastal strip. As one of my interviewees put it:

> Comme on avait parlé il y a quelques instants de cette fameuse politique d'industries industrialisantes, nous

FIGURE 13

POPULATION DENSITY, 1966



Source: *World Atlas of Agriculture*, Africa, Vol. 4, 1976.

> constatons qu'actuellement une ligne d'industrialisation était réalisée le long de la côte à savoir créer plusieurs pôles de développement pour animer l'économie du pays. Une première zone dans la région algéroise, une deuxième zone dans la région oranaise avec Arzew, le grand port pétrolier de raffinerie, la zone de Annaba et la zone de Constantine. Ce qui fait nous avons le Nord qui est très industrialisé, mais l'arrière pays lui n'a pas d'industrie. Alors depuis quelques années une deuxième ligne à 200 Kms à l'intérieur des côtes a été créée internes pour fixer les populations, pour créér des biens et des services pour dynamiser l'agriculture sur les hauts plateaux et amener toutes les sources du progrès. Actuellement, il semblait que cela n'était réservé qu'à la vitrine, la façade maritime de l'Algérie, mais que l'intérieur du pays souffrait encore de manque d'emplois qu'il était sous équipé en routes, en réseaux ferres, en réseaux électriques, en téléphones, en voie de communications, etc. Le pays a été disons couvert d'infrastructure de toutes sortes l'infrastructure scolaire a été l'une des premières, maintenant, il faut que cette infrastructure industrielle se diversifie, qu'elle pénètre à l'intérieur pour qu'il y ait pas de régions déshéritées et de régions développées. Il s'agit de réaliser un équilibre au niveau de toutes les régions pour qu'il n'y ait un équilibre au niveau national. Il ne faut pas qu'il y ait des régions qui restent sous-développées et des régions qui sont sur-développées; notamment autour de la capitale. Il s'agit de vraiment couvrir le pays d'une manière égale de toutes les ressources qui y sont produites. Alors deux fronts donc: une façade maritime avec des industries qui d'ailleurs pour des raisons de nécessité techniques devaient être construites au bord de la mer. Maintenant à l'intérieur beaucoup d'industries vont dans une ligne qui va de Tébessa à Saida et elle rejoint un peu Béchar parce que plus bas, il y a un gisement de fer, là-bas il va y avoir des aciéries peut être, je ne sais pas et tout au long des hauts plateaux il va y avoir des usines de camions à Tiaret, des usines de moteurs à Berrouaghia et Ain Maira, des usines de textiles vers Tébessa, des usines de plastiques à Sétif, tout cela ce sont des villes qui se trouvent à l'intérieur du pays. Très loin de la côte, une usine également de camions de petits tonnages, à Sétif, des pompes, des rannes, etc. Toutes ces industries vont être disséminées à travers tout le pays et il s'agit maintenant d'édifier tout cela le plus rapidement possible pour que l'ensemble puisse bien jouer. (Abucar, field notes, 1976)

The problem of Algeria is not so much population growth, with which the expansion of the economy is able to cope, but maldistribution of the population and unbalanced investment between the regions, which Algeria

inherited from colonialism. Chapter 8, section D, examines some aspects of this problem in current Algerian national development.

The Algerian Development Plan, 1974-1977, identifies six zones or development poles (see Map 4). Zone I embraces the Wilayaat of Alger, Skikda, Constantine, Annaba, and Guelma and the Wilaya d'Oran, except Telagh, divided between the Wilayaat of Tlemcen and Mostagenem. Major industries and agricultural enterprises are concentrated in this zone; according to a 1973 estimate it has over thirty-eight percent of the total population of Algeria. The land is much richer and accessibility greater than in any other part of Algeria. This zone is located in the coastal plains of Algeria.

Zones II and IV are similar in respect to ecological conditions and the role they played in internal and external migration. Although some parts of zone II have land similar to zone I, it is not sufficient to support the population of the area, while zone IV has very poor land and an absence of water. In 1966 an estimate indicated that the population of zone II was 1,500,000 and zone IV 2,100,000 inhabitants. Zone II is located between small coastal plains, the interior valleys around Chélif-Soummam, and the high plateau.

Zones III and V are located in the mountains, steppes, and the Saharan Atlas. Zone III is to be found in the northeast; Constantine; the mountains of Nememtcha-Aures-Hodna and the east centre; the massif of Kabylie, northwest of Constantine; and at the centre, the mountains of Blida and Medea. Zone V covers the steppes and the Saharan Atlas. These two zones are not capable of supporting a large population because of the poor quality of agricultural land, and they also are unsuitable for raising cattle. However, fifteen percent of Algeria's cereals are

MAP 4

MAJOR NATURAL REGIONS


MAJOR NATURAL REGIONS
1 Lowlands
A Littoral fringe
B Coastal lowlands
C Interior lowlands and Tell basins
2 Northern ranges of Tell Atlas
3 Interior ranges of Tell Atlas
4 High plateaux
5A Saharan Atlas and Piedmont
5B Aurès and Nemencha massifs
6 Sahara desert
0
250 MILES
0
400 KILOMETRES
1A
1B
1C
2
3
4
5A
5B
6

Source: *World Atlas of Agriculture*, Africa, Vol. 4, 1976.

grown in these zones. It is a potential resource for immigration into towns and abroad.

Population density is very much higher in these zones and varies from 50 to 12 per square kilometre. Zone III had 3,200,000 inhabitants in 1972, and the population in zone V was 1,200,000.

Zone VI is predominantly desert, and agricultural occupations are very rare, with the exception of oases in the south. The rate of urbanization is very low. It has mineral resources, such as petroleum, but most of the people are engaged in handicraft industries and tourism. There were 750,000 inhabitants in 1966.

At present, there are in Algeria thirty-one provinces (Wilayaat); more than half these provinces are new. Table 6 presents population estimates according to the census, for each province. As seen from the table, the old provinces have larger populations than the other provinces. Most of these provinces are located in the zone I economic unit mentioned above; the purpose of creating the new provinces was to create a regional equilibrium and the transformation of the colonial economy based in the coastal towns. A later chapter in this study discusses the strategy of Algerian development, whereby regional development is analyzed.

TABLE 6

POPULATION DE 1966 PAR WILAYA

(d'après le nouveau découpage administratif)

Adrar : 106.527
Alger : 1.164.369
Annaba : 308.614
Batna : 126.636
Béchar : 97.717
Bejaia : 420.524
Biskra : 358.702
Blida : 553.894
Bouira : 274.215

— Constantine : 466.436
— Djelfa : 242.171
— El-Asnam : 624.055
— Guelma : 434.094
— Jijel : 282.589
— Laghouat : 182.593
— Mascara : 312.836
— Médéa : 356.260
— Mostaganem : 563.144

— M'sila : 306.993
— Oran : 449.551
— Ouargla : 132.319
— Oum El-Bouaghi ; 302.449
— Saïda : 254.847
— Sétif : 715.973
— Bel-Abbès : 385419
— Skikda : 361.890
— Tamanrasset : 29.915

— Tébessa : 278.082
— Tiaret : 447.680
— Tizi-Ouzou : 643.525
— Tlemcen : 448.836

● TOTAL ALGERIE
ENTIERE : 12.096.347

Source: *El Moujahid*, No. 3612, 1977.

CHAPTER 4

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ALGERIA

A. THE ORIGIN

To uncover the origin of the Berber tribes, obscure in the current literature on North African history, has in the last two decades been the object of an attempt to bring to light the pre-history of North Africa prior to east Mediterranean and southwest Asian influences in the area. Henri Lhote undertook archeological studies in the region in 1956 with a team of French artists. They surveyed an area comprising the territory between southern Algeria and the Libyan province of Tripolitania. They discovered "hundreds of wall paintings in the caves and grottoes of the sandstone mountains, representing thousands of human and animal figures, some composed in tableaux of great beauty, some superimposed one upon another, of many differing styles and techniques" (Nickerson, 1961, p. 6).

These paintings were discovered in the Tassili range of the Hoggar Mountains around the North African central Sahara. These paintings have historical relevance, so far as they provide us with a comprehensive view of life in the pre-history of North Africa, the climate and vegetation, types of animals, religious practices, physical characteristics of the people, and contact with other cultures in the continent.

Archeological evidence suggests that these paintings were made around 8000 B.C., and during that time there is every indication that the Sahara, now desolate and barren, was a fertile land which gave rise to conditions suitable for human development. At that time there were cattle, goats, sheep, elephants, giraffes, hippopotami, and other animals. Of course, the survival of these beasts depended upon the availability of water and grazing land.

Other paintings suggest that the North African region had contact with northeast Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. Some of the paintings dated about 3500 B.C. indicate that North Africa had contacts with the cultures of the Nile. Two types of physical characteristics are distinguished in the paintings: a symbolic manifestation of negroid type and naturalistic and incidental portraits of European features. This latter type suggests Egyptian influence in the region. The presence of chariot painting in the Sahara indicates that there was contact between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, through the "Gulf of Syrtes (Tripoli) via the oasis of Ghadames, through the passes of the Hoggar mountains to the Niger" (Nickerson, 1961, p. 9).

The Tassili paintings give us an understanding of the past, when North Africa was in much closer contact with the rest of the continent. There is also an indication that the people inhabiting the region possessed physical characteristics similar to those of the rest of Africa. That is to say, they were blacks.

This archeological evidence has been supplemented in a recent study undertaken by the Italian scholar Fabrizio Mori, who surveyed other parts of North Africa, particularly the borderline between the Libyan province of Fezzan and the oasis of Ghat. Most of his discovery confirmed the similar evidence obtained by M. Lhote. However, Fabrizio went further, suggesting that some of the paintings dated about 1500 B.C. and that the people inhabiting the area were the Garamantes from whom the Romans defended themselves.

Algerian history has meaning only in the context of North African history; apart from the cultural resemblance to the region, it also has historical similarities with the region. The history of the North African region can be divided into five distinct periods (see Figure 14). These periods reflect only the periods of alien occupation; prior

FIGURE 14

ALGERIAN HISTORICAL EVOLUTION



Source: Harris, 1962.

to these periods the history of the region is not known. Detailed accounts begin at the end of the Third Punic War. This certainly obscures the origin of the inhabitants of the region and their relationship with the rest of continental Africa. These five periods emphasize only eastern Mediterranean and southwest Asian occupations in the region.

The first period falls within the Carthaginian occupation, up to 146 B.C., when Carthage was finally occupied by the Romans.

The second period covers the whole of Roman occupation of the region between 100 A.D. and 430 A.D. The Roman occupation was interrupted by Vandal invasions; this was put to an end by the first Islamic invasion, which penetrated the area in the middle of the seventh century.

The third period was marked by the second Islamic invasion of the region, which was begun in 642 A.D. and ended with the consolidation of Islamic power in 708 A.D. During this era, there were several setbacks due to the resistance offered by Berber tribes against southwest Asian invasions. After that, the region became arabized, and northern and eastern Mediterranean influence declined until the nineteenth century.

The fourth period marked the beginning of colonial impact on the North African region. Algeria was occupied by the French army in 1830; the French consolidated their power in 1847.

The fifth period (1954-1962) was the period of national struggle for Algerian independence.

B. THE ROMANS

The Romans established themselves on the shores of North Africa, replacing Carthage as the only major power in the region, from 100 A.D. to 400 A.D. Figure 15 depicts Roman North Africa in the early third century A.D. The decision of the Romans to take over the Carthaginian empire was due partly to the fact that they regarded the Carthaginians as dangerous to their existence, and partly to the desire of the Romans to acquire wealth from North African regions. Unlike modern colonialism, the Romans had no internal pressures to settle a surplus population somewhere else, in order to resolve political instability at home. However, they had an aristocratic and policy-making elite who desired to possess exotic goods for personal aggrandizement.

Four Roman provinces were established in North Africa following the Roman conquest. The Third Legion comprised five thousand soldiers, Romans and Romanized natives, who were recruited to serve the legion. At the outset, a small Roman colony was created, and later a large native labour force was brought in to work on plantations established for profit motives. Most of the labourers and servicemen in the Third Legion were not Roman; they were native Berbers recruited to serve the Romans in exchange for Roman citizenship. The Romanized Berbers gave up the Punic language and took to Latin and later to Christianity.

In order to consolidate their foothold, the Romans sought alliances with the native chieftains. The Roman frontier became known as *limes*, or frontier, and at each *limes* there was an observation post. The best-known ones were located along the present Libyan-Algerian frontier. The exact line of demarcation is not known for certain, but it was believed to be as follows, according to Nickerson:

FIGURE 15

ROMAN NORTH AFRICA IN THE EARLY THIRD CENTURY A.D.



Source: Harris, 1962.

> The Roman frontier finally included all the best agricultural land. Starting in Libya only a few miles from the coast, it enclosed all the fertile part of southern Tunisia and Algeria, following along the northern foothills of the high tableland which separates the sea plains from the desert to the south, but never including that plateau, which remained in native hands. (Nickerson, 1961, pp. 17-18)

The demarcation line between the Berber tribes and the Romans did not, however, prevent some Berber tribes from occasionally attacking Roman settlements along the North African shore. Opposition to Roman occupation in the region occurred sporadically until its collapse.

Roman military conquest in the region led to the creation of a plantation system in North Africa for the first time. This brought together large numbers of agricultural workers; these workers were recruited from the Berber tribes. The Romans would not have been able to run the region without the veneer institutionalization of the Berber tribes, both in the military and in the plantation system. In the cities which they established along the coast, the majority of the inhabitants were Berbers who had acquired Roman citizenship. The Romans were in the minority in all cities. Intermingling of the Romans and Berbers resulted in the first generations of Afro-Roman descent. Some of these later generations obtained high-ranking positions in Roman courts.

This socio-cultural mixing of Romans and Berbers was based on a systematic exploitation of agricultural peasants, since the Roman settlement depended on agriculture as a mode of livelihood and as a means of accumulation of capital. The majority of all work in the cities and in the plantation system was undertaken by the Berbers rather than the Romans. For their part, the Romans offered their experience in creating in their colonial settlements things that had cultural affinities with Italy, such as the forum, basilica, temples, and baths. These were decorated with statues, triumphal arches, marble columns, altars, and inscriptions. Of course, the labour to build such glorifying monuments came from the Berbers, who carried out such colonial undertakings.

The remnants of Roman monuments are still observable in the coastal towns of Algeria, but the Algerian government and people regard such monuments as symbols of the Roman colonial settlement in Algeria and do not therefore consider them as a part of the national heritage. These ruins are seen everywhere; they could not have been created by the Romans alone, because they did not have the large labour force needed to erect such monuments. Today, some of the Roman towns are maintained as tourist attractions—for example, at Tabassa, two hundred kilometres from the city of Algiers. At present, around these towns one finds new tourist compounds.

The major infrastructure work during the Roman period employed both civilians and the Roman regular army. The majority of the work force was drawn from the Berbers. The Berber workers built roads, bridges, and irrigation systems and maintained the defence system of the Roman *limes* against other Berber tribes.

Unlike the Carthaginian empire, which established only very small agricultural estates in the region, the Romans employed landless Berber peasants for domestic service. The Romans expropriated large areas of agricultural land from the peasants and placed them under the control of the state and large Roman landlords. Taxes were imposed on land left in the hands of the peasant cultivators.

Land expropriation and taxation imposed on small cultivators altered the economic character of the region. Those peasants who lost their land had no other alternative but to become wage earners in latifundia or seek refuge in the mountainous area outside the Roman *limes*. Small cultivators were absorbed by large farmers and forced to give up their land. Most large enterprises were owned by absentee landlords, who were few in number. Within Roman *limes*, most of the Berbers were employed in military service, corvée labour in the state, and privately owned agricultural enterprises. There was a marked economic disparity between romanized Berbers and the Romans, as this quotation demonstrates:

> Although the rule of Rome brought vast physical improvements into every aspect of North African life the population soon became divided into two unequal parts, those who benefited enormously from Roman government, and those who benefited very little—the latter being by far the larger portion of society. The great landlords whose estates were managed for them by overseers; the soldiers, magistrates, merchants, artisans and other town-dwellers who had become Roman citizens, frequented the schools and public libraries, spoke Latin and enjoyed all the advantages of Roman civic life obviously benefited enormously. They formed a large class which became the full equal of European-born men in the culture and life of the Roman towns of North Africa. Everyday life in the towns of Africa Romana must have been pleasant enough, while in the splendid villages of the great territorial magnates it was on a scale of princely luxury. (Nickerson, 1961, p. 25)

The Berbers who were outside Roman *limes*, and who constituted the largest portion of the Berbers, did, however, benefit from Roman physical improvements, as did those other Berbers who were directly under Roman rule. The vast physical improvements brought into cultivation large areas of agricultural land destined to support the Roman settlements and Roman emperors in Italy, as the following quotation indicates:

> The African annona—the tax in kind—became an absolute essential to the City of Rome, which without it would have been menaced with starvation, and the safe arrival of the

> grain ships in Ostia was a constant preoccupation of the emperors, who always feared that a recalcitrant provincial governor would hold up the fleet and thus involve him in conflict with the Roman populace—as indeed happened more than once. (Nickerson, 1961, p. 22)

The surplus, often exported to Rome, was produced by Berber labour. Small cultivators had to pay in kind. Wheat was deposited in huge central depots at the disposal of military garrisons and civil magistrates; part of this surplus was destined for Rome. Wood and olive oil were other items which were regularly sent to Rome for the personal use of the emperor. Wood was used for heating the public baths, which were an important aspect of the Roman way of life. Olive oil was an essential element for lighting houses and public places. The Romans became accustomed to having African figs and wines with their meals. The export items involved large quantities. Also included were wild animals, which the Romans were delighted to have for exhibition and entertainment in their courts.

The interruption of Roman occupation came from within the system and from outside invaders. The romanized Berbers resented their inferior position within the system, due to the growth of disparities in economic benefits between themselves and the Romans. The Christian church, in teaching the gospels, leaned towards the poorer sector of the Roman empire and populations, and this drew attention to the lack of equality within the system. Of course, the majority of the lower classes were Berbers by origin. Their resentment generated conflict between the Romans and the romanized Berbers. This, however, merely anticipated the disintegration of the Roman Empire in North Africa; the final blow came from the Berber tribes living outside the Roman *limes*, and from the Vandal invasions.

Internal and external threats—class divisions within the Roman settlement in Africa and foreign invasions—led to the fall of the North African empire of Rome. The Vandals, a German tribe residing in Spain, overran the Roman realm in Africa and replaced the Roman overlords. During the Vandal's rule, the whole economy of the region was devastated. The replacement of the Romans by the Vandals did not bring any improvements in the lives of the Berber tribes.

C. THE COMING OF ISLAM FROM SOUTHWEST ASIA

Southwest Asian penetration into North Africa occurred for the first time in the seventh century. It appears first as a group of people motivated by religious interests (Moslem) rather than by military conquest. The southwest Asians established their sovereignty over the region gradually by proclaiming a government represented by the Caliph. Following their military conquest in the region, they installed a permanent garrison and an administrative corps to control the area in order to islamize large numbers of Berbers. The islamization of Berbers did not, however, replace Berber customs and traditions but did bring about a change in the dominant language. Latin, spoken since the time of the Roman conquest, was replaced. Also, intermarriage occurred between the southwest Asians and Berber tribes, particularly between soldiers and local people. This helped to consolidate the military conquest.

At the outset of the southwest Asian conquest, the Berbers offered resistance. This led to the death of Queen Kahina, who had thought that the invasion could be stopped if all the trees were destroyed and the houses levelled. This attempt, however, in no way changed the advance of the Arab tribes. With the help of the islamized Berbers, the Arabs were in a position to consolidate their power in the region.

A turning point of this conquest occurred when the islamized Berbers once again began to resent their dependence on an alien power. The Berbers seized power in the region in about 903 without repudiating the Islamic religion and proclaimed their independence from the southwest Asian tribes. This was done by a group of Berbers who proclaimed themselves as the Khariji. The Khariji represented an ideal type of Islamic purity. They stood for the negation of material possessions in order to re-establish the essence of the Islamic faith in its original form by the strict application of a puritanical life. Their seizure of power, which was spontaneous, led, for the first time in many centuries, to North African independence from alien rule. Two independent kingdoms emerged: the Fatimite dynasty and the Idrissite dynasty.

The Idrissite dynasty was founded in the Fezzan around 808 and extended its rule into Tunisia and to the eastern part of Algeria. The major supporters of this dynasty were the Carthaginians and romanized Berbers who sought protection from Arab invaders. This dynasty lasted two centuries; after that, it began to disappear gradually.

The Fatimite dynasty was founded in Morocco and expanded inwards and outwards, beyond the North African frontiers. The main supporters of this dynasty were a sector of Islam dissenting over theological issues.

The Berbers under the Fatimite dynasty, for the first time, controlled all North Africa and the Near East. The capital of the dynasty was moved from Kairouan to Al-Kahira (Cairo). Berbers held important positions in the administration and in the military, and they also played an important role in trade relationships between North Africa and southwest Asia. There were at that time large numbers of Berber merchants. The nature of class relationships at this time is not very well known, but there is no doubt that an aristocratic class emerged which had administrative and economic power. However, the situation was very much obscured by sectarian conflict and tribal conflict. The Fatimite dynasty collapsed in 1171.

Some tribes claimed their independence from the Fatimite dynasty. For example, the Sanhaja Kingdom assumed control in North Africa until the second invasion of the southwest Asian tribes (known as Banu Hilal). What we know about this invasion is from an account given by Ibn Khaldun. The second southwest Asian invasion was the largest group ever to penetrate into North Africa. In contrast to the situation at the time of the first invasion, the North Africans at the time of the second invasion were in an Arabic stream of life. The majority were Moslem, and Arabic was spoken and understood everywhere, with the exception of isolated mountain areas. The Banu Hilal invasion devastated the whole economy of the area, which was based on agriculture, and created conditions for the fall of the Sanhaja Kingdom.

This was followed by a period of intertribal conflict, until the Sanhaja tribe adopted the Almoravid doctrine. The Almoravid was a movement which fought against corruption and excessive taxation and sought to liberate people from domination. The doctrine came into existence in Ribat Lal-Murabitum (people of the Ribat) and called for the strict application of Islam. This movement established itself in North and sub-Saharan Africa in 1069 and conquered Spain in 1103. Similarly, the Almohads (*al-muwahhidun*, or "monotheists") were the offspring of Ribat, led by Ibn Tumart, who proclaimed himself the Mahdi. The Almohads replaced Al Moradid, taking over Spain and North Africa with the help of mountain tribes under the leadership of Abdel-Mumin of the Zenata tribe.

Both these movements failed to create unity among North African tribes; the region became separated into three divisions, as Oliver and Fage describe:

> In the east, the well-established Hafsid kingdom continued until 1574, prospering from what could be recovered of Tunisian agriculture, and from its trade with southern Europe and the Sudan. In the west was Morocco, where first the Marinid dynasty and then the Wattasids (1465-1554) strove to secure the ideas of a central monarchy and a regular administration against the inroads of tribesmen from the mountains and steppes, and also against foreign invaders. In the centre lay what was eventually called Algeria, where the "Abd al-Wahids," themselves of nomad stock, and unsupported by the wealth or by the tradition of ordered government available in Tunisia or Morocco, proved quite powerless to check the almost complete destruction of civilized society at the hands of the Bedouin. (Oliver and Fage, 1968, p. 85)

Three kingdoms emerged: the Hafsids (1230-1574), who occupied what is known now as Tunisia; the Wattasids (1465-1554) in western Morocco; and the Zayamids (1299-1367). The intertribal conflict continued within and between the kingdoms, until the whole region came under the domination of the Turks. Algeria was the first country in which the Turkish regency was established.

D. THE TURKISH OCCUPATION

Ottoman authority was established in Algiers in 1525 and expanded gradually to the east and to the west. The Turkish occupation was facilitated by internal and external conditions of the region.

The North African region was facing problems of political disintegration, due partly to internal tribal conflicts and partly to European attempts to get hold of the area. Spain was the major European power in North Africa and established its sovereignty in the western part of Algeria, particularly in the city of Oran, in 1517. There was an alliance between Spain and the Zayanids, who had control over the city of Tlemcen. By 1554, Oran became a city isolated from the rest of Algeria, until 1791, when Spain ceded it to Turkish authority.

Though Turkish authority was accepted all over Algeria, the tribes maintained autonomy in their respective zones. (Section F of this chapter analyzes the Turkish and French establishment in Algeria.) The making of Turkish Algeria was known as the Beylerbey period. During this period Algeria was ruled by the Janissaries, appointed by the Ottoman Sultan to conduct war against the Christians in Spain. Algiers became the capital of the Turkish regency and was inhabited by Turks, Andalusians, Jews, Christian renegades, and local Arabs and Berbers (see Illustration 1). The official language was Turkish, though Arabic was widely spoken. The French established a consulate in Algiers in 1564. At that time they had several trade establishments involving businessmen from Marseilles.

After 1792, when the Spaniards evacuated Oran because Algeria became part of the Ottoman empire, Algeria was divided into three provinces (*beyliks*) and was ruled by Pachas, who were nominated from Istanbul for a period of three years. The capital of the eastern provinces was Constantine; the central province's capital was Medea; the western province had its capital at Oran. The mandate of each province's administration was to maintain law and order and to collect taxes.

ILLUSTRATION 1

ALGIERS UNDER THE TURKS, 1516-1830



Source: Charles André Julien, 1970, p. 289.

The major cities were inhabited predominantly by a non-Algerian population; the Algerians were living in the countryside. The Turkish administration in no way affected the rural population. Tribal features were the dominant social organization everywhere. The Turkish administration maintained continuity of social organization by using tribal chiefs to control their respective areas.

Turkish administration in Algeria came to an end in 1830, when a French military force occupied Algiers.

E. FRENCH COLONIALISM

Prior to the military conquest of Algiers, French merchants and banks already had commercial ties with Algiers, on which the Bey became totally dependent. This was due to the continuous decline of revenue from piracy, because of western involvement in the Mediterranean Sea.

French military forces penetrated into the coast of Algiers (Sidi Ferruch) on June 14, 1830, under the command of General Bourmount. This military expedition stemmed from conflict between the French consulate and the Bey of Algiers which had arisen over financial settlements between French merchants and the Bey. Thus was brought about the end of Turkish sovereignty over Algeria.

For some time the countryside remained in the hands of the tribes. The resistance to French military conquest came from the peasants, led by Emir Abdel Kader. In 1841 General Bugeaud was appointed as commander-in-chief of the French army; this was the beginning of a new era of French conquest in Algeria. The French at home were very much divided over whether to retreat or extend their conquest over the whole country. The French government, however, decided to conquer the whole country; Algerian resistance was subdued, and in 1847 the Emir Abdel Kader chose exile in Damascus.

The French military government consolidated its conquest and brought into existence large settlements to be given as concessions—lands originally owned by the peasants or in the hands of the Beys. The settlers began to resent the military government, and they demanded the establishment of a constitutional government. In 1847, there were in

Algeria 109,000 Europeans; half of the settlers were French citizens by birth. When the constitution of 1848 was adopted, Algeria was accepted as part of French Territory and recognition was given to three departments, run by a civil governor appointed by the government in Paris. But the general remained in power until 1870, disregarding the Paris decision.

There is a similarity between the French colonization of Algeria and Roman conquest in North Africa: the French military colonialism seized most of the best land in the fertile plains between the Aures Mountains and the Mediterranean, as the Romans did, and gave free concessions to European colonists. The peasants who previously owned the land provided the labour needed for the exploitation of agricultural resources.

Land appropriated by the colonial regime in Algeria falls into several categories:

(1) Public land, known as *beylik*;

(2) Communal holdings; and

(3) Family land, known as *melik*.

Lands in (2) and (3) were under the protection of traditional social institutions. Land in (3) was commonly inherited by the communities concerned, and regulated by traditions accepted by the members of the community. Chapter 5 will outline in more detail the pre-colonial mode of production. Most of the communal lands were appropriated following a military defeat of any of the social groups; for example, land in Kabylia had been sequestrated following the Mograni's defeat.

In 1873 the *Loi Warnier* was introduced, by means of which *melik* land could be expropriated by economic mechanisms, that is, through usury and extortion (Roger, 1963, p. 20).

First, the lands classified as *beylik* were public domains; *habus* was land owned and operated by religious institutions; and *arch* was land owned by the tribe and regulated by customary law.

In the second category was *melik*, land owned by individuals or families under customary law. The *Loi Warnier* reduced tribal land (*arch*) to one-fifth and the *melik* to two-fifths. The settlers possessed a quarter of the arable land (Map 5 shows the extent of European agricultural holdings in Algeria.) Another two-fifths of the land which previously had been under native customary law was brought under French law. The appropriation of land becomes relevant when it is examined; the land came under European possession. The most fertile land in Algeria was located in Mitidja, the Algerian plain and sahel, Philippeville (now Skikda), and Orania.

The expropriation of land and the interruption of indigenous social institutions followed the redistribution of land between the indigenous populations and the new settlers.

Table 7 indicates that eighty to ninety percent of the fertile land in Algeria was reallocated to the settlers. In these agricultural areas, less than ten percent was left to the indigenous population.

Land expropriation brought about far-reaching consequences to Algerian society; the interruption of pre-colonial economic and social structures was put into motion. Economically, the proportion of land available to indigenous inhabitants for cultivation of cereals was reduced, and this had an effect also on other economic activities, such as pastoralism, which was supplementary to the way of life of rural inhabitants. Consequently, commercial and artisan activities in the rural areas began to decline. For example, in 1917 French

MAP 5

ALGERIA: GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF EUROPEAN AGRICULTURAL HOLDINGS



Source: Roger Murray and Tom Wengrey, *New Left Review* 22(1963):30-31.

TABLE 7

EUROPEAN LAND

(Algeria's Most Fertile Land)

	Over 80%	Over 90%
Mitidja	x	
Algerian plains and sahel		x
Annaba plains	x	
Philippeville (Skikda)	x	
Orania	x	

Source: Roger Murray and Tom Wengrey, *New Left Review* 22(1963):25.

colonialism forced the Tuareg to abandon central Sahara, due to confiscation of forests in the western Sahara, with less possibility of grazing land. All over Algeria, colonial assaults were felt. Many inhabitants of rural areas were forced to immigrate to towns and abroad.

The expropriation of land undoubtedly put an end to social institutions of pre-colonial Algerian society. As a senior militant explained in one of my interviews (1976):

> الترابط القبلي ترابطا متينا ، [٢٧] وعندما ابتدأت الحملة الفرنسية ، توجهت في البداية
> الى تفكيك هذا الترابط حتى لا يبقى اى تماسك بين افراد القبائل ، اى خلق تفكك
> وبما ان الاستعمار الفرنسي كان في الاساس استعمارا استيطانيا ، فمن بين العوامل
> التي اثرت في تفكك القبائل او الروح القبلية ، هو ان فرنسا احتلت الاراضي فانفصلت
> المجتمعات القبلية لطلب الرزق ، وتفككت القبائل وذهبت الى جهات اخرى في طلب
> الرزق ، والبعض منهم ذهب الى المدن ، والبعض الاخر احتمى بالجبال ، والجبال
> ليست بها اراضي او غيرها للعيش فيها ، وهذا ما حمل المجتمع القبلي يتفكك شيئا
> فشيئا ، اثناء عملية الاستيطان الفرنسي"

Translation:

> Since the intention of French colonialism was to settle the Algerian land and live there, their intention and goal was to break tribal unity. To accomplish this, the French occupied and confiscated the tribes' agricultural land and forced the people to leave and find other jobs to live on.
>
> As a result of this, the tribes were divided and many individuals went to the big cities to make a living, and some people occupied the bare mountains and lived under severe poverty conditions. (Abucar, field notes, 1976)

The dehumanization of the individual was another result. To complete such a process, it was within the discretionary power of the colonizer to remove the work of the colonized completely. Since most peasants lived on the land, the expropriation of land, therefore, had the greatest consequences on the lives of individual peasants. The expropriation of land was the main thrust of French colonial policy in Algeria.

Most of the literature on urbanization and industrialization concentrates on such aspects as "pull-and-push" factors. This underemphasizes very much the political forces which compel people to leave their homes and families. It was not the desire of the Algerian peasant to leave his home and his fields. It was the colonial power which forced the peasant to abandon his traditional social setting. In section E of this chapter the peasant resistance against colonialism is analyzed.

Social dislocation took place in various forms, which is noticeable in the composition of present dwellers in towns and villages in Algeria. The first, and the most commonly referred to in the literature on French colonialization in Algeria, is that of the politics of regroupment. This consisted of removing a large number of people from their own villages and resettling them in other parts under the surveillance of the army.

A second form of dislocation was to force migration to neighbouring states, such as Tunisia and Morocco. Anyone visiting these two countries will encounter Algerians who involuntarily made their homes there, although a large number of these migrants joined the war of liberation and returned to Algeria. During my stay I encountered many such people who had married Tunisians and Moroccans.

Colonial dislocation has affected the whole region of North Africa, but Algerian emigration into neighbouring countries during the colonial period is far greater than emigration from any of the neighbouring countries. Many Algerians were forced to leave their country. Algerians emigrated not only into nearby countries but also to the Near East and to Europe.

Such dislocation brings about an interruption of family life. Single parents become common during colonial domination. Able-bodied men are taken away from their mode of life or drawn into regroupment areas all over Algeria. And some of them were massacred; the military occupation started by destroying the villages and burning the crops. Instances of such situations have been recorded in the notebooks of French army officers. Marshall Bugeaud, commander of the French forces, described such a situation as follows:

> More than fifty fine villages, built of stone and roofed with tiles, were destroyed. Our soldiers made very considerable pickings there. We did not have time in the heat of combat to chop down the trees. The task in any case would have been beyond our strength. Twenty thousand men armed with axes could not in six months cut down the olives and fig trees covering the beautiful landscape that lay at our feet. (Clegg, 1971, p. 24)

From 1830 to 1963, Senatus-consulate, an ordinance to redress the inequities of 1844-1846 which identified property rights with the Islamic Turkish state, was created. French colonialism wanted to replace traditional political institutions by creating new property rights and administrative boundaries, such as the *Douar* (Murray, 1963, p. 24), which were less articulated with traditional institutions such as tribal units.

It is often recorded in colonial literature that the colonizer set up artificial boundaries in Africa which in no way represent the original boundaries of the inhabitants of the area. Such a situation is commonly the source of conflict between African countries. Many contemporary problems in the continent have their origin from colonialist domination. In an Algerian context, both internal and external rearrangements of traditional boundaries have produced much of the tension between Algeria and Morocco following Algerian independence: a prime cause of this tension is the colonial legacy. However, as regards the internal situation, French colonialism tended to reduce social cohesion and units within traditional society by creating amalgamations and disintegrations of the basic units of traditional society. By bringing together several previously distinct units, an intensification of conflict is created among them, so that French colonialism could prevail. "Divide and rule!"

In 1912, the whole North African region came under French domination: Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. Each of these three countries has had a different colonial experience. Algeria had a much longer period of colonial domination compared to Morocco and Tunisia, as Table 8 indicates.

TABLE 8

COLONIAL DOMINATION

	French Invasion	Lasted until:	Duration (years)
Algeria	1831	1962	132
Tunisia	1881	1956	75
Morocco	1912	1956	44

Source: M. Abucar, field notes, 1976.

Colonial bondage was much more intensive in Algeria than in any of the other countries. Obviously this does not mean that Morocco and Tunisia have not suffered from colonialism; of course they did. However, the time span of colonial bondage and dehumanization varied among these countries. Colonialism lasted 132 years in Algeria, 75 years in Tunisia, and 44 years in Morocco.

French colonial practice was not at all homogeneous in North Africa and other parts of Africa. In Algeria, the objective of French colonialism was the total destruction of indigenous institutions, mass resettlement, and a capitalist agrarian economy.

Colonial practice in Morocco and Tunisia was not similar to that in Algeria. French colonialism acknowledged the cultural heritage of Morocco and Tunisia while denying the existence of the Algerian nation and its culture. Even so, colonial practices in Morocco and Tunisia were not homogeneous; the Moroccan monarchy enjoyed autonomy within the colonial structure, which led to the continuation of peasant exploitation by both the monarchy and French colonialism. French colonialism tended to reinforce the ancient court and to assist the monarchy in modernizing the sultan's administrative machinery, which was diminishing in importance prior to French occupation. Both the monarch and French colonialism became beneficiaries of the colonial enterprise, in the sense that peasant resistance against French occupation was offset by acceptance of the Sultan's authority.

Unlike Morocco, the Tunisian dynasty did not benefit from colonial conquest. The conditions of colonial practice led the country into a succession of rulers and never provided the same security given to the Moroccan monarchy. The source of the deterioration and insecurity experienced by Tunisian rulers was the assimilated petite bourgeoisie of native origin, who assumed importance between World War I and World War II. Because of their association with the colonial system, they became spokesmen of Tunisian society vis-à-vis the colonial system.

Unlike Morocco and Tunisia, French colonial practice seems to be different, as Hermassi indicates:

> The dismantlement of Algerian political structures was accompanied by the refusal to recognize Algeria both as a nation and as a specific culture. In a country in which religious tradition included no institutionalized clergy and in which nationalists were demanding the separation of religion and state, France preferred to create an Islamic clergy which it trained in a series of improvised schools. Although it professed to be secular, France tried, in fact, to base its rule on brotherhoods, or cults of saints, thereby trying to revive the most obscurantist and primitive forms of religious life. (Hermassi, 1972, p. 72)

Apart from differences in colonial experiences, the Maghreb society is homogeneous in ethnic and cultural background. Most of the inhabitants of the region are Berbers or Arabs, and it is difficult at present to distinguish between Arabs and Berbers. Although Berber culture persisted in many rural areas, most of the Berbers became arabized.

Algeria has a strong underlying affinity in culture and religion with Morocco and Tunisia.

F. COLONIAL SETTLEMENT

A nucleus from France was the initial group that created colonization in Algeria. These people were brought together by different situations that had come about in metropolitan France, such as:

> "the parasites of the July monarchy" armies, the beaten proletarians of 1848, and the unemployed of the Ateliers Nationaux, political deportees of 1851, Alsatians made homeless in 1871, French wine-growers ruined by phylloxera, the Italo-Slav flotsam thrown up by Italian unification, the opening of the Suez Canal and the Balkan war, and refugees from Spain and two World Wars. (Murray and Wengraf, 1963, p. 2)

French colonialism in Algeria, among other purposes, operated to resolve certain internal political tensions of the metropolis. Charles X, who initiated the Algerian conquest, was in a bad political situation at home. From 1830 to 1870, France experienced five different governments. Charles X was succeeded by Louis-Philippe, who left the country after eighteen years in power. The Third Republic was proclaimed at the end of the Franco-Prussian war.

At the time of the French military conquest of Algeria, major decisions were to be made concerning subsequent developments in the internal situation in France. Most French people were obsessed with the national question, and lesser attention was given to French colonization in Algeria. The government's appeal to set a French settlement in Algeria did not attract great enthusiasm from the people. The French government turned its attention to recruiting settlers from the eastern Mediterranean countries.

Unlike French colonial policy in the rest of Africa, the French conquest of Algeria was interested from the start in establishing a settlement scheme as a basis for consolidating French military conquest. This human deposit was not necessarily French in origin but was brought from many parts of the Mediterranean basin, to simplify the colonial conquest. After forty-one years of French conquest, more than half of the Europeans who had settled in Algeria were not French by origin but were Spaniards, Italians, and Maltese.

In general, colonizers and settlers were not homogeneous groups. But historical experience suggests that, very often, such groups develop a common ethos which unites them vis-à-vis indigenous populations. Unlike colonialism, colonial settlement has distinctive characteristics, somewhat different from colonialism.

In the context of colonialism, the opposing forces are the alien power and the traditional elite of the indigenous population. A relationship which was originally a trading relationship will certainly give way to conquest. In such a situation one of the chieftains of West Africa once remarked:

> I am not insensible to the high honour which your great master the Chief of Portugal has this day conferred upon me. His friendship I have always endeavoured to merit by the strictness of my dealings with the Portuguese and by my constant exertions to procure an immediate landing for the vessels. But never until this day did I observe such a difference in the appearance of his subjects; they have hitherto been meanly attired; were easily contented with the commodity they received; and so far from wishing to continue in this country, were never happy until they could complete their landing and return. Now I remark a strange difference. A great number, richly dressed, are anxious to be allowed to build houses, and to continue among us. Men of such eminence, conducted by a commander who from his own account seems to have descended from the God who made day and night, can never bring themselves to endure the hardships of this climate; nor would they here be able

> to procure any of the luxuries that abound in their own country. The passions that are common to us all will therefore inevitably bring on disputes; and it is far preferable that both our nations should continue on the same footing as they have hitherto done, allowing your ships to come and go as usual; the desire of seeing each other occasionally will preserve peace between us. The sea and the land being always neighbours are continually at variance, and contending who shall give way; the sea with great violence attempting to subdue the land, and the land with equal obstinacy resolving to oppose the sea. (Budu-Acquah, 1961, p. 16)

In a colonial settlement, opposing forces are not limited to two but involve rather three or more different opposing groups: indigenous populations, settlers, and colonizers. Settlers or colonizers are not one, as colonial history shows. At the turn of the eighteenth century, former colonized settlements such as America, New Zealand, and Australia became independent from the metropolis. The settlers in Algeria tried to be independent from France in the 1950s; at the same time, they deny the rights of indigenous populations to exist, so the settlers are caught between two forces: the French metropolitan government and the native elite. However, the objective of the metropolitan government was not different from that of the settlers, because each wanted to maintain its hegemony over the indigenous population.

Algeria was a colonial settlement *par excellence*; a more recent example on the African continent is Rhodesia. In colonial settlement, one culture becomes dominant. In Algeria, French culture became the universal culture among the settlers; in Rhodesia, English culture. In each circumstance, the settlers, within a generation, became citizens of the colonizer. For example, in Algeria, settlers of non-French origin were allowed to obtain French citizenship and to attend French schools. In short, settlers were given the basic human rights, while the majority of the indigenous population was denied any rights whatsoever.

Colonial settlement creates a situation not observed in other types of colonialism; groups of European settlers originally were from different ethnic and religious backgrounds. The presence of a non-French population, particularly drawn from eastern Mediterranean countries, within colonial society raised issues with the colonizer; they were not part of the colonized population of colonial society but were a sub-population within the colonizer group. In 1848, at the end of the defeat of colonized resistance, the colonizer faced the problem of meeting the demands of the non-French population in Algeria. Their demand was for total assimilation into the French population in the colonial settlement.

In 1889, the French government issued a law which allowed the non-French population to become French citizens. At the time, the settlers were extended all legal privileges given in any French province, including taxes and duties. The economic structure of the settlers was not independent of the metropolis, and major decisions affecting their lives were made in France. The interests of the metropolis were first, and settlers' interests were second. Their agricultural produce could enter France only when it was not in competition with local products.

What maintained social cohesion among the settlers was that they were in a privileged position vis-à-vis the indigenous population, even though the settlers were not a closely structured society. A relative assimilation was achieved where French culture and colonial policy were accepted and practised by the majority of the settlers. In the 1950s, colonial statistics showed that only 18.5 percent of the population were born outside Algeria.

Institutional racism, as it is commonly known in more advanced capitalist economies such as the United States, and colonial settlement, as in South Africa, appeared in Algeria during French colonialism. The social, political, and economic advancement of the majority of settlers meant deterioration and dehumanization for most of Algeria's indigenous population. Virtually all the jobs in the cities were in the hands of the settlers. There was a great disparity of income between the settlers and the indigenous inhabitants; jobs unwanted by settlers were given to indigenous inhabitants, whose wages were often below the minimum standards of living. This point will be elaborated in a later chapter of this study.

The settlers wished to maintain what they had achieved by violence. Most paying jobs were reserved for settlers who were known as "pieds-noirs." Major cities in Algeria were exclusively inhabited by them.

Institutional racism is manifest in many aspects of colonial structure, such as education, health, and the economy. As regards education and illiteracy, for example, the enrolment in secondary schools in 1952 was 28,178, of which one-fifth were Algerians. Similarly for university education: the settlers had one student per 300 inhabitants, while the Algerians had one student per 15,000 inhabitants. This shows a marked difference between the Algerians and the settlers in educational achievement. Equally, it shows that the percentage of illiterates was higher among Algerians than among settlers: in 1950 the illiteracy ratio was ninety percent for Algerians and six percent for settlers (see Table 9).

TABLE 9

EDUCATION OPPORTUNITY:
COMPARISON BETWEEN FRENCH ALGERIAN AND MOSLEM ALGERIAN

	Illiterates, as Percent of Population (1950)	Those Receiving Primary Education, as Percent of Population (1954)
Algerian "Moslems"	90	19
Algerian "French"	6	100

Source: Roger Murray and Tom Wengrey, 1963, p. 26.

French colonial policy was that, out of regard for the settlers, the indigenous population was not allowed either to receive French education or the Arabic schooling which they had enjoyed in the past. French colonial policy downgraded indigenous Arabic culture systematically by creating cultural pauperization. In 1938 the French colonial government in Algeria established Arabic by law as a "foreign language."

This colonial legacy is a persisting factor in the contemporary life of Algeria, and it is not surprising to encounter people who cannot read or write in French or in Arabic. This is very common among adults. Among one hundred agricultural workers whom I interviewed, only five could read, although some of them are learning how to read and write Arabic at their place of work.

G. NATIONAL STRUGGLE AND COLONIALISM

The historical evolution of Algeria's national struggle against colonialism suggests three stages: (1) the social protest movement, which is a peasant-based movement with religious and tribal organization as a means of creating national unity; (2) a national political organization, led by middle-class professionals who oppose the alien power in order to obtain concessions; and (3) a national state, led by bureaucrats, peasants, workers, intellectuals, and the national bourgeoisie, who seek economic independence by establishing a new economic order. The first two aspects of historical evolution of the national struggle are discussed in this chapter; the third aspect will be dealt with in Part II of this study.

National struggle was not only directed against Turkish domination but also against French domination and against collaborators with Turkish and French domination as well. In its first form, national struggle started in 1830 as social protest, led by a religious leader known as Emir Abdel Kader. It was the first attempt to unify the various tribes of Algeria into one nation based on the principle of "Dar el Islam" as opposed to "Dar el Harb." The Islamic theologian distinguished two homes within the world: home for peace and home for war.

There were several varieties of social protest, and these included: (1) the movement against foreign domination, which was not only a religious movement but in essence a peasant movement protesting the appropriation of the most fertile land in the country by a small foreign group; (2) the movement intended to preserve the traditional national culture of Algerian society, which, in fact, involved various representative social groups, including a minority of foreign origin, for example the Turks, who had become part of Algerian society; and (3) movements which were organized in line with the social structure of traditional society, with, however, the underlying ideology of the movement being not tribal but religious.

Both the Turkish and the French practised land expropriation as a means of consolidating their conquest. However, French domination was much harsher than Turkish. In fact, French expropriation of land in Algeria was felt by all of society and had far more consequences than Turkish expropriation. The Turks took land from the peasants, gave concessions to the Beys in the form of private property, and placed large areas of land under public ownership. French colonialism gave peasant land as a free concession to the settlers and also expropriated land belonging to religious foundations. Land expropriated is indicated in Table 10.

During the Turkish domination of Algeria, of course, they Bey took land from the peasants, and most of these lands were located in the more fertile part of Algeria. But at the same time the Turks accepted coexistence and tolerated the peasants' cultivation of their land, if they could pay the taxes imposed on them by the Beys. The following quotation demonstrates how the peasant felt under Turkish domination:

> We have been pushed back on land most of which is yet uncleared. We have not been so unhappy since the time of the Turks, because a large part of our people were established on those beylik lands which have always been the best and the best irrigated. It is time that we had only use rights to these lands; but certainly we cultivated them and they always produced a great deal more than the terrain we occupy today. There we work, but we have not yet succeeded in putting them into proper condition for cultivation. (Nouschi, 1961, 386-387)

Before Turkish domination, the peasant had more land and produced more without paying any taxes. In reality, most of the land expropriated by the Turks, never cultivated by the Beys themselves, represented various forms of landholding, as Table 11 indicates. The Beys' lands

TABLE 10

LAND APPROPRIATION POLICY

Colonial States	Colonial Method		Land Appropriated by Colonial States				
	Protectorate	Colonial Settlement	Bey	Tribal	Family	Religious	Grazing
Turks	x		x		x		
French		x		x	x	x	x

Source: M. Abucar, field notes, 1976.

TABLE 11

FORMS OF LANDHOLDING BY BEYS

Land Categories	Administration	Individual Private Use	Turkish Army
(1) *Melik* land		x	
(2) *Beylik* land	x		
(3) *Azel* land			x

Source: M. Abucar, field notes, 1976.

Note: X = forms of landholding.

were divided into three categories: (1) *melik* land—land given for individual use, but with the right of property ownership resting with the ruler; (2) *beylik* land—land coming under the jurisdiction of the administrative districts into which Algeria was divided under Turkish domination; the land which fell under this category was administered by the Beys and cultivated by corvées enlisted from neighbouring tribes or, if the Beys wished, by sharecroppers; and (3) *azel* land—land confiscated from a tribe who had offered resistance to Turkish domination, falling into two types, agricultural and pastoral lands; these lands were given to Algerian families who served the Turkish army.

Besides these three categories of landholding, there was tribal land which came under the jurisdiction of the ruler. However, the land belonged to the tribe; the inheritable right was given to the one who cultivated it, and whatever he produced remained exclusively his own property.

The French seized both Bey lands and tribal lands and also the grazing land and land pertaining to religious foundations. In doing so, the French certainly violated rights existing among the tribes using the grazing land and use rights attached to religious foundations. Such colonial practices which violated the values of the existing society became intolerable for peasant and religious leader alike.

Removal of land from the hands of the indigenous population and putting it at the disposal of settlers not only took agricultural land from the indigenous population but also destroyed pastoral land. In North Africa and elsewhere in Africa, land in the form of agricultural and pastoral land is a social and economic institution. It brings together large numbers of people, and traditions are established governing its use and appropriation. Thus, French colonial conquest in Algeria put to an end the basic institutional rights governing the relationships between individual and society.

Furthermore, both Turkish and French domination in Algeria introduced a tax system to the area. The Turks charged every peasant two percent of his total yield. It was practically possible, under such circumstances, for a peasant to lose his land by not meeting the demands of the ruler. French colonialism in Algeria adopted two types of taxes: a heavy tax imposed on areas where social protest was frequently encountered, and a light tax in areas of less resistance to French colonialism. In the protest areas, besides the heavy tax, large numbers of the people were removed from their districts, and their lands were given to the settlers. Some of these peasants were pushed onto non-arable land or left without any alternative.

The reasons behind social protest in Algeria are more complex than some people have thought in depicting it. In fact, French colonialism in Algeria penetrated the social fabric of society, the economic institutions, and the social and cultural institutions. Therefore, the social protest movements led by Emir Abdel Kader and El Mograni were not tribal revolts against colonialism but, rather, peasant uprisings, since most of the issues which the conflict revolved around involved the basic institutions and belief systems of the peasants.

Unlike the Turkish domination of Algeria, French colonialism tended to destroy purposely the basic institutions of Algerian society. Table 12 indicates the character of social organization in Algerian society during Turkish domination, the French colonial period, and the resistance movements, particularly Emir Abdel Kader's era.

TABLE 12

THE EVOLUTIONARY SCHEME OF ALGERIAN SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

	Tribal Structure	Intermediate Group	Settlers	Surplus Appropriation
Turkish domination	Status quo	New element		Tribute
French domination	Breakdown	New element	Colonial society	Capitalist mode
Emir Abdel Kader	Reformist			Tribute

Source: M. Abucar, field notes, 1976.

The Turks were not interested in any way in changing the social organization of Algerian society. They were interested in maintaining certain political and religious influences in the area, in order to pay tribute to the Ottoman empire. However, the Turks were the first to create a group which remained faithful during Turkish rule in Algeria. This group occupied a privileged position in relation to the total indigenous population. Unfortunately, sociological analysis and historical information concerning how such a group was formed is missing in most of the literature. It seems that intermediate groups were recruited among those who showed strong sympathy and loyalty to Turkish rule. The group was selected from the leaders of traditional society, who offered to the Beys their children and members of their tribes for service in the Turkish army. In some cases, the Turks, in order to create rivalries between traditional leaders, favoured and gave concessions to one tribal group against another in order to win their sympathy and collaboration. This illustrates the principle of divide and rule—often referred to as the cornerstone of colonial policy in Africa and elsewhere.

Similarly, French colonial policy followed to a certain extent the Turkish policy of divide and rule. However, the French replaced the groups that were loyal to Turkish administration in Algeria with new groups recruited from traditional society. The way these groups were recruited was no different from the methods used by the Turks. For all intents and purposes, however, French colonialism in Algeria maintained a constant policy of interruption of the social structure and the organization of pre-colonial society without providing any alternative. Chapter 6 examines these changes. In contrast, Turkish domination in Algeria maintained most of the status quo with little relative modification of traditional structure.

Intermediate groups such as developed by both the Turkish and French administrations did not exist before their conquests of Algeria.

These groups gradually evolved a new aristocracy which acquired economic and political power, along with a social prestige not known in pre-colonial society, and they grew at the cost of total pauperization of Algerian society.

The Algerians who became assimilated into either Turkish or French colonial systems were drawn from the groups having access to association with alien institutions. This undermined traditional authority and brought about a group representing a new social institution. This group had the function of levying taxes on the peasant on behalf of the Turkish and French colonial administration. In return, they received secure tenure of land and the right to represent the Algerian people. Their children were given access to French or Turkish education. The presence of this group and their children is still noticeable in contemporary Algerian society.

Uneven educational attainment and income disparity among the indigenous population originated during colonial domination. These developments led to internal polarization. From this analysis it becomes evident why social protest led by peasant and religious leaders was directed not only towards the alien ruler but also towards the new class created by the colonial system.

؛ هذا من ناحية ، ومن ناحية التراث الثقافي فان اول شيء يربط بين افراد المجتمع الجزائرى هو احساسهم بانهم ابناء وطن واحد وهذا الاحساس رايناه في مرحلة المقاومة ، مقاومة الامير عبد القادر الذى انطلق من قبيلة استطاع في مدة وجيزة ان ينشر فكرة المقاومة والروح الوطنية الى اكثر من ثلثي البلاد الجزائرية ، في ذلك الوقت ، فقد خلق الاحتلال الاجنبي مناطق جديدة = ونظرة جديدة في الوطن ، وروحا جديدة ، والنظرة الوطنية ، وبعد المقاومة التي قام بها الامير عبد القادر ، كانت هناك مقاومات اخرى اقل ، ولكن هذا اوصل الشعب الجزائرى شيئا فشيئا الى نتيجة اساسية وهو في اول القرن 19 اصبح يحس بان الروح الوطنية اصبح لها كيانا وترابطا وتلاحظا بين افراد المجتمع تجاه الاحتلال الاجنبي .

ثم بدأت فعلا الحركة التحررية بالمفهوم العصرى ، في اوائل القرن الحالي بدأت هذه الروح تسيطر فعلا على المجتمع الجزائرى ومن ثم انطلقت الحركات السياسية ، التي كانت نتيجتها ثورة نوفمبر المجيدة ، فالشعب الجزائرى اذا كشعب فلاح زراعي يعيش على الزراعة اساسا ، وله قيم واخلاق المزارعين ككل المزارعين في العالم ، عرف انه لا يمكن ان يسترجع أرضه التي سلبت منه الا اذا كان غير نظرته القديمة ، النظرة القبلية المحدودة الى نظرة شاملة واسعة وهي النظرة الوطنية والتلاحم الوطني ، وهكذا استطاع هذا المجتمع القبلي ان ينسلخ عن الاطار الضيق شيئا فشيئا ، الى الاطار الواسع ، وكانت طبعا ثورة نوفمبر في الاساس ثورة الفلاحين الجزائريين الى جانب العناصر الاخرى مثل الطبقة العاملة

Translation:

> As for the cultural background, the most important factor (element) that ties the Algerian society together is the feeling that prevails among these people that they belong to one nation.
>
> Their feelings of belonging to one nation were very apparent during the resistance period, which was led by Abdel Kader. Abdel Kader was a native of an Algerian tribe, but he was able to spread his revolutionary ideas to more than two-thirds of the Algerian population in a relatively short time. His ideas were resistance against French settlement and patriotism. There were other revolutionary movements after Abdel Kader's on smaller scales in comparison to his major movement. These revolutionary movements had further effects in that they formulated the revolutionary trend and direction among the Algerian people at the beginning of the nineteenth century.
>
> The liberation movement began in the first half of the twentieth century and led to the political movements. The result of that was the (glorious) November Revolution.
>
> Algerian society is primarily agricultural—and most Algerians were peasants; they share the same ethical values and the same characteristics of the farmers in the world.
>
> The Algerian peasants knew beforehand they would never be able to restore their stolen land unless they changed their attitudes from the ideas of belonging to tribes to that of belonging to one nation.
>
> This new attitude (from the small limited tribal point of view) is one of belonging to one cohesive society that composes the whole society.
>
> Thus, the Algerian Revolution was primarily the revolution of the peasants, along with other groups such as the labour group and others. (Abucar, field notes, 1976)

Emir Abdel Kader (1847-1939) was the first to create national unity and bring about an awareness of the colonial situation. This unity was based on bringing together various tribes into one nation. At the same time, the movement was determined to fight against French colonialism and the natives associated with it. During this struggle, Emir Abdel Kader developed a social organization intent on creating a national society within the traditional structure of the pre-colonial society. For the purposes of unifying the various tribes for Algerian society, religious leadership was considered as the only force in maintaining a balance. Social organization had six levels of political, social, and religious articulation. It was organized along vertical lines, in contrast to tribal organization, which was based on horizontal organization in respect to each other's tribe. In this sense, it is often said that during Emir Abdel Kader's era, Algeria entered a period of reform and the beginning of the transition of Algerian society from a society based on tribal structure to one based on the concept of Algeria as a nation. Diagram 1 indicates the social organization of Algeria during Emir Abdel Kader's era.

At the bottom of the pyramid in the diagram are the representatives of the tribes. They were represented by their Sheikhs. These Sheikhs had received recognition from their own tribal and local communities. At the top of the pyramid is located the leader of the Islamic community. This is a combination of tribal and religious institutions, in order to give an ideological and social representation of Algerian society in its struggle against foreign conquest and native collaborators with the alien ruler.

DIAGRAM 1

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF ALGERIA UNDER EMIR ABDEL KADER



Source: Eric R. Wolf, 1968, p. 218.

Both the Turkish and the French, during their domination in Algeria, built into the social organization of Algerian society a check-and-balance system which definitely maintained the interests of the colonial system by promoting a balance among tribes, under the influence of the large tribes, because these latter could upset such a balance.

H. POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE COLONIAL SITUATION

Colonial societies which have hitherto existed in Africa and elsewhere have shown the emergence of two distinct societies: settlers and indigenous inhabitants. Each of these societies presents certain distinctive characteristics of culture, religion, economic and financial institutions, political systems, and technology. Of course, these characteristics do not necessarily create a colonial situation; rather, it is the classes within society that create a colonial situation.

The colonizer is an extension of the metropolis, representing and glorifying the institutions of the centre—economic, financial, cultural, and religious. Within the colonized society, there are three classes: upper, middle, and lower. But in the colonial situation these classes appear as one, seen in terms of the totality. This distinction has to do with the position they occupy within the colonial economy.

In the Algerian situation, settlers, occupying the lowest level of the colonizing society, felt they were better than the colonized people. The mystification created by the colonial situation undermines class relationships in society. The colonized society is an extension of the centre. The predominant socio-economic formation is communal ownership. Most of the inhabitants are involved in peasant agriculture.

In a colonial situation, the periphery eventually tends to organize itself in order to get out of the colonial situation. Political parties emerge with a clear-cut political programme for achieving concessions or political independence from the centre. As experience suggests, the local colonizers (settlers) are the first to resist any concessions being given to the colonized natives. This has been the case in Algeria.

The Algerian experience suggests that the colonial situation intends purposely to undermine the inherited social structure of society. However, the colonial system has not been able to destroy completely the traditional social relations and values nor to generate a coherent new social structure. In all colonial history everywhere in Africa, the impact of the colonial situation has been partial, and that is why the phenomenon of heterogeneity is a concomitant of the colonial situation in Africa. Heterogeneity takes different forms: physically, it creates an uneven regional growth; socially, it creates distinctive and subordinate social classes, such as the petite bourgeoisie or professional strata, commercial intermediaries, a small land-owning elite, and the proletariat. Culturally, the old literary standards begin gradually to disappear. The nature of this class relationship is examined in Chapter 6.

The colonial situation is capable only of generating national struggle, which is totally different from class struggle. The struggle of the local periphery against the local elite is a national struggle. Both the settler and the indigenous inhabitant are victimized by the metropolitan centre. The alternatives open in such situations are several. First, the indigenous inhabitants may be absorbed within the prevailing system by giving them equal opportunity and a fair share within the system. This approach has never been accepted by settlers in Africa or elsewhere.

A second approach, which is much more prevalent in colonial encounters, is to let the indigenous inhabitants partially acculturate into the way of life of the settlers. This is done by missionary education and by extending the religion and language of the settlers to indigenous inhabitants, while at the same time accepting social and economic coexistence with the indigenous population.

A third approach, also much more commonly practised in colonial situations, is parallel development. The indigenous inhabitants are condemned to an inferior position within the colonial system. This approach differs from the second approach because of its racial emphasis and because it assigns the natives to a defined geographical setting determined unilaterally by the settlers.

A fourth approach is destruction of the indigenous institutions, forcing the natives to retreat into isolated mountains or regions, while permitting acculturation among those natives who collaborate with the settlers in crushing the aspirations of the indigenous population.

The national struggle in Algeria against the colonial situation started as social protest, as described above. In a later stage of Algeria's national struggle against the colonial situation, different forms and policies have been assumed, all aimed at solving the contradictions between the indigenous population and the settlers on the one hand and between the centre and the periphery on the other.

Between the two world wars and during the post-World War II period, Algeria's political history entered a new stage. Several factors were responsible. During and after World War II, for the first time, Algerians were recruited to work in factories in France and to join the French army. At the same time, political advancement led to the representation of Algerians in local and communal assemblies. The latter were a political base for the colonial petite bourgeoisie, who began to form a new intermediate group between the masses of native inhabitants and the settlers.

From this social regroupment emerged three groups with distinct political tendencies. The first group were those who subscribed to the idea of assimilation with minimum cultural autonomy. They represented the new colonial petite bourgeoisie, such as the legal administrative staff of colonial institutions, the merchants and artisans, and the professionals. Undoubtedly most of this group were the fourth generation of the families who collaborated with Turkish and French administrations in Algeria and adopted French culture. The relationship between this group and the masses did not lead towards liberation from the yoke of colonial bondage. Rather, the underlying assumption was the integration of the masses into the mainstream of colonial institutions.

This first group was different in many ways from the masses. Educationally, they had access to schooling; economically, they had better incomes; culturally, they could claim affinities with the dominant colonial culture. They occupied a lower position in relation to the settler but relatively better than the masses of the indigenous population.

The second group were those who vehemently rejected any kind of assimilation and demanded political independence from France. They represented those who had come into contact with capitalist institutions—Algerian workers in France and the Algerians who joined the French army. These groups were the first to establish a political organization outside Algeria. Etoile Nord-Africaine was created in 1924 among the Algerians in France. Table 13 indicates the appearance of political parties and trade union organizations in Algeria from 1924 to 1954.

A third political tendency was represented by those religious and traditional leaders who sought national unity based on existing

TABLE 13

POLITICAL PARTIES

Date	Organization	Political Orientation	Objective
1924	Etoile Nord-Africaine	Left-nationalist	Independence
1927	Fédération des Elus	Right-nationalist	Assimilation
1932	Association of the Ulemas	Traditionalist-nationalist	Arabization/Islam
1936	Union Populaire Algérienne		
1937	Parti du Peuple Algérien	Left-nationalist	Independence
1956	Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens	Socialist-nationalist	Independence
1946	Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques	Left-nationalist	Independence
1946	L'Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien	Right-nationalist	Autonomy within French system
1947	L'Organisation Spéciale	Nationalist	Independence
1947	Le Comité Révolutionnaire d'Unité et Action	Nationalist	Independence
1954	Le Front de Libération Nationale	Nationalist	Independence
1958	GPRA	Nationalist	Provisional government

Source: M. Abucar, field notes, 1976.

traditional social structures, with emphasis on Islam and the Arabic culture as opposed to westernization.

The setback of left-wing nationalism in Algeria was due partly to the international situation of the left-wing movement in Europe, where for a generation after World War I the dominant political tendency was socialism in one country, as adopted by the Third International.

The left-wing nationalist parties had difficulties operating in Algeria during the colonial period. However, the Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés participated in the municipal election of 1947 and had obtained thirty percent of the vote, while the right-wing nationalist Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien obtained twenty-seven percent of the vote.

Algerian political organization and activities depended a great deal on the political situation in France. The liberal caucus in France was more in favour of extending democratic institutions and associated civil rights to the colonized society—for example, the Blum-Violette proposal in 1936. At the beginning of World War II when France was defeated, the Vichy government crushed any political aspirations of the indigenous population of Algeria and suspended all political parties.

Following the defeat of Nazi Germany in Europe, a new political situation was created in France. At the end of World War II a socialist government came to power. For the first time, the metropolitan government of France entertained the idea of independence for Algeria, with the hope that Algeria would remain with France. Right-wing French liberals sought to give concessions to indigenous inhabitants of Algeria, by granting limited rights to the settlers without transforming the status quo.

In 1945, in the midst of this situation, General de Gaulle came to power, which seemed to strengthen the second alternative but at the same time intensified political and military solutions to the Algerian crises. However, political aspects came to outweigh the military. General de Gaulle called for negotiation between the representatives of the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) and the French government.

The Evian agreement of 15 March, 1962, paved the way for Algerian self-determination; to that effect, on 31 June, 1962, a referendum was called on the question of independence for Algeria. Algeria became independent on 5 July, 1962.

When these political factions began to emerge, the climate was not favourable for even minimum concessions with respect to the Algerian problem. However, three other forces anticipated the possibilities for Algerian independence. These were the revolutionaries, the intellectuals, and the military. The social base on which these forces relied was the peasant and the lumpenproletariat.

In contrast to the politicians, the revolutionaries did not come from a privileged position in the hierarchy of colonial society. Neither did they occupy important positions in the traditional structure of Algerian society. In fact, they were the proletariat of colonial society. However, some of them had had direct experience with colonial administration and performed different types of occupations. For example, they were teachers, soldiers in the French army, workers in processing industries and agriculture, and trade unionists. They associated in one way or another with the political parties. Many of them gained considerable experience with the Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA) and the Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD).

The MTLD was the only political party which maintained that political independence could not be obtained solely by peaceful means, without violence. In 1949 a paramilitary organization was created, known as the Organisation Spéciale, attached to the MTLD. The members of the group were drawn mainly from the revolutionaries, and some of the members of this organization became national heroes in Algeria after independence.

In the 1950s it became apparent that the political movements organized within the structure of colonial settlement were incapable of bringing about national independence. An alternative solution was to seek a broader organization that could bring together all the political organizations into one. On 1 November, 1954, the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) was set up. Membership in the FLN was open to all Algerians, provided they renounced their previous affiliations. The FLN gave precedence to individual affiliation over group affiliation, as a means of minimizing internal ideological conflict among the various political organizations existing at that time. The FLN called for unity first and ideology second.

The problem of internal ideological conflict has remained still unsolved in contemporary Algeria. The FLN, despite its adherence to individual membership rather than an amalgamation of the existing political parties, succeeded in bringing together politicians, revolutionaries, religious leaders, intellectuals, and the army.

The declaration of armed struggle on the part of the FLN necessitated the creation of six *wilaya* posts within the country. The men and women who led the insurrection in 1954 were drawn from the revolutionaries already engaged in urban guerilla warfare. In fact, in 1954, it is estimated that eighty percent of settlers were living in urban centres and only twenty percent were living in rural areas. Therefore, the real struggle of the liberation movement took place in the cities.

For the purposes of organization and coordination between internal and external struggle in the liberation movement, a Congress was called at Soumonam Valley, in the country, on 20 August, 1956. The outcome of this congress has been summarized by William B. Quandt (1956) as follows:

(1) Primacy of the interior over the exterior;

(2) Primacy of the political over the military;

(3) Collegial decision-making.

The main problem of the Algerian liberation movement was to secure independence and recognition from the French government without the partition of Algeria. Negotiations for settlement between the FLN and the French government were not possible without the French first acknowledging the Algerian nation. The political solution consisted of providing an option to French minorities in Algeria either to become Algerian citizens or maintain double nationality, redefining French-Algerian relations in terms of aid and cooperation in areas of economics, monetary policy, and social and cultural areas.

The Congress also approved the creation of the Conseil National de la Rėvolution Algérienne (CNRA) and the executive committee of five, the Comité de Coördination et Exécution (CCE). The CNRA consisted of members elected by congress, with five members for the CCE. Most members of the Council and Committee were drawn from the revolutionaries; politicians and religious leaders were among those who were less represented.

However, the situation was different in the GPRA, which was established in 1958 in Cairo, and the independent government of Algeria, established in 1962. Membership and participation of revolutionary groups in the GPRA, as well as in the formation of the Algerian government, has gradually decreased, while the membership of intellectual and military groups has increased since 1962 and the coup d'état of 19 June, 1965.

We shall now turn to the subject of Algerian nationalism in greater detail.

I. ALGERIAN NATIONALISM

There is a marked difference between Algerian nationalism during World War I and after World War II. In World War I it seems that the traditional elite attempted to accommodate French colonialism so much that their interests were taken into consideration. With the help of the traditional elite, particularly the Makhzens, who changed their allegiance from Turkish to French colonialism in one night, the colonial regime was assisted in recruiting soldiers for the French army. Algeria in this sense participated in World War I. As Abdalla Laroui puts it:

> The Maghrib fought beside France in the First World War. Algeria contributed 173,000 soldiers, whose courage was acclaimed in August 1914, and 25,000 of whom never returned; and moreover a third of the male population (119,000 men in 1919) went to France to replace drafted French workers in the factories. (Laroui, 1977, pp. 351-52)

The Makhzens received, in exchange for their collaboration with the colonial authorities, a comparable position to that which they held during the Turkish domination. During this period their lands were expanded, and they were given the right to tax the peasants as they wished. The traditional elite also received their share of the expropriation of the peasant lands by colonial authorities. The current literature on the subject of the traditional elite, particularly those of the feudal land type, presents two views in regard to this subject. There are those who hold that the feudal landlords who collaborated with France during the era of colonial occupation were feudal landlords who emerged during that period, and they were not necessarily representing the continuation of pre-colonial structure (Lacheraf, 1976). This implies that French colonialism was used to serve their purpose. The second view maintains that the history of the Maghreb suggests, in the case of Algeria, a pattern of foreign or native rulers supporting the rise of a class of big landowners. These "men were new, but the social group had been long in existence" (Laroui, 1977, p. 353). This implies that this class was the remnant of the pre-colonial structure.

In the urban area there was at that time an urban elite. This group enjoyed a privileged position, but in 1920 their condition began to worsen due to the hard taxes imposed upon them.

The uprising which took place in Algeria did not come from the landlords and the old merchants but from their external competitors, the Algerian peasant workers in France, the Young Algerians, and the educationalists such as the religious leaders. Emir Abdul Al-Kadir is one of the most remembered leaders of the religious movement. This movement was a rural-based movement. In 1912, the first group of Algerian graduates from the French schools set up an organization called the Young Algerians. This group had the opportunity of doing so because France was experiencing a military imbalance in Europe with Germany. At the same time, the population of Algeria was increasing. A manifesto was published which stated as follows:

> They offered to support the French project of extending conscription to Algeria in return for abolition of the Status of Native Laws and of the special taxes on Arabs, increased representation in the local Algerian assemblies, and the right to send deputies to the parliament in Paris. There are many who still characterize this program, then supported by French liberal circles, as assimilationist. It should be remembered, however, that at the time Algeria was already autonomous and such a program, if applied, could only have resulted in a change of majority, in other words, in an Algerian Algeria—not explicitly Arab or Moslem, to be sure, but at that stage the Young Algerians gave no more thought to the problem of national identity than did the Young Tunisians. In any event, the movement was weak (membership has been estimated at one thousand) and achieved none of its aims, except for the abolition of administrative internment. But its program formed the basis of the reforms of February-March 1919, imposed by Clemenceau on a reluctant Chamber of Deputies.*
> (Laroui, 1977, p. 362)

At the end of World War I, the educational stage of reform had ended. The years 1925 to 1930 marked a period of reflection and rethinking in Algerian society. Since that period, a new movement has emerged calling for Algerian national identity and protest against social exploitation. The most noticeable personalities during this period were the Sheikhs Ibn Badis al-Ugbi and Ibrahimi. These two religious leaders advocated Algerian national identity.

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*The number of Algerian Moslems eligible to vote was increased (421,000 for the local councils, municipal councils and jma'as; 130,000 for the general councils and Délégations Financières; the proportion of Moslem municipal councillors rose from one-quarter to one-third, and they were not entitled to participate in electing mayors; the number of departmental councillors rose to one-quarter of the total. Access to French citizenship remained contingent on renunciation of the personal status. Cf. Bernard, *L'Algérie*, pp. 493-495; Ageron, *Algériens musulmans*, Vol. II, pp. 1212-1227. (Laroui, 1977, p. 362)

Equally important during this period were the Algerian workers in France, who in 1923 (when they numbered 92,000) created the Etoile Nord-Africaine movement. In 1925 this movement demanded independence from France. Before and after World War II, particularly during 1937-1938, 1945-1949, and 1951-1954, the intensity of Algerian movements was greater than in any other period, because Algeria was completely integrated into the French metropolitan economy and because the social conditions of the peasant had worsened. Alexander Werth, who visited Algeria in the late 1950s, gives the following account:

> They know that our aims—social security, decent wages, etc.—are incompatible with the regime they are trying to perpetuate. As you know, the social legislation of France is not applied to Algeria. There are about two million unemployed in the country; in agriculture, the present "minimum wage" is 360 francs a day—but few work more than half the year—with luck. The French say these people are lazy; it's not true; there just isn't enough work for them. There are practically no family allowances, no social security, no accident insurance. . . . And when they do get work, they have to work damned hard for their 360 francs a day—12 or even 14 hours. It's not enough to keep themselves and their families alive. So masses of farm labourers ask the *colons* for advances; at the end of the year these have to be repaid—but how? Simply by going on working for the same boss. This indebtedness is something chronic and terrifying. There are entire families who have worked for the same landowner for generations. Oh, not *colons* only; a few rich Arab proprietors, too. It's truly medieval. . . . (Werth, 1957, p. 240)

At the end of the colonial era, it seems that all Algerians became united in order to oppose any form of colonial establishment, as this quotation indicates:

> What was the position in August 1956? For several months "pacification" had been in progress. The *quadrillage*—the division of the country into small military units, in which the show of French military strength was supposed to "persuade" the local populations of the towns and *douars* into loyalty and submission—had not succeeded. The French were up against something new—a kind of national unanimity among the Algerian masses they had not known before. Every Arab, almost without exception, had a soft spot for the

> Rebels, the National Liberation Front or at least for the remnants of the Messali movement. Every Arab had mental reservations, and saw an enemy in the Frenchman; and, to the French, every Arab was a potential assassin and *égorgeur*. (Werth, 1957, p. 328)

This was two years later, after the FLN called for armed resistance and the liberation movement intensified its armed struggle against the colonial establishment. The marked contradiction that existed between rural and urban Algeria began to disappear; as well, the tendency of some Algerians to cooperate with their colonial master began to weaken, but did not disappear. The war of liberation was waged on both sides, in rural and urban areas, and made the settlers feel too uncomfortable to remain in Algeria. The French colonial policy of divide and rule failed, due to the unwillingness of the loyal Algerians to support this policy in the end. At the end of 130 years of French colonialism in Algeria, the settlers as well as the French colonialists had experienced a total resistance of the people against colonialism and colonial settlement. The backbone of Algerian nationalism derived from the total negation of Algerian society by the settlers and French colonialism. Thus was produced a total rejection of colonialism by the colonizers. This, however, does not imply a homogeneity of the colonized or colonizer society, because in both societies existed a class structure. The unity of the colonized society existed because there was no future within the colonial system. As Abdallah Laroui puts it:

> One might say that in this totally repressed society, everything, even the ideal, was seen in retrospect. But colonial society did not stop with the repression of traditional groups; it engendered new groups which, though subordinate, experienced the world in the same way and looked out on the same horizon as the colonial bourgeoisie, though for them the horizon was closed. These groups saw things in a flat perspective that offered no view of a totally new future. This was the birthplace of "nationalism"

> in the usual sense of the term: caviling, making demands, but participationist, opposed to innovations. Unable to conceive of a postcolonial situation, these nationalists tried, long after the end of formal dependence, to reenact the colonial tragedy; the consequence is what is commonly known as neocolonialism. (Laroui, 1977, p. 370)

By tradition there existed religious aristocratic groups and aristocratic landowners such as the Makhzen (tribes who, in return for their allegiance to the Turkish government, received land and tax compensations) and those who collaborated with the French and in return received privileged positions within the colonial system for certain periods of time. The urban bourgeoisie consisted mainly of petite bourgeoisie, such as small landowners, shopkeepers, and teachers. The religious aristocracy were divided on colonial issues. There were those who collaborated with French colonialism and those who resisted it. The colonial repression affected all the strata of Algerian society, including the new social categories which were associated with the growth of colonial expansion, such as the liberal professions, the intellectuals, the urban proletariat, and the farm proletariat. These groups became conscious of the colonial situation, before and after World War II. The French government appealed to Algerian urban leaders in 1940 to join the war with the allied nations against Nazist and fascist regimes. Ferhat Abbas, who was the spokesman of the Algerian people at that time, welcomed the idea, but he inserted one condition: that the Algerian people would participate in the war if the French government in return would guarantee to the Algerian people human rights and liberties. The French government and the settlers refused to entertain the Algerian request. On 10 February, 1943, Ferhat Abbas issued the Manifeste du Peuple Algérien, in which he stated as follows:

We must, therefore, search outside the errors of the past and the out-dated formulae for a rational solution which will put an end to this secular conflict.

We are in North Africa, at the portals of Europe, and the civilized world is present at this anachronistic spectacle: a colonialism is exercised over a white race with a proud past, belonging to the Mediterranean race; and having manifest a sincere desire for progress.

Politically and morally, this colonialism can have no concept other than that of two societies, one foreign to the other. Its refusal, systematic or disguised, to give French citizenship to Algerian Moslems has discouraged the partisans of the policy of assimilation extended to the autochtones. This policy appears today in the eyes of all, as an inaccessible thing, a dangerous device placed at the service of colonialism.

The hour is passed when an Algerian Moslem will demand anything else than to be an Algerian Moslem. . . .

President Roosevelt, in his declaration made in the name of the Allies, has given the assurance that, in the organization of the New World, the rights of all peoples, big and small, will be respected.

Strengthened by this declaration, the Algerian People demand from now on:

(a) the condemnation and the abolition of colonialism; that is, the annexation and exploitation of one people by another people. This colonialism is only a collective form of the slavery of the Middle Ages. It is, besides, one of the principal causes of rivalries and conflagrations among the major powers.

(b) the application for all countries, small and large, of the right of peoples to dispose of themselves.

(c) the giving to Algeria of a constitution guaranteeing:

1. The absolute liberty and equality of all its inhabitants without distinction as to race or religion.
2. The suppression of feudal privilege by a major agrarian land reform and the right of well being, for the immense agricultural proletariat.
3. Recognition of Arabic as the official language, with the same position as French.
4. Liberty of the press and of assembly.
5. Free and compulsory education for children of both sexes.
6. Liberty of creed for all inhabitants and the application to all religions of the principle of the separation of church and state. (Hahn, 1960, pp. 142-43)

The French government and the settlers refused categorically the Algerian appeal. President Roosevelt, on behalf of the allies, declared that "in the organization of the new world, the rights of all peoples, big and small, will be respected."

Again on 26 May, 1943, in addition to the manifesto was added the creation of an independent Algeria and the call for an election by universal suffrage, open to all Algerian inhabitants. On 3 June, 1943, the French Committee of the National Committee of National Liberation rejected the Algerian demands and suggested that they would be examined after the war. However, to cool down the Algerian political situation, de Gaulle promulgated a series of reforms on 7 March, 1944, giving the Algerian people more representation in the local assembly and extending French citizenship to Algerians. At that time, however, it was too late for the Algerians to accept this change. At the allied celebrations of victory on 8 May, 1945, a demonstration was organized all over Algeria, renewing Algerian demands for independence. The most remembered encounter between the French army and the Algerian people was the Setif battle, during which hand-to-hand fighting took place. Thousands of Algerians lost their lives, and hundreds of French soldiers were killed. The French army carried out a mass massacre, by throwing the Algerians from high mountains near Setif. All over Algeria, mourning was declared on 8 May, 1945. During my visit to the Wilayat Setif, I journeyed to the locality where the massacre took place. There is today a monument commemorating the freedom fighters. There has been a change in Algerian nationalism from World War I to the end of World War II. There is also a marked difference in the way the Algerian traditional elite and urban elite articulate the Algerian issues. The traditional elite were concerned about personal interests, and the urban elite put forward national interests before personal ones.

After independence, Algerian nationalism was trapped into sectarial division between Tlemcen and Tizi-Ouzou in 1962, and border conflict in 1963 with Morocco. From 1962 to 1967, Algerian nationalism has come into contact with French neo-colonialism; France attempted to maintain a neo-colonial relationship until Algeria rejected technical and economic cooperation with France. Thus Algeria controls its national resources, and most of the investments of her national development plan comes from local resources—a new era of Algerian nationalism. Today there is confidence and ambition that in 1980 Algeria will enter into a new era of industrialization and the country will be able to provide income to all its citizens. Algeria's present nationalism is oriented towards national reconstruction and anti-imperialism and supports a genuine liberation movement all over the world.

The Algerian nationalism of 1976 is different from that of 1945 and 1956. At present, the Algerian people are more confident than ever before of creating better economic conditions for themselves. The results of eleven years of nation building is evident in every part of Algeria. There are more industries, better agricultural methods and schooling, and more opportunity to live and work than has existed in 130 years of French colonialism. In the past they were searching for their enemy; today they are searching for their friends. One afternoon when I was in Algeria, I met a young man in a public garden in El Bayer (Algiers), and I asked him what he was doing. He told me that he was studying to become an elementary schoolteacher and then asked me where I came from. I replied that I was from Somalia. He asked if Somalia was friendly towards Algeria, to which I replied yes. He asked why Somalia did not support the Polisario, to which I enquired, "How do you know they do not support the Polisario?" The young man explained that Somalia's name was not mentioned by the journal *El Moujahid* as supporting the Polisario.

CHAPTER 5

PRE-COLONIAL ALGERIA

A. HISTORICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF ALGERIAN SOCIETY

Pre-colonial Algeria cannot be analyzed in terms of the concept of the primitive mode of production, for evident historical reasons make the concept inadequate as a tool for analysis. Historical records suggest that pre-colonial Algeria was far from a primitive economy, since communities showed characteristics of private ownership side by side with clan ownership. Even in the latter form of ownership, elements of internal exploitation were evident. In short, the overall view shows that private appropriation—which in some cases was complete—occurred within communities.

With the development of cities during the Islamic period, there is every indication that craftsmen were not completely assimilated into the way of life of rural communities but were established as petty traders. This created internal relationships between cities and rural communities, by giving rise to merchant classes in the major Maghreb cities. The cities, originally the centres of military and political power, assumed commercial and industrial status and dominated rural communities and international trade with Europe and sub-Saharan Africa.

With the growth of independent states in North Africa, following the decline of the Almohad empire, a class emerged with a monopoly over the economy and political power. Most of the fertile lands were owned by this class, which had a base in the cities and which owned industrial and commercial enterprises. Rivalry between these states over the control of the country as a whole was a common phenomenon.

Despite these historical events, the socio-cultural and economic forms of the ancient mode of production continued to exist with some variations during the Roman, southwest Asian, and Ottoman rule in the region. However, in the current literature on the pre-colonial mode of production it is suggested that by the time of French occupation in Algeria feudal structures were already operating but had not created a national bourgeoisie, despite Algerian involvement in long-distance trade.

A distinction must be drawn here between Western European feudalism and Maghreb feudalism, for that distinction explains the origin of underdevelopment in the Maghreb and Mediterranean societies and the development of Western Europe. A beginning of an explanation is the different origin of a bourgeois class in the Maghreb and in Mediterranean societies on the one hand and Western European on the other. Although the hierarchic structures of Western Europe, Byzantine, Arab, and Turkish feudalism are similar, "de-feudalization" occurred in Western Europe because of the advent of capitalism. Such a transformation did not take place in the Maghreb and Mediterranean societies. European feudalism emerged in the countryside, while the development of Maghreb feudalism took place in the towns, which dominated the countryside. The contrast between European feudalism and Maghreb feudalism was obvious. The absence of a central authority in European feudalism led to the development of autonomous feudal states in Europe, while in the Maghreb such a system did not take place due to the centralized authority of Maghreb feudalism. Apart from this difference in their political system, Bloch (1974, Vol. I) describes how European feudal states were isolated from each other. This was due to the limitations imposed by nature and the lack of a transportation system, while Maghreb feudalism enjoyed the caravan routes, where the camel and the horse were used as transportation. This, of course, limited the development of an autonomous national bourgeoisie in Maghreb society.

B. ROMAN SOCIETY

That whole area which was at one time or another under Roman control is here referred to as Roman society. These areas included the Roman Empire in Africa and in the eastern Mediterranean. The mode of production in these areas was not uniform in character. For example, in Italy, the slave society which existed until the first century A.D. gave way to free men, both as tenants and labourers. However, the concentration of lands in the hands of a few landowners persisted. This led gradually to the disappearance of small holdings in favour of large holdings, whereby the peasant became converted into a tenant.

Within the Italian region, a marked difference in landholding has been observed. In the south and centre of Italy, large property ownership was more often practised than in the north, where small freeholdings remained common.

Egypt and Syria were similar to northern Italy: small holdings were common at a certain time, but this did not last for long. Large landowners grew by absorbing small landowners, for it became impossible for the small farmers to pay the heavy tax imposed upon them and to bear the excessive bureaucratic brutality of the ruling aristocracy.

Despite these difficulties, some communities in Syria and in Asia Minor continued to exist as autonomous communities by meeting the demands imposed upon them by the ruling aristocracy. To pay taxes, these communities produced an indigenous wealthy class which owned most of the land. Under these circumstances, the farmers who lost their land became labourers or tenants.

In North Africa, the Romans established a land settlement scheme whereby some Italians were brought in from Italy to settle on the shores of North Africa with rights of land ownership. Some of these settlers were absentee landlords who owned large-scale enterprises, and they acquired the most fertile land in North Africa. Figure 16 depicts the settlement pattern of western Algeria during the Roman period.

To lands outside this concession, the system of land partition known as *centuriation* was applied. Under this system, two categories benefited: military personnel and those Berber tribes who were loyal to the Roman Empire. The land given in concession was located in the countryside, near the Roman *limes*. Those who obtained land concessions were expected to protect the Roman *limes* from the Berber tribes who resided outside the Roman frontiers.

During the time of the Roman Empire in North Africa, three types of landholdings were distinguished: latifundia, owned by absentee landlords; small landholdings allotted to some of the indigenous inhabitants around the Roman *limes*; and small holdings allotted to military personnel attached to the Roman Empire. Land given to the indigenous inhabitants was virgin soil, and it was brought under cultivation. The farmers who were given concessions to such land were exempted from taxation and were granted eventually the right of ownership. This,

FIGURE 16

THE SETTLEMENT PATTERN OF WESTERN ALGERIA IN THE CLASSICAL PERIOD



Source: Lawless and Blake, 1976.

however, benefited the Romans rather than the individual farmers. Because these farmers brought new land into cultivation, crop production was good, and the Romans were able to obtain further surpluses from the farmers.

During this period, the area of cultivated land increased. The long-term prospect for such enterprises depended upon the background and material resources available to the farmers given those property rights. These small landholdings of the indigenous inhabitants were located between Roman military sites and Berber villages. The majority of the indigenous inhabitants lived in the villages, and the dominant way of life was communal. The settlement pattern during the Roman occupation of Algeria highlights the problems of uneven development between Roman settlements and the indigenous inhabitants.

During this era, communally owned pastoral and agricultural land coexisted with privately owned land. Most of the latter was owned by the Romans and a small number of Berber tribes who came into contact with the Romans. Absentee landowners, such as the crown and the church, were not the only ones with large landholdings; professional classes, merchants, and craftsmen did as well, although these latter categories owned less land than absentee landowners.

The lands owned by the peasants were smaller in size than even the rented farms. Peasant properties were getting smaller and smaller in each generation, because the lands were divided among the male heirs. Small peasants paid more taxes than those who owned more land. Small property owners were sometimes forced, due to the conditions they were living under, to seek employment as labourers with one of the big landowners.

There was marked inequality between the Romans and the Berbers, since the land was concentrated in the hands of the Romans, and those who lost their lands were forced to migrate to the towns. Most of the communal land was located outside the Roman *limes*. The more the Romans advanced, the more the Berber tribes retreated into the mountains, where land suitable for cultivation and for grazing was insufficient to satisfy the basic needs of the communities. In general, the peasant condition continued to deteriorate in both urban and rural areas (Nickerson, 1961, p. 25).

C. AFRO-ASIAN SOCIETY

Unlike the Roman occupation in North Africa, the southwest Asian impact did not establish a separate settlement but amalgamated with North African society. This encounter took place in the arid zone. Both the southwest Asians and the indigenous inhabitants necessarily concentrated more on stock breeding than on agriculture, although that was true only in some regions and not common to all regions where they established themselves. In some regions—those better watered—there was a marked increase in village life and the growth of agriculture.

During Almoravid and Almohad rule in the Maghreb, distinctive North African urban centres emerged, such as Fez, Al-Aliya, Ceuta, Tlemcen, and Kairouan. With the Spanish conquests of these rulers, commercial ties developed between the Moslems in Spain and those in the Maghreb cities. This led to the immigrant settlement of Andalusian communities in all major Maghreb cities. The disintegration of the Almohad dynasty, which succeeded the Almoravid dynasty, gave rise for the first time in Maghreb history to three independent kingdoms (as discussed in Chapter 4).

Within these cities, several developments took place in relation to the development of internal markets and international trade based in Europe and sub-Saharan Africa. Specialization in commerce and in industry developed, along with a more complex division of labour. A class established itself which dominated the state, wielding political, economic, military, and administrative power, appropriating surpluses from the peasants and from long-distance trade. The role the city played during this period is demonstrated by Lawless and Blake (see also Figure 17):

> Tlemcen acted as a central place for the surrounding countryside, collecting local products either to supply the urban population or for export, and distributing the necessary goods and services which the countryside demanded. The inhabitants of the rural areas immediately surrounding the city brought their products direct to the specialist markets and made their purchases at the bazaar. Commercial relations with rural areas further away from the city were carried out through a series of secondary urban centres. Tlemcen, like Tunis and Fez, was surrounded by a number of smaller urban centres, each acting as a focus for the small rural area surrounding it. Foodstuffs and other products were brought first to markets in the smaller urban centres within easy reach of the rural population and were then transported to the capital. Imported goods and the products of urban industry, clothes, shoes, tools—were also distributed through these small satellite towns. (Lawless and Blake, 1976, p. 37)

During this period in Tlemcen, such urban industries developed as luxury goods, crafts, textiles, leather-working, building trades, tools and equipment. The artisan at first approached the markets with his products directly, but this practice decreased and gave way to middlemen merchants and shopkeepers, who bought the products and retailed them to local markets and neighbouring villages. Some of these products were sold to northern Mediterranean and neighbouring Arabian

FIGURE 17

TLEMCEN'S CENTRAL PLACE FUNCTIONS DURING THE 'ABD AL-WADID PERIOD



Source: Lawless and Blake, 1976.

countries, as Lawless and Blake describe (see also Figures 18 and 19):

> Tlemcen was also one of a small group of cities in the Maghreb which had active commercial relations with the states of sub-Saharan Africa and the Christian states of the northern Mediterranean. During the 'Abd al-Wadid period, the principal trans-Saharan trade route led from Awdaghost in the Kingdom of Ghana and, later in the thirteenth century, from Oualata and Timbuktu northwards to the great commercial city of Sijilmassa in the Tafilelt on the northern edge of the Sahara. (Lawless and Blake, 1976, p. 37)

Unlike external trade, internal trade was not extensive. Technological innovation did not keep up with the development of industry so as to create the network of transport facilities necessary for the expansion of internal markets. Social classes did not emerge, due to the harsh taxation imposed on rural communities. The emphasis on external markets was among the reasons internal markets could not develop. Expansion took place outside Algeria, while the major cities of North Africa remained isolated from each other, each dominating small urban centres, which were the rivals of rural communities.

Again, to quote Lawless and Blake:

> Nevertheless, the sphere of economic influence of Tlemcen was not very extensive, and was limited in the east by the valley of the Sig and in the west by the Moulouya. Southwards, however, its influence probably extended to the northern edge of the Sahara across the steppelands of the interior high plains, from which the nomadic peoples came to exchange the products of stock rearing for cereals from the coastal zone and the products of the city's industries (Le Tourneau, 1957).
>
> Although Tlemcen, like the other more important Muslim cities in the Maghreb during this period, served the surrounding area through a series of smaller urban centres, poor communications prevented any real economic competition or interaction with other cities possessing high order services, e.g. Fez and Marrakech. These cities existed in comparative isolation one from the other, and there was little contact of economic significance. There was little specialization and, in each city, it was necessary to duplicate the same service. Webb (1957) has described

FIGURE 18

TLEMCEN, NORTHERN TERMINAL OF THE MAJOR TRANS-SAHARAN TRADE AXIS



Source: Lawless and Blake, 1976.

FIGURE 19

TLEMCEN, GATEWAY TO THE MEDITERRANEAN



Source: Lawless and Blake, 1976.

> this situation as "an isolated urban society" in contrast to the "integrated urban society" of today. A vague hierarchy of administrative centres may be distinguished, but a real city system did not emerge in the central Maghreb during the 'Abd al-Wadid period. (Lawless and Blake, 1976, p. 37)

While the internal relationship between the city and the countryside has continued with intermediate centres, inter-regional trade between Maghreb states at this time did not function satisfactorily due to internal conflict between the aristocratic elite based on Islamic sectorial division and tribal conflict. Internal trade between the regions was difficult. Therefore, urban centres remained isolated from each other. However, trade between these urban centres in the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa continued through the caravan route in the Sahara. The caravans arriving from sub-Saharan Africa brought ivory, ostrich feathers, gum, incense, amber, and gold. On the other hand, the North exchanged cereals, textiles, copper, glassware, drugs, and perfumes. Not all these products were produced in North Africa; some were imported from Europe.

During this period the kingdom of Aragon was the major power in the Mediterranean region, although Castille and Portugal had economic, political, and cultural experience with the Maghreb. The kingdom of Aragon had a stronghold in the key strategic points in the Mediterranean Sea, particularly the island of Majorca. This gave them a more advantageous position than Italy, because the kingdom of Aragon controlled the main "water gate" of the Mediterranean for establishing commercial ties with the Maghreb.

Historical and cultural similarities existed between the kingdom of Aragon and the Maghreb kingdoms. In the thirteenth century, forty percent of the population within the kingdom of Aragon was Moslem (Lawless and Blake, 1976). Due to religious conflicts, some of the Moslems began to migrate to the Maghreb. External trade relations with Europe and sub-Saharan Africa created in the major cities of the Maghreb a rich merchant class, which dominated the hinterlands because of their economic position in the cities. Information on the relationship between the cities and the hinterland in the medieval cities of the Maghreb is scarce. However, according to Le Tourneau (1957), the cities depended a great deal on the hinterland, the major economic gain of the cities coming from the countryside. The main medieval cities of the Maghreb, such as Fez, Constantine, Marrakech, and Tlemcen, were relatively unimportant in trade with Europe and sub-Saharan Africa, if one compares the profit they gained from the hinterlands.

By contrast, Samir Amin (1976) holds that social formation in the Maghreb was related to long-distance trade; the profits obtained at this level were much greater than those gained from the internal markets. It was simply that the exchange level was much greater, because the cost of production was known only to one society, the one partner having to accept the terms of trade defined by the other, due to the scarcity of the goods in question. Therefore, an element of monopoly was involved, which gave rise to a class society. However, since this class had a monopoly over internal and international trade, it assumed control of the hinterland.

During this period, then, cities emerged as a force for domination of the hinterland. A pattern of rural land use was thus created, consisting of irrigated gardens and orchards, extensive cereal cultivation, livestock rearing, and forest and rough pasture (see Figure 20). Most

FIGURE 20

AGRICULTURAL LAND-USE ZONES AROUND THE MEDIEVAL CITY OF TLEMCEN


T
IRRIGATED GARDENS and ORCHARDS
EXTENSIVE CEREAL CULTIVATION and LIVESTOCK REARING
FOREST and ROUGH PASTURE

Source: Lawless and Blake, 1976.

of the irrigated gardens and orchards were owned by rich citizens who were absentee landlords. The gardens and orchards were cultivated by farmers who resided in the city. Lands for cereal cultivation and livestock rearing were owned by wealthy citizens from the city and from tribal communities. A distinctive class structure emerged in the city and rural economy, despite the existence of a tribal economy.

The development of medieval cities in the Maghreb was associated with several industries owned by *M'allen* (patrons). Each enterprise unit employed two to ten workers, including apprentices and the owner. Not all enterprises, however, were small; some had larger units than others, although small enterprises were greater in number than large enterprises. The combination of ownership of land and of industrial property by the city dwellers, who accumulated wealth both from agricultural surpluses and commercial profits, dominated the hinterlands.

During the Turkish occupation of Algeria (1551-1830), major changes took place in the character of Algerian societies. Old cities lost importance; new centres of administrative, military, political, industrial, and commercial importance emerged. In western Algeria, Tlemcen was once the most important city. In the medieval period, with the Turkish regency, Oran became the most important city, as the administrative headquarters of the western region.

Systematic exploitation took place in Algeria. Marketing centres developed in the coastal towns, where the nomads brought their products to sell in exchange for cereals, and during this period of temporary visitation, local prices were raised. Wool, which was the only product which the nomads could sell, was reduced in price.

At the same time, the decline of the internal cities and the growth of coastal cities affected the economic situation of the nomads, due to the distances involved in marketing their products and to the constant fall of the price of their commodity. With the discovery of sea routes, trade between sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa declined. Due to this change, trade between West Africa and Europe increased, and trade between African regions diminished. However, Maghreb society became increasingly involved in trade relationships with the Near East. Within Maghreb society, craftsmen working in the towns continued to sell their products to the villagers and tribes in the surrounding countryside, who in return supplied the towns with cereals and livestock products.

During this period, the local aristocracy began to lose its influence in internal and external trade. Foreign aristocracy—the Turks—replaced indigenous aristocrats in a secondary role. Firstly, most of the fertile lands were expropriated by the Turks, who took under their control large areas of land in the public domain. Secondly, indigenous aristocrats became intermediaries between the peasants and the Turkish authorities, by collecting tributes. Thirdly, international trade with Algeria and North Africa was taken over by Europeans who were partners with the Turkish aristocrats. Under these conditions, peasant exploitation continued. In fact, most of the land owned by Turkish aristocrats was cultivated by Khammès—farm tenants who received, in return for their labour, lands, tools, seed, animals, and one-fifth of the harvest (Lazreg, 1976, p. 251).

D. PRE-CAPITALIST MODE OF PRODUCTION

Experience suggests that the history of man evolved in several stages. In theory, in each of these states one economic formation dominates, which gives rise to a distinctive social formation. However, in practice, these stages are not related to each other by unilinear evolution. They are dialectically determined by the struggle of opposites and are characterized by leaps and bounds.

Historical experience also suggests that several modes of production coexist in a given society. Each historical solution gives rise to the different economic formations which evolve—and may interact with each other—in different societies, such as hunting and gathering, horticultural, agrarian, pastoral, capitalist, and socialist societies, of various combinations of them. For example, in many hunting and gathering societies, the most common mode of production was communal ownership. Often, whatever the community produced was consumed more or less equally, and any surplus produced was left at the disposal of the community, directly or indirectly. Relatively speaking, in such a society excessive expropriation of the surplus by a few members of the community was absent as such.

In an agrarian society, unlike hunting and gathering societies, expropriation of the surplus by a few members of the community was dominant. In such a society a pattern of pre-capitalist classes may be widely exhibited (see Table 14). In some cases, these classes are just beginning to take shape; in other cases, they are present in a mature form. This may well be the case when some families assume a dominant role, taking control of surplus produced by the community, by means of their ownership of land.

Samir Amin (1975) distinguishes five modes of production: (1) the "primitive-communal" mode; (2) the "tribute-paying" mode; (3) the

TABLE 14

CHARACTERISTICS OF MODES OF PRODUCTION

Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production	Simple Commodity Relation	Monopoly	Circuit Commodity	Circuit of Non-Commodity Transfers	Commodity Exchange	Equal Opportunity	Distribution Kingship
Primitive-communal	x					x	x
Tribute-paying		x	x				
Slave-owning			x	x			
Simple petty-commodity	x				x	x	

	Division Hierarchical		Class Structure		Appropriation of Surplus		Contradiction		Proletarization	
	Nuclear Family Extended Village	Feudal Lord	Embryonic	Mature	Community Leader	Feudal Lord	Community vs. State	Feudal Lord vs. Peasant	Collective Ownership of Land	Private
Primitive-communal	x		x		x				x	
Tribute-paying		x		x		x				x
Slave-owning				x		x		x		x
Simple petty-commodity										

Source: Derived from Samir Amin, 1976, pp. 13-29. Compiled by M. Abucar, 1977.

Note: "X" indicates the characteristics of each mode of production.

"slave-owning" mode; (4) the "simple petty-commodity" mode; and (5) the "capitalist" mode of production. The "primitive-communal" mode of production and the "tribute-paying" mode of production are very common in pre-capitalist formations. Then comes the "slave-owning" and the "simple petty-commodity" modes of production.

The "slave-owning" mode of production was common, if not dominant, in Roman society, and in some other societies under the form of patriarchal slavery. This mode of production reduces the worker to the essential means of production.

For each of these types of society, the labour product assumes a different significance. Patriarchal slavery—the slave-owning mode of production in which the worker is a part of the means of production, his product—enters into the circuit of non-commodity transfer, or it comes into commodity circuits, as in the case of Roman slavery. Unlike other modes of production, the simple commodity mode of production occurs when two petty producers exchange commodities on an equal basis. Though this mode of production is rare, it is more frequent when handicraft production is autonomous from agricultural production. So far there is no indication that any society has ever experienced, exclusively, this mode of production.

Each of these modes of production may coexist in certain periods within a particular society. The element of contradiction within each mode of production is not necessarily the same. For example, communal modes of production produce an embryonic class structure which tends to negate the essential features of communal society by giving rise to the division of labour and a surplus of products unequally appropriated (see Table 1). The transition towards class society is gradual and fragmented.

In some cases, demographic factors may upset the increase of surplus products, since the product created is shared by more people, and this reduces the chance of accumulation of a surplus by a few. As well, unavoidable natural conditions such as drought may affect the amount of surplus.

Unlike communal modes of production, the tribute-paying mode of production exhibits two distinctive classes: a peasant class and a ruling class. The former is organized around communities, the latter has a monopoly over political power, and their relation with rural communities is not in commodity form. The experience of human evolution in North Africa indicates that, as a rule, the tribute-paying mode of production succeeds the communal mode, which in turn gives rise to a feudal mode of production. The struggle within the tribute-paying mode of production "is the contradiction between the continued existence of the community and the negation of the community by the state" (Amin, 1975, p. 15). The lack of awareness of the community—its failure to perceive the contradiction—is crucial in the process of social evolution, because the socio-cultural facade of the community subscribes exclusively to the past social relationships without facing the question of its transformation.

In the case of Algeria's pre-colonial mode of production, the particularism that dominated each village community, and geographical dislocations, obscured the ability of the community to comprehend social transformation. This will be discussed in more detail in a later part of this chapter.

E. ALGERIAN PROPERTY STRUCTURE AND MODES OF EXPLOITATION

The relations of production that existed in pre-colonial Algeria can be classed into three categories, based on property ownership: *arsh* (land owned by the tribes not subject to transferable rights); *melk* (land owned by individual citizens subject to transferable rights); and *habus* (land under the jurisdiction of religious institutions), as described in Table 15.

TABLE 15

ALGERIAN PROPERTY STRUCTURE

Arsh	Part of the tribal land recognized as the private property of the individual or family who works it	Cannot be sold
Melk	Private property acquired by contract	Can be sold, but custom forbids selling it
Habus	Property donated to religious foundations or cultural institutions	Cannot be sold

Source: Marnia Lazreg, 1976, p. 27.

These phenomena were to be found everywhere in Algeria, although in some areas one aspect was more dominant than in others. For example, in the Mitidja, the *melk* form of ownership was predominant. When these *melks* came to be excessive in number, they were referred to as *haush*, which consisted of several property rights, often owned by one person. However, by virtue of his land, the owner was not entitled to any sovereign rights over other individuals in the community.

The difference between *arsh* and *melk*, however, is that *arsh* land is owned by the community, but each individual has the right to work a plot of land to provide food for himself and his family. This right is relative to the concession given to the individual by the community and is not an absolute right. Sovereignty over the land resided within the community and not with the individual. Inheritance rights were regulated on the basis of customary laws accepted by the community. There has never been uniformity in relation to inheritance rights on *arsh* land in traditional Algerian structure. For example, the Tuareg and Kabyle adopted different customary laws of heritance rights; the former maintained matrilinear and the latter patrilinear rights.

In recent years, the pre-colonial mode of production of Algeria has become the subject of research in an attempt to identify the relationship between political forms and relations of production. According to René Gallissot, *arsh* property relationships were not free from exploitation:

> A family, or a hierarchy of families, or rather of "important families," appropriated the product of the group's labour. These family heads lived in luxury and had their own chiefly tents, horses and weapons. They exacted dues, punished the recalcitrant, enlisted men for war and increased the tax burden. All kinds of power were fused in this tribal chiefship. There was no equality, far from it; and the growth of their herds further increased their own prosperity and power. (Gallissot, 1975, p. 423)

Within the community, whether agricultural village or tribal settlement based on a pastoral economy, elements of exploitation have occurred which created a surplus administered by the head of the community. By virtue of his economic position in the society, he was above the level of the ordinary villagers. The heads of communities, depending upon regional diversity and the nature of the social structure, were numerous. For example, in Kabyle villages:

> the centre of gravity of exploitation was displaced. To begin with, the basic economic social unit was no longer on the same social level. The village community was still vital, and beyond this there were still village federations, regional alliances and what were still called tribes. But these structures were essentially political; economic life was not governed by them. Indeed productive activity was fundamentally and exclusively carried out through family exploitation, and each land-holding family constituted a closed enterprise and was thus the true basic element of the economy. Family exploitation and family property thus coincided, where individual cultivation corresponded to individual ownership. The Kabyle commune provided services only: grain silos, market, public health, maintenance of mosques; what was communal was supplementary to income from individualised family property.
>
> Private appropriation was no longer that of the product of labour but that of the land itself, which tended towards concentration, although family fission continually counteracted this tendency. The Kabyle village also had its hierarchy. One can sense through the meetings of the *jama'a* the activity of family heads who were economically the most comfortable in the village, but there were also in larger number those who were compelled merely to subsist on their meagre patches of land, and those who did not have enough land but worked for others under a complex system of metayage; and in yet greater numbers, there were the dispossessed who were condemned to look for work. Bands of seasonal workers sold their services to distant tribes. Craftsmen were not merely the complement of rural life but supplied petty trade. Specialisation had now appeared, providing even in smuggling (counterfeit money, weapons) an indication of this search for a livelihood. At the same time emigration was taking Kabyles to Algiers where they constituted the labour force of the workshops and the docks of the Dey, and worked in all jobs outside the control of the guilds. (Gallissot, 1975, pp. 423-24)

Several forms of property relationships coexisted—both communal and individual ownership. These forms were not exclusive of each other, since within the communal ownership was to be found private ownership; the head of the community at the village or regional level had overriding power in the community. Such power eventually created hereditary rights which were exclusive to one particular family. The increasing concentration of land in the hands of fewer families, and regional alliances among those families, produced many a landless labourer who was ready to cede his or her labour to far-distant tribes.

Specialization and trade were not absent from these village communities. When communal ownership gave way to private ownership, internal contradictions arose within the community between community rights and family rights to the land. *Melk* right, which coexisted side by side in the past with communal ownership, became the predominant characteristic of Algerian pre-colonial society. However, despite concentration of *arsh* property in the hands of a few families, the head of the community was provided with sovereignty over the land.

Unlike *arsh* land, *melk* land carried more weight in terms of possession. Individuals or families who acquired land under the *melk* classification enjoyed complete sovereign rights over their land. In this sense, *melk* is different from *arsh*. As we have seen above, in the case of *arsh* land, the problem is not the right of ownership only but rather the mode of exploitation. This point is illustrated by René Gallissot:

> The Mitija domaines were an example of this kind of joint family exploitation. In 1830, a *hawsh* of the Mitija included (as in other semi-rural areas) several hundred hectares and some tens of families; it too was made up of small plots held in family shares. The *hawsh* seems to have been a rural, quasi-village, community characterised by family ownership. It also seems to have been a kinship grouping, bearing a collective name—as, for example, "the sons of —": *Hawsh ben Turkia*. In fact, the name was often only that of the family which dominated the group since one family stood at the head of the domain and the authority of its head was such that he was in charge of agricultural activity and gradually took over the rights of possession. This can easily be seen, when these family heads presented themselves to the commissions which legalised colonial confiscations in order to claim the lands of the *hawsh* as their own property. The picture of equality is shattered; for under the cover of the family the move towards private appropriation was played out. It is clear that he who,

> together with his close family, dominated the *haush*, enjoyed not only the prestige of descent claimed direct from the eponymous ancestor, but also and primarily access to income arising from the labour of the other families. Above all, as there was collective tax responsibility, whoever held authority over the domain was also the agent for the collection of all dues. Through this mingling of a pseudo-patriarchal authority with the function of tax-collection, and this confusion of economic, political and sometimes religious responsibilities, the slide towards personal appropriation took place. (Gallissot, 1975, pp. 420-21)

Depending on the region of Algeria, *melk* sometimes evolved within *arsh* land, or it assumed a dominant form as private property. In either case, when *melk* properties created a *haush*, there emerged a figurehead who owned more land than other families or individuals making up the *haush*. *Melk* land, unlike *arsh* land, is subject to the right to sell, but these rights are relative to the consensus of the co-inheritant rights of other members of the family. For anyone wishing to sell his land, precedent right is given to a member of the family. If these conditions are fulfilled, the land is made available to outsiders. The mechanisms for acquiring property ownership at the village level create conditions of contradiction within the community. The success of one family eliminates the next by acquiring its land.

The mode of acquiring land practised among the villages lays the foundation for disparity between haves and have-nots; it was, indeed, the concentration of lands in the hands of a few individuals or families. The landless labourer, of course, has no other alternative than to migrate into towns or to become an agricultural labourer.

Besides *arsh* and *melk* land, there was in pre-colonial Algeria another form of property ownership: the *habus*. This consisted of a donation given to a religious institution, in the form of land and buildings. The rent accruing from this property was expected to be administered by persons attached to the religious foundation. The necessary labour for maintenance of the buildings and gardening of the land was provided by the community. This form of property was frequent in towns and rural areas. Often, the people who provided the necessary labour claimed the right of ownership. The *habus* was not free from exploitation, as René Gallissot describes it:

> A consideration of *habus* property, that is the property of a religious foundation, is enough to make perfectly clear the internal mechanism of exploitation and to expose the illusion of the collective form. The importance of the *habus* in the Algerian countryside is not fully clear: according to André Nouschi it was minimal in the Constantine area, but seems to loom larger in the areas of Algiers and Oran. *Habus* revenue was used for the upkeep of the sanctuary and for charity and above all for teaching and for propagating the religious life; *habus* was at once mosque and school, centre for pilgrimage and cultural centre, whether of a traditional kind or based on pious legends and superstitious practices. We should take note even at this point that the *habus* ensured the existence of a category of people whose function was exclusively religious; it provided support for the marabouts. There were of course holy men who devoted all their strength and all the product of other people's labour to God. But we must be realistic—the *habus* consisted of a collection of buildings and land (possibly hundreds of hectares and sometimes more); peasant families worked on the *habus* while a family "of religious functions" directed it, a family called maraboutic and frequently claiming Sharifian descent. The *habus* provided them with a standard of living which put them above the peasants as well as with real social power. On the eve of the colonial conquest, and particularly in the west, the authority of maraboutic families often equalled that of tribal heads of acknowledged warrior nobility. Some maraboutic families were in fact true seigneurial families based on religious lands taken over as their own domains. (Gallissot, 1975, p. 423)

Property relationships in pre-colonial Algeria undoubtedly created an embryonic class structure unknown when land was used solely to provide the basic necessities of life for the entire community. This mode of production gave way, eventually, to private ownership. Here, land became the instrument of labour. The growth of family ownership of land under *arsh* and *melk* coincides with the growth of religious families known as *marabouts*, who depended a great deal on donations from land-owning families and labourers among the peasants for their existence in the village communities. The *habus* came under the jurisdiction of the *marabout*, who made a living on the rent and on the agricultural revenue obtained from the land and buildings.

During the Turkish occupation of Algeria, property relationships assumed a new dimension, while the old form of property relationship continued. Marnia Lazreg (1976) distinguishes two types of property relationships during this period: public domain and *azel*. The former includes all the lands owned by the Beys and their dependents. The latter consists of the lands given in concession to the Algerians who collaborated with the Turkish administration, in reward for the services they rendered. Public and *azel* lands were estimated at 146,693 hectares; nearly all these lands were in the most fertile areas of Algeria. The peasants on *azel* land were subject to partial tax, if they did not make available to the Beys a given quantity of grain or if they did not collect the tax from the peasants. On the Beys' lands, peasants laboured without return. The labourers were drawn from the landless peasants and the neighbouring tribes.

In the history of Algeria, evolution is marked by chronic peasant uprisings in protest against the expropriation of their lands and their labour—for example, the Kharijile (711 A.D.), the Kabyle (1872), and the Hill people (1947). Despite social cohesion, the economic context of exploitation never remained constantly the same. The land which was owned by the community was subject to change into family ownership, at the expense of other members of the community. Some families acquired more land than others. The product of labour was not acquired at the same rate; production and distribution continued to change due to the increase in *melk* ownership. New forms of social subordination began to emerge, such as the caid, the tax collector, the military garrison, and the like. Exploitation of labour was carried out under the customary code; kinship relations emerge as naked exploitation, in relationship to products and means of production.

These changes were not generally recognized by the peasants. Peasant life was carried on by diverse and divisive collective forms, with geographical variations. Geographical variations produced two distinctive modes of livelihood: pastoral groups, and agricultural village communities, separated from each other physically and socially. These particularisms led the pastoral group to maintain themselves and agricultural villages to become indifferent to each other. The inchoate situation of the peasants is illustrated by René Gallissot:

> The rural world of precolonial Algeria did not yet know this complete disunity resulting from the prevalence of private property, since it was still held strongly together by communal bonds. However this did not constitute a consolidation into social class; it constituted a social class only negatively by virtue of the common status of being exploited—and the exploitation, moreover, was diversified. From this situation, which is found in all precapitalist economies, comes the confused nature of social struggles. The goals of peasant uprisings are lost in aimless violence, deflected into local confrontations and disparate alliances, and dissolved in superstition or mysticism. In periods of crisis, peasant unrest and social violence produce at best insurrectional explosions or a succession of revolts. And such too was the case with the maraboutic uprisings in Algeria in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. (Gallissot, 1975, p. 426)

Furthermore:

> Thus at the lowest level there emerges from the peasant mass a large number of family heads who already possess political weight by virtue of their economic standing; for example, land holding families of the Kabyle village, families having power over an agricultural domain of the *hawsh* type in the Mitija, leading families with *melk* property in a mixed economy *duwar* or with herds in a pastoral group. This is not yet an aristocracy, but merely a step in the process: they are agents in fiscal exploitation or minor employers of labour. When control over the land by private property and by local or regional domination prevails over peasant possession and collective rights in such a way that it subordinates peasant groups to a power of authority (a definition which is quasi-seigneurial) then we reach the level of the rural upper classes.
>
> That exercise of authority which allows control over men is first and foremost a means of fiscal exploitation which can double the receipt of first taxes raised on personal land by the *khammessat* generally, and of profits obtained from putting labour to work—either by cultivating private land or by herding animals considered as personal property. But a social organisation based on the exploitation of the rural world is complex due to the dual origin of the rights of authority. Firstly, power arises from economic control, whether local or regional, native or assumed to be so (in the proper sense of the term); secondly, it appears as an emanation of Turkish sovereignty from the Regent of Algiers who acquired his economic status from his control over public property. The intervention of the Regent occurred either through invested representatives (Arab and Kabyle chiefs), or through direct agents (Turks and half-Turks, called *kulughli*).
>
> There was thus a dual aristocracy of unequal "nobility." One section was from the land and in spite of relations of exploitation it was integrated into local life where clientage and personal ties between men maintained local solidarity. The other section, in spite of long residence, retained its alien, or rather external character. Its power was based in the Beylical capitals and in the Casbah of Algiers where its force, that is its means of exercising economic privilege, was held in reserve in the fortresses containing the Turkish garrisons (*ojak*) and the auxiliary regiments. In this way, an aristocracy, both military and urban, with political and economic functions, was superimposed on a rural aristocracy made up of warriors rather than soldiers, and sometimes of holy men. (Gallissot, 1975, pp. 426-27)

Within communal ownership, a distinctive family emerged, due to the position they occupied in their communities, as heads of the communities or extended families. Within the framework of kinship ties an accumulation of capital was created, which these families expropriated from the peasants, with whom they claimed certain affinities. This gave them an economic power which created a gap between them and the peasant. In recent studies, such as the work of Claude Meillassoux (1972) on social organization of production in rural communities, it is indicated that the essence of the social structure prevailing in these communities is an economic relation, within which an ideology was built. The continuity of the social structure depends on economic relations in the community. Class structure came into existence in such communities when labour came to be viewed as instrumental—that is, a means to an end—by others who were the dominant minority.

In the Algerian pre-colonial situation (see Figure 21) the dominance of the *melk* property relation over *arsh* property varied according to region. However, it has been observed that in some regions *melk* and *arsh* coexisted, while in some other regions only one type of property dominated. René Gallissot suggests that the Algerian pre-colonial situation gave rise to communal feudalism. Unlike European feudalism, which grew up in the countryside, Algerian communal feudalism grew up in the towns, in the sense that towns dominated the country, while giving room for existing indigenous aristocrats in the countryside who were loyal to the urban, predominantly non-Algerian, aristocrats. The development of communal feudalism occurred under the Turkish occupation of Algeria, by establishing sovereignty over existing tribes. This aristocracy, which was based both in the country and in the towns, depended largely on the exploitation of the peasants and on international trade.

FIGURE 21

PRE-CAPITALIST ALGERIAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE



Source: Marnia Lazreg, 1976, p. 32.

F. SOCIAL FORMATION AND LONG-DISTANCE TRADE

Property relations in a society may contribute to our understanding of how surpluses are generated and of the process of transformation of modes of production from a communal to feudal structure in a pre-capitalist situation. Further understanding of the generation and circulation of surplus requires the analysis of social formations in pre-colonial Algeria. The modes of production never remained in a pure state. Therefore, pre-colonial formations included: (1) the predominance of a communal or tribute-paying mode of production; (2) the existence of simple commodity relations in a limited sphere; and (3) the existence of long-distance trade relations.

What we know about the state of modes of production in medieval periods in Algerian history has been described by Arab writers, such as al-Idris, who, in the twelfth century, gave an account of the economic situation of Bougie, a capital city of the Berber kingdom:

> Ships touch there (wrote al-Idrisi at the time of the Almohad triumph), caravans come thither, and it is a repository of merchandise. The inhabitants are rich and more skilled in various arts and crafts than men generally are elsewhere, so that commerce is in a flourishing state. The merchants of this city do business with those of West Africa as well as with those of the Sahara and the East. Much merchandise of every kind is warehoused. Around the city are cultivated plains which yield wheat, barley and fruit in abundance. Great vessels are built there, ships and galleys, for the surrounding mountains are heavily wooded and produce resin and tar of excellent quality. . . . The inhabitants engage in exploiting iron mines which yield very good ore. In a word, the city is a hive of industry. (Julien, 1970, pp. 106-107)

The indigenous aristocracy and merchants were engaged in long-distance trade with sub-Saharan Africa and southwest Asia, including the Near East. Agriculture, mining, and industry supported a distinctive feature: the city was inhabited by rich people whose wealth came from the land and long-distance trade. This complex civilization led to the development of pre-colonial Algerian social formations. An hierarchical organization was established; this was run by the archaic state in order to control surplus expropriation from long-distance trade and from the peasant. In each of the kingdoms, the capital was the centre of economic transactions.

In the history of Algeria, the rise and fall of major cities was a common phenomenon; the old cities in the medieval period never remained constantly the same. When trade routes were shifted from caravan to sea routes, cities around the coast assumed importance and became major centres of trade. When Europeans established contact with West Africa, Algeria consequently began to lose its privileged position in the long-distance trade, as this quotation indicates:

> A partir de la fin du XIVème siècle, le Maghreb central perd sa fonction d'intermédiaire privilégié entre l'Afrique et l'Europe. L'ouverture des routes maritimes atlantiques qui permettent aux Portugais d'atteindre directement à partir de 1450 les côtes d'Afrique occidentale et d'attirer à eux une partie du trafic de l'or aboutit à l'isolement du Maghreb des routes de l'or dont le contrôle avait été une des bases de la création des Etats mediévaux. On assiste alors à un poressus de monopolisation du commerce méditerranéen par les marchands européens (Français, Italiens, Espagnols) et à une désagrégation des structures étatiques maghrébines.
>
> Cette désagrégation s'explique en partie par le fait que l'existence de ces Etats et de leur classes dirigeantes était liée à la necessité d'organiser les circuits commerciaux dont elles tiraient sous forme de prélèvements fiscaux ou de participation directe, la plus grande partie de leurs revenus. En effect le commerce n'était pas le fait exclusif d'une bourgeoisie commerçante mais aussi des représentants du pouvoir d'Etat, eux-mêmes, entre lesquels existait une sorts d'osmose. (Dieghloul, 1975, p. 66)

With the opening of maritime Atlantic routes in the eighteenth century, the Maghreb region lost its position as an intermediary between Africa and Europe. Furthermore, this led to the capitulation of the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa. The breakdown of medieval states in the Maghreb region makes obvious the existence of a state and a ruling elite which had control over surplus.

From the ninth century to the fourteenth century, prior to the Turkish occupation of the Maghreb, the Berber kingdoms were already involved in long-distance trade. During this period, the beginning of pre-colonial Algerian social formations took place, each kingdom assuming control over long-distance trade and ownership of land from which they had obtained revenue. The decline of these kingdoms gave rise to Turkish penetration and the establishment of their sovereignty over the whole region of the Maghreb. At the same time, the Portuguese established control over the port of Oran, by concluding a treaty with some of the tribes in the area, which led to the interruption of the trade relationship between the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa. From the fourteenth century on, Turkish sovereignty was established all over Algeria. During this period, the landowning aristocracy (Makhzen tribes) and the religious aristocracy continued to coexist, but the long-distance trade was taken over by the Turkish aristocracy. This consisted of Deys, Beys, Janissaries, Taifa of Rais, and Kurghuli, as this quotation demonstrates:

> L'oligarchie turque a tenté de mettre en place une structure institutionnelle hiérarchisée, capable d'augmenter le rendement de la fiscalité (Dey, Bey, Khalife, Caid, Cheikh . . .). Nous verrons plus loin que cet effort à en grande partie échoué, la plus grande partie étant accaparée par les organismes intermédiaires et certaines régions ne se soumettant pas au fisc beylical. Ces deux faits expliquent le caractère modéré de la fiscalité.
>
> Parallèlement au maintien des impôts coraniques traditionnels (Achour, Zekkat, Gharama, Kharadg payé seulement par les tribus Raia), le beylic crée un nouvel impôt le H'okor sur les terres détribalisées qui ont été incorporées au domaine public. Il représente pour les paysans le prix de la concession des terres qu'ils occupent et pour Nouschi "il est assimilable à un droit féodal de fermage." (Dieghloul, 1975, p. 68)

With regard to Algeria's internal situation, two distinctive aristocracies came into existence: the indigenous aristocracy (Makhzen tribes) and a foreign or Turkish aristocracy (Dey, Bey). However, the indigenous aristocracy played a role secondary to the Turkish aristocracy, which had a monopoly over the best land and over external trade. The relationship between the two aristocracies was hierarchically structured. The indigenous aristocracy were given the power to control peasant tribes, while the *azel* peasant was directly controlled by the Turkish aristocracy. Both these aristocracies brought about the transformation of social formations in Algeria, by their expropriation of agricultural surplus. The tendency towards private appropriation of land made possible the dissolution of an archaic mode of production. The form of land exploitation during this period resembles that of medieval Europe:

> Azeliers et Khammès payent donc en échange de la possession de la terre une rente foncière. Ce fait les rapproche des serfs du Moyen-Age européen. Cependant, la rente ne s'identifie pas au servage. Ce dernier implique en effet l'attachement des paysans à la terre, ce qui n'est pas le cas pour les Azeliers et les Khammès dont le status régi par un contrat se rapproche de celui des fermiers. Dans la pratique s'opère toutefois un rapprochement entre la condition de Khammès et celle de serf. (Dieghloul, 1975, p. 68)

The nature and characteristics of Algerian feudalism made impossible the development of an indigenous aristocracy, since their autonomy was subordinate to the overriding Turkish aristocracy. The Turkish aristocracy controlled all major economic activities. Financial pressures were therefore imposed on both the peasant and on the indigenous aristocracy. From the top of the hierarchy down, the indigenous aristocracy were obliged to pay part of their profits to the Turkish aristocracy. Under such conditions, feudal development took place at the top, while the lower level of feudalism remained stagnant.

The social formation of Algeria was determined not only by the internal situation but also by external factors which were in operation during the Berber kingdom and after the establishment of the Turkish aristocracy. In fact, from the sixteenth century to the eighteenth century, Algerian trade was dominated by Europeans, and Algerian economic surpluses were exported to Europe. However, Algeria's external trade was in most cases in the hands of the state, although the Turkish government did not involve itself in all trade activities. Some of these activities were undertaken by Jews and some by Algerians who traded with Europeans. Nevertheless, the Turkish government enjoyed the power to levy export taxes and asked the European merchant to pay fees.

Thus, Algerian social formation did not serve to accumulate capital in the hands of a national bourgeoisie. Rather, it served the development of a landlord class and the accumulation of capital by the European bourgeoisie, such as the French and Spanish.

CHAPTER 6

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CAPITALIST COLONIAL AGRARIAN ECONOMY AND MODES OF EXPLOITATION

A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Historically, there are at least three periods in which capitalist development in Algeria can be analyzed. These periods are: (1) 1830 to 1850; (2) 1851 to 1904; and (3) 1880 to 1955. From 1830 to 1850, capitalist development was taking shape, but the dominant mode of production was pre-colonial, hence neo-feudal. Unequal exchange relationships with capitalist markets were dominant. From 1851 to 1904, pre-colonial modes of production were becoming less dominant, and a proper capitalist structure began to replace the pre-colonial structure, due to the transformation of the means of production, the monetization of the pre-colonial economy, and external trade with metropolitan France. From 1880 to 1955, the capitalist mode of production became dominant in certain specific geographical areas, and in other areas pre-colonial modes of production were practised on a limited scale. This partial transformation created further class distinctions based on land ownership, income, and regional imbalance.

B. DISPOSSESSION OF THE PEASANTS' LAND

The development of a capitalist colonial agrarian economy depended a great deal on the transformation of land as an "article of commerce." This did not occur on a large scale in the 1830-1850 period, but the land speculation necessary for acquiring capital was put in motion through the transformation of the pre-colonial mode of production to the capitalist mode of production. Europeans obtained land and applied different forms of speculation to the land. Some of these lands were left uncultivated, some were resold, and others were rented to Algerians. Lands which were brought under cultivation employed for a short period imported European agricultural labourers or were put under the Khammès system. In 1864 the Europeans possessed 467,000 hectares. According to a French historian, only 188,000 hectares were under cultivation (Guy, 1876, p. 41). Capitalist development in Algeria during this period was limited to specific geographical areas, namely the Mitidja and sahel regions (see Figure 22). In 1839, the French colonial regime created settlements for 316 families with small holdings consisting of 15,000 individuals, with 300 agricultural labourers imported from the south of France or from Minorca to grow grain for the army's horses. These agricultural workers had a fixed salary (Julien, 1964, p. 153).

Land policy during this period was as follows. In the Tell zone, land was totally agricultural—14,000,000 hectares. This agricultural land was divided into three categories: (1) 2,690,000 hectares remained under state control, out of which 390,000 hectares were forest land; (2) the settlers were given 420,000 hectares in concession, half of which was rented or resold to the Algerians; and (3) the indigenous inhabitants were left with 2,000,000 hectares to cultivate. Overall, actual cultivation of the land by the settlers themselves was uncommon; most of them preferred to rent or resell the land to the Algerians, in

FIGURE 22

COLONIZATION IN THE MITIDJA REGION, 1840-1849



Source: Charles André Julién, 1964, p. 368

Note: 1 = centres of ordinary colonization; 2 = villages spontaneously created by enterprises; 3 = farms; and 4 = agricultural colonies under the Second Republic.

order to obtain an easy profit. Both the state lands and settlers' lands which were brought under cultivation employed the pre-colonial method of land cultivation known as Khammès, as Baudicour illustrates:

> Le résultat des travaux faits en commun n'était pas toujours plus heureux que celui des efforts individuels. La première année, on avait fait ensemencer par les Arabes une portion du territoire des colons; convoqués pour la moisson, beaucoup de ces derniers avaient répondu à l'appel et compromis même leur santé. Or, plusieurs s'étant avisés de demander qu'on leur distribuât la part qui leur revenait, les administrateurs de leurs colonies leur déclarèrent que les frais compensaient les bénéfices de la récolte, et que, tout compte fait, il ne restait rien. Cependant, en supposant qu'on n'eût pas, dans cette circonstance comme dans bien d'autres, exigé des Arabes, purement et simplement des corvées, ils ne devaient pour leur culture recevoir que le *kramsa*, le cinquième, et il n'était pas admissible qu'on leur eût donné les quatre autres cinquièmes uniquement pour le vannage du blé. D'un autre côté, les frais faits pour les colons pendant la moisson avaient été de peu d'importance; on s'était borné à leur accorder une légère augmentation dans leur ration ordinaire. (Baudicour, 1860, pp. 282-83)

All agricultural produce was bought at low prices and sold at higher prices in Europe. At the same time, due to an increase in European settlement, Algeria became an important market for European goods, and the indigenous inhabitants began to acquire European goods. The importation of European goods exceeded Algerian exports. The principal Algerian products were cereals, tobacco, and wine. Most of the produce marketed during this period was produced by the Algerian peasants.

The colonists who established themselves in Algeria during this period were of two categories: *cultivateurs* or *ouvriers d'art*. The *cultivateurs* were given several hectares of land in concession in order to obtain profits, while the *ouvriers d'art* were allowed to be employed in construction work, in maintenance, and the like. For the colonists, the colonial regime provided each family, upon their arrival, with the following assistance:

> 1. Une maison d'habitation construite en maçonnerie, recouverte en tuiles, et divisée en deux pièces, chacune de 3 mètres 50 centimètres sur 5 mètres;
> 2. Un lot de terre de deux à dix hectares, indépendamment d'une parcelle de terrain affectée au jardinage;
> 3. Des instruments aratoires, des semences et quelques têtes de bétail;
> 4. Des rations journalières de vivres pour chaque personne au-dessus de 7 ans, et des demi-rations pour les enfants au-dessous de cet âge. (Baudicour, 1860, p. 279)

In 1848, there were in Algeria forty-two *colonies agricoles*, with a total population of 10,000, consisting of:

> 4,821 hommes,
> 3,738 femmes,
> et 1,817 enfants.
>
> Dans ces colonies 3,230 concessionnaires, dont 2,842 mariés, et 688 célibataires;
> parmi lesquels 1,648 anciens cultivateurs,
> 1,017 anciens militaires,
> et le reste 567 de professions diverses, avaient reçu 23,728 hectares de terres, dont ils avaient défriché 10,491 hectares:
> 4,911,29 avaient été ensemencés en blé,
> 2,721,90 en orge,
> 328 en mais,
> 67,74 en pommes de terre,
> 50,24 en fèves
> 186,79 en légumes divers,
> 10,35 en prairies artificielles,
> 10,66 en tabac,
> 101,57 avaient été mis en cultures diverses: ce qui présentait un ensemble de 8,388,54 hectares de cultures. (Baudicour, 1860, pp. 288-89)

In 1852, the agricultural population remained constant, but the land at their disposal had increased from 10,491 hectares to 15,133 hectares, with average holdings of 19 hectares per individual. Besides land concessions given to the colonists, the colonial regime provided them during this period with 5,350 head of livestock (cattle, horses, mules, goats, sheep, and pigs) and also with 27,937 pieces of farm equipment (plows, harrows, spades, shovels, picks, wagons, wheelbarrows, and the like).

From 1851 to 1904, acceleration of primitive accumulation assumed a new phase. Land was given in concession to companies, which established large estates run and operated by a manager. This, however, had a cumulative effect of the destruction of communal property based on customary law. In this connection Charles A. Julien writes:

> La redistribution et le remembrement des terres apportèrent de profondes perturbations dans la population algérienne. Les communautés perdirent, dans la plupart des cas, les immenses surfaces qui servaient au pacage des troupeaux et apportaient un complément nécessaire à l'agriculture. Les familles déchues ne reçurent que des lots de 12 hectares, qui ne pouvaient suffire à leurs besoins. Les anciens propriétaires, après avoir vendu leurs terres, devinrent les *khammès* ou les ouvriers agricoles des colons. (Julien, 1964, p. 402)

The colonist population increased in 1851-1857 from 131,000 inhabitants to 181,000, and 68 villages were created between 1851 and 1858. During this period, the colonial regime gave more preference to big companies than to individual colonists. In 1853, the colonial government gave concessions to the Société genevoise to establish estates, as this quotation illustrates:

> Plus scandaleuses encore eussent apparu, si elles avaient été connues, les faveurs accordées aux grosses sociétés financières dont les représentants savaient entretenir l'intérêt de l'entourage de l'empereur, notamment du prince Napoléon, lié aux banques helvétiques et des ministres de la Guerre, les maréchaux de Saint-Arnaud et Vaillant dont la tolérance aux pires abus saurait difficilement s'expliquer par le seul aveuglement. En 1853, la Compagnie genevoise, formée par un groupe de capitalistes de Genève dont Sautter de Beauregard se montra, à Paris, l'avocat persuasif, reçut 20,000 hectares de terrains domaniaux aux environs de Sétif, dont 10,000 devaient être répartis, par fractions de 20 hectares, entre les 500 habitants de 10 villages de 50 feux; 2,000 affectés à la constitution de communaux et 8,000 accordés en prime aux concessionnaires. La société devait construire les villages dans un délai de dix ans et y installer des colons suisses, possesseurs d'un pécule de 3,000 francs, qui lui verseraient un acompte de 1,000 francs sur le prix des maisons, fixé à 2,500 francs au maximum. L'Etat prenait à sa charge tous les travaux d'utilité publique ainsi que le transport des colons et dispensait la société

> des redevances légales, malgré les réserves de Randon. Jamais les "colons au gants jaunes," fondateurs des grands domaines de la Mitidja ou d'Oranie, et les compagnies françaises antérieurement créées, comme l'Union agricole du Sig, ne bénéficièrent de telles faveurs. (Julien, 1964, pp. 406-407)

The colonial regime, in accordance with the policies of the metropolitan government, used to provide big companies with land, personnel, and agricultural material. The methods of exploitation were based on the labour of tenant farmers and agricultural workers. In order for the companies to obtain land, the colonial regime established a "canton theory," which gave big companies and land speculators the right to acquire land belonging to the indigenous inhabitants by free concessions or by purchasing lawfully at a price arbitrarily established by the colonial regime.

> Le cantonnement n'eut pas de caractère légal mais fut opéré par mesures administratives. Or, les fonctionnaires étaient pour la plupart inféodés aux colons. Le préfet de Constantine, Zoepffel, considérait que la France n'avait pas consenti de lourds sacrifices "pour augmenter outre mesure le vien-être et les horizons de travail des Arabes aux dépens du but principal qu'elle poursuit: le peuplement européen sur une grande échelle," et concluait qu'il suffisait de laiser à la population indigène "le quart ou, au plus, la moitié des espaces qu'elle détient aujourd'hui." C'est cet esprit qui présida à l'"équitable transaction" qui devait profiter aux deux parties. Chaque question fut traitée comme un cas d'espèce, en dehors de toute règle fixe. En Oranie, les anciennes tribus *makhzen* des Douair et des Sméla perdirent "le meilleur de leurs anciens terrains de culture." Il en fut de même pour les Ouled Khalfa du cercle d'Aïn-Témouchent. Dans l'Algérois, les Ouled Kosseir de la vallée du Chélif passèrent en vingt ans, de 39,000 hectares à 27,193. Beaucoup d'entre eux, transformés en propriétaires individuels, vendirent leurs biens à des spéculateurs, dont l'un acquit aussitôt 800 hectares. Lapasset, revenant à Orléansville, après une absence de onze ans, trouvait "la plus belle tribu . . . diminuèe de moitié et ruinée, complètement" après avoir "pris pour les colons tous les terrains fertiles, sans exception" et il constatait avec amertume: "Bouleversement moral, révolution sociale et agricole résument faiblement ce chaos anarchique." Les Abib el-Ferailia qui possédaient 8,941 hectares de la terre d'El-Kantara, dans la partie occidentale de la plaine d'Affreville, n'en conservèrent que 3,983 en 1857. En

> 1860, leur cheptel avait diminué d'un tiers. Dans la province de l'Est, les plans de cantonnement ne laissèrent de côté que les régions montagneuses de Kabylie et de l'Aurès. Dans la région de Guelma, trois tribus perdirent 40 à 50 % de leurs biens, une quatrième 85 %. Des populations sédentaires furent réduites au nomadisme. Malgré un appel pathétique du lieutenant-colonel de la subdivision de Philippeville, Lapasset, que son général qualifia d'"inqualifiable diatribe," les tribus des environs de Jemmapes finirent par être réduites aux 2/5 de leurs territoires originels. Celles de la vallée du Rummel n'en conservèrent que la moitié. Des tribus, comprenant 3,000 habitants, subirent quatre déplacements. Les anciens détenteurs du sol se virent, comme l'écrivait Lapasset, "condamner à la plus effroyable des misères." Beaucoup durent émigrer en Tunisie et en Orient. (Julien, 1964, pp. 405-406)

The canton theory provided the basis for establishing private estates on collective land and removing Algerian rights of ownership to land. The text of 1851, which was the outcome of the canton theory, established among other things: (1) reserve tribal areas, which capitalist development in Algeria was to desire—a "reserve army"; (2) the distribution of land to douars; and (3) the creation of private ownership within the douars. This also meant the expansion of the capitalist model of public property at the expense of collective ownership of land.

The canton theory had a fatal effect on Algerian pre-colonial social structure. Dispossession of Algerian land occurred at all levels of the social structure, including some of the indigenous aristocracy such as the Makhzen (the pastoral community). Capitalist modes of production became dominant.

The means to accelerate primitive accumulation in Algeria during the colonial period were not limited to dispossessing the Algerians of land. The colonial administration imposed various forms of taxation, collective fines, arbitrary delimitation of the forest land, and generalizing individual property of land.

The Turkish system of taxation was maintained during the colonial period, and at the same time an additional tax system was introduced, such as communal taxes and rental taxes, sales taxes, and the like. From 1877 to 1881, the indigenous inhabitants paid the following taxes:

> Les seuls chiffres sûrs, chiffres moyens des années 1877 à 1881, sont cependant fort éloquents. Les Musulmans payaient à côté des impôts arabes proprement dits (soit quelque 13 à 14 millions de principal) 1° les centimes additionnels (2,300,000 F en moyenne), 2° les centimes extraordinaires (800,000 F), 3° les taxes municipales (5 millions). A quoi s'ajoutaient les impôts dits français directs et indirects; (par exemple en 1881: 45,000 F de licences pour la vente du tabac, 138,321 F de patentes indigènes, 679,770 F de droits de timbres et d'enregistrement, les droits de douane, d'octroi de mer de pouvant être sérieusement appréciés). Enfin, si l'on voulait mesurer l'effort fiscal réel en ces anées, il ne faudrait pas oublier le versement dans les dix années 1871-1881 des 34,500,000 F de contribution de guerre et des 9 millions de rachat d'une partie du sequestre.
>
> Or ces impôts, nous le savons, étaient applicables à des affectations dont les tribus ne tiraient aucun bénéfice. Imagine-t-on sans dérision ce que pouvait signifier pour les gens des tribus les centimes perçus pour l'assistance hospitalière (européenne) ou la constitution de la propriété, alors que de l'avis général, "pas un centime n'était restitué sous forme de travaux d'intérêt public de nature à am'liorer la situation économique." Il n'est pas exagéré de dire, concluait *la Vigie Algérienne*, que si un pareil régime de succion permanente était pratiqué dans un pays européen, fût-il le plus riche d'entre tous, il suffirait de quelques années pour réduire ce pays à la plus complète misère. (Ageron, Vol. 1, 1968, p. 258)

The indigenous inhabitants did not, however, benefit; tributes were used for the expansion of capitalism in Algeria. During this period, taxes were a major source of the funds used to provide the infrastructural works and services intended to promote colonial settlement. Ageron (1968, Vol. 1, p. 259) suggests that "la propriéte foncière indigène était taxée au triple de celle de France."

Taxes were paid in money rather than in kind. The peasants were obliged to sell part of their crops in order to pay taxes to the colonial regime, and the price of agricultural products and livestock was determined by the colonial administration—tailored to meet their demands. The peasants were subject to losing their land. The colonial taxation system was applied to all indigenous inhabitants, regardless of their economic situation, according to Ageron:

> On remarque cependant qu'il n'y a pas d'abattement de base: les plus pauvres gens, sans terre, paient (pour 3 moutons, 3 chèvres 1.65 F d'impôt); il y a des cotes pour 1 mouton, 1 chèvre! De même les paysans sans bétail: X . . . pour 1/6 de charrue, sans bêtes, paie 9.10 F d'impot. Un contribuable "riche" (?) 10 ha, 310 moutons, 11 bovins, 22 chèvres, paie 177.5 F (exemples pris dans la commune indigène d'Ain-Beida exercice 1880 A.G.G. 21 H 213). (Ageron, 1968, Vol. 1, p. 258)

The metropolitan government and the Société d'Alger expressed the desire to find ways and means for extracting taxes from the indigenous population. From 1870 to 1890, the Algerian peasant paid fifty percent more than in previous years (Ageron, 1968, pp. 260-65).

The processes of primitive accumulation were extended into the collection of fines imposed upon tribes, hence the *djemaa* (community). Whenever there was a forest fire, the colonial administration did not hestiate to apply a collective fine to a whole *djemaa* or section of a douar. Damages were estimated by the *société concessionnaire*, who always tried to obtain higher compensation for the damage occurring on their forest lands. According to Ageron, in 1881, for the first time, a collective fine was applied for a forest fire. The collective fine affected ninety-nine communities; fifty-three were imposed collective fines, and forty-six were imposed collective embargoes, with one individual embargo. There were five companies that owned the forest land. They claimed payment of 4,800,000 F as the total cost of damages. It appears that each of these companies claimed, as Ageron puts it:

> La Société du Fendeck réclaimait 2 millions; la Senhadja et Guebbès, la London and Lisbon, Gaultier de Chaubry, 800,000 F chacune; Pedley: 400,000 F. Or ces 5 sociétés avaient acheté leur propriété pour 170,000 F au total! (Ageron, 1964, p. 118)

The application of collective fines for forest fires was not only to protect forest land, which came under colonial administration regardless of the customary rights of the indigenous inhabitants to grazing lands for their herds. The aim was to get more agricultural land for colonization. More often, those communities that were imposed collective fines were dispossessed of their land.

The indigenous inhabitants depended a great deal on the forest as fields for grazing their herds. It was estimated that three million hectares of forest land were available in Algeria; two-thirds were brought under colonial administration as state property. That restriction caused a decrease in the numbers of herds.

?

C. PRINCIPAL SECTORS OF PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION OUTSIDE LAND OWNERSHIP: AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY

The process of transforming the Algerian peasant into an agricultural worker was put in motion by the excessive expropriation of peasant land. Both small and large properties within the colonists' landholding system were replaced by collective ownership of land; certain specific geographic areas were consolidated. That permitted the survival of pre-colonial modes of production in certain regions of Algeria. The mode of exploitation was not necessarily based only on the individual farmer working his or her plot, but also on the exploitation by the capitalist of many workers. The capitalist mode of production became complete in certain aspects of the capitalist colonial agrarian economy, particularly in agriculture and in industry. Large estates owned by private companies and operated by managers took precedence over small landholdings operated by their owners. Both the metropolitan and the French colonial administration gave higher priority to large estates and enterprises by according land concessions and long-term credit. These companies were not necessarily French; Italian and Swiss companies took part in the capitalist enterprise.

The capitalist colonial agrarian economy, unlike capitalism proper, directed its priorities to specific agricultural commodities of which the mother country was badly in need. But these priorities were also determined by the metropolitan and colonial administrations with the intent of establishing or expanding industrial enterprises existing in the mother country—for example, cotton for the expansion of the manufacturing industry. The capitalist colonial agrarian economy's mode of production is based primarily on agriculture and the separation of agriculture from industry; industry does not exist on a large scale. The need to maintain these agricultural units is dictated by the expansion of industry in the mother country. The development of an autonomous industry in the colonial settlement will certainly jeopardize the interests of the metropolitan class. However, the relationship between capital and labour is artificially created on a limited scale. The antithesis between the two modes of production—the capitalist mode and the pre-colonial mode—sets limits, "the separation of the labourer from the conditions of labour and their roots, the soil," since the colonial administration applied the capitalist colonial agrarian economy in a limited sphere of the economic life of the colonized society.

"Systematic colonization" occurred in the colony when a portion of colonized society was turned into wage-earning workers. To quote Marx in this respect: ". . . the expropriation of the mass of the people from the soil forms the basis of the capitalist mode of production" (Marx, Vol. 1, 1972, p. 768). From 1880 on, many peasants were removed from their land and became agricultural labourers. With the advent of large estates, colonization increased, and the small landholdings of individual farmers began to decline; the latter form of landholding was the backbone of French colonization. Large and small estates grew all kinds of agricultural crops (such as cotton and cereals in the form of wheat, barley, maize, and sorgho). In 1910 these crops covered three million hectares in the plains of the Chélif, the Mitidja, and the Seybouse (Devereux, 1912, pp. 164-65). The colonial estates gained a great profit, due to cheap labour and the application of scientific methods.

The pre-colonial mode of production was characterized by the dominance of command feudalism, of urban and rural character, which dominated external trade. Under the colonial mode of production, which was the basis for development of capitalism in Algeria, the capitalist colonial agrarian economy posed the traditional mercantilist economic approach, oriented towards an export economy. Algerian agricultural commodities (such as hard wheat, barley, and tobacco) were in demand on world markets. From 1879 to 1909, hard wheat covered between one to two million hectares; however, the area under cultivation varies constantly, depending upon the season. Both the colonists and the indigenous inhabitants were engaged in growing cereals in Algeria. Algerian peasants alone in 1900-1901 cultivated an area of 2,308,613 hectares and produced 15,779,036 quintals (see Table 16). The land in Algerian possession was decreasing. In fact, in 1891 Algerians possessed 7,333,399 hectares of land; in 1900 they had only 6,200,887 hectares, a decrease of 15.4 percent of the cultivated land.

Cereals were only one of several Algerian products, but hard wheat played an important role in the colonial economy. From 1898 to 1909, 12,488,844 quintals of hard wheat were exported to France and the rest to Europe (see Table 17). At that time, the price of the metric quintal of hard wheat varied according to the season, between 20 and 25 F. Among the cereals, barley was the most commonly cultivated. It constituted fifty percent of the cultivated area. In 1905, the area under barley cultivation extended over 1,329,000 hectares and produced 10,888,000 quintals (see Table 18). However, the production of barley, like wheat, was subject to variations; it has been estimated that the Algerians produced an average of 9,500,000 quintals per year. The major countries to which Algerian barley was exported were France, Belgium, and England, although France had the lion's share of Algerian barley exports.

Algerian barley was very much preferred to barley produced in France during the winter season, as it was less costly and had better ingredients, containing sixty-three percent starchy matter (convertible into alcohol) and only nine percent nitrous matter (which facilitates secondary fermentation) (Jourdan, 1910, p. 40). The colonial administration obtained a large profit on Algerian exports by buying cheaply from the Algerian peasant and selling at higher prices in France and other European countries. Algerian exports were taxed, and imports from Europe entered into Algeria tax free.

TABLE 16

SUPERFICIES CULTIVEES PAR LES MUSULMANS ET PRODUCTION EN CEREALES (A)

année agricole	superficies cultivées en céréales (en ha)	superficies cultivées en autres produits alimentaires [1]	superficies cultivées au total [2]	production des céréales (en quintaux)	quantité par tête
1900–1901	2.308.613	38.966	2.412.025	15.779.036	3,85 q
1901–1902	2.244.335	45.445	2.564.938	16.144.679	
1902–1903	2.436.143	45.365	2.571.052	13.991.446	
1903–1904	2.190.694	44.623	2.337.009	11.797.885	
1904–1905	2.242.866	46.270	2.415.128	10.187.139	
1905–1906	2.202.456	47.187	2.372.192	15.388.350	3,43 q
1906–1907	2.146.565	48.855	2.372.848	13.276.374	
1907–1908	2.230.133	52.397	2.557.521	12.007.333	
1908–1909	2.199.588	57.179	2.445.488	14.158.819	
1909–1910	2.248.316	56.714	2.503.218	15.223.270	
1910–1911	2.200.079	59.944	2.461.615	15.306.552	3,24 q
1911–1912	2.269.247	87.275	2.549.540	10.462.130	
1912–1913	2.196.688	74.149	2.493.819	15.384.078	
1913–1914	2.216.425	74.138	2.457.886	12.302.878	

(A) Blé dur, tendre, seigle, orge, avoine, maïs, bechna, millet.

[1] Jardins, racines alimentaires, legumes, etc... (sauf fruits de cultures arbustives).

[2] Total comprenant les superficies cultivées en céréales et autres produits alimentaires + les vignes, les champs de tabac, les prairies artificielles et toutes autres cultures arbustives et industrielles.

Source: Charles-Robert Ageron, 1968, p. 798.

TABLE 17

THE EXPORT OF HARD WHEAT TO FRANCE, 1898-1909

(in quintals)

1898	486,837
1899	854,572
1900	835,823
1901	1,542,638
1902	1,421,482
1903	724,658
1904	922,792
1905	555,029
1906	1,189,804
1907	2,014,743
1908	724,313
1909	1,216,153

Source: R. Jourdan, 1910, p. 38.

TABLE 18

ALGERIAN EXPORT OF BARLEY, 1900-1909

(in quintals)

Year	Barley Exports		
	To France	To Foreign Countries	Total
1900	744,401	98,735	843,156
1901	1,841,558	166,339	2,007,897
1902	1,516,718	151,421	1,668,139
1903	560,037	12,287	572,324
1904	384,235	5,951	390,186
1905	163,968	24,525	188,493
1906	490,182	35,637	525,819
1907	902,591	310,607	1,213,198
1908	476,758	210,542	687,300
1909	706,542	97,483	804,025

Source: R. Jourdan, 1910, p. 39.

From 1901 to 1919, the Algerian peasant produced 120,681,362 quintals of hard wheat and 9,795,659 quintals of soft wheat, and at the same time 137,192,469 quintals of barley (see Table 19).

Algerian wheat and barley were very much in demand on world markets, and the brewers were very much interested in purchasing it. Despite the increase in demand for local consumption and for export, the areas under cultivation in Algeria began to decline, due to excessive colonization of the most fertile land. Besides wheat and barley, there were many agricultural products exported to France and Europe, such as potatoes, artichokes, French beans, peas, tomatoes, citrus fruits, oranges, and tobacco. For example, the tobacco industry was one of the most successful agro-industries in Algeria during the colonial regime. In 1911, there were eighty-two thousand factories in Algeria. Algeria used to export tobacco (both leaf and manufactured tobacco) to France and Europe. From 1900-1905, the area cultivated increased from 8,574 to 12,009 hectares (see Table 20).

Another agricultural product which played an important role in primitive accumulation was, of course, cotton. To quote Roy Devereux:

> Cotton was, however, grown by the Arabs before the French conquest, and was revived with great profit to the colony during the years that followed the war of succession in America. . . . The new possibility that cotton might come to mean to Algeria all that it meant to Egypt has induced the government [colonial regime] to offer every encouragement to those who are again attempting to acclimatize the plant . . . . The average profits per hectare obtained in America are quoted by official returns at frs 165 (£ 6 12 s.) and in Egypt at frs 110 (£ 4 8 s.). In comparison with these figures, the success which has rewarded the efforts of planters in the Cheliff—where profits of frs 340 (£ 13 12 s.) to frs 770 (£ 30 16 s.) per hectare have been realized—seems to indicate a brilliant future for cotton in Algeria. (Devereux, 1912, pp. 170-71)

The capitalist colonial agrarian economy was embarking on a project

TABLE 19

WHEAT AND BARLEY HARVESTED BY INDIGENOUS INHABITANTS AND YIELD PER HECTARE

(in quintals)

année agricole	*blé dur*	rendement à l'ha	*orge*	rendement à l'ha	*blé tendre*	rendement à l'ha
1900–1901	5.716.695	6,1	9.149.902	7,2	457.802	6,3
1901–1902	6.095.656	6,8	9.056.363	6,9	513.140	6,9
1902–1903	5.920.731	5,8	7.218.456	5,6	407.432	5
1903–1904	4.241.644	4,6	6.809.696	5,9	432.670	5
1904–1905	4.352.749	4,6	5.074.498	4,3	320.135	3,6
1905–1906	5.584.104	6,2	8.874.528	7.5	519.756	6,4
1906–1907	4.521.419	5,3	7.731.421	6,7	623.944	7
1907–1908	4.235.496	4,7	6.860.727	5,4	565.561	4,7
1908–1909	4.542.418	5,3	8.225.245	6,7	697.153	7,5
1909–1910	5.491.170	6	8.698.566	7,3	550.513	5,8
1910–1911	5.540.485	6,5	8.425.245	6,8	697.153	7,4
1911–1912	3.712.035	4,2	5.909.145	4,8	379.132	3,9
1912–1913	4.895.693	5,8	9.188.082	7,7	586.363	6,4
1913–1914	4.312.594	4,9	6.823.924	5,8	588.790	6
1914–1915	4.193.006	5,4	6.583.017	6,2	548.632	5,2
1915–1916	4.121.058	4,6	6.187.617	5,7	559.721	5,5
1916–1917	*2.829.317*	*4,0*	*4.340.831*	4,0	374.705	4,1
1917–1918	4.699.993	6,0	7.505.225	7,0	599.864	5,9
1918–1919	3.046.764	4,1	4.529.981	4,7	373.193	4,7

Source: Charles-Robert Ageron, 1968, p. 301.

TABLE 20

TOBACCO: AREA CULTIVATED AND EXPORTS BETWEEN 1900 AND 1909

YEAR	CULTIVATED AREA — (Hectares)	PRODUCTION — (Quintals)	IMPORTS into Algeria Tobacco leaf	EXPORTS FROM ALGERIA (Quintals)					
				TOBACCO, LEAF			MANUFACTURED TOBACCO		
				to France	to foreign countries	Total	to France	to foreign countries	Total
1900.....	8.574	77.323	14.705	23.761	877	24.638	748	6.404	7.152
1901.....	6.606	75.553	15.526	33.824	6.740	40.564	784	8.338	9.119
1902.....	(1) 12.312	83.559	15.931	23.794	5.826	29.620	684	7.162	7.846
1903.....	7.266	59.026	13.308	32.385	6.163	38.548	906	7.427	8.333
1904.....	6.780	56.662	14.963	30.179	2.036	32.215	657	7.688	8.345
1905.....	7.394	58.992	13.766	22.455	5.537	27.992	1.074	8.630	9.704
1906.....	7.459	61.576	13.155	35.500	10.073	45.573	804	9.401	10.205
1907.....	6.005	64.306	12.869	31.805	3.370	35.175	972	11.441	12.413
1908.....	6.301	50.007	12.686	14.563	3.914	18.477	819	12.169	12.988
1909.....	(2) 12.009	124.569	13.017	23.962	15.274	39.236	863	12.948	13.811

(1) The area cultivated in 1902 shows a considerable increase in comparison to the preceding and following years. This comes of an error in the estimation of the production in a district.

(2) In 1909 there was a considerable extension in the cultivation of tobacco.

Source: R. Jourdan, 1910, p. 63

to give higher priority to crops that were more profitable in terms of the world market (such as tobacco, cotton, and wine) and tentatively tried to replace wheat and barley, which had been more commonly cultivated in Algeria since ancient days and which most of the indigenous inhabitants used in their diet. Between 1910 and 1911, Algeria reversed her trade deficit; her exports balanced her imports:

> A gain of 53,383,000 francs (£ 2,135,320) in the total movement of her commerce is demonstrated by the official returns for 1911. Of this increase only 163,000 francs (£ 6,520) is represented by exported produce, as against a rise of 53,220,000 francs (£ 2,128,800) in the value of her imports. But as the total value of the former in 1911 is recorded at 513,430,000 francs (£ 20,537,200), while the latter attained 565,188,000 francs (£ 22,607,520), it is evident that Algeria has nearly reached the moment when her imports and exports balance each other. As may be imagined, the surplus production of the colony consists chiefly of cereals, wine, olives and vegetables, which with sheep and oxen, including their skins and wool, form the principal articles of exportation. (Devereux, 1912, pp. 200-201)

If we compare Algeria with other colonial settlements (such as Australia), the acceleration of primitive accumulation was far greater than in Australia. The capitalist colonial agrarian economy in Algeria attempted to balance its imports and exports in less than half a century, while in 1890 Australia's imports exceeded her exports. It was nearly a century before Australia could reach the level of primitive accumulation realized by Algeria. Algerian exports were dominated mainly by raw materials destined for metropolitan industries, and her imports were dominated by manufactured goods. In 1911 Algeria imported manufactured goods worth 42,237,000 francs (£ 1,689,480), and spent half that sum for importing minerals. During this period Algeria did not develop, and the commercial relations between the metropolis and the colonial settlement were in favour of France. The relationship hampered the development of industry in Algeria.

Exploitation of natural resources was already under way. Most Algerian provinces possessed large quantities of mineral resources. In 1902 there were forty-two mines; in 1911, the colonial regime granted concessions to ninety-six private companies for the exploitation of mineral rights, and fifty-seven were already under exploitation. Out of those, ten companies were exclusively interested in iron mines, and thirty-five were interested in a combination of zinc and lead. Table 21 presents a listing of ore exports from 1905 to 1909.

The capitalist colonial agrarian economy is a mercantilist capitalism, and its main function is in the exchange of commodities.

> Since merchant's capital is penned in the sphere of circulation, and since its function consists exclusively of promoting the exchange of commodities, it requires no other conditions for its existence—aside from the undeveloped forms arising from direct barter—outside those necessary for the simple circulation of commodities and money. Or rather, the latter is the condition of *its* existence. No matter what the basis on which products are produced, which are thrown into circulation as commodities—whether the basis of the primitive community, of slave production, of small peasant and petty bourgeois, or the capitalist basis, the character of products as commodities is not altered, and as commodities they must pass through the process of exchange and its attendant changes of form. The extremes between which merchant's capital acts as mediator exist for it as given, just as they are given for money and for its movements. The only necessary thing is that these extremes should be on hand as commodities, regardless of whether production is wholly a production of commodities, or whether only the surplus of the independent producers' immediate needs, satisfied by their own production, is thrown on the market. Merchant's capital promotes only the movements of these extremes, of these commodities, which are preconditions of its own existence.
>
> The extent to which products enter trade and go through the merchants' hands depends on the mode of production, and reaches its maximum in the ultimate development of capitalist production, where the product is produced solely as a commodity, and not as a direct means of subsistence. On the other hand, on the basis of every mode of production, trade facilitates the production of surplus-products destined for exchange, in order to increase the enjoyments, or the

TABLE 21

EXPORT OF ORES

(in tons)

	Destination	1905	1906	1907	1908	1909
Iron:	France......	56.273	54.922	65.356	20.659	22.150
	Foreign countries...	523.221	700.255	856.085	814.262	823.894
	Total.......	579.494	755.177	921.441	834.921	846.044
	The annual average for the preceding ten years was about 500.000 tons.					
Copper:	France......	306	759	157	3.616	4.602
	Foreign countries...	4.169	3.975	6.580	833	183
	Total.......	4.475	4.734	6.737	4.449	4.785
	The annual average for the preceding ten years was 773 tons.					
Lead:	France......	5.420	7.945	7.206	16.688	15.396
	Foreign countries...	4.456	6.310	13.775	8.042	4.286
	Total.......	9.876	14.255	20.981	24.730	19.682
	The annual average for the preceding ten years was 4.150 tons.					
Zinc:	France......	11.465	13.098	10.447	12.581	6.935
	Foreign countries...	46.676	56.636	68.504	65.720	64.798
	Total.......	58.141	69.734	78.951	78.301	71.733
	The annual average for the last five years 1895-1899 was 12.630 tons and for the five years 1900-1904, 20.526 tons.					

table continued on next page......

TABLE 21 (*continued*)

	Destination	1905	1906	1907	1908	1909
Mercury:	France......	88	25	"	52	"
	Foreign countries...	"	"	"	"	200
	Total (quintals)..	88	25	"	52	200
Antimony:	France......	"	"	"	150	211
	Foreign countries...	107	386	906	350	2.300
	Total.......	107	386	906	500	2.511
Phosphates:	France......	72.049	66.265	78.814	84.762	40.080
	Foreign countries...	276.027	257.080	265.761	280.780	293.363
	Total.......	348.076	323.345	344.575	365.542	333.443

No exports before 1889; from 1889 to 1894 no tonnage worth mentioning; from 1895 to 1899, annual average 98.000 tons; from 1900 to 1904, annual average 143.000 tons

Source: R. Jourdan, 1910, pp. 126-27.

> wealth, of the producers (here meant are the owners of the products). Hence, commerce imparts to production a character directed more and more towards exchange-value. (Marx, 1974, pp. 325-26)

Merchant capital does not necessarily require strictly capitalist modes of production. Of course, the existence of several modes of production will promote maximization of profit, insofar as the two extremes of mercantilistic capital are functioning within a given society; hence, commodity exchange. The Algerian capitalist colonial agrarian economy relied heavily on the independent producer, such as the Algerian peasant, feudal land (under the khammès schemes of production), settlers, individual holders of land, and big companies (under the khammès scheme of production). The last two classes were under the colonial regime's protection. In order for trade to expand within the internal and external markets, the colonial regime, which was the agent of merchant capitalism, promoted the expansion of auxiliary processes of developing merchant capitalism. The auxiliary processes are the infrastructure: (1) railways and ports; (2) shipping companies; and (3) insurance companies and banking institutions.

In Algeria, the colonial regime bore the cost of the Algerian railways. Initial capital was paid by the metropolitan government, and in 1908 the French Chamber voted 175,000,000 francs of credit for its expansion and improvement. Similarly, the colonial regime made available to private companies and individual colonies and farmers, as well as to some indigenous farmers, a flexible system of credit. For this purpose there were several institutions, notably Crédit Foncier d'Algérie, the Compagnie Algérienne, and Crédit Agricole Mutuel. Some of these institutions were under the direct control of the colonial administration.

The Crédit Agricole Mutuel, for example, was established by the Treasury to assist the rural population, but the great majority of its members were European settlers.

The capitalist colonial agrarian economy, then, is capable of accentuating production of exchange values by bringing pre-colonial modes of production into the capitalist world. The capitalist colonial agrarian economy has had a certain influence on the disorganization of social relations in production in Algerian society, but the degree to which this influence can dissolve the pre-colonial modes of production and the colonial system depends to a great extent on the production unit and its internal relations, and on the social relations of production in pre-colonial society.

D. CLASS STRUCTURE OF THE CAPITALIST COLONIAL AGRARIAN ECONOMY

At the end of the colonial era, the effects of the capitalist colonial agrarian economy upon Algerian social structures were observed in many aspects of Algerian society, such as in unbalanced regional development and socio-cultural characteristics, partly modern and partly traditional. That was the outcome of 132 years of French colonization in Algeria: the modern agricultural sector, with its application of modern technology; and the subsistence sector, very poor and less equipped with modern technology. These sectors represent two strata of colonial society: the settlers, mainly European with French culture and language; and the indigenous inhabitants, sometimes referred to as Moslems or Arabs—the Algerians. Both the traditional and modern sectors were linked to metropolitan France through several networks, such as marketing, storage, and exporting industries and financial institutions of a public and private nature. In 1960, these sectors yielded, as Thomas L. Blair (1969, p. 16) puts it: ". . . the 165 billion in gross agricultural production and 7 billion profit against 56 billion worth of production and 7 billion set aside for amortization renewal." Thus, agriculture is a key sector of the national economy and contributed a higher proportion of the national economic product than local industry, which consisted of five thousand small firms and a few large affiliates of foreign companies providing consumer goods and services (Blair, 1969, p. 17). The overall contributions of local industry to production in the national economy amounted to twenty percent. The class structure of Algeria during the colonial period can best be understood by analyzing land distribution, landholding, and income distribution in colonial society.

The class structure of colonial society becomes more evident when one examines land distribution between the European settlers and the indigenous inhabitants: 22,037 European farmers possessed 2,726,700 hectares, while 630,732 Algerian farmers and peasants owned 7,349,800 hectares (see Table 22).

The average landholdings of European farmers were much bigger than the average landholdings of Algerian farmers and peasants. On the average, the European farmer held 120 hectares of land, while the Algerian farmer held 11 hectares. However, the Algerian farmers and peasants do not constitute a homogeneous group; differentiation of income and landholding are noticeable within a colonized society. Among landowners, there were three distinguishable categories: small, medium, and large landowners. In 1955, these categories exhibited the

TABLE 22

LAND DISTRIBUTION IN ALGERIA, 1951

Size of Holding	Number of Units		Surface Area (in millions of hectares)	
	Europeans	Algerians	Europeans	Algerians
Less than 1 hectare	2,393	105,954	.8	37.2
1-10 hectares	5,039	332,529	21.8	1,341.2
10-50 hectares	5,585	167,170	135.3	3,185.8
50-100 hectares	2,635	16,580	186.9	1,096.8
More than 100 hectares	6,385	8,499	2,381.9	1,688.8
Total	22,037	630,732	2,726.7	7,349.8

Source: E. Hermassi, 1972, p. 85.

following characteristics (see Table 23):

(1) Small farmers represented twenty-two percent of the agricultural population with an average annual income of 60,000 francs per family. The tenant farmers and the rural proletariat were in a similar economic situation, and they accounted for fifty percent of the agricultural population. Their annual income varied from 40,000 to 60,000 francs per family. The rural proletariat offered their labour to the European farmers and to medium and large Algerian farmers. The size of their landholdings depended upon their geographical location; in the Tell zone, small farmers and tenant farmers held three hectares of land per family, while in the steppe zone they were allowed to hold ten hectares of land per family. In the Tell zone, most of the rich lands were owned by European farmers.

(2) Medium farmers constituted twenty-two percent of the rural population, with an average annual income of 200,000 francs per family.

(3) Large farmers represented five percent of the rural population and earned an average annual income of 560,000 francs per family.

Besides these three categories, there were agricultural workers who comprised less than ten percent of the agricultural population and who earned an average annual income of 100,000 francs per family. This category was well accepted within the capitalist colonial agrarian economy, and they had a permanent position within the colonial economy.

Large and medium landowners were the top strata of colonized society; next were the permanent agricultural workers, whose incomes were much higher than those of the small and rural proletariat, who were at the bottom of the rural population strata. Under colonial

TABLE 23

DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL INCOME IN ALGERIA, 1955

	Number of Persons (per 1,000)	Total Income (in milliards)	Per Capita Income (in 1,000 F)
Workers			
Permanent	100	10	100
Temporary	500	24	40-60
Algerian landowners			
Small	210	13	60
Medium	210	42	200
Large	50	28	560
Colonized lands	-	93	-
Total	1,070	210	

Source: S. Amin, 1970, p. 130.

administration, the size of the rural proletariat and the sub-proletariat was increasing, while medium and large farmers were decreasing, for example, between 1930 and 1954. The number of Algerian landowners decreased by twenty percent; during the same period the numbers of agricultural workers increased by twenty-nine percent (Hermassi, 1970, p. 86). The transformation of Algerian society during the development of the capitalist colonial agrarian economy will be discussed in the next section of this chapter.

Class distinctions were commonly observed in urban populations and were based on income and property ownership. Colonial society consisted of two distinctive societies: settlers and the indigenous inhabitants. Each of these societies exhibited class distinctions. In urban Algerian populations there were three distinctive classes: a working class (including white-collar workers), the petite bourgeoisie (including small business owners, merchants, liberal professions and junior executives, and senior executives and directors (see Table 24). In each of these categories, there are variations in terms of average income, depending on the nature of their occupations and the institutions in which they were working—large enterprises or small. For example, factory workers made more money than construction workers. Normally, productive workers made less money than non-productive labour. The average income of productive workers was 150,000 francs, compared to 270,000 francs for the non-productive workers. Within the labour categories, there were disparities of income.

The petite bourgeoisie had an average income comparable to that of non-productive workers. However, within the former category there were internal variations of income, senior executives and directors being

TABLE 24

SOCIAL CLASSIFICATION OF THE URBAN MOSLEM POPULATION IN ALGERIA IN 1955

	Numbers		Average Incomes	Total Incomes	
	Overall (thousands)	Per-cent	(thousand francs)	Amount (thousand million francs)	Per-cent
1. *Unemployed*	(150-230)	(25-33)	0	0	0
2. *Workers*					
In large factories	85	18.5	200	16	15.0
In small factories	40	8.7	200	8	7.5
Building labourers	75	16.5	100	8	7.5
Domestic servants	25	5.5	100	3	2.8
Total (2)	225	50	150	35	33
3. *White-collar workers*					
In big businesses	15	3.2	300	3	2.8
In small businesses	45	9.8	200	9	8.5
In government service	30	6.5	400	12	11.5
Total (3)	90	20	270	24	23
4. *Middle class*					
In small-scale industry	35	7.6	300	10	9.5
In small businesses	83	18.0	250	21	19.8
Liberal professions	10	2.2	300	3	2.8
Junior executives	7	1.5	400	3	2.8
Total (4)	135	30	270	37	35
5. *Senior executives and directors*	7-8		1,000-1,500	10	9
General total (excluding unemployed)	460	100	230	106	100

Source: S. Amin, 1970, p. 70.

the most privileged groups in this category.

A capitalist colonial agrarian economy does not necessarily bring into the economy large numbers of the indigenous population. It provides nearly all the settlers work opportunity while denying similar opportunity to the majority of the indigenous population. So, society is polarized into two distinct categories: the haves and the have-nots. The distinction falls within racial and religious lines in the society. Most of the settlers, of course, were of European origin, and they were in a privileged position within such an economy, while the majority of the indigenous Algerian population were Moslems. If we go beyond physical and religious characteristics, it becomes apparent that in each category there exists very distinctive classes, determined by the nature of the relation of production within the capitalist colonial agrarian economy.

In the colonial period there were four classes: (1) peasants, (2) workers, (3) landowners, and (4) petite bourgeoisie. The political influences of settlers in the colony as well as in the metropolis were concomitant with the economic position they occupied in the capitalist colonial agrarian economy. However, all colonial settlers were not in the same economic position (see Table 25). In fact, within the settlers there were four distinctive classes: (1) large landowners, (2) small landowners, (3) bourgeoisie, and (4) workers. The class structure common to any colonial settlement is obscured because of the presence of a large sub-proletariat of the indigenous population within the capitalist colonial agrarian economy. The population of the settlers maintains the status quo and defends equally the richer population of the settlers. Similar attitudes also have been observed among the poor

TABLE 25

SOCIAL CLASSIFICATION OF THE URBAN EUROPEAN POPULATION IN ALGERIA IN 1955

	Numbers		Average Incomes	Total Incomes	
	Overall (thousands)	Percent	(thousand francs)	Amount (thousand million francs)	Percent
1. *Workers*					
Large factories	59	19.2	400	24	8.4
Small factories	20	6.5	500	10	3.5
Domestic servants	9	2.9	200	2	0.7
Total (1)	88	29	400	36	13
2. *White-collar workers*					
Big business	15	4.9	500	7	2.5
Small businesses and services	33	10.8	500	17	6.0
Government service	32	10.5	600	19	6.7
Total (2)	80	26	530	43	15
3. *Heads of small businesses, etc.*					
Industrial	25	8.2	1,200	30	10.5
Trade	32	10.5	800	26	9.1
Liberal professions	13	4.2	2,000	26	9.1
Junior executives	44	14.4	1,100	44	15.4
Total (3)	114	36	1,150	126	44
4. *Wealthy classes*					
Senior executives	17	5.5	3,000	51	17.9
Company directors	10	3.3	3,000	30	10.5
Total (4)	27	9	3,000	81	28
Overall total	305	100	950	286	100

Source: S. Amin, 1970, p. 71.

populations of the most advanced capitalist countries vis-à-vis the underdeveloped world.

Following the Evian Peace Agreements (1962) between the Algerian provisional government and the French government, the settlers started evacuating from Algeria, and they started destroying all the processing industries. The export economy was interrupted, due to the war of liberation movements which called on the part of the metropolis to review the whole colonial relationship. The sudden evacuation of settlers from Algerian soil was the beginning of social transformation in Algeria. In fact, the peasants and workers all over the country emerged to occupy positions in society again. However, the whole economy was as follows:

- The economy was dependent on outside markets, over forty percent of which were supplied by goods produced by settlers' firms, transformed and consumed in the metropolis;
- Settlers destroyed most of the local processing industry. The capacity of the country to import was drastically reduced. In fact, between 1960 and 1964 the total export of fruits dropped forty-five percent, vegetables dropped thirty percent, and wine forty percent;
- The disintegration of the export economy reduced the level of manpower of the country, which was exclusively the monopoly of the settlers.

The capitalist colonial agrarian economy was undoubtedly geared towards the privileged minority of settlers. The departure of the settlers led to a programme of recovery of large masses of the indigenous population, to their assuming the responsibility of production.

E. THE BREAKDOWN OF PRE-COLONIAL SOCIETY

1. The Transformation of the Means of Production

In 1830, during the era of French conquest in Algeria, communal ownership of land (*arch*) was dominant in the countryside. However, private ownership of land was not absent, and coexisted with *habus* land and Bey lands. The dominant economic formation was agro-pastoral. Such types of economic activity required pastoral lands besides agricultural lands. At the advent of French colonialism, a forced form of transformation of the means of production began to be operant, which intended to interrupt the pre-colonial way of life. The historical transformation of such processes occurred at various levels of production in Algerian society.

The structure of property relationships described in Chapter 4 was challenged by French colonialism in Algeria, and its ultimate transformation became inevitable in 1844, 1863, and 1876. In 1844, the expropriation of all lands was carried out: (1) cultivated lands under *arsh* and *melk* ; (2) *habus* property in which rights were abolished; and (3) pastoral lands were limited to small areas; for example, in the Mitidja valley the total land for cultivation was 168,203.59 hectares; out of this land, 131,672.45 hectares were taken from the peasants and 11,511.74 hectares were left to the original owners.

Thus, expropriation of land has affected all segments of Algerian society. However, the poor section of the society suffered more than the others. In the province of Algiers, for example, 81 families were left with 326 hectares to cultivate and 21 hectares for pasturing their animals. In 1863 and 1870, pre-colonial property relationships were divided into three categories: (1) land for agriculture, (2) land for pasture, and (3) *melk* land. The first two categories of land were at the disposal of the community, and anyone within the community who could exploit them regularly and who maintained traditions was permitted to do so. The third category was among the land left to its owners, other than the lands which were expropriated. The holders of the latter category of land were sometimes referred to as "Arab colonists."

The new classification of land brought about a new property relation, giving a dominant role to *melk* land, which increasingly exceeded that of *arch* land: 2,840,531 hectares for *melk* and 2,859,505 hectares for *arch* of the overall total population. The majority of the peasants made their living attached to *arch* land; proportionate to the population, only a small number of people had the right to excess *melk* land. These property rights were not exclusive but were subject to expropriation if the colonial regime felt it was necessary to do so. This classification of property led to the individualization of land in which each individual in the community was allowed to hold three hectares of land. This, however, was not restricted to tribal lands only; *melk* property was subject to similar conditions, and even if one speculator bought a share in *melk* property, he had every possibility to bring about the disintegration of *melk* property. This was the customary practice during the colonial period in Algeria.

From 1834 on, each territory was divided into three zones; this division was based on political and social rights and on ethnicity. The zones consisted of: (1) mixed, (2) civil, and (3) Arab. The civil zones were territories inhabited exclusively by Europeans. They had the political right to elect their own representatives to municipal councils, and the right to obtain public services. The other two zones were inhabited by the indigenous population. In the mixed zone, the Arab population was the dominant ethnic group, although small numbers of Europeans were brought in by the colonial administration to reside in this zone. Unlike the two other zones, the Arab zone was exclusively inhabited by the indigenous population, who had no political rights either to vote or to be represented. Equally, no services were available to these communities.

2. The Disintegration of Community Life

The colonial situation not only dislocated man from the means of his existence but also devastated the natural resources of the country. Cattle herding began to decline; pastoral land and seasonal migration from the south to the plains and in the north were interrupted. The agro-pastoral life which had existed in Algeria for centuries lost its importance when the land which had been available in the past for such economic activities began to shrink. These economic formations had developed corresponding social institutions, and their existence depended a great deal on the structure of land ownership. For example, *habus* land, which sustained the religious aristocracy, used to provide, almost every year, some assistance to the poor peasants, the Zawias. A previously provident institution lost its existence due to the expropriation of land. The tribal unit, which seemed to be the social unit, was in reality an economic unit. Therefore, the existence of tribal solidarity was dictated by the position that certain groups occupied in economic activity. The removal of the economic base led to the disintegration of the social unit of the tribe and the breakdown of economic institutions became problematic, since the heads of families who were responsible for providing the basic necessities of work within the community lost their position in the community. Under these circumstances, the relationship between the family heads and the peasants became weak. The forced transformation of the means of production interrupted the economic activities of the community and led to the breakdown of social institutions in Algerian society.

3. The Feudalization and Disintegration of Community Life

The feudal structure never remained the same, although the indigenous aristocracy of a non-religious character and some aspects of the Turkish aristocracy continued to coexist with colonial capitalism from 1830 to 1850. However, a special position was allocated to the Turkish and the indigenous aristocracy in the structure of colonial capitalism in Algeria. During this period, they were the agents of primitive accumulation; their role was to collect taxes from the peasant and impose fines whenever they felt it was necessary. Thus the Turkish aristocracy began to disintegrate, and those who refused to accept their new position within the structure of colonial capitalism returned to Turkey. A new group was brought into the indigenous aristocracy structure, who accepted collaboration with the French colonial settlement. These newcomers and the old aristocracy of a non-religious character assumed importance and made fortunes by their positions within the structure of colonial capitalism. A new tribute-paying aristocracy, both indigenous and Turkish, was re-established, as the Mostefa Lacheraf describes:

> Les impérialistes français ont si bien compris de quel côté se trouvaient leurs alliés et leurs auxiliaires naturels que, pour briser l'unité d'action du peuple et prendre le contrepied de l'oeuvre de démocratisation des cadres entreprise par l'émir, ils créèrent, dès les premières années de la Conquête, un nouveau makhzen, une nouvelle classe de privilégiés et de seigneurs, entièrement dévoués à leur cause et fort contents de trouver un refuge contre la vindicte populaire et un moyen puissant de faire échec à l'émancipation des masses rurales. A ce propos, Augustin Bernard s'exprime ainsi: "L'oeuvre essentielle du maréchal Valée fut l'organisation de la province de Constantine, où il appliqua les méthodes de politique indigène qui furent, par la suite, étendues à toute l'Algérie. Elles consistaient à faire administrer le pays, dont la France ne se réservait pas la gestion directe, par de grands chefs indigènes placés sous l'autorité du commandant supérieur de la province. (Lacheraf, 1975, pp. 57-58)

For the purpose of consolidating the country's political and economic power, French colonialism embarked on the idea of reviving the tribute-paying aristocracy; hence, the feudalization of Algerian society, which existed during the Turkish regency, began to assume a role in the economic structure, based on a pre-capitalist mode of production. However, the economic base of the "feudalization" was the value of capital as the means of social relation. Thus the peasants were able to maintain their land only if they were able to pay the taxes and fees imposed upon them by the indigenous aristocracy. In turn, the aristocrats had to pay tribute to the French colonial administration.

French colonialism erected a prototypical feudalism on the Turkish model. Thus the aristocrats enjoyed a greater power than they did under Turkish domination; for the first time, the indigenous aristocracy assumed control over a whole province and nominated their subordinates with the protection of colonial power. In 1833, a French parliamentary commission recommended that these aristocrats, in order to maintain their privileged positions, pay a tribute to France; hence, the political power of feudal institutions was derived from French sovereignty. The French colonial administration nominated a Bey from among the most influential families of the indigenous aristocracy in the regional divisions in which the Turkish regency was represented. These were: Constantine, Medea, and Oran. French colonialism did indeed employ the Turkish model of feudalism, but it also added a new character of political submission, as Charles A. Julien describes:

> Cependant, le général tâchait à instaurer à Oran le même régime qu'à Constantine. Dès la fin de décembre, il pressa Lesseps d'aboutir. La convention, signée à Alger le 6 février 1831, qui nommait bey d'Oran Sidi Ahmed, fils du nouveau bey de Constantine, différait profondément de la précédente, sauf en ce qui concernait les clauses financières. Le gouvernement, au lieu de renoncer à l'installation de toute garnison, se réservait d'"occuper à volonté" le fort de Mers el-Kebir. Le bey restait "à l'égard de la domination française dont le siège est à Alger, dans les mêmes rapports de dépendance que les beys, ses prédécesseurs, envers la Régence d'Alger," étant entendu qu'il ne s'agissait, en l'occurrence, que de "la souveraineté acquise à la France par droit de conquête." Enfin, le gouvernement française se réservait le droit de révoquer le bey s'il n'exécutait pas ses engagements. (Julien, 1970, p. 70)

Thus a dependency relationship was established, based on the fact that the Beys, in order to maintain their newly acquired position, had to provide the French colonial regime with an annual tribute, the recruitment of soldiers, and an oath of fidelity to French sovereignty.

The rights given to the Beys consisted of the power to determine the basis of tax, the appropriation of profits gained from *azels* and *habus* land. The vassalization of the Beys, recruited from the indigenous aristocracy, with the power to control large areas, makes one think that Algeria's social structure at this particular period was in a state of quasi-feudalism; these new Beys whom the French colonial regime nominated came from very influential families—the dominant families within the tribal federation. They expropriated tribal and *habus* lands, which gave them enormous economic power. Their position in the community did not depend on their relationship with the tribal structure of the community; they were, however, responsible to French colonial sovereignty, to whom they had to account for their actions.

This anticipated the breakdown of traditional social structure, which was based on family ties and the federation of the tribes; the quasi-feudal structure led dominant families to assume overall control of whole regions. The feudalization of social relations was brought about by the French colonial army; under these circumstances, the peasant was not attached to the land as in European feudalism. The land expropriated by the Bey was often worked by khammès, who were similar to serfs. However, large parts of the population were not brought into the feudal structure, since tribal and *melk* property still continued to exist on a small scale during this period. There is an indication that the transformation of pre-colonial modes of production occurred, the end result of the feudalization of social relations being the division between tribes and between families, and its intensification due to the vassalization of some tribes or families by the French colonial regime.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, PART I

Part I of this study focussed on the evolution of Algerian society from the Roman period until the end of the colonial era. The purpose of the analysis was to show that the pre-colonial structure never remained the same but was subject to external influences and changes. These changes, however, never produced national capitalist structures capable of transforming Algerian society into a capitalist society. The North African region was subject to a mediterranean influence. The Romans' introduction of large-scale farming into the region marked the beginning of changes to the Algerian communal mode of production. During this period, however, communal ownership of land was dominant and spread over the entire country. The private ownership of land emerged due to the expropriation of peasant land by a few families, who became a dominant class in pre-colonial Algerian society.

With the influence of southwest Asia in the North African region, indigenous states emerged, seeking their allegiance to the caliphate or claiming their independence from the caliphate, due to the sectorial divisions in Islam which developed after the death of the Prophet Mohamed. Those states emerged as a major power in the Mediterranean Sea and conquered Spain and Sicily for the expansion of Islam.

During this period, distinctive North African cities emerged which dominated the hinterlands. Internal and external trade were dominated by native classes, such as the landowning aristocracy, the religious aristocratic elite, and craftsmen. The main trade routes were the caravan routes which connected North Africa with the rest of Africa. These states, because of their geographical position, created a trade link between the Mediterranean and sub-Saharan Africa. The long distance contributed to Algerian class formation at that period of time.

European colonialism opened up sea routes in North Africa. The Portuguese established sovereignty over the western part of Algeria, due to an internal conflict in Algeria. The eastern and northern parts of Algeria remained under native rule. The Turks then established sovereignty over the northern and eastern parts, then expanding westwards and finally forcing the Portuguese to retreat from Algeria. During the Turkish occupation, North Africa became isolated from sub-Saharan Africa. Algerian feudal landlords were superimposed by the Turkish aristocracy, who dominated the country. The dominant form of production during this period was the tribute mode of production, which remained until the French conquest, when it was replaced by the capitalist colonial agrarian economy. Neither mode of production gave rise to the growth of an independent national bourgeoisie. Algerian evolution from feudalism to capitalism was hampered by the Turkish and French occupations.

However, a noticeable transformation in terms of social dislocation took place during French colonialism, which lasted until 1962. The peasants were the most active component during the period of alien occupation of Algerian soil. They were the first group in Algerian society to revolt against foreign domination. Several instances of such revolts took place in several parts of the country to protest the appropriation of peasant land by feudal landlords, the Beys, and French colonial settlements. The peasants and the sub-proletariat were the backbone of Algerian nationalism, led by the urban petite bourgeoisie. In the army's struggle against French colonial settlements, the peasants constituted the majority who waged war, although the workers, the intellectuals, and the petite bourgeoisie formed an alliance with the peasants to free Algeria. At the end of the colonial era, there was total opposition to French colonial settlement.

On the eve of Algerian political independence, workers and peasants seized agricultural enterprises and set up *comités de gestion*. Without the participation of Algerian peasants, workers, and intellectuals, the Algerian revolution would not have been realized. Therefore, the social dimensions of the Algerian revolution are to pursue a policy of socialist development in Algeria. Because of the lack of historical development of a national bourgeoisie, the state, which represents the national collectivity, assumes the role of transforming the colonial structure and the organization of Algerian society.

PART II

ALGERIAN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

CHAPTER 7

THE POLITICAL AND CULTURAL CONTENT OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

On 18 March, 1962 the Evian agreement came into existence, both the French government and the GPRA agreeing in principle as follows:

(1) The French government recognized Algerian self-determination and agreed to provide technical, cultural, and economic cooperation to an independent Algeria.

(2) Both governments agreed to respect the rights and interests of their countries to exploit jointly the wealth of the oases and the Sahara, with due respect to Algerian sovereignty.

(3) Constitutional development towards political independence would be led by a provisional executive, consisting of both the Algerians and the French, for the purpose of organizing the election of a National Assembly and maintaining law and order.

During this term, social security and defence were in the hands of the French government. The Evian agreement signifies two important historical-sociological factors: the end of colonial settlement and the beginning of a new era. The capitalist colonial agrarian economy began to vanish like melting ice, since most of the settlers began to leave the country at once following the declaration of Algerian independence. Secondly, the economy which was created purposely to sustain settlers began—primarily because of the shift of emphasis imposed by the metropolis—gradually to transform financial institutions whose interests now began to reflect not agricultural exploitation but the exploitation of natural resources in the oases and in the Sahara.

To be independent after a century of colonial exploitation meant a lot for every Algerian. This would not have been realized without the participation of the masses in the liberation struggle which led to the breakdown of the capitalist colonial agrarian economy. This struggle created the conditions for a new foundation for Algerian society, and a new level of consolidation of collective awareness was achieved during the struggle for national liberation.

In this regard, an official document of the GPRA declared in 1962, on the eve of Algerian independence, that:

> An analysis of the social content of the liberation struggle makes it apparent that it has been the workers and peasants generally who have been the active base of the movement and have given it its essentially popular character. Their massive participation has in turn led other social layers of the nation. It has given rise to a peculiarly important phenomenon: the total commitment of the Algerian youth, regardless of social origin. It should be noted in this connexion, that in most cases it was young people of bourgeois origin who determined the adherence of the bourgeoisie to the cause of independence.
>
> The people's movement has had the effect, in the course of the armed struggle, of going beyond the objective of liberatory nationalism towards a more long-term perspective, that of Revolution. By its continuity, its sustained effort and the immense sacrifices that it has undergone, it has helped to give a more homogeneous form to the fragmentary national consciousness. Moreover, it has extended this form into a collective consciousness oriented in the direction of the revolutionary transformation of society. (Tripoli programme, in Blair, 1963)

The young generation of bourgeois and petit bourgeois origin took part in the national liberation movement. The objective of this latter group is somehow different from that of the peasant and the worker due to their social, political, and economic position in colonial society, since their commitment to the national movement was dictated merely by either patriotic conviction or opportunism. The experience of colonial struggle has shown that the bourgeoisie and the petite bourgeoisie seek easy solutions to solve the colonial situation, and they often have been a third force in colonial society, seeking alliance either with the colonial power or with the masses. However, when the colonial relationship becomes unbreachable, they see themselves in alliance with the masses. If national liberation created the conditions for national development by establishing a sovereign state in Algeria, the revolutionary transformation of society presupposes socialist principles with a popular content. This means:

(1) The partial restoration of values of the pre-colonial society and elimination of feudal-colonial social institutions—the primacy of the emancipated man over colonial-feudal institutions.

(2) Economic institutions are collectivized and hence involve changes in the relationships of production. Leadership should be in the hands of the peasantry, workers in general, youth, and revolutionary intellectuals.

(3) Collective responsibility takes primacy over individual responsibility.

A. THE CULTURAL BASE OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Franz Fanon once remarked that "decolonization is quite simply the replacing of a certain 'species' of men by another 'species' of men" (1963, p. 29). The decolonization of culture implies, then, the replacing of colonial culture by national culture, that is, *El-Nahda*—a cultural rebirth. In the Algerian context, the cultural base of national development consists of (1) national culture and (2) revolutionary culture and scientific culture.

1. National Culture

Colonialism was directed not only towards the economic foundation of colonized society but also towards the cultural foundation of the indigenous inhabitants. "Cultural estrangement" is an obstacle to national development; therefore it was a matter of historical necessity to put Algerian culture within the context of national development. In fact, national culture received first priority within Algerian national development. What do the Algerians mean by national culture?

According to the Tripoli programme (1962) and *La Charte d'Alger* of 1965, national culture is defined as follows:

> First, its role as a *national* culture will imply above all that the Arabic language, which is the very expression of our country's cultural values, should be restored to its dignity and efficacy as a language of civilization. Algerian culture will therefore apply itself to the task of reconstituting, reevaluating and making known the national patrimony and its double humanism, classical and modern, in order to reintroduce them into intellectual life and the education of popular sentiment. Accordingly, it will fight the cultural cosmopolitanism and western impregnation which have contributed to inculcating into many Algerians a contempt for their language and their national values. (Clegg, 1971, p. 216)

First and foremost, national culture creates the conditions to relate between the past and present; it becomes a medium of communication. The Arabic language enhances the continental function of national culture; it relates Algeria to the rest of the Arab world. Second, the content of national culture provides the bases of disengagement of cultural estrangement imposed by colonial settlement and international imperialism.

Since Algerian independence, a new curriculum has been developed at all levels of the educational system, and during the transitional period from colonial culture to a national culture an educational duality has been maintained whereby both languages (French and Arabic) are employed on an equal footing for the first time in Algerian history. However, Arabic is becoming the language of the future in Algeria, and a tremendous amount of progress has been achieved since independence, as Table 26 indicates, thanks to inter-Arabic cultural cooperation.

TABLE 26

INCREASE OF ARABIC STUDENTS IN ALGERIA

(in thousands)

	1971-1972	1972-1973	1973-1974	1974-1975	1975-1976
Effectif des étudiants en langue nationale (Arabic)	2.015	3.830	5.848	8.366	10.216
Indice d'évolution des effectifs	100	190	290	415	507
Proportion (%)	8.2	14.1	19.4	23.31	24

Source: *El-Djeich* 160, 1976.

Table 25 indicates the number of students enrolled in the Arabic language in 1975-1976 and how this number has increased from 8.2 percent in 1971-1972 to 24 percent in 1975-1976.

In almost all educational institutions at present, instruction is either bilingual or arabized. In each university there are two divisions for each major academic discipline, one in Arabic and one in French. With the exception of the secondary level of education, most higher education, particularly in technological and scientific institutions, is taught in French, while Arabic is becoming predominant in the humanities and social sciences. The mass media is broadcast in French, ethnic languages, and Arabic. Apart from the daily news, cultural features are predominantly in Arabic and in some cases in ethnic languages. The French language is decreasing in importance in this area. However, while the French language is losing its importance relatively, in many aspects of cultural life French is yet the language of the administration, both in the public and private sector of the economy.

It appears that Arabic is the language spoken by the masses, while French is the elite language. During my field work in Algeria, most of the people I met spoke Arabic, then French, particularly among the agricultural and industrial workers. In contrast, most of the cadres, with the exception of a few who entertained me in Arabic, had a tendency to speak French more than Arabic, and a few of them could not speak Arabic at all. I began to discover that a few families were virtually encapsulated by cultural estrangement. A female cadre told me that her family had spoken French for several generations, and at home they spoke only French. In the process of decolonizing national culture, initiated following Algerian independence, the new generation of the masses and the elite attended bilingual schools. But as yet both languages are not on an equal footing in this family. Some families speak only French at home, and this is a common practice among mixed marriages and families who had close association with settlers. These families are normally from the new or the old aristocratic classes.

In families from peasant and worker backgrounds, Arabic is the language spoken at home.

Decolonization of culture, therefore, is very much directed to the upper-class families who are very much involved in colonial cultural estrangement, although some of these families are working to rediscover themselves and to lose the ties with their colonial past. During this transitional period, the children of both types of family partially adopted one culture and its own context.

Besides these two types of family, there is in Algeria a third type of family wholly committed to Arabic culture, because of the convictions of the Islamic religion. This type of family consists of the two classes indicated above. For this purpose, there are Islamic institutions in each region where both the Arabs, the Berbers, and a minority of Turkish origin send their children to such schools. At present, there are in Algeria primary and secondary schools, and technical colleges, mainly in agriculture, in which teaching is in Arabic.

The arabization of the school system is only one aspect of the development of national culture. Other aspects are: literacy and arabization of the environment. Most adult educational programmes are carried on in Arabic, acquiring skills which presuppose a knowledge of the Arabic language. People are taught how to read and write Arabic. Most of the workers in national enterprises in agriculture and industry attend literacy classes during working hours. This programme is geared towards needs arising from the work situation, and it has the character of functional literacy. It provides the opportunity, given to them at the enterprise, for instruction needed in order to comprehend the environmental situation.

The cultural environment has a mass line character and is directed to all citizens so that they learn Arabic, because it is becoming necessary to know Arabic in order to survive within the environment. This programme started as bilingual; French and Arabic were written on all signs in the streets, hotels, schools, factories, public and private institutions, and on products. Since last year, Arabic has become the medium of environmental communication. The maps which might have been useful before may not be useful any more, because Arabic signs are everywhere. Therefore, for everyone living in Algeria, Arabic has become a matter of necessity in everyday life. Major newspapers are evolving gradually into the Arabic language only; at present, regional newspapers are in Arabic.

This, however, indicates, indeed, that Algeria is moving towards self-sustained national cultural development. When cultural replacement became apparent, the minority, new or old, who enjoyed privileged positions in the past, began to manifest a naive attitude towards the new situation. My association with these minorities made me aware of the change in the cultural environment. This group used to carry on their protest behind doors and in the salons of the administrative offices of their taste. However, it must be realized that this cultural development in formal institutions and mass education does not necessarily provide for the development of a national culture. National development can be achieved only through cultural liberation. In a neo-colonial situation, the success of cultural liberation depends on the leaders and the people being sensitive to the new forms of colonialism and their manifestations in national culture. The lack of safeguards in the international situation may lead to the development of cultural disguise and cultural confusion.

In classical colonialism, the carriers of cultural silence were the missionaries, the entrepreneurs, colonial education, and the colonial machinery and its cultural artefacts. In the neo-colonial situation, the conveyors, as bourgeois society used to call them, are not only the French in Algeria but an aggregation of individuals from all over the world, mainly from the developed parts of western and eastern Europe and North America and the remnant of colonial society resident in the country. There are coopérants, international entrepreneurs, liberal professions, and local representatives of multinational corporations. These, and their internal coopérant counterparts, represent the strata of the know-how of national development. These groups occupy a privileged position in Algerian society. They enjoy most everything that is available, even when such resources are limited, for example housing. These groups are in contact with the people, directly or indirectly, and their relationship with the people is based on individual relationships. However, because of their background, they create a cultural exposure by introducing to the area new habits, particularly the habits of consumption, new lifestyles, heterogeneous ideas, and manifestations of cultural superiority; all these factors reach, directly or indirectly, the masses of society.

Cultural exposure is one of the elements which works against cultural liberation. I found that in Algeria people want goods produced in Europe and North America rather than goods produced by their own society. A director of an enterprise in Rouiba told me that he does not print "Made in Algeria" on a shirt made in Algeria. The carriers of cultural exposure are not always foreigners but also Algerian immigrants, Algerian students abroad, and Algerian professionals who are in contact with the developed parts of the world. Therefore, cultural disguise is an international phenomenon created by the gap existing between developed and developing countries. This gap reduces the individual and the masses of emerging nations to cultural spectators, expecting that their desires for possessions will be fulfilled by developed countries. Since cultural disguise creates a hierarchy of possessions of cultural artefacts within the strata of developing society, that stratum and their foreign counterpart creates the desire for possessions and the invitation for imitation at the level of the masses of these societies. This in turn reduces the individual to a position of consumer rather than a producer.

In Algeria, unlike its neighbouring countries, there is no problem of marginalization such as found in many emerging countries. The basic necessities are provided by the government to all citizens. In general, people eat well, dress well, education is provided to all citizens, and jobs are available. The biggest problems in major cities are housing and transport; but in regard to these problems the government assists the people by providing adequate houses and public transport. Because of cultural disguise, discussed above, people attach more value to things produced outside their country and desire to possess things not possible within the framework of the present stage of their country's development. Table 27 indicates the evolution of national culture, the social and cultural environment in which national culture evolves, gradually assuming different cultural phases, each of which is in dialectical relationship to the other, determined by the ideological and economic base of the society. These two factors are in direct relation to the present international situation involving developed and underdeveloped countries.

TABLE 27

THE COLONIAL AND POST-COLONIAL CULTURAL SITUATION

Phase I	Colonial situation	"Cultural silence"
Phase II	National independence	Transformation, or cultural disguise, or cultural confusion
Phase III	Neo-colonialism	Cultural spectator and cultural liberation

Source: M. Abucar, field notes, 1976.

Paulo Freire's work is one of the studies dealing with the relationship between the infrastructure and the cultural base of society. According to him, the infrastructure of domination in emerging nations corresponds to "l'ensemble des schémas de pensée et la mentalité qui se sont formées depuis la colonisation espagnole et portugaise dans le monde paysan de la plupart des pays d'Amérique latine" (p. 6). He calls this domination "culture de silence" (Silva, 1970, p. 8). It has commonly been observed in most developing countries that once political independence has been achieved a policy of cultural development is embarked upon. Therefore, national culture is the antithesis of "culture du silence." The immediate aim of national culture is to replace the colonial culture imposed on the masses of the people in colonial society. This replacement takes place in the search for an authentic culture, a culture that represents most of the people, with which they can claim historical affinities and which has a significant relationship to the stage of development of the country. The "culture du silence" as it is manifested in the Algerian situation has been described by Ahmed Taleb Ibrahim:

> Si la France, en occupant l'Algérie, n'avait pas détruit toute trace d'enseignement national, ils auraient trouvé des écoles où apprendre l'arabe. Mais ils n'avaient pas le choix. Au surplus, la France ne s'est pas contentée de leur apprendre sa langue, de leur inculquer sa culture: elle leur a appris qu'en dehors de cette culture il n'y a rien, et que l'histoire de l'Algérie commence en 1830. Comment s'étonner dès lors qu'ils vênèrent des totems qui leur sont étrangers et qu'ils ignorent qu'avant Descartes, il y eut Ghazali, avant Vico, Ibn Khaldoun, avant de Foë, Ibn Tofail, avalt Cl. Bernard, Ibn Sina, avant Dante, Al 'Ma'arri et avant Lamartine, Omar Ibn Rabi'a? (Ibrahim, 1972, pp. 13-14)

The source of cultural silence is to be found in the attitude and policy of the colonial regime. In Algeria, it became a customary attitude, both on the part of the settlers and the French government, to negate Algerian history, culture, and nationality by maintaining that Algeria has been a country conquered by many civilizations, such as the Roman and Byzantine; consequently, they have never been a nation.

As those who are aware of Algerian pre-colonial history know, the fact is that Algeria was part of North African civilization in particular, Arab civilization in general, prior to the French conquest of North Africa. In fact, colonialism was never able to destroy completely Algerian culture. Again, Ahmed Taleb Ibrahim explains the presence of Algerian culture and its contribution to the civilization of the world:

> Est-ce à dire que la déculturation de l'Algérie a réussi? En vérité, il n'y a pas de commune mesure entre les résultats obtenus d'une part, les espoirs nourris et les efforts déployés d'autre part. Une culture ne meurt pas; lorsque les "sociologues" décrivent l'attachement des Algériens à certains symboles de leur personnalité, ils concluent à une momification. Il s'agit en fait d'une mise en hibernation. La culture nationale s'est maintenue dans les proverbes, les chants folkloriques et toute cette littérature orale qui a continué de refléter la vie et la lutte du peuple. Les coutumes et les traditions qui se

> sont maintenues en Algérie, malgré les 130 ans de colonialisme, ont constitué le fil d'Ariane qui a permis à l'Algérien de plonger dans son passé, de faire connaissance avec ses ancêtres. L'oeuvre de l'association des Oulémas (près de 150 écoles primaires arabes fonctionnant avec l'argent et l'appui du peuple et malgré les brimades de l'administration coloniale) a contribué à donner plus de consistance à cette phase de redécouverte de soi. Dans ces écoles, nous avons pu apprendre notre histoire et notre langue, notre histoire en notre langue. Nous avons su notamment que les peuples du Maghreb ont créé dans le passé des valeurs culturelles d'une portée historique mondiale. Sans parler d'Ibn Khaldoun, fondateur d'une science qui prend de plus en plus d'ampleur aujourd'hui (la sociologie), nous pouvons mentionner Ibn Tofail, auteur d'une oeuvre philosophique puissamment originale "Hayy ibn Yaqdan," Ibn Rochd, le célèbre Averroès qui fut le lien incontesté entre l'aristotélisme et le thomisme, etc. (Ibrahim, 1972, pp. 14-15)

During the national struggle against French colonialism and pre-colonial conquest, national culture was preserved by the people with their modes and contributions. It is true that Algeria had been conquered by many different civilizations, yet Algerian national culture survived with the people during centuries of colonialism. However, it must be remembered that despite Algerian resistance against colonial culture, directly and indirectly, some of her people were brought into the mainstream of colonial culture. Memmi and Fanon, who are well known for their studies of colonial society, have expressed different opinions on the dialectic relationship between national and colonial culture. According to Fanon, the breakdown of colonial culture is concomitant with political independence: the day independence is proclaimed, the symptoms of colonial culture begin to disappear, gradually. In contrast, Memmi holds the view that colonial culture will persist after independence, even if the relationship between the colonizer and the colonized comes to an end. The breakdown of colonial culture gives rise to transformations of the "culture du silence" so that it takes either the form of cultural disguise, or cultural confusion, or cultural liberation, as we have indicated above. Under such circumstances, even if colonial culture persists, it will never remain the same.

In the city of Algiers, I came into contact with people who had grown up during the time of colonial settlement. The majority of these people abhor the colonial situation of the past, but some of them still have an attachment to the past; hence the colonial situation. They told me that during the French colonialization, there was not *Ghach* (heterogeneity) in Algiers: "We knew each other; today we do not know who is who."

During the colonial period the inhabitants of Algiers were 250,000; ninety-three percent of these inhabitants were settlers and seven percent were indigenous inhabitants. At present, ninety-nine percent of the population is Algerian. The Algerian experience suggests that whenever colonial structure and colonial culture begin to disintegrate, the awakening of the people begins to take shape in an unprecedented form within human history. This situation will persist until a new structure and new culture come into existence, by giving shape to the new society.

Bourgeois sociologists, such as Lerner Daniel and F. Riggs, have made an attempt to study the breakdown of colonial culture and structure and have come up with outrageous and naive conclusions about the culture of non-Western societies. Riggs (1965) is concerned with the relationship between the administration of non-Western societies and the social and cultural environment. His conclusions were drawn mainly from the Philippines. According to him, non-Western societies are of two polar types, agrarian and industrial, and in the middle is found a spectrum of heterogeneous characteristics which give rise to traditional-modern types. He calls his thesis prismatic society.

Lerner Daniel, the best known of the bourgeois academics, has written a book on the passing of traditional society. According to him, the transition towards modernity takes three different steps: one of social lethargy, one of aspiration and explosion, and finally one of balance. Each of these stages exhibits, according to him, certain particular characteristics. The first stage will show both low expectations and a low level of achievement; the second stage is one of high aspirations and low achievement; the third stage is one of high aspirations and high achievement in balance. Both Riggs and Lerner Daniel's studies on non-Western society are too static and too simplistic, with all kinds of naivete, emotional prejudice, and ethnocentric biases. Secondly, these studies are ahistorical, with strong structural-functional biases.

The Algerian colonial experience suggests that the transformation of the colonial relationship between colonized and colonizer has not been achieved peacefully: over two million Algerians died in the colonial war for human liberation. Therefore, the contradiction inherent within the colonial situation was the factor which created the conditions for social transformation. It is equally important to remember that some of these contradictions may still persist after the remodelling of the colonial situation and that colonial culture, after breakdown, may assume different forms. Therefore, cultural disguise or cultural confusion are by-products of colonial-traditional legacies which have deep roots in post-colonial society. The success of culture as a liberation factor in national development depends a great deal on the ideological unity between political power and the masses, on the one hand, and the relationship between the national and economic structures of the society.

2. Cultural Revolution

The word revolution has a particular meaning in the liberation of Algerian national development. It intends to refer to equal opportunity and responsibility for all Algerian citizens, and to the right to learn and to participate in national development as an inalienable right of all citizens. The term revolution is used in industry, in agriculture, and in culture. By cultural revolution, according to Ahmed Taleb Ibrahim, is meant:

> En définitive, et en schématisant un peu comme l'exige un exposé bref, on peut dire que la Révolution culturelle, par-delà les différences liées à un peuple ou à une époque, consiste avant tout à:
>
> 1. Ouvrir les portes du savoir et du savoir-faire aux masses populaires;
> 2. Favoriser le développement culturel et la démocratisation de la culture;
> 3. Former un homme nouveau dans une société nouvelle;
> 4. Maintenir un effort continu d'animation et d'explication . . .
>
> Après ces considérations sur la Révolution culturelle en général, nous allons voir que l'Algérie dispose d'atouts importants pour le triomphe de cette Révolution, qui ne va pas à contre-courant de nos traditions. (Abdel-Malek, 1970, p. 198)

This implies the fact that opportunity for acquiring knowledge is open to all citizens regardless of their social origin. In the past, in traditional society and in colonial society, the right to acquire knowledge was reserved only for a few people in society. Because of the disparity in political and economic positions in society between the settlers and the broad masses, it was virtually not possible for the children of peasants and workers to acquire knowledge and responsibility in society. Within the frame of cultural revolution, schools are established all over the country, and access to education is open to all citizens. Table 28 indicates the quantitative evolution of education in Algeria.

TABLE 28

QUANTITATIVE EVOLUTION

	1962-1963	1964-1965	1974-1975	1975-1976
Primaire	777.636	1.215.037	2.499.605	2.600.000
Moyen et secondaire	50.491	103.249	419.359	500.000
Supérieur	2.809	5.926	35.887	37.000
Total	830.936			3.137.000

Source: *El-Djeich* 160, 1976.

In the context of cultural revolution, a distinction is drawn between colonial and Arab-Islamic heritage. The importance of this distinction in the context of cultural revolution is that Algerian national struggle was not a struggle between Algerian classes but rather a struggle between the Algerian people and an alien culture, hence the French colonialism. Therefore the cultural revolution is very much directed towards decolonizing the national culture rather than promoting a struggle between classes within the social structure, as happened in China in early 1965.

What is apparent, however, in contemporary Algerian society, is that the French language is still the language of the elite and Arabic is the language of the masses. However, the Arabic language does occupy an important position in the development of national culture; bilingualism, which exists commonly in Algerian educational institutions, indicates that Arabic may acquire a position in Algerian society after the long period of French colonialism, during which the Arabic language was virtually eliminated from the educational system and was considered as a foreign language.

At present, Arabic is the official language in Algeria. Education has been opened to all Algerian citizens since independence, which may well be taken to indicate that the cultural revolution aims indirectly at overcoming class differences through education. The fact must be kept in mind that the application of the Arabic language at schools and universities does not imply that Arabic will substitute for the French language in all fields of knowledge. This point has been elaborated by Ahmed Taleb Ibrahim:

> Pendant une longue phase, nous avons besoin de la langue française comme une fenêtre ouverte sur la civilisation technicienne en attendant que la langue arabe s'adapte au monde moderne et l'adopte et que l'Algérie forme ses propres cadres arabisants. Dans nos programmes scolaires, la langue française aura le statut de langue étrangère privilégiée. Ce qui n'empêchera pas nos enfants d'étudier, dès l'enseignement secondaire, d'autres langues vivantes.
>
> Je voudrais ajouter quelques mots au sujet de la francophonie. L'Algérie a toujours refusé de s'associer à ce mouvement parce que l'arabe qui est notre langue nationale et notre langue officielle a, lui aussi, une vocation mondiale; parce que ce regroupement face aux problèmes majeurs de notre temps, ne présente aucune unité politique ou économique et encore moins géographique, et aussi parce que, objectivement, il comporte des tendances néo-colonialistes. Plutôt que de favoriser la cristallisation en blocs, nous pensons qu'il vaut mieux favoriser l'interpénétration des cultures. L'Algérie, quant à elle, souhaite la rencontre des peuples et des cultures par-delà la barrière des langues. (Abdel-Malek, 1970, pp. 199-200)

The role of the French language in Algeria is to link Algeria to the world of technology during this period of transition, until Algerians can train their own cadres in Arabic. The application of the French language in the Algerian school system does not make Algeria francophone, since Algeria has its own national language.

The problems associated with decolonization of culture in Algeria are many; some of these problems have been discussed in section 1, especially the role of the family in the context of the reconstruction of national culture. However, there are other problems connected with cultural revolution which are obstacles for the development of national culture and national development. These problems are: vested interest in preserving the French language, the gap between Arabic and French in the teaching materials of science and technology, and the structure of the administrative institutions.

The persistence of the French language in the administration can not only be conceived as a window for technological transfer; it seems the problem is much more complicated than that. Most of the senior and junior civil servants who occupy important positions in the public and private sectors of national development were trained during the colonial period, and after independence, in French. This group consists of the old civil servants who worked during the colonial period and following Algerian independence and who assumed higher positions in the administration. The number of this group is decreasing gradually; because their service period is phasing out, they constitute the oldest group in the Algerian administration. Within this group there are young civil servants who also have acquired their knowledge, in French, in Algerian institutions or abroad. The latter are different from the former, because their ideological orientation is consistent with the present political situation in Algeria. Despite their similarities and differences, these groups have a common interest in preserving the continuity of the French language in Algeria.

These are not the only groups with a vested interest in maintaining the French language; there are the professionals, the merchants, and the lower echelons of the civil service. The structure of Algerian administration has not changed since independence. Most of the routine work in the administration is carried on in French rather than in Arabic; in this sense, they enjoy a more privileged position than any other group. Although some senior and junior civil servants do have a good command of the Arabic language, they prefer to use French in their work.

Despite the revolutionary government's policy of accelerated arabization of the school system and the environment, and the algerization of the universities and schools, there is much doubt whether this will reduce the gap between French and Arabic, as to the opportunity of gaining knowledge in technology, science, and administration. At present, these areas are predominantly taught in French. This does not mean that all the teachers of these institutions of technology, science, and administration are French. No: in fact, most of the teachers of such institutions are from socialist and Third World countries. It is only that the medium of instruction is French.

A growing number of Algerians have obtained training in Arabic countries and at home. This group is known as "El-Mouarab." I encountered quite a number of this group in agricultural institutions. They are the most frustrated group, because they are trained in the Arabic language and the administrative structure of the country is not in a position to accommodate such a group. The reasons are several, but the most commonly observed one is that the working language of most institutions in Algeria is francophone-oriented: reports, discussions, and correspondence are carried out in French. Due to the language barrier, the "El-Mouarab" technicians or engineers remain outside the bureaucratic machinery, even when their knowledge is badly needed in the country. Because of the language problem, the "El-Mouarab" has limited possibilities within the system to show his talent. One of the members of this group told me: "I have given up the struggle with the francophones; I just come to the office and do my own business."

Despite their frustrations with the system, this group in fact does a lot of grassroots work; they have a great deal of contact with the farmers and society by and large, and they do a lot of community work. They tutor students and farmers who are beginning to learn how to read and write Arabic, they act as voluntary technical advisors to farmers as to how to improve the quality of production, and they are in close contact with the peasant. They do all this work outside the framework of the administrative structure.

It seems that most of the farmers have more confidence in working with this group than with the francophone-oriented administration of the agricultural institutions. Mainly, this results from the fact that in the institutions there are problems and tensions between farmers and bureaucrats. This raises the issues of the prices of agricultural commodities, fertilizers and transport costs, marketing procedures, and agricultural equipment. The problems arising from the decolonization of national culture are not a separate entity from the problems arising from decolonizing the national economy.

As Algeria became independent, its Arab-Islamic heritage assumed importance in society. Therefore, the contemporary political situation gives importance to the preservation and protection of the patrimonial culture of the past. This cultural opportunity is open to all Algerian citizens regardless of their social origin. Thus the educational and social formation of Algeria is constituted. The past culture consists of Algerian literature, poetry, history, arts, and music. Since independence, all these items of culture have become an expression of national culture. Each region has begun to give importance to its folklore, art, and poetry as a basis for re-creation of the national culture; the sum of these regional expressions constitutes national culture. Since 1973, it has become customary to send voluntary artists to travel all over the country, covering a number of regions every year in performing plays in each community, as the following quotation demonstrates:

> Cette activité a connu un grand impact. D'ailleurs, ce n'était pas la première fois que le C.V.U. entreprenait une telle expérience. La première date de 1973 où, déjà une troupe théâtrale constituée par des étudiants volontaires, avait sillonné six wilayate de l'Est pour présenter aux populations rurales une pièce de théâtre traitant de la Révolution agraire et des problèmes qu'elle rencontre. Depuis, l'expérience était renouvelée chaque hiver et chaque été. Les caravanes qui ont touché au cours de ce mois de volontariat plus de 40 000 personnes se déplaçaient chaque jour de commune en commune présentant un spectacle complet, organisant des débats en collaboration avec les brigades de volontaires qui se trouvent sur le terrain.
>
> Cette expérience a eu une très grande audience auprès de la paysannerie dans la mesure où, par des illustrations, des exemples concrets, etc. . . . elle arrivait à expliquer la Révolution agraire et à traiter des problèmes que rencontre cette dernière. Elle a donc un aspect complémentaire du travail des volontaires qui se trouvent sur les lieux. (*El-Moujahid*, 10 August, 1976)

One of the functions of national culture is, on the one hand, to interrelate between the older and the younger generations and on the other to promote peasant enthusiasm in order to foster the level of production. The continuous contact between the productive force and the non-productive force creates conditions of awareness on the part of the younger generation who have never lived in *Reef** for learning about the conditions and the work in the hinterlands. There is great enthusiasm on the part of the younger generation to do voluntary work, although they are not the only group. There are other groups also, such as the army, party officers, and civil servants, who spend weekends helping gather in the harvest in their particular region or locality. Their rhythm of enthusiasm undoubtedly derives from forces embodied within national culture, as this quotation from the editor of *El-Moujahid* demonstrates:

**Reef* means "rural" in Arabic.

> En vérité, pour les productions de l'esprit, la première condition est d'avoir la foi: foi en soi-même, en ce que l'on veut dire par l'écriture ou la peinture, par la musique ou le film; foi en les idéaux qui régissent notre société, foi en le peuple qui la construit et auquel on s'adresse; foi en la Révolution. Comment pourrait-on, autrement, trouver l'inspiration et les accents sincères pour chanter une oeuvre qui ne reçoit pas un assentiment profond?
>
> La seconde condition, non moins essentielle, est de s'acharner au travail. Le simple bon sens nous apprend que les génies ne sont pas légion. Sans vouloir ignorer le talent, nous croyons que le résultat dépend aussi, et peut-être surtout, du travail. C'est par le travail que l'on peut améliorer son niveau, que l'on peut embellir ses oeuvres. Pour les arts et les lettres, comme pour toute autre matière, rien sans doute n'est plus dangereux que de suivre la voie de la facilité. Elle ne conduit qu'à une stérile vanité. (*El-Moujahid*, March 1972)

National culture creates what the French call "foi" in oneself and the opportunity to be engaged in creative work that is rewarding to the nation and the individual taking part in the affairs of his own country. During French colonialism this aspect of their lives was not intact, due to the oppressive character of French colonialism which removed self-awareness from individuals taking part in shaping their destiny. Two of the essential elements of life were missing: the ability to act and the opportunity to participate in building one's culture. These two elements are essential elements in the outcome of man's ability to shape the surroundings. "Foi et travail" assumes its historical mission when the correct line of national culture is defined within the framework of the political and economic evolution of society. A national debate was held in Algeria in May 1976 for the adoption of a "Charte Nationale" dealing with the organization of Algerian society; forums were held everywhere in the nation, and these meetings were reported in the mass media, on television, and in the national and regional newspapers. The main issues discussed were the position of women in society, Islam and socialism, corruption, bureaucracy and national issues, regional equilibrium, agricultural industry, the question of bilingualism, and the role of art and national culture in nation-building. The people's viewpoint on these issues was reported constantly in the major newspapers, broadcast in the mass media, and seen on the television network. A citizen of Saida made the following comment on the question of art and culture:

> Dans les conditions de lutte de notre pays contre l'impérialisme et la réaction, et dans la perspective de conquérir l'indépendance économique et instaurer une société prospère où régnera la justice sociale, la liberté, la démocratie et le socialisme, la culture et l'art prennent une importance grandissante.
>
> Dans ce sens:
> 1. Il ne saurait y avoir "d'art pour l'art," "d'art en soi," "d'art neutre," mais d'un art résolument libérateur, résolument engagé, partisan fécond et actif, arme consciente, vigilant et efficace dans la lutte anti-impérialiste et anti-réactionnaire, arme au service et entre les mains des masses laborieuses dans leur lutte quotidienne pour la liberté, la démocratie, la prospérité et le socialisme.
>   Concrètement, cet art doit apporter l'espoir en une vie meilleure, la conscience et pousser à la mobilisation des forces vives et créatrices de notre peuple.
> 2. Il doit pour cela s'inspirer de l'héritage culturel national en partant du point de vue de l'avenir et du progrès, à savoir:
>   --Puiser dans l'héritage culturel d'une manière vigilante et consciente, c'est-à-dire prendre, et dans la lutte quotidienne, tout ce qu'il porte en lui comme acquis scientifiques et progressistes, tout ce qui servira actuellement et dans l'avenir au succès des luttes actuelles et futures d'édification.
>   --Refléter, interpréter activement en fonction avec la vie et la science, nos réalités nationales dans la perspective de leur transformation en faveur des masses laborieuses.

> --Faire naître toutes les possibilités créatrices de notre peuple dans nos campagnes et dans nos villes, dans nos écoles et universités, un art et une culture nouveaux et authentiques.
>
> --Contribuer ainsi à renforcer l'alliance des forces du travail, de la science, de la culture, en aiguisant et en renforçant sa pointe démystificatrice anti-obscurantiste, ceci en vue d'annihiler l'analphabétisme et l'arriération, d'élever le niveau culturel, scientifique,et de conscience.
>
> --Le programme de cet art est un programme de lutte quotidienne pour la prospérité, la liberté, le pain, la vérité et la beauté.
>
> A ce prix, cet art de cette culture seront d'édification nationale, de contenu populaire, progressiste et révolutionnaire.
>
> Un art qui ne contribuerait pas à mobiliser et libérer nos masses laborieuses, qui ne contribuerait pas à l'abondance, à la prospérité et à la liberté de notre pays, qui ne contribuerait pas à sa manière à élever toutes les énergies créatrices en vue de plus en plus d'emplois, du plus en plus d'écoles, d'hôpitaux, de logements, d'usines, de crêches, etc. n'est tout simplement pas un art, mais une chose creuse, abstraite, inutile et mystificatrice.
>
> Ainsi, à l'heure actuelle, nos artistes, au même titre que nos maîtres d'école, nos professeurs, nos hommes de science, portent une responsabilité particulière dans la construction nationale et anti-impérialiste. Dans ce cadre, l'art peut être vivant et créateur, doit être populaire, accessible et révolutionnaire. (Abucar, field notes, 1976)

Art and culture are inseparable entities for national progress; both should serve the interests of the collectivity in order to promote national consciousness. Art and culture should fit needs arising from national development and must exhibit a national character; socialist art must have an anti-imperialist content.

Theatre groups and orchestras are not the only groups who effect the diffusion of national culture to the public. In Algeria, there are more than three hundred cinemas all over the country, and most of these cinemas present films of a national and international character. Besides cinemas, there are also cinémathèques in each region. Since independence, Algerian film production has concentrated its attention on the Algerian struggle against French colonialism. From 1962 to 1971, they have produced seventeen films, with fourteen of these on the liberation movement. In recent years, importance has been given to problems arising from alcoholism and family problems. Films are used as a means to overcome problems in big cities.

3. Scientific Culture

The content and meaning of scientific culture were elaborated by the Tripoli programme in 1962 and by the Charter of Algeria in 1964. According to these documents, "Algerian culture should define itself according to its national character, its technical equipment, the spirit of research that animates it, and its methodical and generalized diffusion at all levels of society."

Scientific culture implies know-how, the application of knowledge to the collective interest, the correct relation between ideology and national development, the ways and means of realizing arabization by replacing the French language. The national character and the spirit animating research should replace the anti-intellectualism and the obscurantism imposed upon peasants and workers by colonialism. Thus, the whole purpose of scientific endeavour should emphasize man's ability to shape the world to the general interest of society, the worker and peasant, in the process of national development; it must be a forerunner in the social reconstruction of Algerian society. Therefore, participation in scientific endeavour is an indispensable element of national development.

Obscurantism and petit bourgeois moralism stand as obstacles to the application of science and technology to national development. Obscurantism and petit bourgeois moralism are the legacies of traditionalism and colonialism. Petit bourgeois moralism is described by the Tripoli programme as follows:

> This is the conception that consists in employing Islam for demagogic ends so as to avoid raising the real problems. Certainly, we are part of Moslem civilization, a civilization that has profoundly and lastingly marked the history of humanity, but it is a bad service to this civilization to believe that its renaissance is subordinated to simple subjective formulae in general behaviour and religious practice.
>
> This attitude overlooks the fact the Moslem civilization, from the point of view of the practical building of society, began and for long proceeded on the basis of a positive effort on the double plane of work and thought in the field of economics and culture. Moreover, the spirit of research that animated it; its rational attitude to science, foreign culture and the universality of the epoch--these made for a fertile exchange between it and other civilizations. It was, above all, these criteria of the creation and efficient organization of values and teaching that enabled Moslem civilization to participate widely in human progress in the past, and this conception should provide a point of departure for any true renaissance. Beyond this necessary endeavour, which should be undertaken, above all, on tangible bases, and according to a rigorously established procedure, nostalgia for the past is synonymous only with impotence and confusion. (Tripoli programme, in Thomas, 1969, pp. 215-49)

The subjective view of Islamic religion is in contrast to the objective view of Islamic religion; the former exhibits a petit bourgeois attitude and negative human development, while the latter offers a practical solution in dealing with the problems of culture and economics and provides the basis for thought and action. The origin of the Islamic religion was based on the practical realities of life. The popular approach to the Islamic religion provides different attitudes towards science, technology, and the diffusion of civilization. The past has relevance only in human evolution, when it is consistent with situations involving humanity.

But to evoke the past for the sake of the past is only a symptom of nostalgia, and that leads to cultural confusion and regression.

According to the Algerians, the spirit of research must be based on the objective condition that the past can become relevant only under certain circumstances. At a national debate which took place in Algeria in 1976 on the National Charter, the subjective and objective views of Islamic religion as part of national culture were brought forward. During this debate, the issues of socialism and the position of women in society were raised. Two trends of thought became apparent in the debate on the National Charter; there were those who argued that socialism and women's emancipation were incompatible with the Islamic religion, since Islam is not only a religion but a way of life. This viewpoint was represented by most religious leaders all over the country, and they demanded the application of Islam as the sole principle in shaping Algerian society. This group has grown enormously since independence. They are becoming the very element of the restoration of Arab-Islamic heritage in Algeria, and they do play a considerable role in Algerian politics. The number of mosques has increased, and there is a Minister of Religious Affairs. Unlike many other Arab countries, Algeria is monoreligious; even the new constitution which came into effect last year prescribes that the president should be a Moslem.

A seminar held in Annaba in July 1976 on the subject of "La Pensée islamique" illustrates some of the problems connected with the remodelling of some aspects of the Islamic heritage in Algeria. This seminar was the tenth dealing with the same subject. The speakers came from Tunisia, Lebanon, Senegal, Libya, Yemen, Spain, Yugoslavia, the German Democratic Republic, the USA, Quweit, Iran, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Nigeria, Mali, Jordan, and Algeria. The following tabulation indicates the period of the seminars.

SEMINAR "LA PENSEE ISLAMIQUE"

Date	Place	Speakers	Days	Hours
July 1976	Annaba	26	5	55

In total, there were fifty-five hours over a period of five days. Forty-four hours were spent on issues facing the Islamic community in improving their socio-economic and political milieu. Some of these problems were the participation of women in industry, technology, and science and their application in the community, and Islamic values and industrial development. The other eleven hours were devoted to the role played by Islamic civilization in the past in fostering science, technology, and international trade. Any of these topics is relevant to the problems Algeria is encountering in the process of national development, namely the conflict between the petit bourgeois moralistic mentality and the most progressive strata of Algerian society, who draw a distinction between the past and the present and who believe that the past can have relevance only if it is consistent with present conditions of Algerian development.

The most progressive strata represent the UGTA (Union Génerale des Travailleurs Algériens), the UNPA (Union Nationale des Paysans Algériens), the UNJA (Union Nationale des Jeunes Algériens), and the UNFA (Union Nationale des Femmes Algériennes). On the national debate concerning the National Charter, these strata supported social and economic transformation. For example, the militants of the Union Nationale des Femmes Algériennes made the following remarks in connection with "Le Socialisme et l'Islam":

> Au chapitre "le socialisme et l'Islam" les militantes de l'UNFA remarquent: "Si on appliquait correctement le socialisme et l'Islam, la femme devra être l'égale de l'homme, ce qui entraînerait par exemple, la suppression de droits à l'homme d'épouser plus d'une femme et le droit à la femme d'avoir une part d'héritage égale à celle de l'homme. . . . Il serait utile pour préserver la cellule familiale et pour l'équilibre de la famille de prévoir dans le code de la famille l'abolition de la polygamie."
>
> Toujours à ce même chapitre, les militantes de cette organisation ont soulevé d'autres questions telles: le mariage mixte, la révision des règles du droit musulman, etc. . . . En ce qui concerne l'abolition de l'exploitation de l'homme par l'homme, les militantes de l'UNFA demandent: "Il faut éliminer l'esprit bourgeois qui pollue notre société ainsi que le nouveau bourgeois. . . ." S'agissant du travail, elles suggèrent: "La création d'établissements et d'entreprises spécialisées pour pouvoir occuper les personnes handicapées." Elles font remarquer: "Il faut faire en sorte que la ferme soit préparée au travail en créant des centres de formation professionnelle avec le concours de l'UNFA." (*El-Moujahid*, May 1976)

The correct application of socialism and Islam in all spheres of life, according to the UNFA, is that men and women should be provided equal treatment in terms of heritage, work, and marriage. In Algeria, Moslem law allows a man the right to marry a non-Moslem woman and to possess more than one wife. In contrast, the Algerian woman is not allowed to marry a non-Moslem man. Similarly, it terms of heritage, the Moslem law provides more rights to the man than to the woman. Since independence, many women have assumed responsibilities in Algerian society. However, their participation is in no way complete. In some areas of activity they are less well represented. This is due particularly to the lack of opportunity for women in mastering industrial jobs; in this sense they lag behind men. What keeps women in a lower status in Algerian society is the tradition of "Taqalid." This tradition is supported by the "esprit de nouveau bourgeois" which wants to maintain the status quo.

Scientific culture, as we have examined it above, attempts to solve the problem of contradiction arising from Algerian national development, even though these contradictions are of a class nature. Petit bourgeois moralism exists within the class consciousness of this group, who are gradually evolving into a bourgeois class. On the other hand, there is emerging a large, progressive strata which constitute the peasants and workers. The dividing lines between these two classes are income, culture, and socio-political position in society. The factors that united them are the search for a national character and for "pouvoir politique," which has an historical reputation in Algerian society, led by the most progressive strata of the petit bourgeois.

Political power is very much favorable to the growth of productive forces. The workers and peasants occupy an important position in national development. However, political power also gives a relative importance to the petit bourgeois who dominate the bureaucratic institutions of Algeria. Both these classes are the outcome of present Algerian national development. One of the dividing elements between these classes which has become an issue in national development was analyzed by Fanon:

> It is true that if care is taken to use only a language that is understood by graduates in Law and Economics, you can easily prove that the masses have to be managed from above. But if you speak the language of everyday, if you are not obsessed by the perverse desire to spread confusion and to rid yourself of the people, then you will realize that the masses are quick to seize every shade of meaning and to learn all the tricks of the trade. If recourse is had to technical language, this signifies that it has been decided to consider the masses as uninitiated. Such a language is hard put to it to hide the lecturer's wish to cheat the people and to leave them out of things. The business of obscuring language is a mask behind which stands out the much greater business of plunder. The people's property and the people's sovereignty are to be stripped from them at one and the same time. Everything can be explained to the people, on the single condition that you really want them to understand. (Fanon, 1968, pp. 188-89)

However, the problem that separates workers and peasants is language and educational achievement.

The accounting, banking, and bookkeeping systems represent a serious problem to the Algerian worker and peasant, but at present in most industrial and agricultural enterprises the representatives of the workers and peasants sit side by side with the managers. It is not a mystery to them, since they have assumed accountability in running the operation of the enterprise and some of them have learned how to run businesses.

The application of French or Arabic does not necessarily eliminate obscurantism. In fact, in all Arab countries there is a disparity between the language spoken by the people and the language of the elite, because the illiteracy rate is very high in most Arab countries. Unless Arabic is de-elitized, the problem of obscurantism associated with language will remain intact. The desire to learn and to acquire skills is much greater in Algeria than in any other place I have visited, and this is true even of older persons. A president of a Worker's Assembly in a plant in El-Hadjar told me, "I am fifty-five years old; I obtained my elementary school certificate last year in Arabic and I am now teaching other workers how to read and write."

However, the Algerian situation is a very peculiar one, since the country has had a longer period of colonial domination than any other Arab country. During this period, the people have suffered from the obscurantism of colonial settlement, which virtually reduced their cultural ability and imposed upon them an iron wall to keep Algeria out of the Arab world. Therefore, it is not surprising to encounter among the older generation people who have lost the ability to speak their own language.

The purpose of scientific culture is to eliminate obstacles to national development such as obscurantism, a petit bourgeois mentality, and the application of science and technology to national development. In the literature on Algerian development one often encounters concepts such as *rational* or *rationalization*, which are commonly found in the writings of Weber and Freud. The *Charte Nationale* adopted in 1976 elaborates the concept as follows:

> La consolidation de l'indépendance nationale et l'épanouissement de l'homme ressortissent au contenu de la Révolution Démocratique Populaire mais ne recevront leur plein effet que par l'édification de la société socialiste.
>
> Il s'agit de consolider, d'abord, l'indépendance nationale en liquidant toutes les formes d'influence impérialiste ou néo-colonialiste et en affrontant résolument la tâche historique du développement sans laquelle il ne saurait y avoir, à notre époque, ni de progrès économique ni de nation vraiment viable.
>
> Mais pour être rationnel et harmonieux, le développement doit être considéré comme untout et fondé sur l'adhésion des masses et à leur service. Ceci suppose une conception radicale de la démocratie qui, dépassant les formes connues de la démocratie bourgeoise, doit d'identifier avec le démocratie socialiste. (FLN, 1976, p. 22)

The historical task of national development in principle requires rational and balanced development. In this context, *rational* conveys ways and means of tackling the problems connected with the relationship between the superstructure and the infrastructure. The relationship in its concrete form requires: (1) public ownership of the means of production, and (2) democratic participation of workers and peasants in national enterprises, cooperative societies, and agricultural autogestion. By *balance*, regional equilibrium is referred to as a means of eliminating uneven regional development. However, this shows that a different meaning is given to the concept than the one conveyed by Weber, who ascribes the following meaning to *rational* or *rationalization*:

> In the last resort, the factor which produced capitalism is the rational permanent enterprise, rational accounting, rational technology and rational law, but again the rational spirit, the rationalization of the conduct of life in general, and a rationalistic economic ethic. (Weber, 1950, p. 354)

B. POLITICAL POWER AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The formation of the FLN brought about a unity of purpose for obtaining independence. The year 1958 was the turning point in the reorganization of political power, as it was perceived by the Mostefa Lacheraf:

> Le F.L.N. n'existant plus depuis 1958 en tant que "parti" conventionnellement admis comme tel, l'autorité politique qu'il représentait et l'autorité nationale dont il était le dépositaire en tant que guide de la nation en guerre, se sont fondues insensiblement, sans différenciation organique sérieuse. Cette double autorité, ainsi amalgamée, s'est, plus tard, réduite à deux pôles restreints d'action purement théorique; à deux institutions, le G.P.R.A. et le C.N.R.A., ayant des prérogatives mitigées, souvent symboliques, par rapport à la masse des militants organisés et aux combattants de l'intérieur. (Lacheraf, 1976, p. 292).

This explains the fact that several events took place between 1954 and 1958. The formation of the FLN in 1954 culminated in a unity among the various factions of Algerian political life, and it gave a sense of purpose for creating Algerian independence. Second, the army's struggle was intensified during this period. Third, the French government began to accept for the first time the rights of Algerians to self-government. The CNRA was established in 1956 and the GPRA in 1958. The Conseil National de la Révolution Algérienne was established by the Soumman Congress held in Algeria on 20 August, 1956. It had a membership of thirty-four to seventy-two and was regarded as the central committee of the FLN. It had the task of drawing up general policy and the orientation of national struggle as well as the future guidelines for national development. The CNRA was headed by a coordinating committee consisting of five members. The Tripoli programme, the guiding principle of present Algerian national development, was elaborated and adopted by the CNRA.

From 1954 until 1962 there were ideological transformations within the leadership of the FLN. In fact, at the outset of Algerian independence the CNRA declared a socialist path to development, for example the Tripoli programme. In 1964, the Charter of Algeria was adopted to deal with the problems arising in socialist development.

According to the Tripoli programme, three major objectives have been outlined: (1) agrarian reform and modernization of agriculture, (2) nationalization of the means of production, and (3) industrialization of the national economy within the framework of a plan.

The agrarian reform consisted of:

(1) Prohibition of transactions in land and the means of agricultural production.

(2) Limitation of property according to crops and yield.

(3) Expropriation of areas surpassing a fixed optimum.

(4) Free distribution of lands thus recuperated to the landless.

(5) Democratic organization of peasants in productive cooperatives.

(6) Creation of collective state farms on a proportion of the expropriated lands with the participation of the workers in management and benefits.

Nationalization and public ownership included:

(1) The nationalization of credit, foreign trade, and mineral and energy resources.

(2) The creation of state companies and mixed enterprises.

(3) The regulation of state companies and mixed enterprises.

(4) The regulation of the transfer of profits.

The Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne (GPRA) was created to represent the Algerian national struggle at the international level, in order to gain international support for Algerian independence. A political solution for the Algerian problem became possible, due to the diplomatic efforts of the GPRA. Following Algerian independence in 1962, both the GPRA and the CNRA were replaced by an elected president and an elected National Assembly. A Political Bureau consisting of five members was established. The National Assembly was dissolved by the military coup d'état in July 1965 and replaced by the Council of the Revolution, led by Houari Boumédienne. He was elected President in December 1976, and in 1977 a newly elected National Assembly was installed. A new constitution was introduced, replacing the one of 1962.

Before the consolidation of power in Algeria, the FLN created the conditions for bringing together different political orientations that prevailed in Algeria at the outset of the national struggle. However, after seven years of national struggle, one political orientation became dominant: what Hermassi El-Baki calls the populist political orientation. The adherents of this political orientation were the intellectuals, the army, national bureaucrats, workers, and peasants.

Morocco and Tunisia gave rise to a political orientation unlike that of Algeria. In Morocco, political power is in the hands of a monarch, while Tunisia adopted a liberal political orientation of the Western type. Why Algeria has adopted a different political orientation than its neighbours has been explained by Hermassi El-Baki:

> In fact, one of our hypotheses concerning the roots of dissensus among Algerian elites is based on the profound discontinuity these elites have experienced vis-à-vis the symbols and institutions of national identity, and the complete obliteration of their political state by a total colonial system.
>
> Therefore we shall add only a few remarks concerning France's intentional eviction and demotion of the traditional grand families and the aristocratic elites. Augustin Berque's inquiry in 1949 into the dossiers of the qaids revealed that out of this body 721 members, who were traditionally great aristocratic chiefs, only 100 were still of aristocratic origin; 200 were fabricated clergy, and the rest, of modest origin and with no authority whatsoever, were simply asked to assume the function of surveillance. The déclassement of the great families and the successive waves of literate and commercial bourgeoisie immigrants deprived Algeria, in contrast with its neighbours, of a vital component in the integration and continuity of the society. It is no surprise to find that in a society which survived a century and a half of colonization with concomitant impoverishment, atomization, and deculturation, the fundamental problem was one of solidarity and authority. (Hermassi, 1970, pp. 132-33)

The major problem during and after the national struggle for Algerian independence was the creation of institutions of national identity. In order to do so, what Houari Boumédienne calls "the institutionalization of the revolution" was required. This implies the decolonization of the national economy. The national development that was set up at the outset of national independence remains, despite changes in leadership in 1965. The overall principles underlying national development under Ben Bella's leadership have not been modified, except at the level of policy implementation. The present leadership emphasizes the primacy of the administration over party cadres. This new orientation has been summarized by Hermassi El-Baki:

> The major policy goals of the new regime were the national goals of the Algerian revolution in general. They preserved the March decrees which instituted the nationalization of the French-owned land and the Charte d'Alger, the important political manifesto written by Marxist intellectuals and devoted to the question of nation building in favor of the popular classes.

> The sole difference was the new emphasis placed upon efficiency and technical considerations, as opposed to the improvisations which characterized the first years. This orientation meant that the new regime came increasingly to depend upon the administration to implement its policy goals. This, in turn, was bound to reinforce the prestige of the administration within the stratification of organizations and simultaneously devaluate the position of the party by circumscribing its sphere of action. Indeed, the new technicians that the military brought into the apparatus of government are becoming increasingly the centers of innovation and power. As ministers and high officials, they represent today a team of technocrats, and are endowed with far greater power than the Tunisian party or the Moroccan monarchy would conceivably permit its own technicians. The Algerian technicians continue to demonstrate a solid competence in conceiving and executing new economic policies--qualities rarely found either in the military or among members of the party. The bureaucracy succeeded also in attracting to itself the secondary and intermediary elites, leaving to the party those who are less skilled. (Hermassi, 1970, p. 168)

At the regional level, in workplaces in major agricultural and industrial enterprises, there is a growing concern for freedom of responsibility. This new orientation allows workers and peasants to assume power hitherto held by management, in making decisions that affect the enterprise and the lives of workers and peasants. Therefore, the technocrats are not the only base of innovation and power since the adoption of the Charter of Socialist Enterprises in 1972.

Political power in Algeria is in the hands of the generation which survived the war of liberation movement and which has established its position in the past. At present, their future depends on their performance in meeting the aspirations of the masses through national struggle. The social origin of the people is the peasant and working classes, although some of them may have come from the old aristocratic and bourgeois families. However, at present, because of their economic and political position in society, they pursue a style of life different from ordinary Algerian society, and their presence in society is felt.

The political and cultural content of national development was decided upon at Tripoli in 1962 at the outset of Algerian independence. Socialism as the ideology of national development was for the first time accepted as the principal guideline for the reconstruction of Algerian society.

An overall view of the reconstruction of national culture is characterized by the replacement of French by the Arabic language, and the restoration of the old culture. This may bring a collective awareness to Algerian society, but does not necessarily bring cultural liberation, unless the objective realities of Algeria are taken into consideration. For this purpose. de-elitization of the Arabic language is essential for national development.

An analysis of cultural disguise and cultural confusion, and the international situation, provides an explanation of the complexity of this problem. The division of the world into developed and underdeveloped countries creates the conditions for cultural confusion in Algeria. The opportunity to satisfy people's expectations is much greater in developed countries than in the underdeveloped world.

The family as a unit is a factor in cultural development in Algeria. Cultural estrangement is a much greater influence in some families than in others. All three types of families described above (the francophone, arabophone, and bilingual) have difficulties in the transition towards development of national culture, due to their class positions in society.

The cultural revolution in Algeria aims directly at the decolonization of national culture and indirectly provides to all Algerians an equal opportunity for education and equal cultural expression for all regions. However, the decolonization of national culture encounters several problems such as vested interest, the administrative structure, the gap in achieving technology and science in Arabic, French at various levels of the school system, and the like. The group that is at stake during this process of decolonization of culture is the "El-Mouarab," whose position is less privileged than that of the francophone group.

Scientific culture intends to correct the line of Algerian national development by trying to eliminate obscurantism and a petit bourgeois mentality by drawing the difference between subjective and objective conclusions. The ideological differences present in Algeria become apparent when such issues as Islam and socialism, the position of women in society, private ownership versus public ownership, were discussed during the debate over the *Charte Nationale*. Obscurantism and petit bourgeois mentality constitute problems for the decolonization of national culture and national development.

The FLN created a unity of purpose in 1954 that was lacking in the past in the Algerian struggle for self-determination. From 1954 to 1962, there was a drastic change in the political thinking of Algerian leaders. The Tripoli programme was the beginning of the application of socialist ideology in Algeria. From 1962 up to the present time, political orientation has remained constant, despite inter-elite conflict. Political power supports the emancipation of workers and peasants, despite bureaucratic foot-dragging.

In the next chapter we will examine the economic structure of the Algerian option for national development.

CHAPTER 8

THE ALGERIAN OPTION FOR NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

A. THE HISTORICAL CONDITIONS OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Algeria, in the new era of independence, was initially confronted with a situation whereby the indigenous population was at the bottom of colonial society. The economy of the country was in the hands of ten percent of the population, the settlers, who controlled ninety percent of industrial and commercial activities. The illiteracy rate of the population was very high. The census taken in 1954 indicated that ninety percent of Algerians above the age of six were illiterate; only six percent of that age group could read French and three percent could read Arabic.

The class situation during the colonial period was examined in Chapter 6, section C. However, following Algerian independence, serious problems emerged related to past differences in socio-cultural opportunity between the settlers and the Algerians. This difference becomes obvious if we examine the socio-professional categories indicated in Table 29.

This situation continued for over one hundred years. The minority (the settlers) had absolute access to the top administrative positions and controlled the principal economic activities of the country. Few Algerians succeeded in obtaining positions at the centre of the decision-making process; and those who did occupied positions of less power than the settlers.

TABLE 29

SELECTED OCCUPATIONS, 1962

	Total	Européens	Algériens
Etudiants ens. sup.	5 146	4 589	557
Fonctionnaires centraux	2 008	2 000	8
Cadres supérieurs	16 400	15 100	1 300
Techniciens et cad. m.	34 500	26 600	7 900
Employés de bureau	35 300	26 300	9 000
Ouvriers professionals	82 700	44 400	38 300
Professions libérales	13 200	11 000	2 200
Industriels	6 900	5 400	1 500
Gros commerçants	8 900	4 600	4 300

Source: A. Akkache, 1971, p. 58.

Algeria was confronted with problems in administration with the departure of these professional categories: nearly all of them left at once. This situation created a short-term shortage of professional categories and skilled labour.

At the time of Algerian independence in 1962, a large percentage of the Algerian population was in the agricultural sector. Only twelve percent of the Algerian population was in the industrial and tertiary (service) sectors (4.4 percent in industry and 7.7 percent in the tertiary sector, as outlined in Table 30). In contrast, most of the settlers were in the industrial and tertiary sectors of the colonial economy (31 and 54.5 percent respectively).

TABLE 30

ACTIVE POPULATION BY SECTOR, 1962

(in percent)

	Total	Européens	Algériens
Agriculture	80.9	14.2	87.9
Industrie	6.9	31.3	4.4
Secteur tertiaire	12.2	54.5	7.7

Source: A. Akkache, 1971, p. 58.

Although the settlers represented only fourteen percent of the active agricultural population, they owned the modern sector, which contributed sixty-five percent of the total agricultural production; the majority of Algerians were in the traditional sector. Production was highly capitalist and was produced for export to Europe, with a large share for France. The economic disparity between the two social categories is obvious (see Table 51, Chapter 10).

The distinguished Algerian scholar, Ahmed Akkache, who at present is a key expert in planning for Algerian development, remarked that:

> Le revenue des Algériens du secteur traditionnel, qui forment les trois quarts de la population, n'atteint que 18000 anciens francs, c'est-à-dire l'équivalent de 180 nouveaux francs d'aujourd'hui, ou 36 dollars. Un franc pour vivre deux jours. C'est l'un des chiffres les plus bas du monde, et une illustration caractéristique de la "pauvreté fondamentale" des peuples dominés par le capital étranger, avec tout ce que cela comporte sur le plan de la misère sociale, de la mortalité, de l'ignorance. (Akkache, 1971, p. 57)

As in many other African countries, the French colonizers did not foresee or countenance any possibility of establishing significant (potentially competitive) industry outside their own country. However, some aspects of industrialization became possible when France was occupied in 1940. A colonial pact was concluded according to which the Africans would participate in the anti-fascist war. This created the conditions for limited industrialization in some parts of Africa. Algeria was one of the countries which benefited from such a pact, due mainly to its large number of European settlers. Industrialization was limited to processing agricultural products, oil, soap and textile industries in Tlemcen, earthenware works in Oran, cement, and machine shops. These products were not obtainable from the metropolis due to the war, so the colony was allowed to set up processing industries. Most of these industrial units were small or medium in size, and began to disappear after the war. There was no interest in investing in local industry because the market was small and because large parts of the indigenous population were not involved in the colonial economy. Even so, the settlers very much preferred investment in London or in big French companies.

Apart from the socio-economic characteristics discussed above, with which Algeria was burdened on the eve of independence, there is the legacy of 130 years of French colonization. More serious problems emerged due to the political and economic conditions under which Algeria regained its independence. They became apparent when Algeria assumed its responsibility as a sovereign state. Evian (1962) created a new situation for Algerian national development, providing France with the exclusive right to maintain a privileged position in Algeria, including economic rights to Algerian national resources in exchange for technical and cultural cooperation. The agreement stated that:

> The wealth of the subsoil in the Oases and Sahara departments will be developed by a technical organization with equal membership from both states. It will create the necessary infrastructure for the exploitation of the subsoil, advise on mining regulations, and examine requests for mining titles. The Algerian state will issue the mining titles and will enact mining legislation in full sovereignty.
>
> French interests will be assured, in accordance with the existing Saharan petroleum code, by the recognition of the rights attached to mining titles granted by France, by preference in the granting of new mining titles being given to French companies, and by the assurance that all payments made in regard to Saharan hydrocarbons will be made in French francs. (Blair, 1969, pp. 210-11)

The Saharan petroleum code was elaborated in 1958 and 1959. At that time Algeria was part of France. The intent was to regulate in principle the relation between the French government, French oil companies, and foreign enterprises which had been given concessions to exploit Saharan petroleum resources:

> Bref, les modifications apportées au Code pétrolier ne réduisaient pas seulement le moyen de contrôle du futur Etat Algérien: elles encourageaient légalement la fraude fiscale. (Dancy, 1971, p. 85)

However, some minor changes regulating the exploitation of natural resources were brought to the code.

The code did not give the Algerian government the right to control the activities of the companies granted concessions to export natural resources. This situation remained until 1965, when the two governments, Algeria and France, established a new cooperative agreement. The nature of this cooperation will be discussed in section B of this chapter.

The Evian agreement included, among other things, cultural cooperation between Algeria and France which stated (among other points):

> France will train Algerian technicians and place teachers and technicians at the disposal of the Algerian state, by common agreement. Each of the countries may establish a university and cultural bureau on the territory of the other. (Blair, 1969, p. 211)

This technical assistance involved the country in hosting a large number of French citizens, following the sudden departure of the settlers. Unlike the old French colonies, these groups were known as *coopérants*, and their number increased noticeably in 1962-1965. They occupied positions in education, all public agencies, the Saharan petroleum and gas agency, and the national development planning unit (the Direction générale du plan). Technical cooperation tended to perpetrate the institutional structure of capitalism: Algerians were trained for civil service posts under French tutelage.

The Evian agreement was a comprehensive agreement which also included trade and aid.

> Algeria shall guarantee the interests and rights of France, and in exchange France will grant Algeria technical and cultural assistance and financial aid for economic and social development. Algeria will participate with France in the definition of areas of commercial exchange and trade preferences, will belong to the franc area, have its own monetary unit and currency assets, and will allow freedom of monetary transfers under conditions compatible with her development. (Blair, 1969, p. 210)

The French wanted a neo-colonial relationship with Algeria, maintaining a privileged position in exploitation of natural resources, monetary control, and markets for French manufactured goods. In 1963, the first Algerian government immediately reacted against the Evian agreement and called for a new cooperative agreement. In 1964, at the first congress held by the FLN, *La Charte d'Alger* was adopted, which among other things amended the Evian agreements as follows:

> The Evian Agreements are the mould which has shaped the rebirth of the Algerian nation and state.
>
> However, the presence of the French army and still more the nature of our financial and economic relations with France, limit our sovereignty and give particular emphasis to negative phenomena and to the activities of the national exploitative stratum. The national tasks laid down in the Tripoli Programme remain.

> Imperialism is still the major enemy of our country. The party must fight vigorously against those who wish to undermine our will to disengage ourselves from imperialism by submerging it under the weight of everyday problems; who wish to lull popular vigilance and make our dependence even greater. The struggle to consolidate independence and the struggle for the triumph of our socialist option are inextricably linked. To separate them is to encourage the growth and influence of forces hostile to socialism and to water down the leading role of the toiling mass of workers and peasants into a series of groups without any principles. (Clegg, 1971, pp. 211-12)

During the transfer of power from the French administration to the Algerian government, the French army remained in the country with the excuse of protecting the French settlers still in Algeria. The first congress of the FLN, by adapting *La Charte d'Alger*, tended to put an end to the neo-colonial relationship with France. This relationship was both financially and economically based on an unequal exchange between France and Algeria.

From 1963 to 1967, the weight of the colonial heritage and neo-colonialism was very heavy indeed. Algeria was confronted at the outset of its political independence with the Constantine Plan and the Evian agreement discussed above. The Constantine Plan was intended to create a large-scale industrial complex with foreign investment in oil and industry, with the possibility of creating 400,000 jobs. It was a five-year plan and began in 1959. This, however, prolonged the relationship between France and Algeria. Because of this neo-colonial relationship, it was practically impossible to regain economic independence or even apply a national planning policy, due to the control by France of many important sectors of the Algerian national economy. Secondly, the choice between the private and public sectors, which originated in 1963 as autogestion, was not brought about effectively because of dependence on France for marketing and agricultural goods.

The control of the national economy entered a new phase in 1965 when the Algerian government began to seize key economic sectors, especially petroleum resources, by way of settling the question which had been the object of disagreement with the French government for many years. This decision abrogated the Evian agreement and the cooperation agreement of 1965. However, this did not bring an immediate end to the internal struggle between the reactionaries, who were very favourable to the neo-colonial status, and the progressives, who were calling for an end to neo-colonialism. That end was not brought about until 1972, when the charter of socialist enterprise and the Agrarian Reform were promulgated as the basis for socialist reconstruction in Algeria during the transitional period. These measures signified the defeat of reactionary forces in Algeria.

B. DECOLONIZATION AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

1. Nationalization and the Creation of Public Institutions

Nationalization of the means of production at the time of Algerian independence was not a spontaneous affair, as some writers claim, but in fact a conscious effort on the part of the Algerian revolutionary forces to account for their commitment to the revolutionary cause. The men and women who liberated Algeria were aware that political independence was not the final stage but a pre-condition for economic independence. At the time of possible political independence, the Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne (GPRA) in 1962 adopted the Tripoli programme. Section C identifies five areas of national economy: the nationalization of agriculture, minerals, energy and resources, financial institutions, and transport and industry. This programme was, in the minds of most Algerians who participated in the war, to liberate Algeria from French colonial settlement. In fact, a veteran of the war, who is currently secretary-general of Algerian Agriculture Workers, told me the following:

> While we were still fighting in the mountains, we used to have serious discussions over the land which was held by settlers. What shall we do about this land? We knew that they did not have the ability to develop this land and we knew that if we divided the land into individual ownership we were defeating the social dimension of revolution. So the alternative open to us was to form collective ownership of this land with state assistance and supervision. (Abucar, field notes, 1976)

Nationalization of the means of production was slow and gradual, with the exception of agriculture. The Algerian government assumed ownership of several farm units in 1963. In fact, the first to seize this opportunity were the agricultural workers and El-Moujahidin who returned to the country from the front lines. The former category were already employees of these farm units. This immediate takeover of farm units was motivated in great part by the desire on the part of workers to maintain production despite the upheaval of the colonial exodus from Algeria, and partly to give momentum to the new opportunity for political independence. When the workers took over farming units in 1963, the FLN and the UGTA reinstated the principles of the Tripoli programme as a guideline to their action:

> The biens vacants are profitable farming enterprises and provide the capital for industrialization--they are the motor force of Algeria's economy. The cash crops produced earn us money to buy capital equipment from abroad. Cutting up the land into peasant family plots leads only to a decline in national agricultural production and encourages consumption at the expense of investment needs.

> What of our brothers, six million of them, who have no land or not enough of it; did they fight a war to remain impoverished in their own country? We must not take this land unto ourselves personally--that is robbery of our nation's patrimony. Let us work it together so that all may prosper from this bounty that, with Allah's help, has been placed before us. (Blair, 1969, p. 42)

Another reason behind the nationalization of colonial farms was the assumption that this would generate surpluses of capital and would make it possible for Algerians to import the equipment needed for the expansion of agriculture required to pave the way towards industrialization. However, the Algerian experience suggests that this assumption has not been realized. The traditional market in which these farm units were established during the colonial period demonstrated an unwillingness to accept Algerian products. This led to the breakdown of the French-Algerian cooperation agreement. Despite the difficulty, the farm units were placed under autogestion, with the exception of those that were placed under cooperative societies, exclusively reserved for the El-Moujahidin.

As Table 31 indicates, the lands possessed by the settlers were over 1.9 million hectares. Forty-three percent of this land was nationalized in 1962. Those were the lands abandoned by the settlers following Algerian independence. The final phase of nationalization of land owned by the settlers took place in 1963.

However, nationalization of the land possessed by the settlers entailed compensation. The Algerian government, with the understanding of the French government, paid to the settlers a compensation commensurate to the property value. The land that was brought under state control was not only the land possessed by settlers but land acquired by Algerians who collaborated with French colonialism during the war of

TABLE 31

FRENCH LAND OWNERSHIP, 1962

	Farm Units		Land Surface	
Region	Number	Percent	Hectares	Percent
Algiers				
Algiers	2,807	52.32	90,014	29.02
Médéa	534	09.95	76,449	24.65
Orléansville	1,410	26.28	118,807	38.31
Tizi-Ouzou	614	11.44	24,847	8.01
Total	4,365	99.99	310,117	99.99
Oran				
Oran	4,670	48.90	489,169	44.37
Mostaganem	3,347	35.04	258,377	23.44
Saida	206	02.15	83.906	07.61
Tiarét	498	05.21	192,434	17.45
Tlemcen	829	08.68	78,371	07.11
Total	9,550	99.98	1,102,257	99.98
Constantine				
Constantine	931	30.26	205,667	35.59
Batna	161	05.23	53,246	09.21
Bône	911	29.61	145,591	25.19
Sétif	1,073	34.88	173,300	29.99
Total	3,076	99.98	577,835	99.98
Grand Total	17,991		1,990,209	

Source: Agence de Défense des Biens et Intérêts de Rapatriés, 1964.

Note: These figures are for 1 July, 1962. In addition to privately owned French lands, there were 531,000 hectares reserved for land reform, distributed as follows: 57,000 sold to Algerians; 324,000 sold to CAPER, the land reform agency; and 150,000 held by the French state and the Algerian state and local authorities.

national liberation; their land was confiscated by the Algerian government. These collaborators were caids, backghas, speculators, rentiers, and others, who were considered as enemies of the revolution. The land confiscated from these collaborators amounted to 200,000 hectares, or about ten percent of the land owned by French settlers.

The land which was nationalized from the settlers was placed under three different forms of social control: autogestion, CAPE (Coopérative Agricole Polyvalente El-Moujahidin), and CAPRA (Coopérative Agricole Réforme Agraire). The last two are cooperative. CAPE is exclusively for the veterans of FLN, and CAPRA consists of land given to landless labourers and the small traditional landholders. Autogestion units were formed of all land possessed by export-oriented settlers and were placed under the control of those who worked in these export firms during colonial settlement in Algeria. According to government publications, in 1964 there were 345 autogestion units employing 9,521 workers (Algiers An II: 1962-1964; Algiers: 1964).

A distinction is made between permanent and seasonal workers; however, both types of workers are employed in agricultural enterprises. Seasonal workers are employed occasionally, depending on the harvest and on the presence of volunteers to do the job. The above mentioned figures refer to permanent workers. Since 1964 the structures of these enterprises have changed enormously; therefore the number of workers employed in these enterprises at present is much greater.

Since 1963, there has been a continuous modification in terms of management, marketing, and the sharing of benefits and crops. Some scholars of North African studies and autogestion, as well as the Fédération Nationale des Travailleurs de la Terre (FNTT), have raised in the past the problems of inconsistencies involved in the Algerian workers' self-management.* In 1964, UGTA called the Congress of FNTT to discuss the problem facing the agricultural workers. The Congress stated:

> Autogestion is not yet fully effective; the workers' organs have not as yet assumed their full duties, nor has auto-gestion followed the Charte d'Alger and the March decrees. The national funds for development, solidarity, and investment have not been regularized. The relations between the members of workers' management committees and the Ministry of Agriculture have not been harmonized. . . . In time, however, with greater efforts by the avant-garde elements, auto-gestion must become a reality. . . . All is possible when we base our efforts on the expressed ideas of our people; nothing is possible when all orders come from the summit. (Blair, 1969, p. 121)

The lack of complete autonomy is related to the internal affairs of the farm units. It was due to the exclusive power given to the institutions set up by the revolutionary government to help the workers, such as Sociétés Agricoles de Prévoyance (SAP), Coopérative Régionale Agricole (CORA), and Office National de Commercialisation (ONACO). These government agencies were responsible for the provision of equipment, capital, and commercialization of agricultural products in the internal and external markets. These institutions, which were intended to facilitate the environment of the self-management enterprises, created additional problems for the workers in assuming their responsibility, namely, limiting the sphere of action of the enterprises. On several occasions during my stay in the northern and eastern regions, I was told that in the area of commercialization of agricultural products these institutions, particularly ONACO and CORA, had an overwhelming power in determining whether a certain self-management enterprise would be successful or unsuccessful.

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*The works of Ian Clegg, 1971, Thomas L. Blair, and several French writers have seriously criticized Algerian self-management in the past.

The workers in self-management enterprises did not have power over what they produced each season. They were asked to bring their produce to the ONACO for marketing and distribution, and at the end of the year they were told if they had earned a negative or positive profit, based on the discretionary power of the bureaucracy and partly on the ultimate desire of the state to create a surplus for industrialization from agricultural accumulation.

However, the workers felt that their products were not recorded properly; these agencies had overriding power to determine the size of their product and to record only those products that were not wasted. Wasted products were not included in their accounting. Undoubtedly this created frustration among the workers. Inability to maintain an efficient enterprise meant the loss of their right of self-management.

At present, new agencies have been created, such as the Coopérative Agricole Polyvalente Communale de Service (CAPCS) in 1972, Office des Fruits et Légumes Algériens (OFLA) in 1974, and Commercialisation des Fruits et Légumes Algériens (COFEL). Each of these agencies is responsible for the commercialization of agricultural products at the district, regional, national, and international levels. The directors of these agencies are appointed by the Ministry of Agriculture. At the district level there is a *comité de gestion* which fixes prices and records each agricultural unit's production, if they are members of the CAPCS. The CAPCS provides services such as fertilizers, a repair shop, and technical advice. The president of the CAPCS is the elected representative of self-management units and cooperative societies, such as the

Coopérative Agricole Polyvalente El-Moujahidin (CAPE). CAPCS deals with OFLA and COFEL. The relation between these agencies is established by law. COFEL handles interregional commercialization of agricultural products, while OFLA deals exclusively with agricultural exports. The appropriateness of each of these agencies to agricultural surplus will be examined in Chapter 9.

In what is now called self-management, the workers initially set up a *comité de gestion*. This form was more popular during the first and second phase of nationalization, 1962 and 1963 respectively. Until 1967, the old structure remained: the power of the enterprises was in the hands of administrators who were previously working with the colonial system.

When the election system was introduced, the government promoted ex-combatants to assume responsibilities for the self-management enterprise. Although this situation never remained constant, it pressed the revolutionary government to reconsider. During the National Campaign for the Democratic Reorganization of self-management bodies, Ben Bella, the President, called off any administrative interference in the election of committees for self-management enterprises. He stated that:

> Today, with the campaign we are launching for the reorganization of self-management bodies, we offer yet another proof of our determination not to let the *decréts de mars 1963* become dead letters or self-management a ritual, empty of all democratic and effective content. Up to now, some *comités de gestion* have, by force of circumstances, been nominated from above. There have often been bogus *comités* that the workers do not accept but reject. We are determined to remedy that. (Clegg, 1971, p. 144)

The *volonté populaire* and the *volonté politique* are two expressions currently found in the guideline policy of Algerian revolution. The *volonté populaire* must be guided by the *volonté politique*, the proper course of action of which is to legitimize the *volonté populaire*. Therefore, within the framework of the *volonté politique*, the *volonté populaire* assumes a significant role in redressing certain situations that have emerged contrary to the original principle of revolution.

The election is free within the framework established by the *volonté politique*, expressed by the Conseil National de la Révolution Algérienne (CNRA). At present, elections in enterprises are set up by the representatives of the government at the Wilaya level, by the coordinator of the FLN at the Wilaya level, and by the UGTA Regional Secretariat, with consultation of the Bureau Syndical in the enterprise and with the directory of the enterprise.

More analysis of the election process will be given in the next chapter. It is sufficient to say here that two candidates are nominated by the representatives for each position. An independent candidate not nominated by them also may compete in the election.

Administrative obscurantism cannot, however, be eliminated completely in any institution. It can merely be reduced to certain limits and only if obscurantism is not accepted in the political climate of the country. Unlike many countries, the *volonté politique* in Algeria is opposed to any form of obscurantism.

Bureaucratic interference was apparent not only in setting up the election but also in finance. In agricultural enterprise, the bureaucrats in the past enjoyed enormous power over the accounts of the enterprise. Although comités de gestion were established, they did not assume responsibility over financial matters. The Algerian experience suggests that their responsibility was assumed by different institutions: Société Agricole Prévoyance (SAP), Centre Coopérative de Réforme

Agraire (CCRA), and then the Cooperative Polyvalente Reforme Agraire (CPRA).

Similarly, in the industrial enterprises, financial direction was in the hands first of the regional prefect, then of the Banque Commerciale Algérienne (BCA), and then of the Banque Nationale Algérienne (BNA). The financial operation, as well as funds for the expansion of the enterprise, were in the hands of the administrators, and the comités had a very limited responsibility in that direction. This situation may have been true in the past, but does not hold true at present. Since autogestion has controlled their finance, records are kept in the enterprise and at the bank and are available for every member of the enterprise to verify.

Another stronghold of the administration vis-à-vis the comité de gestion in the past was the provision of capital goods and raw materials. The comité de gestion had virtually no power and depended greatly upon the state bureaucracy to make them available, particularly in agricultural enterprises. Algerian agricultural workers today talk about the difficulties they encountered in assuming control over the provision of capital goods and raw materials. In the past, because of the bureaucratic red tape, it often took months to resolve such needs. This also was partly due to the colonial ties the country maintained with France following the Evian agreement.

At present most of the agricultural equipment is made in Algeria; therefore, some of these problems are not so frequently encountered. Some of the self-management enterprises I visited near the capital, Stouali, as well as in El-Hadjar (in the neighbourhood of Annaba), possess the agricultural materials listed in Table 32. Most of these machines were acquired during the 1970s and were in good repair in 1976.

TABLE 32

INVENTAIRE DU MATERIEL

Domaine Ferhat Abdel Kader--Commune--Stauéli

Materiel	Date de mise en circulation	n°	Date de mise en circulation	n°	Total
Tracteur roue	1958	1	1967-74	6	7
Camion		0	1970-73	3	3
Camionnette		0	1973-75	2	2
Moto culteur		0	1974	1	1
Mobylette		0	1970-74	3	3
Epandeur fumeur		0	1975	1	1
Remorque	1958-60	2	1972-74	2	4
Rotovator		0	1974-75	4	4
Disque		0	1974-75	2	2

Source: M. Abucar, field interviews, 1976.

Note: The period 1958-1960 was the most difficult period of Algerian history. The liberation war was intensified, and the settlers evacuated Algeria two years later. It seems that the settlers destroyed most of the agricultural materials. At the time of independence there was only one tractor and two twings.

Workers' management in agriculture had very difficult times with the state institutions during the early years of independence, partly because this was the first sector in which liberation of national economy was applied. The Algerian revolutionary government at that time put its emphasis on agricultural development as the basis for industrialization. However, the experience they gained suggested that alternative approaches to industrialization were needed. I shall elaborate on this point in section D of this chapter.

In the industrial sector the situation was not much different from agriculture. The industrial workers have experienced similar problems not only from state institutions but also from private institutions. Some of the nationalized enterprises faced competition in the market, problems of spare parts, and so on. Some of them moved towards denationalization or some form of mixed enterprise, as this quotation demonstrates:

> A well-documented case of attempted denationalization due to corruption is that of the *Entreprise Ben Badis* at Rouiba, a firm making agricultural machinery. A *bien-vacant*, the firm re-opened under *autogestion* in August 1964; but it was in competition with the private, French-owned firm SACRA. In March 1966, the director of Ben Badis asked that his firm be merged with SACRA as a mixed, state-private concern, because he could not compete with it. In November 1966, a government enquiry found that the managing director and sales director of SACRA had bribed Ministry of Agriculture officials and the director of Ben Badis in an attempt to get hold of the firm. (The extent of corrupt practices in the administration is described more fully in the next chapter.) The paper of the PRS--*Sous le Drapeau du Socialism*--gives another instance. Ministers Medeghri, Abdesselam and Bouteflika tried to give some farms under *autogestion* in the Oranais to some middle-class friends early in 1966. The public outcry raised by the UGTA forced Boumédienne to intervene and return the farms. (Clegg, 1971, p. 151)

Decolonization was not easy in Algeria because colonial structures and colonial ties remained for a long time after independence, despite the independence orientation of the Algerian revolutionary government. Breakdown of colonialism did not come automatically, partly because of internal and external resistance. Cases of denationalization seem to have been only a temporary setback. New trends in Algerian national development became apparent from 1966 on. Sections C and D of this chapter analyze some aspects of these features.

It is sufficient to say at this moment that mixed and private enterprises have not been completely ousted. They occupy limited positions within Algerian national development. In the political economy of Algeria during 1963-1966, the basis of Algerian industrialization was agriculture, which was at that time the only modern sector.

The Algerian experience suggests that the breaking of neo-colonial relationships with France and the nationalization of financial institutions and of national resources were the pre-conditions of industrial and agricultural development (Tables 33 and 34).

TABLE 33

NATIONALIZATION OF INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Public and Private Institutions	Date of Takeover
Transport companies	1963
Insurance companies	1966
Import and export companies	1966
Banks	1966
Steel	1968
Textiles	1968
Chemicals	1968
Oil production	1968
Construction	1968

Source: M. Abucar, field notes, 1976.

TABLE 34

NATIONALIZATION OF FOREIGN ENTERPRISE

Foreign Enterprise	Date of Takeover
Bien vacants	1963
Mines	1965
Sociétés pétrolières	
Anglo-saxonnes	1967
Ensemble du marché	
Pétrolier	1968
Sinclair	1969
Filiales de Shell, Phillips	
Sofrajet et Amif	1970

Source: M. Abucar, field notes, 1976.

Several factors were responsible for the nationalization of the key sectors of the national economy. First, continuation of the development of the modern agriculture sector inherited from colonial times would have perpetuated Algerian dependence on France, in agricultural equipment and fertilizer as well as in marketing. Algerian agricultural products were known in France. However, the destruction of political ties between the two governments made it impossible to maintain traditional colonial relationships. Second, the Algerian government saw that large profits from oil were taken by private international companies, particularly French. Algeria realized that such patterns of foreign exploitation were inconsistent with development of the nation.

Third, and most important of all, popular aspirations and anti-imperialism movements erupted in the country prior to Algerian political independence. These movements were directed against those comprador (foreign-agent) Algerians interested in maintaining imperialist relationships with France. Nationalization of the means of production weakened the position of comprador interests and strengthened the anti-imperialist groups in power.

Nationalization of the means of industrial production, however, would not have taken place without particular support from the workers who were to initiate pressures to take control of foreign private enterprises. In 1964, the Congress of Petrol Workers took a leading part in nationalizing their own industry.

> Workers' management was thrust to the forefront of petroleum affairs by workers seeking a more responsible role in company operations and policy decisions. The Congress of Petrol Workers meeting in early October 1964 called for the Algerianization of management cadres, the formation of comités de gestion, and accelerated training programs under their supervision. President Ben Bella announced that Algeria would soon produce her own petroleum technicians at the rate of 250 per year at the newly established Russian-aided Centre Africain des Hydrocarbures and the French-assisted Institut Algérien du Pétrole. He urged workers "to use trade union action and, if necessary, the strike weapon to bring about your legitimate interests as workers." (Blair, 1969, p. 102)

The objectives of foreign enterprises were inconsistent with Algerian national development. Such arrangements would have been of no help to her long-term strategy of industrialization. Algeria obtained in 1964 one percent of the profit realized by these enterprises, in the form of royalties and indirect taxation. However, the Algerian government endeavoured to diversify its dependency relationship in order to weaken the old colonial ties between France and Algeria. At the same time it established new relationships with other capitalist countries.

The government encouraged foreign corporations to establish joint companies, wherein the government owned fifty-one percent, to explore for oil and gas. Since 1971, the Algerian government has been able to raise over eighty-one percent of the capital needed for its development plans.

The diversification of dependency relationship was further brought about by changes in Algeria's trade patterns. This is illustrated by Table 35.

TABLE 35

SALES OF ALGERIAN OIL, 1971

	Barrels per Day	Percent
Western Europe	604,800	88.1
France	(151,800	22.1)
West Germany	(200,100	29.1)
North America	41,600	6.0
Eastern Europe	21,100	3.1
Other		2.8
Total		100.0

Source: Compiled from *Middle East Economic Digest*, 13 October, 1972. See also MEED, 9 November, 1973.

Unlike the nationalization of farm units, the Algerian government set up a different type of workers' organization in nationalized industries. However, the problems that the workers have encountered in industrial enterprises were no different from those experienced in agricultural enterprises between 1963 and 1969.

In 1964 the government nationalized companies such as tobacco and match products. However, large-scale nationalization of industries occurred only in 1971. In the nationalized industries, worker participation systems were established, consisting of elected representatives of the workers at the conseil d'administration. These workers were elected from various units of SNTA (Société Nationale des Tabacs et Allumettes). The UGTA (Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens) had the task of supervising the election. Representatives of the workers were entitled to obtain from management the following information: profit, sales, and investment. There was centralized management, however. Each unit of the Société Nationale had an elected comité de d'entreprise and a conseil des travailleurs. The success of worker participation depended a great deal on the militancy of the trade union.

Nationalization of the means of production and worker participation, however, were not unilinear trends. Occasional setbacks in some units have been encountered, leading to denationalization of a few enterprises. Ian Clegg provides some of these instances:

> Denationalization immediately after the 1965 *coup* affected some quite large concerns such as the *Coopérative Ouvriere Aissat Idir*, which was centred round Blida. In Blida itself the cooperative contained a butcher, a fruit market, furniture shop, ironmonger, stationer, chemist, a garage, a hotel, a soft-drinks factory, a brick works and several small farms. At Boufarik, twenty kilometres away, there was a building concern and a paint workshop; fishermen at Bou Harroun, Chifalo and Castiglione were also members of the cooperative. In all, the cooperative involved some 1,500 workers. There were four *comités de gestion*, one for each sector--agricultural, food, mechanical and building--headed by a *conseil d'administration*, elected by the *comités*. In strict economic terms the cooperative was unwieldy, embracing so many activities. As a political experiment in social and economic integration it was one of the most successful examples of *autogestion*. On state orders, many of the small concerns were sold or returned to their original owners; the rest were integrated into the various state sectors for agriculture, industry, building and fisheries. The breaking up of the cooperative, which had

> been founded on the initiative of the UGTA, gave clear evidence of the administration's fear of the implications of the successful local organization of production and distribution by workers acting entirely outside the state. As a political and social experiment it threatened not only the power of the administration but, implicitly, its whole *raison d'être*. (Clegg, 1971, pp. 151-52)

Reasons behind the denationalization of some enterprises included interference on the part of the state to reduce worker involvement in local organization of production and distribution. Clegg mentions corruption and conflict between the workers and management. The take-over of the means of production and management on the part of the Algerian government has in the past produced strong reactions among some resisting workers. Again Ian Clegg offers an account of such situations:

> During the rapid demise of *autogestion* after 1965 the ability of the workers to wrest some degree of managerial control from the state depended largely on the strength of their organization. In almost every case this came to mean the strength of union organization. In the *sociétés nationales* and firms run directly by the state the union began to assume the functions of representing the workers as the conflict began to develop into a straight clash between two classes. This process is illustrated by the case of the *Société Algérienne des Boissons* in Algiers, in 1967 the only large state-owned manufacturer of soft drinks and beer. In 1966 the French owner of the firm left the country, owing 2.5 million DA in unpaid taxes. This device has been employed by many of the European capitalists to realize as much profit as possible before leaving. Often in such cases the government, since 1965, has sold the enterprise in order to recoup the taxes. Here the workers, who were well organized, demanded nationalization. The state acceded to this and appointed a state director who refused to consider any form of workers' participation. Faced by this, the workers operated a go-slow and demanded a new director. Specifically they asked for a man who had been a UGTA official until he was implicated in the 1963 rising. In face of a reduction in production from 60,000 to 5,000 bottles a day the state gave in to this demand. (Clegg, 1971, p. 150)

The experience of industrial enterprises was similar to that of agricultural enterprises, although denationalization did not occur in the latter. Yet common parallels existed in such areas as state control over finance, marketing and provision of raw materials, and the lack of profit-sharing. Some of these problems have been solved in later Algerian national development, as we shall see. Others remain. However, the past conflicts suggest a lack of proper definition of tasks between the administration and the workers. At that time the government was hesitant to accept trade union decisions. The latter had an advisory effect in the government's perspective of establishing a planned economy.

Nationalization of the means of production which started in 1962 was nearly completed in 1971 when the Algerian government recovered petroleum resources and natural gas. Since then the Algerian government has assumed total control of mining resources, construction materials, electronic enterprises, and twenty-five percent of leather and textiles. In 1971-1972 a major change occurred. One example was the promulgation of the *Charte socialiste des entreprises*, which allowed the worker to assume responsibility in all aspects of the enterprise. In 1972 the government promulgated the *Révolution agraire*, which aimed to set up cooperative societies and to distribute land to landless labour. These two measures brought about a radical transformation of Algerian society, which will be examined in Chapters 9 and 10.

C. PLANNING: THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CLIMATE

Algerian historical evolution suggests that during and after political independence in 1962 the prevalent social climate looked towards the creation of a socialist state, without which Algeria would not have been able to accelerate the decolonization process. The *Charte d'Alger*, adopted in 1964, made possible the political condition under which such a state could be created. This presupposed minimal technical conditions necessary to elaborate a national plan for socialist construction. Those conditions were stated by the Charter of Algeria, Part II, Chapter I.

> 18. The period of transition is when the political organization of the society prepares for socialism, starting with the abolition of the exploitation of man by man, the establishment of the material and social bases for a rapid development of the forces of production, and the freeing of the workers' creative activity. None of these aspects must be given precedence over the others, since they are an indissoluble whole.
>
> 19. The suppression of economic exploitation, the abolition of colonial and neo-colonial relationships, the expropriation of dominant foreign capital, the agrarian revolution, the socialization of the means of production will all allow us to end economic anarchy and make it possible to plan effectively and harmoniously in the real interests of the community. (Clegg, 1971, p. 218)

A comprehensive national development can be attained if all aspects of life are coordinated in the sense that allocation of the basic necessities of life does not rest on exploitation. Instead, a more equal distribution of revenue and public services must be promoted.

The decolonization and socialization of the means of production require a plan which will guarantee that the various interest groups in society can be regulated. The role of the socialist state in development is, among other things, to defend the revolutionary forces from exploitation by other countries. The state, in consolidating its socialist objective, tends to eliminate gradually private sectors that are hostile to the realization of those conditions necessary for worker participation in management. If private sector or foreign sector hostility becomes apparent, the state has to accelerate socialization. Such state intervention may be considered temporary in the first phase--the move towards self-management. Once the means of production are socialized, the workers assume control of the enterprise.

Decolonization creates a social surplus needed for industrialization and for the improvement of the life of the peasants and workers. However, these steps do not necessarily solve the problem unless the contradiction imminent in the new situation is understood, namely, the problem of consumption. If, during the transition, the government postponed all qualitative improvements in the life of the people, that would mean popular rejection of the push towards socialism. Therefore, a policy of maximum accumulation of surplus may lead to political turmoil. The best possible way to handle the situation is the removal of constraints that might reduce the life standards of the people and the permitting of an optimum level of accumulation, with relative outlets for consumption.

Raising the level of accumulation presupposes full employment. Unemployment can have a negative effect on the level of production and of accumulation, and it can raise in a relative sense the rate of consumption. Therefore, bringing the "reserve army" into economic production could mean both increased accumulation and increased consumption. The undertaking of infrastructure projects may solve some of the problems of rural unemployment or underemployment. This, however, is a precondition for economic development in general, and not necessarily for industrialization in particular.

Overall national development calls for maximum individual involvement during the planning period, partly in order to overcome existing shortages of trained personnel.

However, contradictions are sharpened if educational opportunity leads to undue political privileges. Economic privileges given to political cadres, because of their professional qualification, may likewise intensify contradiction. It is crucial to reduce this conflict during the transitional period. The transition period is exceedingly crucial. Some of the political conditions of the transition period will be analyzed in this chapter.

1. Technical Conditions

The preparation of technical conditions of planning were completed in 1966, when for the first time after independence the government carried out a population census over the entire country and at the same time carried out an enquiry into socio-economic conditions. The Constantine Plan, which was elaborated in 1958, had a very limited objective. The modernization of the petroleum industry, the provision of infrastructure, and the creation of temporary jobs did not cover overall national development. Algerian national development started in 1967-1969.

The Algerian experience of planning suggests that political and economic independence presupposes some form of comprehensive state planning. Yet planning may not take place, and certainly cannot be implemented. What are those technical conditions in the case of Algeria?

In Algeria, the first years of planning were to determine, among other things, the minimum technical conditions for elaborating a proper plan. What financial laws would facilitate the promulgation of an equipment budget? What would help the economic administration? What measures would develop information to enrich "le tableau de bord économique et social du pays"?

In 1966, a general census of the population was conducted over the entire country. Technical information, enough for minimal planning, became available. At the same time, "le pouvoir politique" adopted the plan.

The 1966 census estimated Algerian population at 11,800,000. In 1973 the population estimate was around 14,900,000. During that period, the population had increased at the average annual rate of 3.4 percent.

From 1973 to 1977, there were 2,200,000 more people than the estimated population in 1973. A higher rate of population growth has produced a larger proportion of young people. It is estimated that in 1980 the population of Algeria will be more than 18,700,000. The growing age cohorts are the younger ones, which of course increases the school population and the working population.

The school population is slightly larger than those who are expected to enter the working population. In 1966, the population of 6- to 18-year-olds was 53 percent of the total population. In 1973, it had increased to 54.5 percent.

It had been estimated for 1974-1977 that there would be an average increase of 4.4 percent annually in the working forces. As we shall examine in the next section, demographic aspects are considered an important factor in Algerian national development. For further analysis of the population structure, see Chapter 4.

Algeria since 1967 has adopted three national development plans: the first covered 1967-1969; the second and third plans were four-year plans, covering 1970-1973 and 1974-1977 respectively. Overall, these development plans rest on the principle that by 1980 Algeria will achieve full employment, and that basic needs such as food, shelter, and medical facilities will be provided to all citizens. A very prominent consultant from the Secrétariat du Plan stated:

> Nous avons commencé donc le processus en 1966 par l'adoption d'une stratégie nationale de développement. Cette stratégie visée pour 1980 à réussir à donner un emploi à tous ceux qui arrivés sur le marché de l'emploi à partir de 1980 en nombre massif puisqu'on comptait qu'en 1980 il y avait à peu près 140.000 Algériens qui arrivaient sur le marché de l'emploi au lieu de 70.000 dans les années 62 à 70. Pour 1980 étaient fixés aussi d'autres impératifs correspondant à la réponse aux besoins essentiels de la population.
>
> Les autres objectifs fixés pour 1980 c'est la disparition de la malnutrition, la scolarisation de tous les enfants garçons et filles de 6 à 14 ans et une réponse la meilleure possible aux besoins et qui correspondent à des droits à la Révolution Algérienne, le droit à la santé et le droit au logement. Vous trouverer ici à atteindre ces objectifs de réponse maximale aux besoins essentiels d'une population qui s'accroît beaucoup. L'Algérie à l'Indépendance avait 10 millions, elle aura autour de 19 millions en 1980. Pour répondre à ces besoins dûs à l'accroissement très rapide de la population, le pouvoir politique imprime comme orientation à l'economie des impulsions telles que les structures économiques de l'Algérie soient complètement en 1980 300 mille c'est-à-dire il faut que l'economie héritée, qui était une économie dépendante et non intégrée puisse en 1980 devenir une économie suffisamment forte la plus indépendante possible de manière à répondre aux besoins economiques et sociaux du pays et ceux dont le cadre de justice sociale qui est une des finalités aussi de la stratégie du développement de 1980. (Abucar, field notes, 1976)

The Revolutionary Council determined the general orientation to be followed in order for Algeria to achieve economic independence. This process of national development was divided into two stages: the first from 1967 to 1973, and the second from 1974 to 1980.

The former laid down the foundation for the long-term plan. The overall objective of that stage has been accomplished, and the Algerian government has been able to mobilize the needed financial resources. The investment for the first development plan was 4,260 million AD.*

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*The Algerian Dinar (AD) is figured at 3.50-4.00 to the US dollar.

This was a modest investment as compared to the 1970-1973 plan, costing 37,000 million AD.

The object of the first stage was, according to an Algerian planning expert:

> Le but de la première période 67-73 consiste à bâtir la machine économique au sens de créer les conditions d'intégration d'une industrie à elle-même c'est-à-dire entre les différentes branches industrielles et d'une industrie par rapport à l'agriculture et d'une manière générale l'intégration de l'Algérie à elle-même. (Abucar, field notes, 1976)

Section D will analyze the economic structure of Algeria. It is sufficient in this context to mention that the Algerian government has achieved positive results during the first stage by providing its citizens with minimum but universal economic support.

> En même temps pour le septennat, nous allons commencer une politique rigoureuse de redistribution des revenus par tous les canaux possibles depuis les bourses dans le système scolaire, les cantines scolaires, depuis la distribution des vêtements, la distribution des produits riches en élément nutritionnel, la supéramine, un produit à base de poissons et de farine jusqu'à une politique de soutien des prix de première nécessité. Ceci que le sucre qui est acheté à plus de 5 Dinars à l'extérieur et en devise mais est revendu à la Dinar 70 à la population, l'huile est acheté à plus de six dinars et est revendu à 2 dinars 70 et beaucoup d'autres produits sans mentionner que ceux-là.
>
> Mais il y a aussi d'autres éléments de la panète de la politique il y a aussi d'autres éléments de la panète de la politique de revenus, il y a des subventions accordées pour les produits industriels dont a besoin, l'agriculture, les engrais, les tracteurs sont vendus moins chers que le prix de revient tels qu'ils sont réellement dans les sociétés qui ont commencé à fabriquer ces produits. Mais qui pendant les premières années n'arrivait pas à la vitesse de croisière permettant d'avoir un abaissement des prix de revient.
>
> Il y a aussi des éléments de politique de revenus touchant les loyers, les transports, le prix du pain est resté au prix de 1959. Les transports ont été abaissé, le prix du gaz a été abaissé de 50% pour la population. Pour que la population puisse acheter du gaz 10 Dinars la grande bouteille de gaz de manière à ce que toute la population notamment: les paysans puisse acheter du gaz plutôt que de brûler la forêt ou en tout case de ne pas utiliser cette source de chauffrage et d'utiliser son domestique diverse. (Abucar, field notes, 1976)

During the first stage of planning, the Algerian government reinforced the redistribution of national income. The prices of basic food and shelter were kept very low, so as to be accessible to all citizens. For this purpose, Algeria spent ten percent of its gross national product to import food and make it available to citizens at half its original price in the international market. The prices of agricultural machines, fertilizer, and tools were kept low so that local industry served the general purpose of the society. Similarly, housing rent, transport, and gas prices are stabilized. In the last fifteen years, the prices of the first two items have remained constant.

The second stage of national development started in 1974. The first phase of this new stage was completed in 1977. During this period, the Algerian government has invested 54 billion AD of this on projects related to industrial development. These were processing industries such as textiles, shoes, and wood products, intended to meet the growing demands of the domestic market.

The foundation for industry has been laid down in the first stage of Algerian national development. The most important of the projects implemented was a fertilizer plant at Arzeur and the iron and steel complex at El-Hadjax. The second stage called for expansion of the capacity of several industrial complexes, particularly iron and steel, and at the same time the expansion of processing industries all over the country, in order that the uneven development inherent in colonial isolation may be redressed. The year 1974 was the turning point of Algerian national development. Qualitative and quantitative changes have been achieved; the nature of these changes will be discussed in Chapter 10.

There are two policies commonly found today in the developing world with regard to the relationship between labour and industrialization. The first holds that to restrain wages during the transition may accelerate the rate of capital accumulation. To that end, some governments seek an alliance between labour and the state. The second tendency holds that acceleration of the rate of economic growth can be achieved by borrowing, thus releasing the restraints on wages.

Unlike Nigeria, Algeria has followed the first approach and has practised restraints on wages and borrowing. In the last four-year plan (1974-1977) the government increased wages by twenty percent overall, yearly income of the workers by eight percent per capita and eleven percent overall, and consumption six percent per capita. A ceiling was imposed on the amount of money the government would borrow from an international bank--twenty to twenty-five percent of the total investment of the national plan. It has been estimated that eighty percent or more of investment came from local resources. By contrast, Nigeria, one of the oil-producing countries in Africa, recently borrowed 5,500 million United States dollars from a consortium of foreign banks.

> Borrowing was not a sign of bankruptcy; it only showed the country's creditworthiness. If you have to develop faster than your resources can support, you have to borrow and when you borrow, there is project discipline. That we borrow shows that we are developing faster than our resources. (Olu, 1976, p. 112)

Restraining wages and borrowing from the capitalist world during national development both seek to accelerate the rate of national capital accumulation. However, the first approach offers a better guarantee of national sovereignty and may lead to the breakdown of neo-colonial relations of economic dependency. The second policy tends to preserve such dependency by relegating economic independence to the future.

In the elaboration of the plan there is continued consultation among various levels of government. By this method, the planning secretariat elaborates the plan. However, implementation is carried out by the workers in each enterprise. There is a permanent committee dominated by the workers and assisted by a production committee consisting of workers and experts. At all levels of the elaboration of the plan, workers are represented. Chart 1 illustrates the normative character of the plan.

D. THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION

The interruption of neo-colonial relationships presupposes an alternative approach towards industrialization, according to Samir Amin:

> Now, this road is barred to the countries of the present periphery precisely because of the advanced development of marginalisation, the considerable and increasing gap between the modern technology set up by ruling capital and the necessity for an immediate improvement in the conditions of the masses, etc. These are the alternatives: either dependent development . . . or self-centred development, necessarily *original* in comparison to those countries already developed. It is in this direction that we discover the law of unequal development of civilisations. The periphery is forced to transcend the capitalist model (even if it is state capitalism). It cannot catch up with it. (Amin, 1974, p. 18)

The Algerian government and people are attempting to develop an alternative approach distinct from the peripheral or imperialist model which brought colonial dependency to their country. In so doing they have established new relationships between national resources, industry, and agriculture in order to create the necessary conditions for the decolonization of the economy.

Nationalization of the means of production and distribution, however, does not necessarily generate new development unless industry and

CHART 1

NORMATIVE CHARACTER OF ALGERIAN PLAN

Characteristics	Role of the State	Collectivity	Transition	Limited Power	Abolition
Popular state			x		
Material and social base			x		
Socialization of means of production	x		x		
Organization of production		x	x		
Discipline		x	x		
Controlling		x			
Owner self-management	x		x		
Preservation of socialist experience in industrialization	x		x		
Exploitative private enterprise					x
Bureaucracies				x	
Cooperation with state at different levels of development		x			
Employment	x		x		
Balance between consumption and accumulation			x		
Exploitation of man by man					x

Source: M. Abucar, field notes, 1976.

agriculture are interrelated. Uneven development is inherent in colonial structure: the increasing gap between developed and developing countries is, in other words, generated not by technology but by the relationships set up by the imperialist power. According to de Bernis, industrialization in Algeria achieved a mechanism of modernization and social transformation which made for a more coherent structure of relationships between the economy and the social base. He explains this structure as follows:

> "*Structure industrielle coherente*": celle-ci peut précisément se définir comme une matrice inter-industrielle "noircie," c'est-à-dire dont les différents secteurs sont iterreliés entre eux par leurs *inputs* et leurs *outputs*, ce qui implique la présence de secteurs de production de biens d'équipements et de produits intermédiaires destinés à une consommation productive interne. La mise en place d'une telle structure industrielle cohérente ne peut se faire qu'à partir d'industries que l'on peut qualifier d'*industrialisantes*, si l'on entend par là celles dont la fonction économique fondamentale est d'entraîner dans leur environnement localisé et daté un noircissement systématique de la matrice inter-industrielle et des fonctions de production, grâce à la mise à la disposition de l'entière économie d'ensembles nouveaux de machines qui accroissent la productivité du travail et entraînent la restructuration économique et sociale de l'ensemble considéré en même temps qu'une transformation des fonctions de comportement au sein de cet ensemble. (de Bernis, 1971, p. 547)

Western Europe's industrialization had an "outward" evolution towards capitalist development such as agriculture ⟶ light industries ⟶ structured transformation. The Algerian experience indicates a different trend: basic industry ⟶ agriculture ⟶ light industry ⟶ structural transformation. The Algerian option for national development has an "inward" movement. Algeria had to tackle problems of uneven internal development inherited from colonization--disarticulation and marginalization. By internal disarticulation we mean that the leading developed regions (Constantine, Algiers, and Oran) were disconnected from each other. They had more economic relationships with metropolitan France than with each other. The economic activities of these regions were connected by external markets, rather than the local market. The "inward" movement of Algerian industrialization has tended to create a self-centered or nationally articulated system.

1. The Economic Base

From 1966 on, Algerian government sought to create the material base for national development. According to de Bernis, it is possible to distinguish two broad categories of industries. Each of these categories embraces a number of interrelated industries.

> Le premier grand groupe d'industries mis en place en Algérie, la sidérurgie, qui valorise les ressources algériennes en minerai de fer, est maintenant en fonctionnement avec une capacité de production annuelle de 400 000 tonnes. La production de "fonte" est déjà assurée ainsi que la réalisation de l'aciérie et la reprise et l'organisation de tout le secteur de la première transformation des métaux. Le Plan quadriennal assurera, grâce aux différents laminoirs (à chaud et à froid pour les plats puis pour les protiles), à la tréfilerie et aux ateliers de transformation, la couverture de toute la gamme de première transformation des métaux. Par la suite, l'accroissement des capacités de production permettra de satisfaire les besoins en produits sidérurgiques induits par la construction de l'économie (1,5 à 1,8 million de tonnes d'acier).
>
> Mais la nouveauté du Plan quadriennal est de développer à partir de là tout le secteur de la transformation des métaux et d'élever grâce à lui le degré d'intégration de l'ensemble de l'economie: industries *métalliques* (charpente, chaudronnerie, tubes sans soudure, emballages métalliques dont les bouteilles à gaz), *mécaniques* (biens d'équipment pour l'agriculture--tracteurs, outillage agricole, vannes, pompes--ou pour l'ensemble de l'industrie--véhicules industriels, moteurs thermiques, machines-outils universelles, outillage à main--et quelques biens durables de grande consommation--cycles et motocycles, premiers appareils ménagers), *électriques* (moteurs, transformateurs, compteurs, bobines, accumulateurs. . . .).
>
> Le second grand groupe d'industries repose sur l'utilisation des hydrocarbures. L'unité d'Arzew, entrée en fonctionnement en 1970, fournit de l'ammoniac, du nitrate d'ammonium et de l'urée, l'unité de compostage fournissant les engrais organiques. L'intégration industrielle dans la chimie va se poursuivre avec le Plan quadriennal par la fabrication des produits issus des hydrocarbures (méthanol, résines synthétiques, hélium, éthylène,

> polyéthylène, chlorure de polyvinile) et la fabrication d'atures grands produits de base (oxygène, azote, acethylène, carbonate et silicate de sodium, acétate de polyvinile, tripolyphosphate, acide sulfurique et chlore, ces deux derniers étant les sous-produits d'unités destinées à d'autres fabrications).
> (de Bernis, 1971, pp. 549-50)

In this sense one can talk of an "inward" movement towards industrialization. The functions of industrialization are to free agriculture from foreign dependency in terms of equipment and fertilizers, and to create employment. At the same time, agricultural development has an impact on the expansion of the industry. The agricultural and industrial sectors will generate the surplus necessary for the expansion of both sectors in the long term. During my stay in Algeria a technical advisor to the Secretariat of Planning told me:

> Les perspectives septannales de développement ont voulu faire en sorte qu'il ait création d'un ensemble industriel homogène à partir des industries de base sidérurgique, industrie mécanique, pétrochimie de manière à ce que cette industrie trouve les bases de son intégration a elle-même et les bases de son intégration à l'agriculture et c'est ainsi que l'ancien complexe sidérurgique visant à faire 2 millions de tonnes, il fait actuellement 700 mille. /
>
> Et que parmi les premières usines d'industrie mécanique qui ont été mises en place, il y a la fabrication et non pas le montage de tracteurs à Constantine, il y a à l'Ouest du pays la fabrication de matériel d'outillage agricole de même qu'à Skikda et à Arzew, il y a des complexes pétrochimiques produisant de création des engrais pour l'agriculture. (Abucar, field notes, 1976)

Regional development integrated with the decentralization of basic industries in the regions, of course, promotes overall national development whereby the industrial structure creates the conditions for agricultural modernization. The industrial contribution to the modernization of agriculture is noticeable in many aspects of agricultural development; the hydrocarbon industry provides plastic materials, pesticides, small tubs for irrigation and drainage, plastic shelters to prevent the evapouration of the water, "Culture sous terres." Besides all these materials, it makes available low-cost energy. The siderurgy and mechanical branches of national industry provide agricultural tools and tractors, and shelters for cattle on the high plateau during the winter season.

The process of integration between industry and agriculture, which started during the first three-year plan (1967-1969) and was later reinforced during the planning periods of 1970-1973 and 1974-1977, has brought certain positive results in increasing the agricultural surplus. This effected an increased income for the agricultural farmers. This in turn has been associated with a democratization of consumption. At present, Algerian agricultural workers are in a financial position to acquire more products produced by the local industries. Consequently, the integrated industrial-agricultural plan has widened the opportunity to work and to earn a reasonable salary. At the same time, it has reduced urban unemployment by cutting rural-to-urban migration.

During this era of economic reconstruction, agriculture can cushion if not solve the problem of unemployment until the industrial sector reaches its maximum capacity of production. However, in overall national development, a great deal depends on the success of the industrial sector. At present, Algerian industry has made it possible for agriculture to achieve a minimum level of modernization, attended by an improvement of the standard of living of the rural population. It is possible in Algeria now to have certain basic agricultural products available in the market all year around, thanks to the development and application of plastic gardens and the controlled supply of underground water.

The Algerian government is pursuing multiple objectives of industrial development. Heavy industry has been given priority over light industry (iron and steel and petrochemical enterprises, for example). This type of heavy industry generates a new economic relation within the country and tends to reduce the dependency of Algerian agriculture on external industry. Consequently, the national resources are treated with the most advanced technology. The products obtained are used for the development of local industry. For example, steel, produced by the Société Nationale de Sidérurgie, is used by several Sociétés Nationales, such as Production, Transport, Transformation, and Commercialization of Hydrocarbons (SONATRACH) for pipelines. Likewise, the machine and petrochemical industries (as we have mentioned earlier) produce tractors and fertilizers which are used by agricultural enterprises. These interrelationships among various industries on the one hand, and the interrelationship between agriculture and industry on the other hand, promote internal exchange and create a new set of social structures within Algerian society. There is an absence of capitalist competition among various industries (including agriculture), and this lack of internecine competition makes possible a coherent cooperation among Algerian enterprises.

Each Société Nationale is comprised of several units, producing different parts of the same commodity. Therefore, an independent relationship exists whereby two or more units of production are regulated. For example, the SN Métal, where I carried out research, has several units of this. Each unit is specialized in some aspect of metal work. If half these units have produced a surplus, that surplus is stored in a pool for the expansion of the Société Nationale. Or it may be used to keep some units working which have not been able to generate a surplus for whatever reasons.

In such situations, the workers are not laid off. Instead, the enterprise is continued and improvements are worked out by a special commission consisting of workers, party members, administrators, and local representatives of the central government.

Similarly, agricultural enterprises are based on regional organization. Part of the surplus created by these enterprises at the regional level is transmitted to the central government, which makes it available to agricultural enterprises located in regions with less agricultural potentiality.

Unlike heavy industry, light industry has only a limited effect on the modernization of other branches of the national economy. But it has an important function in achieving economic independence, in the sense that it reduces dependence on foreign products and provides for the processing of raw materials available in Algeria. Light industry covers such items as hides, skins, and textiles, and plants are located in Mascara, Tebessa, Bel-Abbas, and Sekf. Textile factories are located in Dra-Ben Khadda. There are also several food-processing industries in several parts of the country.

The Algerian government has given higher priority to basic industries, such as petrochemicals and mechanical, because these industries have a higher potential for creating the conditions for national development. The reconstruction of heavy industry requires a long-term period. The pattern of investment of each four-year plan to date indicates the importance the government attaches to industry. For example, the plan for 1970-1973 devoted nearly half of public investment to industry, compared to fifteen percent for agriculture (see Table 36).

TABLE 36

PLANNED PUBLIC INVESTMENT, 1970-1973

	En millions de dinars Algériens	En pourcentage du total
Industrie	12 400	45
Agriculture	4 140	15
Education-formation	3 300	12
Infrastructure	2 300	8
Autres secteurs	5 500	20
Total	27 640	100

Source: A. Akkache, 1971, p. 85.

The total investment was 27.7 billion AD. The 12.4 billion for industry was allocated as follows: thirty-six percent to hydrocarbons, fifteen percent to siderurgy, eleven percent for mechanical transformation, and eight percent for construction materials.

Heavy industry was decentralized and automobile factories were established in Oran and Rouiba. Decentralization of light industry was also undertaken. Textile industries, shoe factories, and food processing industries were located in several parts of Algeria.

The objectives of the first and second development plans have been achieved. From 1969 to 1973, the annual investment amount was increased from 4 to 12 billion AD. Ninety-five percent of this investment was realized by the public sector. It is estimated that comparable results will be obtained in the 1974-1977 development plan period.

The foundation of the 1970-1973 plan was laid down in the 1967-1969 plan, according to Ahmed Akkache:

> Le plan triennal passe à une étape supérieure d'industrialisation. La mise en place d'unités isolées ne suffit plus. Il s'agit maintenant d'entreprendre la construction des bases matérielles du développement. Examinons d'abord, pour avoir und idée générale de l'orientation du programme, la répartition des investissements prévus (en millions de dinars algériens) d'après les projets publiés par la direction générale du Plan et des Etudes économiques:

Hydrocarbures	2 295
Mines	248
Electricité	279
Sidérurgie	1 510
Chimie lourde	750
Indust. mécaniques	220
Indust. alimentaires	347
Chimie légère	135
Industrie textile	509
Cuirs et peaux	88
Industries diverses	202
Matér. de construction	126
Artisanat et divers	90
Total	6 800

(A. Akkache, 1971, p. 84)

The overall orientation of national development in terms of diversification of the economy and regional development was undertaken in the first short-term plan. Two-thirds of the investment was concentrated on industry, petrochemicals, and siderurgy. The plan for 1974-1977 followed the same priorities. These were:

- The iron and steel industry and the primary transformation of metal;
- Certain areas of mechanical and electrical construction;
- Heavy chemistry;
- Energy; and
- Construction materials.

Basic industry receives forty percent of industrial investment. The next plan will spend two to three times more than the 1974-1977 plan.

Structural transformation has taken place in Algeria, if the active population and external commerce are taken into consideration.

At the same time, education and training are undertaken to meet the demands of the economic transformation that has taken place since 1969. The Algerian government spent, during the 1970-1973 plan period, eleven percent of the GDP for education and training; this stands at roughly twenty-five to thirty percent of the national budget. It has been estimated that the world average spent on education is three to four percent of the GDP, compared with Algeria's eleven percent (Godet, 1974, p. 51).

Algerian national development would not have been realized without the natural resources, gas and petrol, of which resources the Algerian government controls seventy-seven percent. Most industry requires capital to purchase the necessary equipment, and the capital is coming from the natural resources. Without these resources, Algeria would have to depend on primary agricultural commodities, like many other countries in Africa.

Since 1969, Algeria has maintained a growth rate of 6.3 percent, two-thirds of which came from petroleum production.

2. The Social Base

The Algerian economic structure described above is undergoing a qualitative and quantitative social transformation. Within the framework of Algerian national development, demographic characteristics assume importance with respect to the future expansion of the economic structure, and future labour requirements. The Algerian government pays close attention to the rate of population growth and the age composition and distribution of the population. These demographic characteristics have been dealt with in Chapter 4 and in section C of this chapter.

The demographic problem Algeria confronts at the present time is not so much the rate of population growth but rather the age composition of the active population and the distribution of this population between agriculture and industry. For example, I observed during my stay in Algeria that the average age of agricultural workers is slightly higher than for industrial workers. A research survey I carried out in Algiers and in Annaba in 1976 confirmed the difference of age composition between agricultural and industrial workers, as Table 37 indicates:

TABLE 37

AGE DISTRIBUTION OF SELECTED AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL WORKERS, ALGIERS AND ANNABA, 1976

Age Group (years)	Agriculture		Industry	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
18-25	21	22.8	49	35.0
26-30	11	12.0	34	24.3
31-35	10	10.9	13	9.3
36-40	16	17.4	10	7.1
41-45	11	12.0	8	5.7
46-50	8	8.7	14	10.0
51-60	12	13.0	10	7.1
61-65	3	3.3	2	1.4
Total	92	100.1	140	99.9

Source: M. Abucar, field notes, 1976.

Due to the economic advantages of work in industry and tourism, most workers prefer industry to agriculture. The government, in order to resolve this problem, is promoting settlement schemes. For example, farmers from the arid zone are resettled in the fertile lands. At the same time, the government is endorsing a unified wage system for agricultural and industrial workers.

There are two approaches in the current literature on the rate of population growth in relation to economic and demographic development. The first one is referred to as the demographic problem and the second as the economic problem. The first approach concentrates on how to reduce population growth. This approach suggests several methods that can be used to tackle the demographic problem, such as the use of birth control measures. These measures could be either oral contraceptives or sterilization. These methods are not widely used so far in the emerging nations, but a minority of writers claim that such an idea could be a panacea for solving demographic problems and, if the rate of population growth is reduced, eventually will bring economic prosperity. Of course, an optimum population growth is desirable, but to reduce the rate of population growth may have an adverse effect. For example, a declining birth rate can do nothing to increase production. The whole approach to the problem of the demographic factor is based on false premises and fails to take into account the fact that the rate of natural increase will inevitably tend to stabilize itself when the death rate reaches the level already reached in the developed world (Hodder, 1973, p. 8).

A second approach deals with how to solve economic problems arising from population growth. This approach suggests that production be increased at a higher rate than the rate of population growth. This means that both agriculture and industrial production have to increase constantly their level of production. The Algerian option of national development has its own approach, as we will see presently.

Algeria has taken into account the demographic aspects of its economic situation during both four-year plans. Christian Godet writes as follows:

> D'ores et déjà des résultats non négligeables ont été obtenus. Près de 300,000 emplois non agricoles ont été créés au cours du premier plan, ce qui est énorme si l'on compare ce chiffre à celui des emplois existants en 1966. Le deuxième plan, grâce à l'inflexion donnée à l'orientation de la politique d'investissement, vise à créer 450,000 emplois nouveaux et à agir sur les conditions de vie à la campagne afin de réduire l'exode rural. C'est l'objectif de la Révolution agraire, de la création des "villages socialistes," du programme spécial d'investissement au profit des villages les plus pauvres et de la place faite aux petites et moyennes industries. Une amélioration indiscutable devrait être obtenue dès 1977. On espère ainsi qu'en 1977, l'élimination du chômage urbain sera en bonne voie et le sous-emploi rural largement atténué. (Godet, 1974, p. 53)

While the first four-year plan created 300,000 jobs in the industrial and service sectors, the second four-year plan generated 450,000 jobs in the rural areas to stop the immigration of labour to the cities.

A much more serious problem is the social disjunction inherited from colonialism: the coastline of Algeria is more developed than the interior. This traditionally has attracted urban migrants from the countryside. The *Charte Nationale* adopted in 1976 states in this respect:

> Il s'agit de faire en sorte que la croissance démographique n'annihile pas les effets de la croissance économique et que, finalement, la course qui semble se jouer entre les taux de ces deux croissances n'aboutisse pas à faire stagner ou reculer la marche du progrès en ce qui concerne l'amélioration des conditions de vie des masses.
>
> Autrement dit, faute, dans les conditions actuelles, de pouvoir freiner efficacement l'expansion de la démographie, il convient

> de transformer l'effet de la démographie en facteur de développement pour l'économie.
>
> L'Algérie a choisi, de cette façon, de régler positivement le problème de la démographie. Au lieu de s'épuiser à essayer de réduire l'ampleur du problème en s'efforçant vainement de diminuer le nombre des êtres à entretenir, il s'agit de faire de ces êtres des producteurs au sens plein du terme au sein d'une population active et efficace et de donner à la société les structures appropriées pour utiliser et valoriser le grand nombre.
>
> Cette voie, en sauvegardant les chances du progrès par le relèvement du niveau di vie, permit de créer les conditions objectives qui finiront par ramener le rythme de la croissance démographique à un taux compatible avec la nécessité d'assurer le maintien d'un rythme accéléré dans la marche vers le progrès. (*Charte Nationale*, 1976, p. 131)

Demographic problems, in brief, are resolvable if the appropriate structure is created in terms of distribution of the population all over the territory, decentralization of the national economy, a reasonable distribution of national income, and improvement of the level of production. Then the demographic factor will help to generate self-sustaining growth because of its participation in the accumulation of surplus. The relationship between the material and the social thus creates the conditions of evolution necessary for the expansion of Algerian national development.

The Algerian model for national development is oriented towards "inward" movements, namely the development of a material base aiming to regulate the characteristics of Algerian society by transforming the colonial structure and replacing it with an appropriate self-determining structure for national development.

Bourgeois sociologists have showed some interest in the relationship between the material base and the market institutions, particularly when an appropriate structure does not operate within a society.

> An example of this evolutionary pattern may be found in the sequence of development between the commodity market and factory employment. Because of the culture of the hypothetical society in the preindustrial phase, commitment [acceptance of the norms in a system of action] starts in the market. Once a market has at least started and developed to some extent, commitment can start in factory employment, in that the nature of commitment in the market was such as to remove the previous cultural blocks to wage labor. However, full commitment in the market in turn may depend on the development of a high level of commitment to factory work. [Money turns out to have increasing uses.] Thus the sequence between the two loci (contexts of action) reverses itself and is "retroactive." The theory is not a determinism of "prime movers" and rectilinear sequences, nor simply a functional correlation, but a sequence with alternating directions . . . . An analogous pattern of change operates in economic systems, as where an initial agricultural revolution makes possible a diversion of productive factors to manufacturing, which in turn makes possible agricultural mechanization, chemical fertilizers, and rapid delivery of agricultural products. (Moore, 1965, pp. 39-40)

According to Moore, social commitment starts at the market level. The desire to acquire goods and services transforms pre-capitalist society from a non-money to a money economy. Because of this desire, the industrial worker enters the relationship of production as a wage-earner. This gives a dimension of growth to the market; in turn, the market will have an impact on the expansion of the factory. This model reflects the peripheral model of colonial dependence, and it does bring a radical structural transformation.

The society in which such a model operates is still under colonial or neo-colonial relationships. According to Samir Amin, underdevelopment of the periphery is due to the relationship between export, luxury, and goods. Wages are low and the function of the peripheral economy is geared towards export. This model could not provide employment for the labour dislocated from their traditional economic base. In such underdevelopment models, conditions of marginalization set in. Samir Amin describes marginalization as follows:

> Industries set up in this way and within this framework are not likely to turn into growth poles but will on the contrary increase the inequality within the system and impoverish the major part of the population (found in sector 2 in their capacity as producers), permitting at the same time a further integration of the minority within the world system.
>
> From the "social" point of view, this model leads to a specific phenomenon: the *marginalisation* of the masses. By this we mean a series of mechanisms heterogeneous in nature which impoverish the masses: proletarianisation of small agricultural producers and cottage industry workers, rural semi-proletarianisation and impoverishment without proletarianisation of peasants organised in village communities, urbanisation and massive increase of urban unemployment and underemployment, etc. Unemployment in this case differs from unemployment under the central model of development. Underemployment, in general, will have the tendency to increase instead of being relatively limited and stable, cyclical variations apart. Unemployment and underemployment thus have a role different to that under the central model: the high level of unemployment ensures a minimum wage rate which is relatively rigid and frozen both in sectors 1 and 3; wage does not emerge both as a cost and an income which creates a demand, vital to the model, but on the contrary only as a cost, demand itself originating elsewhere from abroad or out of the income of the privileged social classes. (Amin, 1974, pp. 16-17)

Unlike the underdevelopment model, the Algerian option for national development brings together the relationship between the material and the social bases. The market institutions function in relation to the evolution of the economic and social base, which are the two essential aspects of the society. The social base, hence the demographic characteristic, has functions in generating the surplus accumulation by increasing production. In this model the material base depends on the social base, without which the material base cannot exist on its own. However, the material base creates the conditions of qualitative development of productive forces.

Diagrams 2 and 3 illustrate the difference between the peripheral model and the national development model. With the peripheral model there is a reciprocal relationship between the material base and the

DIAGRAM 2

PERIPHERAL MODEL

A



DIAGRAM 3

TURTLE MODEL

B



M = Material base
S = Social Base
W = Wages
MK = Market
L = Labor

market, and a lesser relationship with the social base (especially with the demographic factor). Demographic changes have little or no relationship with the material and market bases. This model is static and does not take into consideration demographic changes due to the model's basic orientation to private profit.

In the Algerian model for national development, there is a closer relationship between material and social bases. Interaction among the means of production and the labour force generates surplus. This in turn is divided into wages and state profit. Part of the profits are reinvested by the state in order to provide basic necessities. Wages are used for consumption and come directly into contact with the market. The profit obtained in such a model is used to meet the basic needs of society.

If one compares Diagrams 2 and 3, it will be found that the market in Diagram 3 is internal and rests on the relationship between the material and the social base. Population increase at present is uncontrollable in Algeria, due to religious beliefs and the level of education of the society. Therefore, the way in which the government has approached this problem makes sense. However, an increase in income and the expansion of the material base depends on the productivity of the labour force, without which Algeria may not be able to meet the rising expectations of the masses. The Algerian option for national development is interdependent within itself and claims an autonomy from outside interference and imperialist domination, as the *Charte Nationale* states:

> C'est la raison pour laquelle les actions visant à apprêter et à promouvoir l'expansion du marché national doivent aller de pair avec le déroulement de la politique de développement de

> l'industrialisation. Lors du lancement du premier Plan de développement, l'exiguïté du marché national apparaissait comme une contrainte au lancement de l'industrialisation. La demande intérieure, évaluée sur la base des statistiques relatives à l'activité économique passée, demeurait en deça du niveau de production considéré, par les économistes des pays développés, comme le seuil de rentabilité pour les industries dont la réalisation était projetée dans le cadre de l'élaboration du Plan.
>
> A l'heure actuelle, par suite de la croissance rapide et continue de la demande intérieure, les objectifs du Plan, aussi ambitieux qu'ils apparaissent à travers les chiffres, se situent à peine au niveau nécessaire pour couvrir les besoins du pays en produits industriels. La croissance rapide du marché national procure, aux industries naissantes du pays, une base de départ qui les met à l'abri des fluctuations et des épreuves inhérentes au marché extérieur. Au moment où elle doit faire face aux multiples problèemes que pose son démarrage dans les conditions d'un pays privé de l'environnement industriel adéquat par suite de l'exploitation coloniale, l'industrie algérienne dispose d'un débouché garanti, en même temps qu'elle apporte à l'économie l'avantage d'un approvisionnement d'origine interne.
>
> L'industrie nationale trouve ainsi, dans le marché national, le soutien indispensable pour surmonter les problèmes de son lancement et pour assurer sa pleine maturation. Elle doit mettre à profit ce soutien pour renforcer ses performances et créer les conditions de sa compétitivité, en vue de prendre place sur le marché international dans le cadre des efforts visant à diversifier les exportations du pays et à faire passer l'Algérie du stade de la vente des matières brutes à celui de la vente des produits élaborés. (*Charte Nationale*, 1976, pp. 129-30)

Of course, the Algerian model of national development may have encountered the market in the past as a limiting factor, both in international and internal aspects. However, an appropriate structure provided opportunity to work, and the masses have an income. This in turn has an impact on the market.

At present the model is heavily dependent on natural resources. But it seems that Algeria has reached a breakthrough into a new stage in which the model will depend on the development of production (for example, the processing industry and agricultural marketing). Such responsibility is in the hands of the working force.

The next chapter will examine the organization of Algerian workers in industry and in agriculture. However, despite its social and economic dynamics, the Algerian model is not free of contradictions, because the division of labour associated with the Algerian model itself produced certain social differentiations or "classes," due to the position these classes occupy within the social system. This differentiation is another aspect of the contradiction which is not necessarily associated with the Algerian national development model, but inherited from precolonial society. Some of these contradictions have been dealt with in the past (for example, agrarian reform) but have not been completely eradicated, despite the radical aspirations of Algerian national development. We will examine the social process of Algerian national development in Chapters 10 and 11.

CHAPTER 9

THE ORGANIZATION OF ALGERIAN WORKERS IN AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY

A. THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF ALGERIAN WORKERS

The organization of Algerian society covers a number of facets relevant to the historical development of the country. These facets are the workers, the farmers, and the emancipation of women and youth. They reflect the qualitative and quantitative dimension of Algerian society. The present study is concerned only with workers in agriculture and industry, both in public and private institutions. A worker in the context of Algerian national development denotes any person who is engaged in a particular occupation and who is entitled to certain rights and obligations. The *Charte et Code de la Gestion Socialiste des Entreprises*, which was adopted in 1971, defines the rights and obligations of the workers as follows:

> Art. 8--Est qualifée travailleur toute personne qui vit du produit de son travail et n'emploie pas à son profit d'autres travailleurs dans son activité professionnelle.
>
> Art. 9--Les travailleurs sont égaux en droits et en devoirs. Ils bénéficient des mêmes rémunérations et avantages pour un même travail et à égalité de rendement.
>
> Art. 10--Un revenu minimum est garanti à tout travailleur. Ce revenu est fixé par la loi en fonction de ses besoins vitaux, du développement de la production nationale et de la politique nationale des revenus.
>
> Art. 11--Le travailleur bénéficie de tous les droits en matière de sécurité et d'assurances sociales, y compris les allocations familiales.
>
> Art. 12--Les travailleurs peuvent, en outre, percevoir des primes de productivité selon des normes de rendement établies par des textes réglementaires et déterminées par nature d'activité.

> Art. 13--A son poste de travail, le travailleur jouit de conditions satisfaisantes d'hygiène et de sécurité.
>
> Art. 14--Le travailleur a droit à une partie des résultats bénéficiaires de l'activité de l'entreprise.
>
> Art. 15--Le droit syndical est reconnu à tous les travailleurs.
>
> Art. 16--Le travailleur a droit à la formation professionnelle et à la promotion socio-culturelle. Il est tenu de remplir ses fonctions avec le maximum de conscience professionnelle et de veiller à l'amélioration constante de sa qualification et de ses connaissances techniques.
>
> Art. 17--Le travailleur doit contribuer à l'accroissement de la production, de la productivité et veiller à l'amélioration constante de la qualité et à la réalisation des objectifs du plan.
>
> Art. 18--Le travailleur veille à la préservation du patrimoine de l'entreprise et participe à la lutte contre toute forme de gaspillage ou de malversation. (p. 18)

The charter underlines two important aspects of the relationship between work and institutions in society. Work is not only a commodity, but also social; therefore the conditions of work, such as satisfactory health and safety, are of paramount importance for worker performance. The right to work presupposes the responsibility to promote production both in the workers' immediate interest and the national collectivity's interest. This responsibility implies increased production and minimized waste--waste which would jeopardize the objectives of Algerian national development.

For this purpose, workers are entitled to organize themselves within the framework of national development. Apart from regular income, as wages, that each worker is entitled to earn according to the internal regulations of the enterprise, the worker is also provided benefits commensurate with his participation in the production process. Economic benefit (wages and benefits) is conditioned by the level of national production and national revenue policy. However, the enterprise is obliged to promote socio-cultural formation and training that will advance the workers' awareness and increase the level of production. The concept of workers, as defined by some bourgeois sociologists, seems to regard work as something that has a direct relationship with individual survival rather than with societal survival; as Lee Braude puts it:

> *Work* may be viewed as that which a person does in order to survive. Narrowly conceived, work is simply the way in which a person earns a living. From a broad perspective, a person works in order to maintain or enhance any of the statuses that are his by virtue of his membership in a multiplicity of groups. A person may be happy in his survival tasks or he may be woefully miserable. He may work merely in order to receive his weekly paycheck, or he may perform some activities for no reason other than sheer joy in the task. However, as long as the person defines, or has defined for him, the activities in which he is engaged as in some manner related to his survival, either physical or social, then we can say that person is working. (Braude, 1975, p. 12)

Braude defines in broad perspective the normative character of work: the individual works because the dominant class wants him to work, and work is beneficial for the individual. If he does not work, he will lose his membership within the group. What is missing in this definition is the social dimension of work. The work of an individual is meaningless unless it takes place within the context of the national collectivity.

In Algeria, there are social collectivities of producers, who create economic activities for themselves and for society by and at large. The existence of these social collectivities depends not on market mechanisms but on their mutual relationship with each other as a whole.

At the opening Congress of the UGTA on 2 April, 1923, the President of the Algerian Democratic Republic, Houari Boumédienne, said in this respect as follows:

> A l'instar des responsables dans ce pays, chacun de vous a sa part de responsabilité dans le milieu dans lequel il travaille. La responsabilité du syndicat et des travailleurs envers eux-mêmes et envers la société socialiste est un appui combien fort pour les acquis révolutionnaires que nous avons réalisés jusqu'ici. Ceci doit se traduire par l'élévation du niveau de production et de la productivité ainsi que par l'auto-discipline des travailleurs afin de bannir de leur esprit l'idée de l'existence du patron et de l'ouvrier. La Charte de la gestion socialiste des entreprises est venue justement pour remédier à cela, par l'organisation des rapports entre le simple travailleur et le grand directeur, en établissant une véritable harmonie et une coopération au sein des entreprises et des unités de production.
>
> Il est donc nécessaire, chers frères travailleurs, d'élever le niveau de la production et d'améliorer la productivité. Ne comptant que sur nous-mêmes et que sur nos propres moyens, nous nous devons non seulement de consolider l'indépendance de notre économie, mais aussi de développer notre pays, d'entreprendre son édification et de sauvegarder l'honneur de notre société. Ceci ne peut être réalisé que par une prise de conscience accrue et une lutte continue.
>
> Le fruit de la lutte que mènent aujourd'hui les travailleurs ne peut en aucune manière servir les intérêts d'une classe bourgeoise ou d'une classe capitaliste. Il doit nécessairement profiter aux masses laborieuses elles-mêmes. (Mameri, 1975, pp. 176-77)

The development of socialist society presupposes the improvement of production, which can only be achieved if each worker assumes his responsibility where he is working and if distinctions between worker and manager are eliminated in order for there to be some sort of consolidation. Results have been achieved in encouraging workers to assume responsibilities within the economy, that is to say, for participating effectively in the struggle for economic independence.

The Algerian option in the area of workers' organization seems to be linked to the relationship between worker and society: the worker is given the responsibility for production, which is considered as the basis for future development of Algerian society. Secondly, work is conceived of as social and economic activities that provide benefits to the social collectivity and the struggle against poverty and imperialism. The Algerian option in the area of workers' organization tends to eliminate the relationship between employer and employee. This is true in public institutions, where the means of production are still in the hands of the state. Because the production relationship in public institutions has gradually been transformed, Algerian workers in public institutions enjoy a certain amount of power over the control and regulation of public enterprise units, particularly in situations that affect them and society at large.

Because of the heterogeneous character of ownership of the means of production, and because of the diversity of economic activity due to the nature of the transition from post-colonial society to socialist society, there are several forms of workers' organizations within public institutions. These are: worker participation in industrial and service sectors, autogestion, and cooperative societies in the agricultural sector. In contrast, workers do not enjoy such responsibility in private institutions, where management is organized along capitalist lines.

Public institutions offer more guarantees to workers than private enterprise, although private enterprises survive within public institutions. What they are able to provide workers in terms of work contracts depends on the need attached to the product in question within the framework of national development. Public enterprises are functionally interrelated, and if there is work it is divided up and shared among the public enterprise units, regardless of their geographical location.

The Société Nationale des Métaux, where I carried out my field work, has eleven units, located in several regions. In 1976, six units brought in a profit, which was divided into two parts. One part remained in the unit, the second part going to the Ministry of Finance.

Profits generated by a successful unit are made available to assist other units. The part that is left over for the enterprise is again divided into three parts. One-third goes for workers' benefits, which is divided equally among all workers in the units, including management. Another third goes for what is referred to as *fonds de base*; this money is reserved for emergency cases and for future investment. The third part of the benefit is used for the purchase part of current expenditures.

The transformation of the means of ownership and the production relationship, examined in Chapter 6, section B, was the pre-condition for workers' organization in Algeria. In this respect, the *Charte Nationale* states as follows:

> La liquidation des structures objectives de l'exploitation, la satisfaction des besoins fondamentaux des masses, sont une condition nécessaire, mais son suffisante d'un développement socialiste. Pour qu'il y ait édification socialiste, il faut qu'il y ait engagement conscient, capacité politique des travailleurs à assumer leur mission historique à l'avant-garde de la nation.
>
> Le travailleur dans l'usine socialiste, le paysan dans la coopérative de la Révolution agraire, sont en principe des producteurs libres. Mais pour le devenir réellement, ils doivent acquérir une conscience politique en rapport avec leur nouvelle situation sociale. En d'autres termes, pour être des producteurs libres, les travailleurs doivent être en même temps des citoyens conscients. Leur conscience socialiste et leur conscience civique doivent se développer simultanément et se renforcer l'une par l'autre. (*Charte Nationale*, 1976, pp. 33-34)

The structural changes which took place following Algerian political independence had, as an objective, the elimination of any form of exploitation of man by man and the release of workers' creativity by promoting production in order to fulfill the basic, fundamental needs of the masses. Workers in socialist enterprises, and farmers in cooperative societies and in autogestion, are designated as the principal producers for society. The Algerian government hopes, by these social and economic transformations, to elevate the political consciousness of the workers and encourage them to assume their historical mission as the avant-garde of the nation.

During this transitional period, the state, representing the collectivity, creates the conditions necessary for the social and economic transformation of Algerian society. Once more, the *Charte Nationale* states as follows:

> L'Etat doit créer toutes les conditions pour que chaque Algérien puisse satisfaire ses besoins essentiels dans la dignité. Ces investissements sociaux, s'ils représentent une lourde charge pour la société, ne constituent pas moins un facteur fondamental du développement. Non seulement ils favorisent la promotion d'importantes couches de la population, qui étaient réléguées dans une condition infra-humaine sous le régime colonial, mais, en les insérant résolument dans la production, ils assurent à cette dernière un soutien de plus en plus vaste. (*Charte Nationale*, 1976, p. 33)

Decolonization of the national economy goes hand in hand with social transformation of production based on the improvement of the life of the people who were victims of colonialism. However, the Algerian government subscribes to the principle of socialism based on: "De chacun selon ses capacités, à chacun selon son travail" (*Charte Nationale*, 1976, p. 32).

That is the central principle of Algerian social organization. Unlike the pre-colonial structure, in which social organization maintained the principle of simplistic egalitarianism based on a biological relationship, the emerging social organization takes personal merit and dedication to the cause of national development into consideration as the primary factors for determining equality within social organization. This form of egalitarianism does not, however, recognize the distinction. Women are encouraged to occupy work positions within socialist enterprises, as much as any other public enterprise, autogestion, or cooperative society.

Personal merit related to the level of production and the accumulation of surplus generated by the enterprise situates the producer's collectivity better in the context of national development. So, if an enterprise achieves the annual production plan target, that enterprise is entitled to benefits. However, on the principle of equality, a distinction is drawn among the collectivity of producers: those who worked the whole year gain a greater share of benefits than those who demonstrated a certain absenteeism during the year. That distinction, a proportional share of benefit, is made with regard to personal merit, rather than to professional qualifications, or to positions occupied within the hierarchy of the organization. In Chapter 10 I will examine further both benefits and distribution of surplus created by the collectivity of producers.

Dedication to the cause for national development is the second factor that enters into play in evaluating the principle of equality in assuming responsibility. This factor consists of "intégrité, la compétence et l'engagement" and is related to the selection of a worker or a cadre to a position of responsibility within the enterprise. During one of my interviews with the director of personnel and the workers' representative at SONACOMBE, in Rouiba, a complex which constructs industrial vehicles, I was told that:

> On n'est pas cadre, on devient cadre.
>
> Ce n'est pas automatique. Le diplôme universitaire il donne la garantie que l'individu possède des connaissances élevées dans tel ou tel domaine, mais il y a des problèmes de personnalité.

> Un cadre c'est quand même un homme qui est responsable, qui a donc le sens des responsabilités, qui a le sens du commandement, qui sait commander dans une entreprise socialiste, et commander, cela ne veut pas dire appliquer sévèrement des consignes. Il y a également la compétence, la conscience politique également de l'individu qui intervient comme élément, comme critère autrement dit un cadre pour résumer le mot c'est une personne responsable au sens la plus large du terme. Il y a trois critères qui ont été définis: céest l'intégrité, la compétence et l'engagement. Un cadre c'est quelqu'un qui est engagé. S'il n'est pas engagé ce n'est pas un cadre, s'il n'est pas engagé pour développer son pays, pour édifier l'économie. S'il n'est pas compétent, s'il fait des erreurs graves qui coûtent très chères à l'entreprise on ne peut pas en faire un cadre. S'il n'est pas intègre cela veut dire s'il constitue et fait des choses malhonnêtes on ne peut pas dire qu c'est un cadre. Ces trois critères se conjugent entre eux et donnent je crois la bonne définition d'un cadre. Engagé politiquement et intègre moralement. (Abucar, field notes, 1976)

A person assumes the cadre position within a socialist enterprise if he or she possesses a university degree or a long period of experience in work. However, the university diploma does not necessarily, automatically, make a cadre of the individual in question. A cadre is a person responsible for and capable of making decisions concerning particular problems within the enterprise in which he or she is involved. There are three criteria by which a cadre is chosen: integrity, competence, and social commitment. These criteria, although they seem to be subjective, do have historical importance in the Algerian struggle for political independence and in the current struggle for economic independence. Among the three criteria, *l'engagement* is more common in political language concerning national development; it means *social commitment*. By social commitment is meant conscious involvement in the struggle for nation building. President Houari Boumédienne, in a speech delivered at the meeting of the cadres of the Party at Tizi-Ouzo on 8 September, 1974, stated that the interrelationship among the three factors was as follows:

> Le premier de ces critères est l'engagement et nous n'avons nullement besoin d'un responsable non engagé.
>
> Le deuxième critère est la compétence car un engagement suivi d'une incompétence ne sert pas l'intérêt national.
>
> Le troisième critère est l'intégrité qui doit caractériser les dirigeants révolutionnaires à tous les niveaux agin que la corruption, les plaisirs et les intérêts personnels soient écartés du processus d'édification de la Révolution.
>
> J'insiste encore une fois sur ces trois critères: aux partisans de la Révolution et aux militants qui sont en son sein de choisir, d'une manière définitive, car nous serons sévères à l'avenir. C'est là l'unique voie qui garantira à la Révolution sa continuité et sa protection.
>
> Il appartient au militant de rendre compte à sa personne avant d'être jugé par d'autres et à ceux avides de richesse de chercher une place ailleurs que dans le cadre des structures politiques et directionnelles de la Révolution.
>
> La vraie bataille n'est pas encore terminée. Nous poursuivons encore la construction de la société. Nous n'avons pas encore éliminé toutes les séquelles du colonialisme, notamment celles qui restent encrées dans les esprits de certaines personnes et dominent les pensées de certains qui se considèrent comme l'élite. (Mameri, 1975, pp. 241-42)

Bourgeois sociologists seem not to be paying attention to the relationship between technical, moral, and social commitments and their relation to society, through which action and reflection take place. Moreover, they tend to isolate the social organization of production by considering action and norms in the realization of economic activity as something divorced from society. In doing so, the emphasis is on the technical aspects of production, rather than the creation of a society based on moral and social commitment. Moore and Feldman define the concept of commitment as follows:

> Commitment involves both performance and acceptance of the behaviors appropriate to an industrial way of life. The concept is thus concerned with overt actions and with norms. The fully committed worker, in other words, has internalized the norms of the new productive organization and social system. By implication, therefore, there are degrees of commitment and partial substitutions, as on the part of the external conformist whose performance remains satisfactory only so long as immediately

> available bribes and discipline suffice to win his compliance. (Moore and Feldman, 1960, p. 1)

Production of goods and services requires that the individual should be subordinate to the institution; the performance of the individual depends then on the acceptance of behaviour appropriate to an industrial way of life. The emphasis here, again, is on individual adaptation to the institution and not on the struggle in which the society is involved for the purposes of reconstruction. Algeria's social organization option takes into consideration the social differentiation that exists in society due to the colonial legacy. New social categories, such as party officers, army officers, managers, professionals, and the higher echelons of the party and the UGTA, must identify with the masses.

And their social, economic, and political privileges in society should not be transformed into positions of dominance. It remains to be seen, however, if the Algerian option for social organization will be capable of translating the organizational alternatives into practice. The size of those social categories becomes larger every year, and associated problems get more complex all the time.

It became evident to me during my field work in Algeria that in enterprises with small numbers of workers, for example the Société Nationale des Métaux in Annaba, with 400 workers and a handful of administrators, tension between management and the workers was less--in fact, they were more united. But if an enterprise employs more than 1,500 workers, the relationship between management and the workers is characterized by tension, due quite simply to the complex bureaucratic structure erected in such enterprises. For example, the manager is surrounded by a large administrative staff, each being responsible for an administrative division within the enterprise, with its own staff and secretariat; the relationship among all of them is very formal. Equally, the Union Office was no less complex than the management office. In both cases, the worker has to contact intermediate groups or individuals before he or she has access to the manager or to the Union Office. However, this is more common for management staff than for Union Office staff within the enterprise. It happens that the two compete for power of a bureaucratic nature, for control of the enterprise. I will examine this problem further in a later part of this chapter.

Worker recruitment is not so elaborate as the appointment of cadres to positions of responsibility within the enterprise. The method varies from one enterprise to another. Job positions are based on the division of labour and the specialization of the enterprise. Normally, there are *ouvriers*, *ouvriers spécialisés*, *ouvriers professionnels*, *cadres*, and the like. Some of the large factories have schools for training workers; the worker receives six months of training before starting work. Training consists of two parts: general, in which the student is taught mathematics, geometry, French, and Arabic; and practical, which consists of rigorous in-service training, in which the student gains experience in methods and manufacturing techniques at the workplace. This type of training assists the rural person to obtain skills in an industrial setting. At the same time, it has a literacy function, enabling the worker to acquire general knowledge of how to read, write, and understand numbers. During the training period, the worker is entitled to an allowance, and, after he or she has completed the programme, a job. For example, at the SONOCOMBE in Rouiba there is a permanent school in the factory, which accommodates 500 *stagiaires*. In this regard, the SONOCOMBE personnel director told me:

> Nous ici nous réalisons une formation professionnelle et actuellement tout le personnel de l'usine a été formé par nos soins. Nous avons un centre de formation qui actuellement compte 500 stagiaires et permanence. Ces 500 stagiaires se répartisent sur la plupart des filières. Nous formons depuis la qualification d'ouvriers professionnels dans différentes spécialités jusqu'à la classe préparatoire pour rentrer dans une école d'ingénieurs. Nous formons également les niveaux intermédiaires qui sont les techniciens, les agents techniques et les agents de maîtrise et ceux dans toutes les spécialités de la mécanique et de l'électronique. (Abucar, field notes, 1976)

When Algeria assumed political control of the national economy, the only modern factor was agriculture; industry was virtually nonexistent. SONOCOMBE was originally owned by the Berliet company. It was called Compagnie Véhicule Industrie and was a small unit assembly plant. Most equipment was made in France; two assembly lines were located in Algeria. In 1971, the Berliet company became SONOCOMBE. At present, the factory produces 4,550 vehicles of different sizes each year, for agricultural and industrial enterprises and for public transport. It has five units: *le bâtiment montage camions, le bâtiment montage autobus, un centre de formation, une piste d'essai*, and *un bureau d'étude et d'adaptation des véhicules et de services généraux.* Each of these industrial units operates in the following sequences in constructing trucks and buses:

> Les bâtiments je vous les ai cités, la circulation rapide disons des produits se fait de la manière suivante. Il y a de la matière brute qui arrive: de l'acier, du fer et toutes sortes de composants. Ces composants sont débités en morceaux ou en lopins. Ces morceaux sont forgés au marteau pilon par exemple ou à d'autres systèmes de forgeage et on a des pièces brutes. Ces pièces sont ensuite manutentionnées vers le bâtiment mécanique dans lequel elles sont usinées aux dimensions voulues suivants les plans qui ont été établis par la direction technique etc. Une fois que ces pièces ont été usinées elles sont manutentionnées

> vers les deux bâtiments de montage quand il s'agit d'un camion vers le bâtiment montage-camion ou quand il s'agit d'un autobus ou d'un car vers le bâtiment montage autobus. C'est là-bas que les pièces ont été fabriquées, donc ici, elles sont assemblées, montées et elles constituent le camion ou l'autobus qui est fait définitivement. (Abucar, field notes, 1976)

This unit alone employs 5,000 workers, of which 4,500 are permanent workers and 500 *stagiaires*. Each worker is specialized in certain aspects of industrial units. The most common areas of specialization are:

> Les spécialités techniques utilisées dans l'usine sont très nombreuses, bien entendu il y a toutes les spécialités de la mécanique, le tournage, l'ajustage, tous les métiers de la mécanique, la soudure, la serrurerie, la chaudronnerie, la tôlerie, la menuiserie, la peinture, tous les corps de métier existant dans l'industrie sont représentés dans l'usine. (Abucar, field notes, 1976)

Apart from the *ouvrier*, the *ouvrier spécialisé* and the *ouvrier professionnel* receive their training at the school factory. However, unlike the *ouvrier ordinaire*, the *ouvrier spécialisé* and the *ouvrier professionnel* are recruited from school dropouts at all levels. They are brought to the factory school to be trained as *ouvriers spécialisés* and a low level of *ouvriers professionnels*. These two categories constitute the lower level of technicians, although the opportunity for training and promotion is also available for the *ouvrier ordinaire*, who comes from a rural milieu and who has little industrial background, as previously explained. The training of this type of worker is more comprehensive, in the sense that the *ouvrier ordinaire* is not only trained in skills but also in literacy. After job experience, he also is allowed to pursue specialized training. Higher level *ouvriers professionnels* receive their training at appropriate technical institutes and universities, established following implementation of the first development plan. Engineers for heavy and light industry are trained at these institutes, one of which is located in Annaba and two in Boumordes, around the capital. Admission to such institutes requires that students possess a high school diploma. However, depending on the area of specialization, some *ouvriers spécialisés* and *ouvriers professionnels* are sent abroad for training.

A third category, to which most Algerian national enterprises give a higher priority in recruiting, is Algerians abroad. There are at present 800,000 Algerians in Europe, the majority in France and West Germany. If these workers accept the government appeal and return home, they are provided with equal opportunity. At a meeting with workers and cadres at SONOCOMBE, at Rouiba, I was told in this regard as follows:

> Maintenant si nous trouvons en face d'un personnel qui a déjà une expérience dans le monde de l'industrie et c'est le cas d'allieurs de tous nos travailleurs immigrés en France, en Allemagne et dans différents pays européens. Lorsqu'ils retournent au pays nous avons créé des conditions d'accueil assez favorables pour leur retour. Et dès qu'ils arrivent, nous leur faisons passer ce qu'on appelle un essai professionnel, il vient, prenons un ouvrier hautement qualifié dans les traitements thermiques, par exemple, des métaux nous lui faisons passer un essai professionnel pour voir si vraiment il a toutes les qualifications requises pour occuper ce poste. S'il réussit avec succès cet essai, il est mis en place directement sans passer par la formation. Il peut se trouver également qu'il y ait des gens localement en Algérie qui ont une expérience ailleurs dans d'autres entreprises et qui viennent chez nous. Ceux-là on les embauchent directement. Alors on a des embauches directes, des embauches formation, et des embauches après essai professionnel. Mais il y a toujours le perfectionnement à l'intérieur de l'entreprise parce qu'à l'intérieur de l'usine il y a des hommes, ces hommes ont un potentiel, ce potentiel là il faut l'améliorer et l'augmenter. Il ne faut pas que les hommes restent trop longtemps avec la même qualification. Il faut pourvoir les postes manquants dans l'usine par le biais de la formation interne et par le biais du perfectionnement et du recyclage. (Abucar, field notes, 1976)

This group has more experience in an industrial way of life than the average Algerian worker. They are expected to undergo training; yet, if they have proper qualifications, they are given posts within industry commensurate with their experience and training. Equally, other Algerian workers who have similar experience in other enterprises within the country are given similar treatment. However, the labour recruitment system provides a flexibility for movement from one enterprise to another, and for hiring Algerians abroad. It was very common in the past for the worker to move from one enterprise to another, for reasons of prospective economic advantage. At that time, there was no unified wage system for all national enterprises. In 1977, the government eliminated wage differentiation policies practised by the various national enterprises. For example, SONATRACH was notorious for such practices, since their engineers, technicians, and workers received better wages than other enterprises. Despite wage differences, inter-enterprise cooperation remained constant.

> C'est ainsi donc que la SNS nous fournit tout l'acier qui nous est nécessaire pour fabriquer notre camion, qu'elle nous fournit également tous les tubes et profilés qui nous servent à réaliser par exemple le treillis des autobus, qu'elle nous fournit les plaques de tôles pour en faire des châssis; la tôle épaisse que la SN/Métal nous fournit, différents moteurs électriques pour faire des ponts roulants pour lever les pièces lourdes etc. . . ; que toutes les sociétés nationales algériennes qui produisent quelque chose nous vendent ce qu'elles produisent parce qu'ils entrent dans la constitution de nos produits. La Société nationale des Industries chimiques (SNIC) nous fournit par exemple toutes les peintures industrielles, la SONATIBA nous construit des édifices. (Abucar, field notes, 1976)

In the way in which the entire economic structure is set up, inter-company cooperation provides raw materials and equipment, which create a certain economic activity. The social organization of workers in Algeria is not divorced from the way in which the company is organized. The system intends to develop corresponding social organizations, parallel to those of the economic structure. Current internal development of Algerian economic and social organizations indicates that eventually Algerian products will be in excess of the international markets and that there will then be better terms of trade, which at the present time seem unlikely to occur due to the domination of international trade by multinational corporations. For that reason, Algeria has taken a hard line against imperialism and has become a spokesman for the Third World in restructuring the world economy. Secondly, the Algerian experience for national development suggests that unless the country is industrialized, her chances of obtaining economic independence may not be realized. Thirdly, it is felt that an alternative approach to the organization of the economy and the society is possible, if appropriate structures are created which will enhance cooperation between members of society and discourage competition and self-destruction.

Seen from the point of view of emancipation from underdevelopment to development, the Algerian option provides the basis for dialectic movement, characterized by a "struggle of the opposites." It is, therefore, meaningful to refer to "developed" in the context of underdevelopment, because we can only talk of developed countries when there are underdeveloped countries. Both "developed" and "underdeveloped" appear in the same context because there is interdependence between the two. The categories are conditional and mutually exclusive, transitory as far as identity is concerned, but the struggle between the two is absolute.

B. THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT* AND THE GROWTH OF PRODUCTIVE FORCES

Prior to the promulgation of the *Charte et Code de la Gestion Socialiste des Entreprises*, economic institutions which were brought under state control were known as the state sector of the socialized sector. This change is due to various factors. In the absence of a national bourgeoisie in most emerging nations, the state assumes the role of social transformation, because it is the only institution capable, on the one hand, of mobilizing the resources of the country and the masses and, on the other hand, regulating the economy by specifying allocations of the surplus in a way that certain amounts of it will be appropriated for future capital investment. Secondly, the state claims the right of ownership of property. I have dealt with these arguments in Chapter 7, section C, because it is an inherent principle of the Algerian revolution to foster collective property ownership of the means of production. The *Chart et Code de la Gestion Socialiste des Entreprises* (1971), Chapter 1, Article 1, defines socialist enterprises as "ayant pour objet une activité économique, sociale ou culturelle, à l'exclusion des secteurs autogérés agricoles ou coopératifs." Furthermore:

> Art. 3--L'entreprise socialiste est la propriété de l'Etat représentant la collectivité nationale. Elle est la régie selon les principes de gestion socialiste, définis dans la présente ordonnance. (*Charte Socialiste des Entreprises*, 1971, p. 17)

Mixed economy enterprises are not included in socialist enterprises, nor does the charter mention cooperative societies or agricultural autogestion. It seems, however, that the charter gives more importance to economic, financial, and commercial institutions. Mixed economy enterprises are those enterprises organized in joint venture between public institutions such as the state, the Wilaya, and the commune, and private capital of national or foreign origin. This type of enterprise is intended to promote interregional cooperation, on the basis of economic decentralization, in order that the local collectivity will benefit (for example, small- and medium-sized industries, handicrafts, and services that correspond to local needs such as transport). Mixed enterprise involved in international cooperation exists between Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria in the cement industry. It seems, however, that the *Charte et Code de la Gestion Socialiste des Entreprises* gives more importance to those enterprises involved directly or indirectly in the means of production and which have an economic, commercial, or financial character. These institutions are:

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*Some references to the literature on the role of the state under capitalism and socialism are: Aitken (1959), Dobb (1946, Chapter 5), Kahon (1967), Veblen (1966), Millband (1969), Poulantze (1975), and Wallerstein (1970).

> (a) les sociétés nationales
> (b) les offices (commerce, tourisme, etc.)
> (c) les entreprises ou établissements de crédit et de finances
> (d) les entreprises sous tutelle des collectivités locales,
> qui sont assimilés aux entreprises d'Etat. (Art. 3)
> (A. Akkache, 1975, p. 3)

In nationalizing natural resources and building up industry, the state assumed a dominant role in giving direction to the national economy. According to the 1971 census, the *sociétés nationales* alone account for 350 establishments and employ over 161,035 workers. I believe this figure has doubled since then.

From 1962 to 1966, several *sociétés nationales* were created in industry, commerce, agriculture, fishing, banking, tourism, and transport, as this quotation demonstrates:

> . . . industrie (Bureau d'Etudes et de Réalisations Industrielles et Minières, Société Nationale des Tabacs et Allumettes, Office National de l'Artisanat Industriel, Société Nationale de Transport et de Commercialisation des Hydrocarbures, Société Nationale de Constructions Mécaniques, Société Nationale de Construction et des Travaux Publics, Société Nationale de Confection, Société Nationale de Siderurgie, Société Nationale de Semouleries, Meuneries, Fabriques de Pâtes Alimentaires et Couscous), Commerce (Société Nationale des Nouvelles Galeries Algériennes, Office National de Commercialisation, Société Nationale d'Edition et de Diffusion), agriculture et pêches (Office National des Pêches, Office National de la Réforme Agraire), Banque (Caisse Algérienne de Développement) transport (Office National des Transports), Tourisme (Office National Algérien du Tourisme).
> (Remili, 1975, p. 14)

Since 1966 the number of *sociétés nationales* has increased. Some of them are: La Société Nationale des Industries Textiles; La Société Nationale de Gestion et de Développement des Industries du Sucre; la Société Nationale des Eaux Minérales; La Société Nationale des Tanneries Algériennes; La Société Nationale des Industries Algériennes de la Chaussure; and La Société Nationale des Entreprises de Récupération. The most important *sociétés nationales* are: SONATRACH, SONAREM, SEMPAC, and SNMC. The first two employ over twelve thousand workers, while SEMPAC and SNMC employ over nine thousand workers (see Table 38). This has relevance only in terms of creating employment. Some *societes nationales*, such as SNS, SNM, and SONOCOMBE, have national importance in terms of creating the conditions for agricultural modernization and improvement of the transport systems. These *sociétés nationales* reduce Algerian dependency from abroad in terms of basic machines and equipment for industrializing the country.

In agriculture, the *Charte et Code de la Gestion Socialiste des Entreprises* allows the creation of *sociétés nationales* in the service sector, particularly in the setting up of commercialization. These service sectors are:

TABLE 38

SITUATION DE L'EMPLOI AU 31.12.1974

		CADRES				TECHNICIENS SUPERIEURS			MAITRISE			OUVRIERS					
		ING	UNIVERS	AUTRES	S/T	TECHN	ADM	S/T	TECHN	ADM	S/T	OP	OS	MO EXEC	AUTRES	S/T	TOTAL
	N	380	436	1456	2272	435	-	435	1522	1665	3187	6872	7022	7494	17920	39308	45202
SONATRACH	E	1705	-	-	1795	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1795
	S/T	2175	436	1456	4067	435	-	435	1522	1665	3187	6872	7022	7494	17920	39308	46997
	A	59	26	265	350	74	-	74	1675	-	1675	1402	485	842	1968	4697	6796
SONELGAZ	E	108	-	12	120	24	-	24	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	144
	S/T	167	28	277	470	98	-	98	1675	-	1675	1402	485	842	1968	44697	6940
S/T ENERGIE		2342	462	1733	4537	533	-	533	3197	1665	4862	8274	7507	8336	19888	17537	53937
	N	-	-	724	724	288	-	288	1598	-	1593	6943	4142	3809	2643	-	20147
SNS	E	-	-	244	244	24	-	24	57	-	57	-	-	-	-	17537	325
	S/T	-	-	968	968	312	-	312	1655	-	1665	6943	4142	3809	2643	6567	20472
	N	-	212	-	212	574	-	574	-	-	-	2550	1835	1211	971	3	7353
SN METAL	E	-	63	-	63	19	-	19	-	-	-	-	1	-	2	6570	85
	S/T	-	275	-	275	593	-	593	-	-	-	2550	1836	1211	973	11903	7438
	N	58	92	184	334	190	165	355	593	393	986	2310	4190	1346	4057	23	13578
SONACOMBE	E	22	5	9	36	2	2	4	3	-	3	4	-	-	19	11926	66
	S/T	89	97	193	370	192	167	359	596	393	989	2314	4190	1346	4075	3757	13644
	N	100	31	102	233	68	-	68	415	-	415	1018	1002	744	993	5	4473
SONELEC	E	12	-	2	14	2	-	2	3	-	3	3	1	1	-	3752	24
	S/T	112	31	104	247	70	-	70	418	-	418	1021	1003	745	993	39795	4497
S/T ISMMEE		192	403	1265	1860	1167	167	1134	2669	393	3062	12829	11 171	7111	8685		46051

Source: Ministry of Industry, 1976.

> --L'Office Algérien Interprofessionnel des Céréales (OAIC) créé dès le 12 juillet 1962, qui dispose d'un monopole total sur le commerce des céréales; tous les producteurs doivent lui livrer l'intégralité de leur récolte.
>
> --L'Office National de Commercialisation des Produits Vinicoles (ONCV) créé en 1968, et qui dispose également d'un monopole en ce qui concerne la commercialisation de produits vinicoles.
>
> --L'Office des Fruits et Légumes (OFLA) créé pour assurer uniquement la commercialisation des fruits et légumes des exploitations autogérées; celles-ci sont tenues d'utiliser les services de l'Office (Ordonnance no 69-18 du 13 avril 1969).
>
> --L'Office National des Produits Oléicoles (ONAPO) créé en 1969 et qui a pour objet de contrôler le commerce des produits oléicoles, d'améliorer la culture de l'olivier et, depuis 1972, d'assurer la production d'huile.
>
> --L'Office National du Lait (ONALAIT) institué en 1969, qui alimente tout le pays en produits laitiers et assure les importations nécessaires; en outre, il a la charge de développer la production nationale.
>
> --L'Office National de l'Alfa (ONALFA), mis en place en 1969 et qui a reçu le monopole de l'exploitation et de la commercialisation de certains végétaux (alfa, palmier nain, driss).
>
> --L'Office National des Aliments du Bétail (ONAB) créé en 1969 et qui doit développer et réorganiser les circuits du commercialisation de la viande. (Remili, 1976, p. 16)

In addition, in 1969, the Office National du Matériel Agricole was created in order to secure some regulation between socialist enterprises in paying for agricultural equipment and fertilizers. Some of these service sectors are not completely independent from abroad, particularly ONALAIT and ONAB. The milk and meat needed for processing by these industries is not available in sufficient amounts in the country. Part of the milk and meat needed for the smooth functioning of these industries, and in fact needed to meet the demands of the market, are imported from abroad--meat from Romania and milk from Austria and Holland. However, the government is aware of the problem, and there is a special programme which has been created for this bottleneck.

Table 39 provides some understanding of the decentralization of socialist enterprises in various regions of Algeria. Despite government efforts to foster a regional equilibrium, it seems that the region which still has the larger share in national development is the coastal provinces--the region which was the backbone of the modern agricultural sector during the colonial period.

Growth of the socialist sector is associated with an increase in size in productive forces. For example, SONOCOMBE in Rouiba (mentioned above under private ownership) employed only one thousand workers in 1971. Seven years later, under *société nationale* status, the same enterprise employed five thousand workers. There have been overall improvements as far as the growth of productive forces is concerned.

The economic structure examined in Chapters 5 and 6 has brought certain changes to the structure of Algerian society. At present, increasingly more people are being employed in the non-agricultural sector of the economy. Table 36 indicates this trend. Equally, the manpower level of the *sociétés nationales* has improved in terms of quality and quantity. The size of the cadres of these socialist enterprises increases at various levels of social differentiation, in terms of income and administrative responsibility (see Tables 40 and 41 in this respect). Such an evolution in social differentiation is not absent in the workers category. Estimates which date from 1966-1969 show that 48.31 percent of workers within the structure of socialist enterprises are at the *manoeuvre* level, while 35.86 percent and 15.83 percent are *ouvriers spécialisés* and *ouvriers qualifés* (see Table 41).

If the socialist sector is compared with the private sector in

TABLE 39

TABLEAU RECAPITULATIF PAR ENTREPRISE ET PAR WILAYA

	NOMBRE D'UNITE PAR WILAYA														
Entreprise Socialiste	AL-GER	CONS-TANT.	ORAN	MOSTA.	ANNA-BA	TIZI-OUZOU	SAIDA	TLEM-CEN	SAOU-RA	EL-ASNAM	MEDEA	BATNA	TIARE	OASIS	SETIF	TOTAUX
SEMPAC	19	7	15	8	4	1	1	7	-	2	1	2	7		8	82
S.N.S.	5	-	1	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	9
SONACOME	6	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	8
S.N.M.C.	21	5	9	1	5	-	-	4	1	6	1	1	1	1	4	56
SONITEX	3	3	3	2	4	4	1	2	1	1	1	4	1	1	1	32
SONIPEC	3	1	2	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	1	12
E.M.A.	3	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	5
ONACO	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	17
SONELEC	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
S.N.T.A.	6	2	1	1		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1		12
B.N.L.B.	8	3	2	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	18
TOTAUX	82	23	34	14	21	8	4	11	3	9	5	10	10	4	18	256

Source: Commission Nationale des Gestions Socialistes des Entreprises, 1974.

TABLE 40

EVOLUTION DE LA REPARTITION DE L'EMPLOI NON-AGRICOLE PAR NIVEAUX DE QUALIFICATION, 1969-1974

III NNN DDD UUU SSS TTT RRR III EEE SSS

an-nées niveau de quali-fica.	Cadres et technique supérieurs	Techniciens et Agents de Maîtrise	Agents tech. pers. haut. qualifiées	Pers. qual. et ouvriers qualifiés	Pers. d'aide et ouvriers spécialisés	Pers. sans qualification manoeuvres
1969	3.416	4.818	50.245		38.782	40.485
1970	4.483	7.592	56.316		34.691	52.001
1971	5.645	7.566	61.819		43.774	47.908
1972	7.404	12.270	15.805	46.699	44.355	51.504
1973	8.839	12.975	17.957	60.753	50.025	54.665
1974	11.090	17.737	23.579	66.265	55.814	56.776
		SSS III PPP				
1969	858	2.140		24.241	12.417	33.396
1970	1.296	4.038		38.744	15.855	46.992
1971	1.253	2.395	14.134	44.709	16.684	47.059
1972	1.520	2.629	15.713	32.824	22.089	51.347
1973	2.096	3.685	18.990	39.658	21.109	57.702
1974	1.824	3.325		39.051	21.550	65.532

Source: Ministry of Work and Social Affairs, Algiers, 1976.

TABLE 41

EVOLUTION DES CATEGORIES D'OUVRIERS DE 1966 A 1969

ANNEES CATEGORIE D'OUVRIERS			STRUCTURES	
MANOEUVRE	28.922	81.944	48,3	33,7
OUVRIERS SPECIALISES	21.474	58.158	35,86	23,9
OUVRIERS QUALIFIES	9.483	103.247	15,83	42,4
TOTAL	59.879	243.247	100,00	100,00

Sources: (1) Enquête semestrielle sur la situation de l'emploi au printemps 66. SDS/SEP.
(2) Idem en avril 1969.

N.B. Ne sont pas considérés les travailleurs des services et commerce.

Source: Ministry of Work and Social Affairs, 1976.

terms of the evolution of skilled labour and employment in the non-agricultural sector, there is an indication of a decrease in unskilled labour in industry in the socialist sector and an increase of unskilled labour in the private sector (see Table 42). This difference may well be attributed to training facilities available in the socialist sector or to the application of new technology, which will reduce the size of the unskilled labour force. However, the table shows an increase in qualified personnel and *agents de maîtrise* also. Therefore, it is more likely that the mobility of workers in acquiring skills is greater in the socialist sector than in the private, given the opportunities available to workers in the socialist sector. However, 1969-1973 figures indicate an overall increase in employment in all categories in the service sector, both in socialist enterprises and in the private sector.

The socialist sector provides employment to over sixty percent of the actual population, and the private thirty percent. This difference can be explained at the level of investment. According to Ahmed Akkache, prior to 1970:

> Les investissements du secteur public ou semi-public ont presque triplé entre 1963 et 1969. La part de ce secteur dans la formation brute de capital fixe, qui était de 60% en 1963, est montée à 84% en 1968. Le budget d'équipement et les importants investissements prévus par le plan quadriennal doivent faire monter encore ce chiffre en 1970.
>
> Dans le secteur privé, par contre, la formation de capital fixe, qui atteignait 780 millions de dinars en 1963 (40% du total) est tombée à 560 millions environ en 1968 (16%). Elle semble avoir progressé depuis en chiffres absolus, mais diminué encore en valeur relative, du fait de l'augmentation plus rapide des investissements publics.
>
> La part du secteur privé dans l'ensemble de l'économie nationale semble donc tendre à se marginaliser, en se limitant aux seules industries de consommation. Il convient cependant de préciser d'une part que l'importance du secteur public résulte avant tout du volume des investissements consentis par l'Etat, et que les capacités d'accumulation propres des entreprises nationales sont

TABLE 42

EVOLUTION DE L'EMPLOI NON-AGRICOLE POUR LA PERIODE 1966-1973

Branche d'activité économique	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
1 Industries extractives	9.532	12.129	12.342	12.500	14.760	17.259	15.505	15.459
2 Pétrole et gaz naturel	6.863	7.726	8.578	10.179	16.240	16.584	22.100	31.661
3 Industries alimentaires Bois	19.850	20.117	25.377	27.309	28.832	28.126	31.284	30.607
4 Industries textiles	5.929	7.659	21.270	24.264	26.245	29.035	28.074	29.607
5 Ind. du cuir et chaussures	6.884	7.342	3.430	5.602	5.828	6.822	7.164	5.741
6 Industries chimiques	6.545	6.305	7.121	7.534	7.411	8.284	8.466	10.768
7 Matériaux de construction	7.490	7.474	7.970	8.026	8.404	12.611	12.188	15.373
8 Sidérurgie	3.553	3.952	4.620	6.275	9.024	9.380	12.313	13.151
9 Prod. et trasf. des métaux	14.859	15.325	17.317	18.970	22.595	22.450	23.996	35.541
10 Ind. de bois, liège et meub.	6.779	7.764	8.582	10.471	8.876	8.375	7.680	7.213
11 Ind. du papier, imprimerie	5.461	5.931	5.775	4.780	5.535	5.762	5.719	5.329
12 Autres industries	499	1.205	1.416	1.836	2.113	2.031	3.534	4.764
13 Bâtiments et travaux publics	61.800	62.450	70.809	73.052	106.925	124.100	124.543	139.963
14 Elec. gaz et serv. sanit.	5.032	5.759	5.729	6.132	6.344	6.476	6.521	8.293
15 Banq. Assur. et Aff. immob.	7.286	7.134	8.731	8.503	9.031	9.132	11.536	12.694
16 Transp. et communication	29.602	29.722	31.324	32.687	32.743	33.780	27.270	40.036

Source: Minister of Work and Social Affairs, 1976.

TABLE 43

EVOLUTION PAR NIVEAU DE QUALIFICATION, DE L'EMPLOI NON-AGRICOLE PAR SECTEUR JURIDIQUE, 1969-1973

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	public	privé
Manoeuvres	29,5	34	28,1	26,5	22,4	27,7	29,4	27,1	29,8	34,1	- 7,1	+ 6,4
Ouvriers spécial.	27,8	20,3	23,8	22,7	24,7	26,5	25,6	29	25,2	23,2	- 3,1	+ 3,3
Personnel qualif.	37,7	27,8	39,3	37,3	40,2	37,4	37,3	35,5	37,7	36,3	+ 2,5	- 1,1
Agents de maîtr.	2,8	5,1	5,3	8,9	8,0	5,2	4,4	4,8	3,8	3,3	+ 5,2	- 1,9
Cadres	2,2	2,8	3,5	4,5	4,7	3,2	3,3	3,6	3,5	3,2	+ 2,5	0
Total	100,0	100,0										
Manoeuvres	41,6	38,2	35,5	34,4	55,8	50,9	50,8	44,8	43	45,2	- 6,3	- 5,7
Ouvriers spécial.	16	13,2	15,2	19	16,9	18,1	16,5	14,7	17	13,8	+ 0.9	- 4,3
Personnel qualif.	37	41,3	44,1	42,5	42,4	28,3	30,5	37,8	34,9	37,7	+ 5,4	+ 9,4
Agents de maîtr.	3,9	5,6	3	2,5	2,6	1,5	1,6	1,7	1,8	1,9	- 1,4	+ 0,4
Cadres	1,3	1,4	1,5	1,6	1,6	0,9	0,8	0,8	1	1,3	+ 0,3	+ 0,4
Total												
Manoeuvre	15,5	18,1	16,3	19,6	16,4	24,5	21,2	27,1	31,0	36,9	+ 0,9	+12,4
Ouvriers spécial.	15,2	16	17,9	15,6	19,3	15,2	17,3	15,2	15,2	16,2	+ 4,1	+ 1,0
Personnel qualif.	63,5	59,3	57,9	54,5	53,0	48,3	47,2	42,6	43,6	36,2	+10,5	+12,1
Agents de maîtr.	3,7	4,2	4,1	7,0	7,9	5,9	7,6	5,8	3,5	6,6	+ 6,2	+ 0,7
Cadres	2,1	2,4	2,8	3,3	3,4	6,1	6,7	9,3	6,7	4,1	+ 1,3	- 2,0
Total												

Source: Calculs effectués à porter des Enquêtes "Emploi et salaires" SDS/SEP.
X calculs effectué par la SDC/SEP.
X calculs effectué par nous.

Source: Ministry of Work and Social Affairs, 1976.

> encore très insuffisantes. D'autre part, la diminution de la part relative du secteur privé ne traduit pas un recul général de l'activité capitaliste dans le pays, mais un ralentissement des seuls investissements étrangers. Si l'on considère par exemple que la formation brute de capital fixe dans le secteur pétrolier privé, qui était de 600 millions de dinars en 1963, n'est plus estimée en 1968 qu'à 300 millions seulement, cela signifie que le capital privé dans les autres secteurs, et notamment dans l'industrie et le commerce, a augmenté, passant en chiffres ronds de 180 à 260 millions environ. La progression est donc assez sensible. Elle révèle un certain développement du capital national et même début de collaboration de ce capital avec le capital étranger, au moins dans certains secteurs de pointe.
>
> Néanmoins, cette augmentation reste très inférieure à celle du secteur d'Etat, qui joue incontestablement le rôle moteur dans le développement économique et qui contrôle actuellement toutes les industries clès. (Akkache, 1971, p. 89)

While the socialist sector is expanding, the private sector seems to be decreasing. However, it was estimated in the 1974-1977 plan period that the private sector invested 2,100 million AD, of which about 1,600 million AD came from hydrocarbons. During the same period, investment in the socialist sector was forty percent of the Gross National Product. However, the struggle between sectors is not over. As Ahmed Akkache puts it:

> La lutte entre ces deux secteurs constitue aujourd'hui la contradiction principale de l'Algérie. L'oublier serait commettre une lourde erreur. Et ceux qui, partant de certains aspects négatifs réels, mais relativement secondaires à l'étape actuelle, rejettent en bloc comme étant "néo-capitaliste" la politique économique du pays, risquent de favoriser en définitive les manoeuvres du véritable capitalisme, celui des grandes puissances occidentales et de leurs agents intérieurs. Car c'est là que réside le principal danger, et non dans un "capitalisme algérien" qui n'aurait de toute façon ni le temps, ni les moyens matériels, ni les possibilités économiques de suivre le long chemin de ses "prédécesseurs," ne serait-ce que parce qu'il n'y a plus aujourd'hui de marchés coloniaux à conquérir, ni de rapports internationaux favorables à une telle évolution.
>
> Aussi fait-il répéter que le secteur d'Etat, base essentielle de l'indépendance nationale, doit être défendu et protégé, à la fois

> contre les agressions économiques extérieures et contre les risques internes de dégénérescence. (Akkache, 1971, p. 86)

But national independence lies in strengthening the socialist sector, without which Algeria may not obtain economic independence. In Chapter 11 we will examine the nature of the principal contradiction and the social process that the Algerian option has created.

The UGTA and the FLN coordinate and supervise popular control of public enterprises. The main instrument of coordination and supervision is the nomination of election candidates at all levels of workers' organizations. The UGTA and the FLN recommend two nominees after consultation with the workers in each enterprise. These two aspects of Algerian worker participation constitute a unique form and are different from worker participation as it is currently practised in more advanced capitalist countries. Furthermore, profit-sharing between workers and the state and the political participation of workers at all levels of political organization highlight other distinctive characteristics of worker participation in Algeria. For example, in the recent election (1977) of the National Assembly, fifty percent of the representatives elected were workers. The objectives of national enterprises are not only economic but social. Participation here implies political, economic, and social formation of the individual, as the preamble to the *Charte Socialiste des Entreprises* states:

> Les objectifs que la Révolution algérienne ambitionne de réaliser ne sont pas seulement d'ordre économique. Ils sont à finalite humaine puisqu'ils doivent, une fois concrétisés, assurer pleinement et définitivement la promotion de l'homme sur l'ensemble des plans politique, économique, social et culturel.
>
> Ainsi mise en place, la participation des travailleurs à la gestion des entreprises socialistes constitue pour les masses laborieuses une école de formation politique, économique et sociale. Les travailleurs y puisent des enseignements qui augmenteront leur sens des responsabilités et leur capacité de gérer les affaires. Ils y

> assurent leur rôle de producteurs gestionnaires et sont les propres artisans de l'amélioration de leur condition. (*Charte Socialiste des Entreprises*, 1971, p. 10)

Apart from popular control of the national enterprises, however, there are bureaucratic controls dictated by the need to coordinate national planning. The *direction centralisée de l'économie* and *l'unité de direction* imply the existence of centralized economic planning. The *unité de direction* of enterprises functions within the context of the national plan. The central planning bureau determines priorities and proceedings that are to be followed and regulates the modes of production by fixing the overall objectives for the enterprise and the way in which the basic needs of the collectivity will be met. The technical elaboration of the plan must coincide with the political principle elaborated by the *Pouvoir révolutionnaire*. The political objectives are:

> . . . de réaliser les aspirations des masses qu'il représente authentiquement, d'oeuvrer à la promotion des travailleurs dans tous les domaines afin qu'ils soient toujours davantage les maîtres de leur destin.
>
> Certes, il est indispensable d'éliminer de nombreuses contraintes, séquelles de la période colonialiste, telles que les disparités régionales, les inégalités de revenus, l'ampleur du chômage et du sous-emploi, la faiblesse de l'encadrement ainsi que le non-respect des droits des travailleurs dans ce nombreux secteurs économiques.
>
> Cette situation doit trouver sa solution dans le renforcement de l'économie socialiste, un contrôle plus strict du secteur privé et une association accrue des travailleurs à la gestion de l'entreprise. (*Charte Socialiste des Entreprises*, 1971, p. 8)

The realization of the organization of the masses can be achieved only if disparities of income and uneven regional development are eliminated, full employment is encouraged, and workers' rights are respected. However, such political objectives will become a reality only when the socialist economy is reinforced by worker participation and strict control is imposed on the private sector. The technical expert who elaborates the plan and the administrator who sets the guidelines for implementing the plan both have certain political, social, and economic privileges over the workers. In this sense, bureaucrats do have a certain power of control over the economy. Any conflict between workers and the bureaucrats is not necessarily based on the principal objectives of the plan but rather on the positions they occupy within the power structure. Although in recent years workers have gained political and economic power at all levels of government institutions, the subordination of workers to bureaucrats remains very much a fact of life.

While the economy is centralized on the basis of the plan, the government encourages decentralization of economic activities, with a certain degree of autonomy. Socialist enterprises are permitted to adapt structures to realize the objectives of the plan. In this regard, the *Charte Socialiste des Entreprises* states:

> L'entreprise socialiste constitue, de ce fait, l'élément fondamental de l'économie nationale. Pour qu'elle soit à même de réaliser ses objectifs, elle doit être dotée de structures et de moyens qui doivent lui permettre de fonctionner en vue d'un rendement maximum. Il est donc nécessaire de lui accorder une autonomie dans les proportions les plus vastes possibles afin de lui insuffler l'esprit de responsabilité et d'initiative et lui imprimer le dynamisme nécessaire en supprimant les entraves bureaucratiques, conformément au principe de déconcentration. Elle doit s'exercer dans le respect de la politique générale du pouvoir révolutionnaire et, en particulier, des objectifs de la planification. (*Charte Socialiste des Entreprises*, 1971, p. 15)

By structure, it is implied that initiative and responsibility be given to workers to make deicisions that affect both the enterprise and their own lives. This, however, is a challenge to bureaucratic control of socialist enterprises.

C. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS

Public and private institutions coexist in Algeria. Public institutions assumed importance at the outset of Algerian independence. However, Algeria inherited both of these institutions from colonialism. At the time of independence, public institutions were small in relation to private institutions. Public institutions concentrated on education and played a lesser role in economic activities, except for finance and transport. At present, public institutions involve all economic activities including culture, transport, finance, and tourism. The *Charte Nationale*, which was adopted in 1976, allows for the existence of private institutions owned and operated by Algerian citizens. So far, the activities of private enterprises are not consistent with the principle of Algerian socialism. The private enterprises that are allowed to operate are:

> Outre les biens d'usage personnel ou familial, elle comprend les petits moyens de production ou de services qui peuvent être exploités soit à titre individuel soit à l'aide d'une main-d'oeuvre restreinte.
>
> Ainsi définie, la propriété non exploiteuse permettra même au stade le plus avancé de la société socialiste, le maintien de tout un éventail d'activités socialement utiles telles que:
> --L'artisanat de production ou de service;
> --Le commerce de détail,
> --La petite propriété du paysan ou de l'éleveur,
> --L'unité du petit fabricant ou du petit entrepreneur de travaux, etc. (*Charte Nationale*, 1976, p. 30)

Family property or individual property is admissible, but properties pertaining to comprador, capitalist monopolies owned by foreigners are not permitted to operate within Algerian territory. Such economic activities reinforce the tie of dependency between Algeria and the world capitalist monopoly and are therefore conceived of as dangerous to national reconstruction and socialism in Algeria.

It is possible, however, within the limit of the law, for an Algerian citizen to be engaged in economic activities such as tourism, industry, and construction, as this quotation demonstrates:

> Dans le domaine de l'industrie, l'intervention du secteur privé national est à restreindre aux activités qui relèvent de la petite entreprise et qui portent sur le dernier stade de la transformation industrielle. Ces activités doivent se situer en aval des productions sortant des usines de l'Etat, notamment lorsequ'il s'agit de fabriquer à petite échelle, certains objets de consommation courante. Les approvisionnements du secteur privé, particulièrement en ce qui concerne les produits provenant de l'extérieur, doivent être assurés par les entreprises nationales. L'obligation de passer par les entreprises nationales pour ce qui est des importations aura pour résultat de limiter, voire d'éliminer les risques de conjonction avec les milieux capitalistes étrangers. (*Charte Nationale*, 1976, p. 31)

The Algerian revolutionary government draws a distinction between private ownership of an exploiting and non-exploiting character. A craftsman, retail dealer, small farmer, small factory owner, or small entrepreneur whose income is sufficient to provide a living for himself and for his family does not, according to the Algerians, constitute an enterprise of an exploitative character. Exploiting private enterprises are those which are capable of expropriating large amounts of surplus from labour for their exclusive self-interest. However, private enterprises can be engaged in industrial activities. In order for private enterprise to participate in the industrial transformation of Algerian society, it is required that they function within the context of public enterprise. Private enterprises enter into contract with public enterprise, who provide the work that is to be done. The product of work created by private enterprise is sold to public enterprise, which in turn makes it available to other enterprises or to the market. Raw materials needed by private enterprise in order to create a certain commodity will be made available by public enterprise. The price of raw materials as well as of the finished product is determined by the state.

The debate on the *Avant-projet* on the *Charte Nationale*, which took place in 1976, highlighted the issues of public and private ownership of economic enterprises. This is an issue on which Algerians themselves are divided. There are those who are in favour of private enterprise and those who are against.

However, the *Charte Nationale*, which restricted the economic power of private enterprise, was approved and adopted. There is an indication that the overall majority of Algerians support public ownership. This may be somewhat obvious, since after the debate this item was not altered. Private enterprise, it was felt, should be subordinated and function within the framework of public enterprise.

In Algeria, there is no competition between public and private enterprises; however, there is competition between private enterprises for obtaining contracts from public enterprises. Private enterprises are not necessarily Algerian; other foreign enterprises take part in competing. In this sense, Algerian private enterprise claims to be providing services to the nation, instead of having services provided by a foreign private enterprise.

The economy and the society are in transition. Many aspects of these transitions have been examined in the previous chapter. At present, however, in the overall view of the Algerian economy and society, Ahmed Akkache identifies the following sectors:

(a) un secteur "traditionnel" d'auto-subsistance, à dominante précapitaliste, dans certaines régions rurales,
(b) une petite production marchande, artisanale et paysanne,
(c) un secteur capitaliste moderne,
(d) un secteur d'Etat,

(e) un secteur autogéré, essentiellement agricole,
(f) un secteur coopératif. (Akkache, 1971, p. 1)

The transition is characterized by several modes of production, the principal force of contradiction being between (c) and (d). The modern capitalist sector is present in light industry, construction, and services, while the state sector is dominant in water and energy, hydrocarbons, mines, and the manufacturing industry.

The difference between the two sectors lies in the ownership of the means of production and the economic objectives. The modern capitalistic sector is concerned with individual profit, while the state sector is concerned with the plan and the eradication of the underdevelopment which characterizes the economy. The state sector controls 69 percent of the key sectors of the national economy, for example 96 or 98 percent in water and energy and 78.3 percent in hydrocarbons. In 1969, 17.8 percent of total production was under state control. At present, 78.3 percent is under state control, and in mines 93.5 percent of production comes under the state sector. Water and energy are exclusively under state control, although with hydrocarbons and mines the private sector is present at the rate of 21.7 and 6.5 percent respectively. For the overall industrial sector, private control represents 30.9 percent, as specified in Table 46.

In the state sector, priorities are given to certain economic activities that are considered to be important aspects of the national economy, such as siderurgy, construction materials, mechanical and alimentary industries, chemicals, wood, and paper. While the private sector concentrates on light industry, particularly textiles and leather goods, these two aspects of light industry compete with the public sector, which is at present relatively weak (see Table 44).

TABLE 44

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY

	Secteur d'Etat	Secteur Privé
Industrie sidérurgiques, Mét. Méc. et Electriques	82.7	17.3
Matériaux de construction	87.4	12.6
Industries chimiques	57.9	42.1
Industries alimentaires	75.6	24.4
Bois, papier	58.8	41.2
Textiles	35.7	64.3
Cuirs et peaux	40.2	59.8
Industries diverses	49.9	50.2
Total	69.1%	30.9%

Source: A. Akkache, 1976, p. 3.

Similarly, because of the transitional characteristics of the economy and society in the agricultural sector, there are three different modes of production: an extreme subsistence sector where the precolonial mode of production prevails, scattered throughout several rural areas; a private sector; and a state sector. The private sector involves 5,000,000 hectares of agricultural land, divided among 500,000 holders. Small parts of this land are engaged in modern capital modes of production, and large parts of this land are in the hands of small subsistence farmers. The state controls 2,000,000 hectares of land, which is divided into 1,800 autogestion units and represents the richest agricultural land in Algeria. Previously, it was owned by colonists. The remaining part of state land is divided into four hundred ancient Moujahidines cooperatives. However, since 1972, the private sector in agriculture has been transformed into cooperative societies; it was at that time that the Coopératives Agricoles de la Révolution Agraire (CAPRA) were created. Some of these cooperatives are more productive than other forms of agricultural organization. In some regions the private sector in agriculture is still dominant.

The principle of popular coordination and supervision exercised by the UGTA and the FLN, and the technical control of the economy, are restricted by the *secrétariat du plan*. However, there are institutional controls. Technical coordination is exercised by the *dire[illegible]ur général* of the *société nationale* in question. That means that within the national enterprise a bureaucratic structure is established, based on division of responsibility and general coordination of the enterprise's activities, in order to ensure realization of the national plan. The central administration of the *société nationale* is headed by a *directeur général* appointed by the President of the Republic after consultation with the FLN and the UGTA. He is nominated by the relevant ministry and represents the state and acts on its behalf. In this respect, the *Charte et Code de la Gestion Socialiste des Entreprises* states as follows:

> Art. 61--Le directeur général de l'entreprise agit sous l'autorité de la tutelle et est responsable du fonctionnement général de l'entreprise dans le cadre de ses attributions fixées par les textes législatifs et règlementaires et dans le respect des prérogatives confiées à l'assemblée des travailleurs.

> Il représente l'entreprise dans tous les actes de la vie civile et exerce l'autorité hiérarchique sur le personnel. (*Charte Socialiste des Entreprises*, 1971, p. 24)

The *société nationale* has several branches all over the country. Branches are called *unités économiques* and each *unité* has a *directeur* appointed by the *directeur général*, after consultation with the workers' representative of the central office of the *unité économique*. The contradiction within socialist enterprise is not so much between popular control and the worker but concerns the institutional control exercised by the *directeur général* of the *société nationale*. The *directeur de l'unité économique* and the workers clash over the issues of technological innovation, distribution of benefits, and technical aspects of production.

Each *société nationale* is divided into two broad categories, an administrative and technical organization and an economic unit. The administrative and technical organization consists of the ministry in charge of the *société nationale*, the *directeur général*, and the *directeur d'unité*. These three organizations are structured hierarchically. There are power relationships based on the division of activity and responsibility, each of these organizations having a certain level of intervention in the economic unit. The economic unit is divided into spheres of competency based on a division of labour and responsibility. The *directeur d'unité* coordinates the economic unit with the help of the workers' representatives. Apart from the hierarchical structure of socialist enterprises, there is nevertheless a horizontal structure based on the relationship between the economic unit and the local representatives of the UGTA and the FLN. These two organizations mediate in relations between the *directeur d'unité* and the workers. Within each of these organizations there is a bureau in charge of socialist enterprises, whose function is to ensure the democratization of the socialist enterprise and to promote autonomy and initiative in worker participation.

After the promulgation of the *Charte et Code de la Gestion Socialiste des Entreprises* in 1971, its provisions were not applied to all *sociétés nationales*, but in fact a pilot project was established in some units of the *Société Nationale des Métaux*, as the following quotation illustrates:

> Avant d'entamer l'application systématique de la loi à travers le pays une expérience intéressante a été organisée à la société nationale de constructions métalliques (S.N. Métal). Des assemblées de travailleurs ont été élues durant la période avril-mai 1972 dans diverses unités de cette entreprise. Les élections ont touché 7 unités dans l'Algérois, 2 en Oranie, 3 à Annaba. Au total 3 à 4.000 travailleurs. Il s'agit en fait de réalités sociales nouvelles. Les directions et les collectifs de travailleurs ne peuvent plus avoir les mêmes rapports professionnels et sociaux. (*Révue Algérienne du Travail* 12 (May 1973): 25)

I carried out my field work in one of the units that for the first time established a pilot project in 1971 to test the practical application of the *Charte Socialiste des Entreprises*. *La Société Nationale Métal—unité Rouiba* has 400 workers specialized in "pylons tous types, galvanisation, caillebotis." Unlike other units, I worked with the President of the Workers' Assembly of the *SN Métal—unité Rouiba*, who received me openly on my arrival at the factory and introduced me first to the workers and then to the *directeur d'unité*. Among the workers in this unit there were some who had been working with the enterprise since colonial times. During the colonial period, the enterprise was small and provided employment to less than 100 workers;

it was owned by a Frenchman.

The experience the Algerians gained from the pilot project led to the systematic application of *gestion socialiste* in all national enterprises.

At the end of 1975, there were 560 economic units which had set up worker participation. These economic units were located in thirty-two different *sociétés nationales* all over the country.

In order to translate the *Charte et Code de la Gestion Socialiste des Entreprises* into reality, the government of Algeria set up a special commission to ensure the application of worker participation in all *societes nationales* (see Chart 2). This commission was called the Commission Nationale Chargé de la Gestion Socialiste des Entreprises (CNGSE) and was placed under the direct authority of the President of the Republic. It has a secretariat directed by one of the President's advisors. The commission is in charge of evaluating the *gestion socialiste des entreprises* and its process of development and change. The first conference of the CNGSE was held in July 1974, on the basis of the expertise gained, to elaborate a new principle for the substructure of *gestion socialiste des entreprises* which will allow some evolution in worker participation.

For example,

> Le statut de l'entreprise socialiste a aussi été étudié et élaboré par la C.N.G.S.E. Le décret du 23 octobre 1973 définit l'unité économique, l'ordonnance du 29 avril 1975 porte le statut type des entreprises socialistes, enfin l'ordonnance du 21 novembre 1975 fixe les principes relations entre l'entreprise socialiste, l'autorité de tutelle et les autres administrations de l'Etat. (Boutefnouchet, 1975, p. 55)

The work of the CNGSE consists of bringing about the changes that are necessary for the effective operation of worker participation and

CHART 2

EVOLUTION OF WORKER PARTICIPATION IN INDUSTRY, TRANSPORT, TOURISM, COMMERCE, AND BANKING INSTITUTIONS, 1973-1975

décembre 1973			avril 1975		
SNS	- Ministère	Industrie	SONATMAG	- Ministère	Transport
SN Sempac	"	"	SNTR	"	"
SONACOMBE	"	"	SN Cotec	"	
SONITEX	"	"	SOGEDIA	"	Industrie
SONIPEC	"	"	SOMELGAZ	"	"
SNMC.	"	"	CHAFEX	"	Commerce
EMA	"	"	SN Métal	"	Industrie
SNTA	"	"	ONP	"	Transport

décembre 1974			mai 1975		
SONIC	- Ministère	Industrie	SONACOB	Ministère	
SNNGA	- Ministère du Commerce		SOMATHERM	"	Tourisme
			SONATITE	"	PTT
			SNTV	"	Transport
			Air-Algérie	"	"
			RSTA.	"	"
			RCATVO (R	"	"
			RMTC	"	"
			RMACA	"	"
			BAD	"	Finances
			SAA	"	"
			CAAR	"	"

Source: M. Boutefnouchet, 1976, p. 52.

bringing about the conditions necessary for its evolution. In 1973, the socialist enterprise was given more autonomy in regulating their financial resources and in elaborating their particular plan within the context of the national plan. The CNGSE brought certain reforms to the relationship between the *directeurs généraux* of the *societés nationales* and the economic unit.

The CNGSE consists of representation of the workers, the FLN, the state, and intellectuals, who meet periodically to review the state of development of worker participation. The president of the commission is in the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, assisted by the advisor to the President of the Republic.

Agricultural enterprises are organized somewhat differently, since they are dependent on regional and district-based organizations, unlike industrial enterprises, which depend directly on national organizations. Popular control of agricultural enterprises is assured by the *assemblée populaire des communes*; the presidents of autogestion and cooperative societies are effective members of this assembly. In each region there is an office of the Ministry of Agriculture responsible for coordinating agricultural production in the region and providing technical service to agricultural units. The coordinator of the FLN and representatives of the UGTA are responsible for the political orientation of workers and supervising elections. The FLN and the UGTA representatives nominate candidates in consultation with the Workers' Assembly and the president of the *assemblée populaire des communes*. Apart from popular and technical control, in each autogestion unit there is a *directeur des domaines* appointed by the Ministry of Agriculture, and his function consists of providing information to the Workers' Assembly and to assist in keeping the accounting system of the enterprise. He works closely with the president of the Workers' Assembly to attempt to realize the directives of the national plan.

The two forms of workers' organization in Algeria do not, however, enjoy equal autonomy. They have greater freedom in autogestion than in the industrial sector. For example, autogestion has a greater power of making decisions on such issues as farm planning and commercialization of its products than do the industrialized enterprises.

D. PARTICIPATION AND AUTOGESTION: TOWARDS THE ORGANIZATION OF WORKERS IN INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE

1. The Concepts

In the literature of industrial democracy, a distinction is drawn between worker self-management and worker participation. According to Hunnius (1970), worker self-management consists of "a situation where the workers themselves manage and control their own enterprises and industry in cooperation with the wider community" (p. 39). In contrast, worker participation is defined by J. R. P. French as "a process in which two or more parties influence each other in making certain plans, policies and decisions. It is restricted to decisions that have further effects on all those making the decision and on those represented of them" (Blumberg, 1963, p. 71).

In Yugoslavia, worker self-management was introduced in 1950 as a form of representation in industrial democracy. The state owns the enterprise, but management is in the hands of the worker. Three systems are identified: workers' assembly, workers' council, and management committee. The workers' assembly, which represents all the workers in the enterprise, elects workers' council members, and the workers' council in turn nominates a management committee and the director of the enterprise. As we will examine later in this section, Algeria's system of self-management is similar to that of Yugoslavia.

Under worker participation, where the employees and employers or the trade union organization and the employers' association meet to discuss matters of mutual interest, two types of participation have been distinguished in the literature of participation (Blumberg, 1963, p. 71). The first type is often referred to as cooperation which takes place through a board of the enterprise by representation of the workers and employers. Under this category, by virtue of worker participation in decision making, workers have the power to influence decisions affecting themselves. The second type is often referred to as co-determination. Under this category, the workers control decisions and have a responsible status in the enterprise, but they do not have the right to strike. This first category of cooperation emphasizes influence, and the second category emphasizes decision.

Participation as a means to influence decisions is associated more with a higher, more advanced, capitalist mode of production. That type of participation concentrates on a certain specific problem existing between the employer and the employee. Unlike the capitalist form of participation, the Algerian form of participation focusses on more complex problems of socio-economic, political, and financial nature. Participation is conceived of as a means of popular control for economic institutions in the sense that the means of production and the relation of production are transformed, so as to make popular control meaningful.

2. Worker Participation in Socialist Enterprise

In socialist enterprise, workers are not "cogestion"; neither are they "autogestion," but *producteurs-gestionnaires*. The relation between workers and enterprise is based not on wages but on overall contribution to the management of the enterprise. The concept of worker participation is conceived here not as material gain but as reconvergence between the worker and the state for the purposes of the country's economic independence. This point is well illustrated by the Mostefa Boutefnouchet:

> Qu'est-ce que la gestion socialiste des entreprises en Algérie? Elle n'est ni cogestion, ni autogestion; la gestion socialiste des entreprises en Algérie est l'initiation des travailleurs à la gestion des affaires de l'entreprise. A ce titre le travailleur n'est pas un associé, ni un ouvrier "intéresseé," mais il est copropriétaire de l'entreprise, dont la propriété revient à l'Etat qui est le représentant du peuple. Enfin, la participation du travailleur, considéré comme un "producteur-gestionnaire" et non pas comme salarié, est basée sur une contribution générale à la gestion de l'entreprise, et non seulement à son intéressement matériel aux résultats financiers de l'entreprise, comme l'est la participation en économie libérale. (Boutefnouchet, 1976, p. 11)

For Boutefnouchet, the means of production are owned by the worker and the state. In this sense, workers are co-owners of the enterprise. He does not see any difference between workers and the state but takes an optimistic view of unity between the state and workers. However, the important aspect of Boutefnouchet's analysis lies in the concept of convergency, which underlies a close relationship between the state, representing the people, and the collectivity of producers, based on general interest. By general interest we mean national well-being and economic independence.

The concept of convergence has meaning within the context of Algerian history. In various stages of the evolution of Algerian society, the masses have taken part in armed struggle (1954 to 1962) against French colonialism. From 1962 to 1965, problems were on the level of economic independence and the struggle against colonialism and neo-colonialism. From 1962 to the present, there has been worker participation in the political and economic organization of the country.

3. Execution of National Plans, 1967-1977

A speech delivered by the President of the Algerian Democratic and Popular Republic in 1968 on the occasion of the third anniversary of 19 June highlights this issue:

> La peuple qui selon les lois de la nature et de l'Histoire s'était révolté contre l'autorité coloniale durant 130 ans a fini par prendre conscience que l'Etat et que le gouvernement était son propre gouvernement. Le peuple a pris conscience que l'Etat et le gouvernement oeuvraient pour ses intérêts et que les respecter c'était respecter ses intérêts propres. (Mameri, 1975, p. 124)

The people would not have participated in the struggle against colonialism, for which the Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne (GPRA) had appealed, if they had not been conscious that the state and the government were their own. The struggle they waged indicates the identity of interest between the people and the government. What the Algerian people and the government meant by participation is difficult to determine. However, in the foregoing discussion it is apparent that identity of interest is the basis for convergency between the state and workers in unity of purpose and of action, which originates in the historical relationship between workers and the state in

Algeria. Workers support the Algerian option for national development. The current industrialization of the country is shared by both the state and workers. Survey research which I undertook in 1976 concerning agricultural and industrial workers in Algeria and specifically in Annaba show that worker participation increases production and was motivated in order to create more industry rather than to gain personal material benefit. Table 45 shows the response each of the two categories of worker gave.

TABLE 45

COMPARISON OF AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL WORKERS ON REASONS FOR INCREASING PRODUCTION

Reasons Given for Wanting Increased Production	Agricultural Workers		Industrial Workers	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
For personal benefit	33	33.0	35	27.7
For industry	42	42.0	76	57.8
To help others	44	46.0	35	26.6
	n = 100		n = 135	

Source: M. Abucar, field notes, 1976.

The way in which permanent committees are set up indicates the area in which the workers have a higher degree of influence in decision making. At the higher levels of the *société nationale*, the workers jointly with the *directeur général* take part in planning and coordinating the economic activity of the enterprise. However, in the area of health and security there is less joint representation between the administration and the workers at the central office level. Normally the two groups have unequal representation, since the administration's representatives exceed workers' representation. But it is also a possibility that with medical doctors and social affairs officers represented in such committees the administration may have more representation than workers (see Chart 3).

Economic participation of the workers in socialist enterprises at the headquarters level consists of coordinating and organizing. The production target for each socialist enterprise is defined by the plan. The task of the *secrétaire général* of the Workers' Assembly is to coordinate the efforts of the productive forces to realize the goal of the plan by minimizing conflict between the manager and the worker at the economic units of the *société nationale* and by promoting training programmes in order to improve production levels. The *secrétaire général* is assisted by the permanent committees mentioned above.

The social and political basis of the Algerian worker is stronger than the administrators in socialist enterprises. The party (FLN) and the UGTA at the national level support worker participation. The FLN and the UGTA have had a good working relationship since 1969.

At the third congress of the UGTA, orientation and principles of collaboration between the party and the UGTA were defined for the first time as follows:

> L'Unité de l'U.G.T.A., dans l'Unité du Parti. Un programme d'action est élaboré, il consiste en:
> --la participation à la gestion de l'entreprise,
> --l'institutionnalisation de la section syndicale,
> --l'engagement à la réalisation de la Révolution Agraire.
> (Boutefnouchet, 1976, p. 8)

By institutionalization what is often meant in Algerian political development is the decentralization of extensive revolutionary power to

CHART 3

SCHEMA DE STRUCTURE ET FONCTIONNEMENT DE L'ENTREPRISE SOCIALISTE

Autorité de tutelle	Exerce sur entreprise pouvoir de: - Orientation (objectif) - Contrôle (réalisation)	Ministère de tutelle
Entreprise socialiste	Responsable exécution objectifs du plan pouvoir de: - planification, - gestion unités	Directeur général
Commission permanente	Coordination Organisation Trésorerie Information et Action de masse Education	Secrétaire général
Unité économique	A pour objet la création de biens ou de services Réalisations d'objectifs déterminés	Directeur d'unité
Conseil de direction	Gère l'entreprise socialiste Gère l'unité économique	Président = Directeur
Assemblée des Travailleurs	Aide à gérer entreprise et veille à réalisation des objectifs	Président = Travailleur élu
Commissions permanentes	Etudient toutes questions de gestion Soumettent résultats à A.T.	Membres A.T. / Direction
Collectif des Travailleurs	Concernés par fonctionnement entreprise et unité, "leur propriété"	Travailleurs - Producteurs - Gestionnaires

Source: M. Abucar, field notes, 1976.

local collectivities, and producers, such as communes, for political participation and autogestion, in cooperative societies and economic participation in socialist enterprises. The process of political participation started in February 1967, when the representatives of the communal assembly were elected, and in May 1969, when the Wilaya assembly was elected. In February 1977, the National Assembly was established. The UGTA has a large representation at all levels of political organization.

Despite this higher network of relationships and ties between workers and the political power of the country, the sphere of autonomy in socialist enterprise in certain areas is limited to, for example, investment and production. In those areas, the second *Plan Quadriennal*, 1974-1977, states as follows:

> Du point de vue de l'autonomie de gestion des sociétés nationales, les nouveaux textes confirment pour la période actuelle le principe de la décision centralisée pour tout ce qui a trait aux programmes d'investissement. Ce choix imposé par la nécessité d'assurer une sélection des investissements garantissant la meilleure utilisation des moyens, devra être maintenu pendant toute l'étape de construction de l'économie.
>
> Les programmes de production des entreprises seront par contre arrêtés par les sociétés nationales dans le cadre d'un système de décision contrôlée permettant de veiller à la pleine utilisation des capacités de production et au respect des objectifs du Plan. Les programmes de production prévisionnels qui seront élaborés annuellement feront l'objet d'une approbation centralisée. (*Plan Quadriennal*, 1974-1977, p. 147)

The new test for socialist enterprises, while maintaining centralized decisions concerning investment and production for the overall regulation of the national economy, will be to secure and utilize the means available in relation to plan objectives.

4. Participation in Economic Units

The new text will provide more responsibility to the economic units of socialist enterprises in terms of management and active participation, as the following quotation illustrates:

> Dans le domaine de la gestion courante des pouvoirs de décision de l'unité de production seront les plus larges dans le cadre de l'articulation des responsabilités au sein de l'entreprise et des règles légales régissant tant son organisation que ses droits et obligations à l'égard de la collectivité nationale.
>
> Le mode de gestion des sociétés nationales qui sera mis en place précisera dans l'organisation des responsabilités au sein de l'entreprise la place du collectif des travailleurs qui aura une participation active à la vie de l'entreprise. En particulier le collectif des travailleurs aura des responsabilités de contrôle de la gestion et participera à l'élaboration des projets de programme de production, d'investissement et de formation. (*Plan Quadriennal*, 1974-1977, p. 167)

For the first time, Algerian labour was allowed certain rights and responsibilities. Among other things, these rights include sharing production benefits, participation in management of the enterprise, and the freedom to establish an organization democratically elected by themselves.

On the other hand, there are obligations attached to these rights. These obligations are that the worker, as a member of society, has a responsibility to the national collectivity. The national collectivity is represented by the state, which appropriates part of the surplus created by workers for the benefit of the national collectivity. In this regard, workers are obliged to increase production for their benefit and for the benefit of the collectivity. There is the expectation among the elite and the intellectuals that once the means or production are transformed and the workers have been given their rights in socialist enterprise, there will be an increase of production, as this quotation illustrates:

> La base essentielle de la bataille de la production se reflète par l'évolution de l'économie socialiste et celle de la situation du travailleur qui vit de sa production et de ses efforts. L'économie du pays a souligné le Président, résultat de l'option socialiste, vise le changement des conditions matérielles des travailleurs. "La bataille de la production est devenue à cet égard la bataille de la révolution. Il ne saurait y avoir de politique authentique, de véritable politique en matière d'éducation, de justice sociale, sans l'effort de l'économie. L'objectif à atteindre est à cet effet clair et doit être compris par les travailleurs, les cadres et les syndicalistes." (Boutefnouchet, 1976, p. 59)

Article 7 of the *Chart et Code de la Gestion Socialiste des Entreprises* states that workers in socialist enterprises are producers responsible to the management of the enterprise. This responsibility consists of control, management, and participation in elaborating production programmes and in setting up investment plans and training programmes (see Chart 4).

All socialist enterprises, at the economic unit level, possess a homogeneous permanent structure. This structure is known as the permanent committee, or *conseil de direction*. The permanent committee is divided into five subcommittees: (1) *la commission économique et financière*, (2) *la commission des affaires sociales et culturelles*, (3) *la commission du personnel et de la formation*, (4) *la commission de discipline*, and (5) *la commission d'hygiène et de sécurité*. The members of these committees are elected by the *Assemblee des Travailleurs*. This institution is one of the most important organizations within the economic unit of the socialist enterprise. It has the power to control management and to implement programmes. Unlike the permanent committees, the *Assemblée des Travailleurs* meets periodically to study projects of the development plan, examining financial costs and prospects and making recommendations if necessary. The *Assemblée des Travailleurs* approves the following items:

CHART 4

L'UNITE ECONOMIQUE

EST:

--Une structure permanente
--Dotée de moyens humains et matériels propres
A pour objet:
--La création de biens ou de services

Critères de définition	Relations entreprise-unités:
L'unité doit avoir: --Une activité économique organisée permanente --Un effectif minimum de 30 personnes --Une autonomie compatible avec l'activité de l'entreprise Unité doit reposer sur: --Critères pour le secteur de production de biens: .Homogénéité de l'organisation du travail .Homogénéité du processus technico-productif .Autonomie de gestion --Critères pour le secteur de production de services: .Doit être créée sur une base territoriale .Ou en fonction de son implantation	L'unité élabore: --Projets de plan de développement annuel et à moyen terme de l'unité --Projets d'organigramme et règlement intérieur Exécute: --Programmes annuels de production d'investissements, d'approvisionnement et de commercialisation Etablit: --Projet de comptes prévisionnels --Projet de plan de trésorerie L'unité: --Participe à l'élaboration de comptes d'exploitation et de pertes et profits --Tient un fichier des immobilisations et stocks --Gère son personnel --Veille au bon respect de l'hygiène et de la sécurité --Contribue à l'amélioration du niveau technique et culturel des travailleurs

Source: M. Boutefnouchet, 1976, p. 19.

(1) Report of the annual execution of the plan;

(2) Accounting work; and

(3) Statement and the report of the work of the commissioners.

The *Assemblée des Travailleurs* makes recommendations on prospects of national development plans or any other national issues whenever called upon to do so. This happens at the *avant projet* stage, before the project is approved by the Revolutionary Council. On any other national issues, the workers may express their opinions and submit their recommendations through the UGTA to the supreme organ of the country, the Conseil National de la Révolution Algérienne (CNRA). However, the internal operation of the socialist enterprise (*Assemblée des Travailleurs*) has the power to make decisions on matters of personal and professional training and internal regulations (see Chart 5).

These decisions are implemented by the permanent committee mentioned above, with the cooperation of the director of the enterprise. In certain matters, the committee is consulted before any decision is taken, for example in restructuring the enterprise and introducing technological innovations. Without the consent of the workers, no decision will be taken in those cases. Not all permanent committees are exclusively for workers; the disciplinary, health, and security committees are handled by a joint representation of workers and the direction of the enterprise. In these committees, representation is equal. The permanent committees assume different roles within the enterprise. These roles are not limited to gathering information and studying problems of the enterprise; rather, the committees have the power to intervene on behalf of the workers to protect their rights and to

CHART 5

ORGANISATION SOCIALISTE DES ENTREPRISES

ASSEMBLEE DES TRAVAILLEURS	CONSEIL DE DIRECTION
Constitution: 7 à 25 membres Durée: 3 années Prérogatives: .Avis et recommandations pour: --Plan de développement --Comptes prévisionnels recettes et dépenses --Programme d'activités .Se prononce sur: --Rapport annuel --Compte d'exploitation --Bilan annuel --Rapport commissaire aux comptes .Décide pour: --Affectation des résultats financiers --Répartition de la quote-part --Adoption règlement "intérieur" .Est consulté pour: --Toute réforme fondamentale --Toute modification importante des structures .Gère: --Oeuvres sociales et culturelles .Veille sur: --Accroissement production --Respect discipline --Elimination gaspillage Fonctionnement: 2 réunions par an et dans l'unité 4 réunions par an	Constitution: 2 représentants de l'A.T. Le Directeur (Président) Adjoints au Directeur Prérogatives: .Informé de: --Tous éléments de gestion de l'entreprise .Statut pour: --Programmes de ventes production commercialisation --Extension des activités --Programmes d'investissement --Statut du personnel --Organigramme --Programmes généraux d'activités --Concours bancaires et financiers --Bilan --Compte d'exploitation --Compte pertes et profits --Désignation des répresentants de la direction aux commissions --Règlements des litiges Fonctionnement: 1 réunion par semaine

Source: M. Boutefnouchet, 1976, p. 34.

control management effectively. For example, the economic and finance committee has the right to take part in marketing their products and the right to know about the movement and operation of funds, more particularly commercialization and supply. Similarly, the personnel and training committee intervenes over questions related to income and material benefits attributed to the workers.

The director of the enterprise cannot dismiss any worker without the consent of the disciplinary committee, on which the workers have equal representation with management. Therefore, any disciplinary action is taken jointly between workers' representatives and the director. Each economic unit, apart from the permanent committee, has an administrative structure divided into several divisions, each dealing with particular aspects of the enterprise.

This administrative structure is not homogeneous in all socialist enterprises: some enterprises have very simple structures, others more complex structures. The difference is due to the size and the nature of the enterprise. However, the large enterprise which employs more than one thousand workers normally possesses five divisions: a general administration office, an accounting office, an investment and commercialization office, a production office, and a paying office. This type of administrative structure provides employment to white-collar workers. A substantial number of these jobs are occupied by females. Medium- and small-sized enterprises have a simple structure: the director plus an accounting office. In the large enterprise units, the workers have a *bureau syndical*, and it has five divisions parallel to those of the workers' organization at the *société nationale* level.

The *conseil de direction de l'entreprise* is an instrument of management and deals with the day-to-day activities of the enterprise (see Chart 6). It has a large representation from management, and two workers' representatives. The *conseil* meets at least once a week. Article 59 of the *Charte et Code de la Gestion Socialiste des Entreprises* describes the function of the *conseil* as follows:

> (a) Les programmes généraux d'activité de l'entreprise et les projets de programmes de vente, de production et d'approvisionnement;
> (b) Les projets d'extension des activités de l'entreprise dans le cadre de l'objet de celle-ci à des secteurs nouveaux;
> (c) Les projets de création d'organismes ou sociétés ayant le caractère de filiales ainsi que les prises de participation dans toutes les entreprises ou sociétés;
> (d) Les projets de plans et de programmes d'investissements de l'entreprise;
> (e) Les concours bancaires ou financiers contractés;
> (f) Les bilans, compte d'exploitation, comptes de pertes et profits; comptes d'affectation des résultats, rapport annuel d'activité de l'exercice écoulé;
> (g) Le projet de statut du personnel et la grille des salaires;
> (h) Le projet d'organigramme de l'entreprise;
> (i) La désignation des représentants de la direction au sein des commissions permanentes de l'entreprise;
> (j) La désignation des représentants de l'entreprise au sein des sociétés dont elle détient une partie du capital;
> (k) Les règlements des litiges de l'entreprise.
> (*Charte Socialiste des Entreprises*, 1971, p. 23)

At the level of the economic unit, there is also a *conseil de direction de l'unité*, which meets regularly every week. This *conseil* has the following functions:

> (1) La désignation des représentants de la direction au sein des commissions permanentes de l'unité.
> (2) Les projets de plan et de programme d'investissement de l'unité.
> (3) Le projet d'organigramme de l'unité.
> (4) Les projets d'extension, à des secteurs nouveaux, des activités de l'unité dans le cadre de son objet.
> (5) Les programmes généraux déactivité de l'unité.
> (*Charte Socialiste des Entreprises*, 1971, p. 23)

The relationship between worker participation in socialist enterprise and the *conseil de direction de l'entreprise* indicates the fact

CHART 6

INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF THE SOCIALISTE ENTREPRISE UNIT

CHARTE SOCIALISTE DE L'ENTREPRISE

Ordonnance no 71-74


CONSEIL DE DIRECTION
COMMISSION D'HYGIENE ET DE SECURITE
COMMISSION DE DISCIPLINE
SECTION SYNDICALE
ASSEMBLEE DES TRAVAILLEURS
COMMISSION ECONOMIQUE ET FINANCIERE
COMMISSION SOCIALE ET CULTURELLE OEUVRES SOCIALES
COMMISSION PERSONNEL ET FORMATION

Source: M. Abucar, field notes, 1967.

that there is limited participation. The *conseil de direction de l'entreprise* has power over elaboration of the plan and investment. The *Assemblée des Travailleurs* has the authority to study plan proposals and to make recommendations and express their opinions. The project and the recommendations are submitted to a higher authority for final decision. However, these two avenues seem to indicate the ways and means to overcome the contradiction existing between the plan and the enterprise. The contradiction is not a fundamental one, but part of overall transformation, institutionalization, and marginalization left over from the colonial period. The current trend in national development tends to reconstruct the historical evolution of Algerian society and to overlook the problem of underdevelopment. The structure of Algerian worker participation is designed to meet this problem.

However, the Algerian experience supports the view that colonial problems are still encountered, due to the heterogeneous characteristics of Algerian society, namely, the existence of several modes of production and a diversity of socio-cultural factors, which divide workers and cadres in terms of expression and work outlook, as well as the social differentiation associated with their recent development. The third regional conference, held in Algiers, Constantine, and Oran in 1975, singled out the crucial problems that *gestion socialiste* had encountered in applying the *Charte et Code de la Gestion Socialiste des Entreprises*. These difficulties were:

> (1) le manque d'explication des textes: à défaut de cette explication, les travailleurs se débattent aux mieux pour les interpréter le plus correctement possible;
> (2) le fonctionnement partiel des organes: en effet, si toutes les commissions sont installées, certaines sont inopérantes, "lettre-morte," seule la commission de discipline semble travailler normalement;

> (3) le choix objectif des chefs d'unités, assurant une collaboration totale avec les travailleurs;
> (4) la circulation de l'information imparfaite qui bloque toute initiative;
> (5) la nécessité de décentraliser et de responsabiliser les unités de production;
> (6) la dépendance trop grande du conseil de direction de l'unité à la direction générale de l'entreprise pour les cas de gestion du personnel, des approvisionnements, ainsi que des budgets prévisionnels;
> (7) la formation continue, politique et professionnelle des travailleurs non encore généralisée;
> (8) la solution aux problèmes sociaux, tels que sécurité au travail, protection de la santé, logement décent, transports, oeuvres sociales. (Boutefnouchet, 1976, p. 58)

French and Arabic are the working languages of socialist enterprise, although French is the language of the administration and Arabic the language spoken by the majority of workers (less for cadres). This, however, makes difficult the interpretation of the charter, in terms of understanding it and applying it to concrete situations as far as emphasis is concerned. The majority of the workers are not literate; some of them may well speak both languages but cannot read or write in either. The application of the charter to all aspects of the enterprise depends on the level of consciousness of the cadres and the workers for making the charter a workable instrument. If the working relationship between the two is solid, then there are more chances of applying the charter, regardless of the language difficulty.

For example, in SN Métal in Annaba I observed that there was a good working relationship between workers and cadres. The permanent committees were functioning on the basis of the principle of the charter, and there was no hostility between workers and management. Whenever there was a problem between the economic unit and the *société nationale*, both management and workers took a similar stand. For example, the *société nationale* was unwilling to provide them with their share of profits in the amount requested. In this regard, they jointly made application to the President of the Republic, informing him that they would not be responsible for production if their demands were not met.

In this unit, the president of the *Assemblée des Travailleurs* was literate in Arabic, and most instructions were given in Arabic, while the director was French trained, yet spoke Arabic. The level of comprehension between the two was great. There was a training programme and a functional literacy programme. The training programme was sufficient to meet the demands of training for workers. The functional literacy programmes exist in all socialist enterprises, coordinated by a professional and a cadre and executed by some of the workers who have previously been through such a programme. But major problems exist concerning further training for some of the workers who are already working in the enterprise. In order to advance in their careers they need specialized training programmes. Some of the institutions for training workers, such as the Centre de Formation Professionnel (CFP), may not adequately respond to such demands, due to the number of participants they can take in each programme. The problem is whether the economic unit is capable of releasing workers in large enough numbers to undertake such programmes, for a couple of months or weeks. Production may be delayed due to a lack of workers to do the job.

Some directors are unwilling to accept a slow-down of production for the betterment of workers' skills for the improvement of production or for personal satisfaction for the future. How this problem should be tackled is not clear in several socialist enterprises. The charter does not establish ways and means to deal with such problems.

5. Autogestion

Until 1972, there were two modes of production in the agricultural sector: autogestion and the private farm. The private sector consisted of two distinct categories: small farmers and absentee landlords. The latter category was nationalized and the land distributed to landless labourers. Small farmers and their newly acquired land were organized as cooperative societies. At present in the agricultural sector, there are three different modes of production: autogestion, cooperative societies, and private farms. The preamble of the *Charter of the Algerian Revolution* defines a cooperative society:

> La coopérative est tout d'abord un cadre de préparation et de formation des petits exploitants, dénués de toute possibilité de progrès individuel, à la gestion démocratique de leurs moyens de production, en vue de réaliser avec l'aide de l'Etat, leur promotion économique et sociale. La coopérative est un cadre d'association libre et volontaire et d'apprentissage à la gestion collective des moyens de production. Par la diversité de ses formes: association d'entraide, groupement de mise en valeur, coopérative de services ou de production et la diversité des buts qu'elle poursuit (approvisionnement, production, commercialisation), la coopérative apporte des solutions variées, évolutives et hiérarchisées répondant au niveau de préparation et aux besoins de ses adhérents. (*Autogestion*, April 1968)

The cooperative society consists of a number of small farmers. They have an autonomy of management and decision making in relation to the evolution of the cooperative. The state provides the cooperative society with financial and technical aid and commercialization of their products. The cooperative society is entitled to borrow the initial capital from the Banque Nationale Algérienne. There are two types of credit: the first type is for ordinary expenditures, used as income for meeting day-to-day expenditures of the cooperative; the second type of credit for equipment is payable in the short term from five to seven years or in the long term for up to twenty years. Credit for ordinary expenditures is paid at each harvest, so that the farmer is entitled again to obtain money whenever necessary. The Commission Nationale de la Révolution Agraire is responsible for the coordination and implementation of the charter, assisted by the members of the *assemblée populaire de commune*. Unlike cooperative societies, autogestion is similar to *gestion socialiste des entreprises* in the sense that autogestion economic activity is controlled by national development. Autogestion is different from socialist enterprises, because it enjoys a greater autonomy than socialist enterprise and because it has autonomy within a given geographical area. Autogestion is defined as follows:

> L'autogestion est un système d'organisation politique, économique et social dont le contenu idéologique constitue la voie principale choisie par l'Algérie dans son ouverture vers le socialisme, et qui concilie les intérêts des travailleurs, promus du statut de salariés au rang de producteurs libres et responsables, par leur participation active, consciente et directe à la gestion de leur entreprise, et leur intéressement moral et matériel aux résultats d'exploitation; et les intérêts de la collectivité nationale par un prélèvement approprié d'une partie des revenus de l'entreprise, et la subordination des plans de développement de l'unité aux plans de développement national et régional. (*Autogestion*, April 1968)

The General Assembly consists of only the permanent workers in an enterprise. It is the centre of the trade union organization within the autogestion. Each member has the right to vote. Voting takes place when two-thirds of the members are present. This constitutes a quorum. The worker loses his rights only when he commits a serious offence. The General Assembly, which is made up of all the workers in the enterprise, elects various committees: the workers' council and the management committee. Each committee, once elected, has the right to elect its own president or chairman. The job of the president is to operate the enterprise, assisted by an administrative director who represents the state in the enterprise. The administrative director is in charge of the day-to-day operation of the enterprise. The director implements decisions taken by the committees and authorized by the president.

The workers' General Assembly meets four times a year. One-third of the members of the workers' council or the management committee have the right to call such meetings. The functions of the General Assembly are as follows: (1) approval of the annual plan of the enterprise and adoption of policies in matters of production, marketing, and investment; and (2) distribution of responsibility among the workers in an enterprise and the limitation of the power of each worker, according to his responsibility, to ensure that cooperation prevails in mutual respect and appreciation.

The General Assembly functions in a large enterprise where there is a high number of workers. If the number of employees in an enterprise is less than thirty, there is no need to create a General Assembly. According to the state rule, the workers' council assumes the responsibility of the General Assembly. In such a situation there is only a two-tier system, the workers' council and the management committee. The permanent workers will automatically be members of the workers' council, and the workers' council is charged with election of the management committee.

Normally the tasks of the workers' council are as follows:

(1) The workers' council meets more often during the year than the General Assembly. Usually, the workers' council meets at the end of each month. The management committee is elected by the workers' council. The recruitment, suspension, and dismissal of the workers comes under the jurisdiction of the workers' council.

(2) The workers' council implements decisions taken by the General Assembly. These decisions regard investment in equipment and short-term loans.

(3) Each plant of fifteen or more workers has the right to elect one member to the workers' council. Normally, the workers' council consists of 100 workers, the majority of whom are directly engaged in production. The workers' council meeting is called by the management committee or by one-third of its members.

(4) The workers' council appoints the members of the management committee. They are selected from the members of the workers' council.

The management committee is the backbone of the enterprise. It works under the General Assembly and the workers' council. Once those two committees have set up the general line of operation, the management committee operates autonomously, assisted by a director. The director is in charge of technical matters and represents the state in the enterprise. The task of the management committee consists of: (1) preparing the annual budget of the enterprise; and (2) making decisions in matters of marketing, short-term loans, and the purchase of spare parts for the enterprise.

The communal council consists of the president of the General Assembly of the enterprise and representatives of the party, the UGTA, the army, and the local administration.

The socialist content of autogestion involves the means of production being publicly owned, and the worker in the autogestion being a free producer for himself and for the national collectivity. Management is in the hands of the workers, assisted by a director appointed by the

Ministry of Agriculture. Profits obtained are divided into two parts: one part goes to the national collectivity, and one part to the workers. Unlike participation in the socialist enterprise, the autogestion unit has the power to make decisions, and the workers assume the responsibility of management. Power invested by the management committee is deliberative and not consultative. As described above, socialist enterprises do not possess powers of deliberation; their power consists of making recommendations, consulting, and approving certain matters related to the internal regulation of the enterprise. In autogestion, the *conseil d'administration* is absent. Instead, there is a *comité de gestion*, presided over by the president of the *Assemblée des Travail leurs*. The director of the autogestion unit is a simple member, and the majority of the members of this committee are workers.

The structure and organization of autogestion consist of the *Assemblée général des Travailleurs*, *le Conseil des Travailleurs*, *le comité de gestion*, and the director. Each of these organizations has a function. Unlike socialist enterprises, there are no permanent committees. Instead, there is a *comité de gestion*. The structure and organization of autogestion is in no way uniform: some autogestion units have a less structured organization than others. This difference is due mainly to the size of the working forces. The institution in which autogestion is set up is called a *domaine*. Usually, the *domaine* bears the name of someone from the area who was killed during the struggle against French colonialism. The workers who work in autogestion live in the *domaine* with their families; some live in the neighbouring villages. Most of the houses they occupy were built during the colonial period; these houses in the past were occupied exclusively by the owners of enterprises and their collaborators. At present, these houses accommodate a number of families. The children of the workers attend school in the neighbouring villages or on the *domaine*. There are special schools created for dropout workers' children. These schools train workers' children in special skills, such as rural nursing, home economics, secretarial skills, and elementary education. The housing condition of agricultural workers has improved since 1972. The government, with the help of servicemen, is constructing several villages, known as "socialist villages." In each province, several such villages were built. However, these villages are not exclusively for workers in autogestion. Most parts of these villages were settled, until recently, by workers in cooperative societies. This group was hosted in temporary houses, and some of them still live in such houses. The government has given precedence to this group. The socialist villages have modern amenities such as electricity and running water, and schools, shops, clinics, and mosques.

The external structure of autogestion is not similar to that of socialist enterprises. The political and administrative institution of the local collectivity defines the organization and the function of autogestion. The local collectivities are: the *kasma*, the *commune*, and the *assemblée provinciale*. Within these local collective bodies, there is a *conseil de regroupement* which brings together all organizations dealing with autogestion. The president of the *Assemblée des Travailleurs*, once elected, is automatically a member of these local collectivities.

This *conseil* regulates and clarifies the relation between autogestion and the politico-economic environment. The main task of this conseil is *animation*, coordination, and arbitration. The environment involves the commercialization of agricultural produce by state agencies, for both internal and external markets, and the banking institution, which provides credit to autogestion.

The relationship between workers and cadres is marked by constant tension and over-differentiation of their lifestyles, due to the positions they occupy in Algerian society. The cadres enjoy higher social and economic amenities in relation to the workers. The representatives of the party in the state agency for the collection of agricultural surplus, that is to say, the directors of the Coopérative Agricole Polyvalente Communale de Services (CAPCS), COFEL, and OFLA, deal with the commercialization of fruits and vegetables, for interregional distribution and for export. The relationship between these agencies, the president of the *Assemblée communale*, and the coordinator of the party, is based on mutual interest. These groups are the new sheiks of the villages, and some of them have been holding such positions for quite a long time, with the exception of the presidents of the *Assemblées communales*, who are, most of the time, natives of the village. The other two categories normally are imported from other regions. The coordinator party is an honourary position; he also holds other positions such as the director of a school, or a civil service position in one of the socialist enterprises in the area. Table 46 indicates the conflict existing between workers and cadres.

This survey shows that both agricultural and industrial workers considered the major area of conflict between them and cadres to be due to a lack of personal comprehension (fifty-four percent and sixty-eight percent respectively, as shown in Table 46). These percentage

TABLE 46

CONFLICT BETWEEN WORKERS AND CADRES

Reason for Conflict	Agriculture		Industry	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Ideological	23	22.8	26	19.8
Lack of responsibility	31	30.7	47	35.9
Lack of personal comprehension	54	53.5	68	51.9
Total	101		131	

Source: M. Abucar, field notes, 1976.

Note: Frequences and percentages do not total because some respondants mentioned more than one reason.

differences show that the industrial worker sees this conflict as more serious than do the agricultural workers. Both types of workers experience hostility towards the cadres at different levels of the institutional structure. The industrial workers experience it very much in relation to the administrative or bureaucratic cadres, rather than to the elected one such as the president of the *Assemblée populaire*. Industrial workers' experience is unlike agricultural workers' experience in relation to direct contact with the cadres having responsibilities to the community of which they are a part and their having a certain power of intervention in the institution in which they work. There is a very distinctive lifestyle difference between workers and cadres, based on housing, social and political privilege, accessibility to material possessions such as automobiles, ownership of certain property, income differences, and political contact.

Because of their privileged position in the community, some cadres may take advantages that are not acceptable to the community and may sometimes show less concern for the well-being of the workers and the community. This tendency is becoming obvious in the current Algerian situation. Despite this problem, ideological difference is not a major issue at this time, since the cadres as well as the workers accept the view of the national objective. A major issue that could defeat the national objective is the lack of responsibility and the lack of personal comprehension; if it is to continue it will gradually undermine the popular aspirations of the masses. The ideological differences which are still in an embryonic state, and yet which already show up in the survey as a factor of conflict, will grow and will become a dominant factor, due to class differences between the two social categories. The only country in the world which has addressed the crucial problems between workers and cadres has been China, during Chairman Mao's reign; there the social ambivalence which can reinstate bureaucratic domination was corrected.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, PART II

Part II of this study has analyzed the ways and means by which the Algerian revolution dealt with the decolonization process: the re-establishment of a national culture and Algerian personality, reorganization of the economy and the social structure, and the organization of Algerian workers.

Algeria had been under colonial settlement for 130 years, during which the French established a cultural hegemony. The Arab culture, which was in a predominant position in pre-colonial Algeria, was replaced by French culture in major public and private institutions, in business, and in the administration. In major urban areas of Algeria, the French language and culture assumed importance. The acculturation process occurred in those areas in which the indigenous population began to learn the French language and culture as a means of survival within the colonial settlement. This, however, became a problem after Algerian independence. This group which came into contact with French culture, constituting the minority of Algerians, assumed importance in the newly established Algerian administration. The Algerian government became aware of the danger of cultural hegemony and reinstated the Arabic language as the official language and religion, limiting the French language to certain specific areas such as the acquisition of technological knowledge.

Algerian society is now divided along francophone and arabophone lines, depending whether the people are trained in Arabic or French. There are unilingual and bilingual schools. Arabic schools are assuming importance in the decolonization of culture due to the acceleration of arabization of the mass media and cultural activities.

The decolonization of culture goes hand in hand with the reform of Algerian traditional culture based on Islam. Current cultural programmes emphasize the scientific approach to Algerian culture and society by creating a new society based on socialist culture. A constant dialogue is promoted, with the aims of bridging the gap between Islam and socialism by emphasizing the similarities rather than the differences.

The Islamic culture and socialism constitute the national culture. Socialism reflects the organization of society and culture. Algerian national development aims at creating a self-centered system whereby industry creates the conditions for agricultural innovation and whereby the dependency of agriculture on the outside sources of machines, tools, and fertilizers can be reduced. The growth of the internal markets associated with the interrelation between industry and agriculture will create more job opportunity in the service sector and light industry. The Algerian option for national development aims at creating jobs and providing by 1980 an income to all Algerian citizens.

In the last ten years, the public sector became dominant and now controls sixty percent of the key sectors of the national economy. The private sector controls thirty percent of the national economy. Only ten percent of the economy is in the pre-colonial mode of production.

Organizations of Algerian workers were set up in 1962, first in agriculture as a form of workers' management committee and then as worker participation in industry. There are two forms of organization: workers' self-management in agriculture and worker participation in industry. Workers' self-management has greater autonomy than worker participation. Proper organization of these institutions was begun in 1969, and 1976 was the turning point for these organizations in Algeria.

In either form of organization the workers do share the benefit of the enterprise and have their own elected representative in each unit of production. The problem of technical and popular control remains, and it is a source of secondary conflict, but the main conflict is between the public and private sectors. The state represents the interest of the national collectivity and regulates the national economy. To this end--the decolonization of the national economy--the state has established public institutions such as sociétés nationales, cooperative societies, workers' self-management, central planning, and the use of elected representatives at all levels within the country to supervise, control, and deal with the problems associated with the organization of workers and the performance of the economy.

PART III

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF ALGERIAN WORKERS

CHAPTER 10

SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF ALGERIAN WORKERS

A. WAGES AND INCOME: AN OVERVIEW

The component aspects of the Algerian worker's income are: wages and social benefits. Each worker receives a fixed annual income, divided into twelve months, with the exception of seasonal workers, who are paid periodically, working no longer than a week or a month. Seasonal workers are common in the agricultural sector, both paid and unpaid. The latter constitute mainly a *volontariat*, drawn from organized groups such as students from post-secondary and secondary institutions, the Armée Nationale et Populaire (ANP), the Union Nationale des Femmes Algériennes (UNFA), and the Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens (UGTA).

The paid seasonal worker receives 15.30 to 20 AD per day, and he is not entitled to benefits. Paid and unpaid seasonal workers obtain a gift from the production units of the agricultural enterprise. The nature of the gift varies from season to season but often consists of potatoes, tomatoes, vegetables, or oranges. These are given to them for personal consumption on the spot or to bring to their families. This gift is minimal, for example a handful of oranges.

The distinction between skilled and unskilled labour is more commonly made in the industrial sector; it is less common in agricultural enterprises. In the agricultural sector, because a specialized division of labour is very low, each permanent worker receives the same monthly allowance plus a family allowance.

Industrial workers, like agricultural workers, receive a monthly income as well as an annual income. But in industry, monthly income expressed as wages is not uniform for all workers, because there are more occupational differentials in industry than in agriculture. There are at least six occupational categories in industry (see Table 59, section C). The variation of wages between workers is determined by their occupation in the factory.

While wage difference is accepted within the framework of occupational distinction, equal sharing is practised in the distribution of profits among workers, regardless of their positions within the hierarchical structure of the enterprise. Under this principle, those who have worked 366 days receive a maximum share of social benefits.

The Algerian experience suggests that middle and upper occupational categories receive larger shares in the distribution of social benefits because absenteeism is higher in the low categories than in the upper categories (25 to 5 percent respectively). Age difference is one factor of difference in income. The lower categories are between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five.

Distribution of profit takes place at the end of each year. The share given to the workers, whether in the agricultural or the industrial sector, is known as social benefits. The accumulation of variable-wage components and the sum of fixed wages make up the total income of the worker. In Algerian labour relation disputes, the distribution of earned income is more of an issue than wages. Wages become an issue when there are inter-industrial wage differences.

The factors that are relevant in terms of reducing absenteeism are family responsibility, job satisfaction, occupational responsibility, and political awareness. These characteristics are more commonly found among the upper and middle categories of workers than among the lower categories. These categories, because of their income and the positions they occupy in the factory, are able to acquire more urban amenities such as private cars and housing, which are difficult to obtain in Algeria due to the nature of Algerian development at present.

There are other relevant factors that have a direct effect on income variation between the workers in industry and in agriculture. One is the way in which the performance of industrial or agricultural enterprises is evaluated by the government. The government employs three criteria to determine the performance of an enterprise: *déficit*, *équilibre*, and *bénéfice*. If an enterprise is declared *déficitaire*, its power for borrowing money from the bank ceases to exist. The government places such an enterprise under the control of the ministry concerned.

The reasons that lead an enterprise to undergo such an experience vary from one enterprise to another. But the most common reasons given in such situations are:

(1) The age situation of workers in the production unit;
(2) The experience in working together;
(3) The regional-ethnic background difference;
(4) Knowledge and experience of work; and
(5) Conflict between the workers and management.

CASE I. At the end of the war of liberation, some members of the FLN went back to work in agriculture. The government created a cooperative known as the Coopérative Agricole Polyvalente El-Moujahid (CAPEM).

Some of the participants were old and felt it was impossible to carry on the work needed in order to make the farm productive enough. What they did was to hire casual labour to do the job. This increased production costs and did not improve the economic performance of the cooperative. This is not the general situation within CAPEM, but this experience occurred mainly in such cooperatives. Some types of cooperatives I visited have done very well; nevertheless, exceptional cases do exist.

I asked the following question on several occasions in different units of production I visited: "What makes your unit benefit?" The answers I got were that the success of a farm unit depends on various factors: (1) ecological and technological, (2) human interpersonal relations, (3) work conditions, and (4) experience in work and learning to work together.

The *Autogestion Agricole* units where I carried out my field work at Stoual and El-Hadj (see Chapter 1, Table 1) have been profitable for a long period of time. The reason for their success is due to various factors mentioned above and to an optimum spirit of cooperation between the members of production units. The members had longstanding relationships, and they developed a structure based on a give-and-take relationship. Most of them worked together during the colonial period in the same enterprise, formerly owned by one man. A senior member of one of the enterprises told me: "Thank God we are free now and collect the fruit of our labour. There is no 'Maalen' [Patron]."

The distribution of benefits at this particular domaine took place at the beginning of December 1976. At the banquet table there were the president of the Assemblée Populaire de la Commune (APC), the coordinator of the FLN at the commune level, the representative of the Union Nationale des Femmes Algériennes (UNFA), the director of the enterprise, the president of the Assemblée des Travailleurs (AT), the representative of the Direction du Développement Régional (DDR), and an agronomist. Everyone at the ceremony was standing. The coordinator of the party delivered a short speech of encouragement, and after that the president of the Assemblée des Travailleurs started calling the name of each benefitor. A sealed envelope was handed over in turn by the representatives standing behind the table. Even I had my turn to shake the hand of the benefitor and hand over an envelope. There is no single person who dominates the ceremony. After that, we all retreated to have soft drinks and sweets at the next table in the room.

I glanced at the list of the names which were on the table and saw that some of the benefitors received over 2,000 AD, and some received less. The reason for the difference in benefits is due to the level of work participation. The maximum working load is 280 days per year for agricultural workers and 360 days for industrial workers. Those who got less than the full amount of benefits were those whose participation had not reached the maximum load required.

Other factors that limit the income of workers in agriculture are the quality and amount of the land. Some lands are not as productive as others. The availability of water in the form of rain, underground water, rivers, or lakes, is a necessary condition for agricultural farms to perform adequately. Therefore, the income differential between agricultural workers is based on low agricultural production per capita and per unit of land; the low percentage of land under cultivation is due to inadequate water supply.

Algeria, unlike most developing countries, does not suffer from the land tenure system. Most land belongs to the national collectivity. The absentee landlord and subdivisions of the land by inheritance have been removed from the Algerian situation; they would have curtailed the income of the agricultural population. In Algeria, the small farms privately owned by Algerian citizens are provided with technical assistance and the marketing of their products. The Coopérative Agricole Polyvalente Communale des Services (CAPCS) handles all problems connected with small farmers. The CAPCS deals with all agricultural units, whether they are cooperatives or under autogestion. However, the technical service facilities that are available at the Coopérative Agricole Polyvalente des Services is not adequate enough in some communes to meet the needs of the Coopérative Agricole Polyvalente de la Révolution Agraire (CAPRA), or the autogestion and the small farmers, as this quotation demonstrates:

> D'un autre côté, on note qu'une partie du matériel attribué est sous-utilisée et qu'il aurait été préférable, au lieu de l'attribuer à une seule coopérative, de la mettre à la disposition de plusieurs, en le cédant à une coopérative polyvalente de service (CAPCS). On constate par exemple que certains tracteurs à chenille ont travaillé seulement 800 à 1.000 heures par an, alors qu'ils doivent faire en moyenne 1.500 heures pour couvrir leur coût d'entretien et leur amortissement. Les CAPRA ont dû ainsi supporter en moyenne 170 DA à l'hectare de charges d'amortissement. Il faut aussi ajouter que ces CAPRA préféraient louer leur matériel sous-utilisé à des privés ou à d'autres CAPRA plutôt que de la laisser inactif. Ce fait engendrait certaines inégalités entre les coopératives, accentuées par la plus faible importance du matériel attribué aux coopératives de plus petite dimension. D'autre part, ces locations de matériel encouragaient le développement de rapports de production basés sur la recherche du profit au bénéfice d'un petit groupe de coopérateurs, et aux dépens des autres. (Zara, 1976, p. 7)

The mechanization of cooperative societies such as the Coopérative Algérienne Polyvalente de Réforme Agraire has produced certain side effects. Some cooperatives are more mechanized than others, and this has an effect on their level of production, which in turn has an effect on their financial situation. The unequal availability of machines and tools to all cooperatives at the same time generates, during the transition, an uneven financial situation between cooperatives. The involution of technology caused by the overuse of tractors by several cooperatives has side effects on the process of production, and this is caused by employing, for example, the tractor beyond its limits. Tractors have the capacity to work 800 to 1,000 hours a year. When several cooperatives or private farms use the same tractor, it is found that sometimes the same tractor was used on an average of 1,500 hours per year. The problem is aggravated when the desire of government agencies, such as the CAPES, to maximize profits, is taken into consideration, since the cooperative or small farmers rent the tractors from CAPES on an average charge of 120 DA per hectare.

Agricultural income remains low, because the prices of agricultural products normally are kept low in order to satisfy the basic needs of the people. So, even if the production of agriculture is increased, what the agricultural worker can obtain in terms of income is limited. However, there are differences in income between agricultural workers. The cooperative societies are not all in the same income group. Some have more income than others. This applies also to the workers in *autogestion*, because some have better land than others.

Some cooperatives, such as the Coopérative Agricole Polyvalente de la Révolution Algérienne (CAPRA) have less income than, say, other workers in *autogestion*. However, there are some Coopératives Agricoles

Polyvalentes de la Révolution Algérienne who are performing very well and have achieved an income greater than *autogestion*. Such types of cooperatives are located in fertile land and grow crops which are export-oriented, such as oranges, grapefruits, and potatoes. Because of the higher quality of these products, they are in demand both on national and international markets. Those cooperatives among the Coopératives Agricoles Polyvalentes de la Révolution Algérienne who have a low income are those who grow traditional products for local consumption, such as hard wheat, soft wheat, hay, dry vegetables, and melons. It has been estimated that an average family consumption of cereals is ten quintals for each cooperative.

The members of the cooperative societies or *autogestion* are sometimes subject to internal conflicts; when such conflicts persist for a long period of time, they have an indirect effect on the productivity level of the enterprise, which in turn has an effect on the income of the workers.

CASE II. The DIRADREAN has 132 Coopératives Agricoles Polyvalentes de la Révolution Algérienne (CAPRAs). Only one cooperative did not show profits in 1976. The rest obtained an annual profit of a minimum 900 to a maximum of 11,000 AD. The reasons one cooperative did not earn profits were internal conflicts between its members. I learned that the members had different regional backgrounds, that interaction among them was not frequent, and that their relationship was built on mistrust and lack of cooperation. Their cooperative was located in some of the most fertile lands in Algeria (Annaba). Algerian agricultural experts told me that in this part of Algeria the land is similar to that of California and capable of growing a variety of vegetables and fruits. The failure of the cooperative to be productive was not due to technological involution or to poor land but to the lack of cooperation between the members of the cooperative.

The income of agricultural workers in *autogestion* and cooperatives is not equal. This inequality of income is due partly to the nature of the land under cultivation (see Table 47).

If we take for granted that each worker supports a family, then the private sector, most likely, is the highest income group. They own on the average 47.61 hectares per family (see Table 48), despite a land offer of inequality for income which exists in some parts of rural Africa. If we examine land holdings as percentages of the total agricultural land in the Daira, *autogestion* holds 67.73 percent of the total land, and 22.86 percent is held by cooperatives (see Table 49). The total area under private ownership is 8.46 percent. What urges this group to earn more than this is that few families own more land than any family in the Daira. The lowest income group is in rural Algeria, which is the petite fellah.

Wage differences exist between the private and the public sectors (see section B), but in terms of income some public enterprises provided workers with more income than the private sector. The workers in public enterprises are entitled to benefits derived from profit sharing and bonuses and from improvements in skill and professionalism through further training either in the enterprise or through study leave abroad. Such opportunities are not available in the private sector. However, the public sector has institutional problems that have indirect

TABLE 47

LAND HOLDINGS PER UNIT, DAIR EL HADJAR

Public or Private Institution	Hectares of Land	Total Workers	Permanent Workers	Seasonal Workers	Units	Families
Private farm	1,000					21
Autogestion	8,000	1,350	850	500	11	
Cooperative (CAPRA)	2,700	429	429		32	
Petite fellah	111					46
Totals	11,811	1,779	1,279	500	43	67

Source: M. Abucar, field notes, 1976.

TABLE 48

DISTRIBUTION OF LAND, DAIR EL HADJAR

(in hectares)

Public or Private Institution	Land per Worker	Land per Unit	Land per Family
Private farm	-	--	47.61
Autogestion	9.41	727.27	-
Cooperative (CAPRA)	6.29	84.37	-
Petite fellah	-	-	2.41

Source: M. Abucar, field notes, 1976.

TABLE 49

DISTRIBUTION OF LAND, DAIR EL HADJAR

(in percent)

Public or Private Institution	Land per Family	Land per Unit
Private farm	8.46	-
Autogestion	-	67.73
Cooperative (CAPRA)	-	22.86
Petite fellah	0.94	-

Source: M. Abucar, field notes, 1976.

effects on the level of production, which in turn affects the income of the workers.

These problems are technical control exercised by the directeurs généraux of the sociétés nationales, the Secrétariat du Plan, and the Ministère des Finances. I have already discussed some of these problems in Chapter 8; it is sufficient here to illustrate two problems.

One is related to the production environment, namely the distribution and acquisition of raw materials and the distribution of contracts to various units of the société nationale. The second is the distribution of profits to the units. In the past, each unit used to purchase its own equipment, spare parts, and raw materials from abroad. The Algerian experience suggests that some of these materials were oversupplied in some units and undersupplied in others. This practice led the government to spend more hard currency for certain equipment that was oversupplied and less on raw materials. In order to stop this practice, the government established centralized stock pools. This provided the necessary equipment, spare parts, and raw materials needed for all units of the national enterprise. However, there are problems between the main office of the société nationale and the units--mainly delivery of the material and transport costs. The bureaucratization of raw materials and spare parts is associated with delays in delivery. Transport costs are paid by the units. These two problems have a direct effect on production performance. If production performance is low during the year, the annual income of the worker will be low, too.

Another major problem which affects the income of industrial workers is the conflict between management and workers. This conflict is over profit sharing, and sometimes over organizational problems. For example, the government has contracts with friendly nations to build wagons. The unit in charge produced the wagon, but the government has not paid back the cost value to the unit because it was a long-term contract. In this case, the workers may not receive benefits.

B. THE EVOLUTION OF WAGE STRUCTURE AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF NATIONAL INCOME

Political independence did not, in most parts of the African continent, lead to an improvement in the standard of living of the masses, because the colonial situation persisted in the post-independence situation. However, political independence has raised the expectation of the masses for obtaining their share of the national income, which they were denied during the colonial era. The Algerian situation in 1963 was that the agricultural population made up 63 percent of the total population and received a lesser share of the national income than the non-agricultural population (see Table 50). The agricultural population

TABLE 50

DISTRIBUTION OF REVENUE TO AGRICULTURAL POPULATION, 1963

(in percent of national totals)

	Population	Revenue
Salaried	18	7.92
Non-salaried	45	8.15
Total	63	16.07

Source: Ministry of Work and Social Affairs, Algiers, 1976.

received 16.07 percent: 18 percent received 7.93 percent and 45 percent received 8.15 percent of the national revenue. The disparity of income existing between the agricultural and the non-agricultural population originated in the colonial situation. The agricultural population who benefited during that period were those workers associated with modern agricultural sectors. This group received a larger share of the national revenue than those engaged in traditional sectors, and who were self-employed. Table 50 indicates the differences.

The Algerian government became aware of the situation when the technical elaboration of the national plan took shape; it was then that the quantitative analysis of inequality of income was first obtained. This analysis constituted the basis for planning the first four years of national development (1970-1973). Prior to this period, the Algerian situation was as indicated in Table 51.

TABLE 51

DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION AND REVENUE FOR THE AGRICULTURAL AND NON-AGRICULTURAL SECTORS

(in percent)

	Population	Revenue
Secteur agricole	63	16.07
Secteur non-agricole	37	83.93
Total	100	100.00

Source: Ministry of Work and Social Affairs, 1976.

In 1963, only 37 percent of the population was engaged in the non-agricultural sector. This group appropriated 83.93 percent of the national revenue. The pre-colonial mode of production received a lesser share of the national income than the modern non-agricultural sector, and the non-agricultural sector received a more significant share of the national income than the modern agricultural sector. This state of unequal distribution of national income was due to the colonial economy which Algeria inherited from French colonial settlement.

In 1967, a distinguishable pattern emerged in the Algerian national economy, due to the decolonization process upon which the Algerian government began to embark shortly after independence (see Chapter 8, section A). The transformation of the national economy started in 1962. The agricultural sector was transformed into workers' self-management enterprises. This sector is known as the *secteur autogéré*. In 1967, a strong public sector emerged, consisting of key industries such as hydrocarbons, steel, mines, and mechanics. This sector is known as the socialized sector.

Despite the development of a strong public sector in the post-independence situation, the private sector was led by a newly emerged national bourgeoisie. This sector represented a threat to non-capitalist development in Algeria. The conditions which gave rise to a private national sector are not clear, but several interpretations are given for the origin of the private national sector. The origin of the contemporary Algerian national bourgeoisie is not known, but it is generally believed that this group was associated with the development of the private sector, which had its origin during the colonial period, although at that time the non-agricultural sector was in the hands of the settlers. On the other hand, there is also a tendency to attribute the origins of the present Algerian national bourgeoisie to the decolonization of the national economy, whereby the private Algerian citizen bought land or business (or was given them by the foreign entrepreneur with whom they collaborated).

Besides these two explanations for the origin of the Algerian national bourgeoisie, there is a third explanation which holds that since 1962 the government has encouraged the development of a national bourgeoisie in order to create the conditions for their development. These conditions are:

(1) Outlawing foreign entrepreneurs to engage in economic activities;

(2) Providing an opportunity for national entrepreneurs to obtain a contract from national companies if they intended to create jobs; and

(3) Attracting many civil servants who previously held a high position in the public service or in the military to move into the private sector.

These groups now constitute the Algerian national industrial bourgeoisie. In the major cities of Algeria, their presence is felt. The following quotation illustrates the point:

> La bourgeoisie nationale existe en réalité mais cette bourgeoisie nationale s'il y a quelques cas très infimes de vrais, de grands capitalistes, la plupart en réalité ce sont des petits entrepreneurs de petites industries par conséquent ce ne sont vraiment pas le poids de cette bourgeoisie qui n'est d'ailleurs pas très grande. Le secteur privé économique est contrôlé par ses matières premières ils les achètent, soit à une société nationale, soit aux monopoles d'importation qui sont également de l'Etat, les banques sont entre les mains de l'Etat, par conséquent la politique du crédit sont entre les mains de l'Etat. (Abucar, field notes, 1976)

I had formal and informal interviews with the new Algerian national bourgeoisie in the Algiers, Annaba, and Biskara regions. According to them, they are performing a service to the nation because they replace foreign entrepreneurs, but they fear the growing power of the working class, agrarian reform, and nationalization.

I visited two private companies (one in agriculture and one in industry); both enterprises employed twenty-one workers. The agricultural enterprise was owned and operated by an Algerian, who in the past held large tracts of land near the land of the settlers. In 1972 the government introduced a land reform programme. The Algerian's land was divided into three parts. Two parts were placed under cooperative societies, and a small part was left for him. He was, at the age of sixty, constantly seen in the field working with his employees.

Private industry was owned by one of the Algerians who made a fortune during the departure of the colonists and consolidated his economic gains after independence. He started with a machine repair shop which he leased from the owner, who left for France. In 1969, he bought a small industry specializing in agricultural equipment, from a French owner. He was in his late thirties and in many ways resembled a small capitalist; he did not have time to receive me. I interviewed his cousin, who is the manager. I was told that some of the private industries employ more than eight hundred workers, and occasionally, if possible, the owner of the industry possesses several medium-sized industries in many parts of the country. Some of them employ a large number of engineers of different nationalities.

The decolonization of the national economy gave rise to the private and public sectors. The public sector consists of the socialized sector, the cooperative societies, and the *autogestion*. Table 52 indicates that there is a difference in wages between the public and private sectors; the private sector remunerates the worker with more than the public sector. This, however, is true only for *la main d'oeuvre qualifiée*.

But in respect to *travailleurs non qualifiés*, both sectors reward equally. The overall view of the wage structure between the two sectors shows differences between the private and the public sectors. Columns 6 and 7 of Table 52 indicate that the private sector leads and is far ahead of the public sector because the average wage is higher in all professional categories, despite the difference in average wage between the private and public sectors. There is also, at the same time, in the public sector a difference in average income between the agricultural and industrial sectors. Workers in the *autogestion* are the lowest paid of all workers in the national economy.

The government has set up a special commission to review differences in wages between agricultural and industrial workers and to make uniform the wage system between various industries, at the same time gradually increasing the wage system in the agricultural sector so as to bring it up to a comparable position with industry. In 1972, wages in the agricultural sector increased from 15.30 to 20 AD per day. From May 1978 to November 1978, the minimum wage in the agricultural sector increased from 24 to 28 AD per day. In the period of a year, wages in agriculture increased by eighty-three percent.

Improvement in basic wages started in 1967, five years after Algerian independence. Table 53 indicates the rate of increase of

TABLE 52

MONTHLY INCOME OF SOCIAL CATEGORIES EMPLOYED IN AUTOGESTION, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS

Secteurs	Cadres et Cadres supérieurs	Techniciens Techniciens supérieurs Chefs d'équipes Ouvriers H.Q Ouvriers Q.	Agents techniques Chefs d'équipes Ouvriers H.Q. Ouvriers Q.	Ouvriers spécialisés Personnel des services administratifs	Manoeuvres sans qualification apprentis	Moyenne	Différence (1 - 6)
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Autogéré	1 192	[illegible]	699	531	464	679	513
Public I	1 765	1 132	710	574	486	719	1 046
Privé II	2 145	1 546	1 053	766	505	1 075	1 070
Différence (II - I)	+ 380	+ 414	+ 343	+ 192	+ 19		

Toute branches d'activité - en DA par mois 1967

Source: Ministry of Work and Social Affairs, 1976.

TABLE 53

ENQUETES SEMESTRIELLES SU L'EMPLOI ET LES SALAIRES DE 1967 ET DE 1974

SALAIRES HORAIRES MOYENS

Majorations pour heures supplémentaires, primes de rendement et prestations sociales non comprises.

	1967		1974	
	Minimum	Maximum	Minimum	Maximum
Manoeuvres	1 DA	3,07 DA	2,10 DA	[illegible] DA
Ouvriers spécialisés	1,23 DA	4,55 DA	2,24 DA	[illegible] DA
Ouvriers qualifiés	1,40 DA	5,35 DA	2,60 DA	[illegible] DA
Ouvriers hautement qualifiés	2 DA	5,54 DA	2,37 DA	[illegible] DA

Les résultats de l'enquête concernent toutes les branches et sont donnés sous forme de fourchettes, avec le taux minimum et le taux maximum constatés.

Source: Ministry of Work and Social Affairs, 1976.

the national minimum wage for each worker. Workers' wages increased between 1962 and 1976, due to the transformation of the national economy, and the public sector gained the confidence which made the wage increase possible. Features of a self-centered system have emerged with the expansion of local markets. Any increase of wages tended to expand local markets, something very much needed for expansion of the economy. However, the increase of wages was followed by an increase in prices. Table 54 indicates this trend. Price increases upset the wages, in particular the wages of the lower income categories. In 1976, in order to overcome an increasing cost of living, the government introduced transitional measures to supplement the salary of low-income workers, as this quotation demonstrates:

> Outre le relèvement du salaire national minimum garanti, dans la fonction publique, il a été créé à titre transitoire pour les fonctionnaires payés entre les points indiciaires 100 et 160 une indemnité mensuelle. Pour les fonctionnaires percevant 510 DA par mois cette indemnité représente 134 DA supplémentaires. Il est à rappeler que la valeur du point a été augmenté de 20% en 1974. Dans l'industrie, tous les travailleurs percevant moins de 800 DA par mois bénéficient d'un relèvement. (Ministry of Work and Social Affairs, 1976, p. 6)

This transitory social measure was intended to protect the buying power of the worker. Workers falling within this category are exempted from taxes and receive family allowances, free medicines, and financial support to meet basic necessities. However, not all workers benefit from this social measure; it is intended to assist only those workers whose wages do not exceed 650 AD per month. Unlike industrial workers, most agricultural workers (and apprentice workers in industry) fall within this category.

The major conflict that exists between the state administration

TABLE 54

PRICE INDEX: MINIMUM WAGES IN INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE

Indices des prix	1969	1973	1974
Produits alimentaires	100	135,3	134,2
Indice général	100	120,4	[illegible]

Les différents relèvement du S.M.I.G. ont été :

Pour le S.M.I.G : (MINIMUM WAGES IN INDUSTRY PER HOUR)

Date	Taux du salaire horaire en DA		
	Zone I	Zone II	Zone III
25 Avril 1963	1,338	1,245	1,131
20 juillet 1970		1,36	
7 juillet 1972		1,73	
1er janvier 1974		2,08	
7 février 1975		2,40	

Pour le SMAG : (MINIMUM WAGES IN AGRICULTURE PER DAY)

Date	Taux du salaire journalier en DA
14 Juin 1963	7,54
27 juillet 1972	9,60
1er janvier 1974	12,25
7 février 1975	15,30
février 1977	20,00
mai 1978	28,00

Source: Ministry of Work and Social Affairs, 1976.

and the worker in Algeria is much more over benefits and marketing products and less over wage increases. The state administration constantly curtails any equal share of profits between workers and government. The colonial law that Algeria inherited from the French settlement is applicable when it comes to the profits earned by an enterprise. For example, workers have to pay ten percent of their share of profits to the provincial authority. This has an effect on the distribution of benefits to the workers and their volume of share with the state. On other occasions, if other units of the same enterprise have not made profits, their total share of profits is reduced, sometimes to nothing.

In the area of marketing, there is constant conflict between workers' self-management and intermediary institutions such as COFEL and OFLO (state agencies responsible for marketing agricultural products). The state administration has set up guidelines for market policy. Table 55 indicates the percentage of profit allowed for each institution, including self-management units.

TABLE 55

RATE OF PROFITS IN THE MARKETING OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS

Institution	District	Province	Abroad	Percent of Profit
OFLA			x	20
COFEL		x		15
CAPCS	x			15

Source: M. Abucar, field notes, 1976.

CAPCS has direct contact with producers (such as self-management units, Coopérative Agricole Polyvalente de la Révolution Agraire [CAPRA], and Coopérative Agricole Polyvalente Al-Moujahid [CAPAM]) to sell agricultural products at the district level. CAPCS receives a commission from these institutions for selling their products. CAPCS is run by a management committee consisting of representatives of CAPRA, CAPAM, and the self-management unit, assisted by a director who is appointed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform. OFLA, CAFEL, and CAPCS collect surpluses from the agricultural sector. Table 56 indicates the interrelationship between intermediary institutions and production units.

TABLE 56

INTERCONNECTIONS BETWEEN STATE AGENTS OF SURPLUS COLLECTORS AND THE PRODUCERS

Location	Working Relationship
Abroad	OFLA
	↑
Region	COFEL
	↑ ↓
District	CAPCA
	↙ | ↘
Producers	Domaine, CAPRA
	↓
	CAPAM

Source: M. Abucar, field work, 1976.

Note: The arrows indicate commercial transactions.

Each of the levels indicates economic interaction between producers and government. The state administrative agencies receive a commission, involving surpluses produced by the domaine, CAPRA, and CAPAM.

The capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production produce different sets of problems: the former gives rise to labour disputes based on wages and the latter to labour disputes based on profit sharing. In the Algerian situation, issues are not so much concerned with wage increases but with profit sharing between producers and the state, since an increase of wages is conceived of as increasing the economic power of labour on the market (considered acceptable so far as it provides a basis for the expansion of internal markets at the time and as an indirect stimulus for productivity). If the government wants to expand economic activities without increasing taxation, then the government appropriates more profits in profit-sharing between the state and producers.

Clark Kerr et al. (1964), Walter Galenson (1959), and W. H. Friedland and C. G. Rosbert, Jr. (1964) suggest that the main contemporary problem in labour relations in emerging nations is the degree to which governments control wages in favour of capital investment (in the sense that wages are kept low in order to achieve maximum profit for investment). The purpose of doing so is to reduce the rate of urban migration by creating jobs in the rural areas. The Algerian experience suggests differently, in the sense that through profit sharing the government employs various techniques to reduce the amount of money which goes into the hands of producers for personal benefit. For example, in the case of financial laws during the colonial era (discussed above), the government retains a share of the profit from the producers. The difference in approach to labour and industrial development depends upon the mode of production prevailing in that particular society. These social scientists fail to see that distinction.

A more detailed analysis of profit sharing will be presented in the next section. In the last eleven years, the Algerian wage structure has been subject to changes, due partly to rising expectations and partly to the fact that Algerian revolutionary government has assumed a dominant role in shaping life in Algerian society. At present, the public sector is more influential than the private sector. If we compare the wage structure during the colonial period and that of the post-independence period, there are differences, we shall see shortly, between the wages of Algerian workers in the colonial era and in present-day Algeria.

Tables 57 and 58 give an inside view of how wages in industry have increased. These tables represent two categories of workers. I personally interviewed both an *ouvrier ordinaire* and an *ouvrier professionel*. For the *ouvrier ordinaire*, the wage per hour during the period 1952-1960 increased by only 8.7 percent and during 1962-1970 by 45 percent (Table 58). The wages per hour for the *ouvrier professionnel* increased during the period 1950-1960 by 2.2 percent; compared with the post-independence period, the wages per hour increased 17.1 percent. Noticeable increases in wages took place after independence (see Table 57).

This increase of wages per hour between these categories indicates that the *ouvrier ordinaire* has obtained a higher percentage increase in the post-independence period. Despite this increase, there are still marked differences in income between various categories of

TABLE 57

WAGES, OUVRIERS PROFESSIONNELS

(in Algerian dinars)

Colonial Era		Post-Independence Era		
Year	Wages per Hour	Year	Wages per Month	Wages per Hour
1950	1.15	1962		1.70
1960	1.40	1964		2.11
		1967		3.46
		1970	912.00	3.80
		1971	950.00	
		1972	1,045.00	
		1975	1,423.00	

Source: M. Abucar, field notes, 1976.

TABLE 58

WAGES, OUVRIERS ORDINAIRES

(in Algerian dinars)

Colonial Era		Post-Independence Era		
Year	Wages per Day	Year	Wages per Month	Wages per Day
1952	87.85	1962		1.65
1960	1.65	1964		1.70
		1967		1.78
		1970		2.40
		1972	570.00	

Source: M. Abucar, field notes, 1976.

industrial workers (see Table 59), although from 1970-1975 the percentage of wage increases for the *ouvrier professionnel* declined from 17.1 to 11.2 percent from the previous period (see Table 57). This reflects a more equitable distribution of national income and a narrowing of the gap between various occupational categories. Table 60 provides an indication of how wages in the agricultural sector increased in the post-independence situation from 1963-1978. Wages for agricultural workers have increased annually on an average of twenty percent over the last fifteen years of Algerian independence.

C. PROFIT SHARING

One method of incentive the government employs to increase production, both in agriculture and in industry, is profit sharing. The distribution of profit between workers becomes possible only when units produce an adequate surplus. But what constitutes an adequate surplus is not defined as such; therefore it leaves unsolved frustrating problems for workers when decisions are made over the distribution of profits. The annual income for an enterprise is equal to the value of the annual production. Article I of the decree 60-17 for February 1969 states as follows:

> Article Premier: Le revenu annuel de chaque exploitation autogérée agricole est égal à la valeur de sa production annuelle--soit la masse des biens et services produits par elle durant une année--diminué des charges d'exploitation, y compris notamment la contribution créée par l'ordonnance no 68-653 du 30 Décembre 1968 relative à l'autogestion dans l'Agriculture, les salaires et primes versés aux saisonniers, les dotations pour provisions courantes ainsi que l'amortissement.
>
> Les variations d'inventaire doivent entrer en ligne de compte pour le calcul du revenu. Les avances sur revenu reçues au cours

TABLE 59

WAGES ACCORDING TO OCCUPATION, INDUSTRIAL SECTOR, 1977

(in Algerian dinars)

Occupation	Minimum	Maximum
Ouvrier ordinaire	484.27	687.77
Ouvrier specialisé	498.69	850.15
Ouvrier professionnel	922.80	1,439.54
Matrize	1,153.51	1,800.00
Cadre	1,937.13	3,021.90

Source: M. Abucar, field notes, 1977.

TABLE 60

THE EVOLUTION OF WAGE STRUCTURES IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR

(in Algerian dinars)

Year	Wages per Day
1963	7.00
1965	8.00
1967	9.80
1974	12.25
1976	15.30
1977	20.00
1978	28.00

Source: M. Abucar, field notes, 1976.

Note: Twenty percent per year for fifteen years.

> de l'année par les membres du collectif des travailleurs seront comptabilisées dans les charges d'exploitation. (Série Autogestion, 197 , page 22)

The annual value of production is divided into three parts:

- Le fonds de réserve légale;
- Le fonds de roulement; and
- Le fonds d'investissement.

Each agricultural enterprise is obliged to save ten percent of revenue for the undertaking or ten percent of the capital cost. The reserve fund is strictly controlled by workers, through their representative. It is deposited in the bank, near the enterprise, and each worker is able to verify the account. However, the above mentioned decree also regulates the rolling fund: the enterprise is allowed to operate up to ten to fifty percent for the annual income of the enterprise. In the case of misuse of this fund, the minister's concern in the enterprise obliges him to assume control of the *fonds de roulement* for any investment that may require expansion or the introduction of new technology. The Workers' General Assembly makes final decisions over the use of investment capital. But such decisions cannot be less than or exceed the amount of money earmarked by the national plan. The annual production of public enterprises is determined by the national plan as well as short- and long-term production. The national plan indirectly coordinates the activities of public enterprises with the help of the ministry concerned.

The method and utilization of the rolling capital and reserve capital is determined by the decree mentioned above. This capital cannot exceed more than one-twelfth of the amount paid for salaries during the budget period.

Agricultural enterprises have their share in profits, and this share is divided into three categories:

- Le fonds de répartition au travailleurs;
- Le fonds de primes; and
- Le fonds social.

The first and third, as a rule, are governed by the principle of equal accessibility, each worker receiving an equal share of the amount of money available to them. The other category of capital is given only to those workers who distinguish themselves from others. The criterion which governs the accessibility of *primes* is individual performance. Because of effective participation in increasing production, these individual workers earn extra points for their efforts. In agriculture, workers who have completed 280 days of work receive bonuses. The purpose of the bonus is to reduce absenteeism, which has an adverse effect on productivity. The *fonds de répartition aux travailleurs* are fixed by the Workers' General Assembly, but the amount that will fall within this category should not exceed one-sixth of total income paid in the previous financial year. The bonus given to individual workers is determined by the Workers' General Assembly. The amount of this fund is governed by the same ceiling imposed on the first category.

The *fonds social* are made available to assist workers in providing educational opportunity for their children and improving health facilities and housing projects. The final decision for these funds is invested in the Workers' General Assembly, but the coordination of any of the three projects is the responsibility of the Assemblée Populaire Communale.

Profit sharing was first introduced into agricultural autogestion. Later, profit sharing was applied to industrial enterprises; 1971 was the first time the government made it effective in all industrial enterprises, with the promulgation of the *Charte et Code de la Gestion Socialiste des Entreprises*. Furthermore, the government clarified these issues when the President of the Republic issued the *Circulaire Présidentielle 932* (1976), reaffirming the distribution of profits among workers in the industrial sector.

Articles 82, 83, and 84 of the *Charte et Code de la Gestion Socialiste des Entreprises* define profit sharing between the state and the industrial workers:

> Art. 82--Le résultat de l'entreprise est constitué annuellement par un bénéfice ou une perte d'exploitation.
>
> Il intègre l'ensemble des charges et des ressources inhérentes à son activité.
>
> Art. 83--Lorsque le résultat est bénéficiare, il se répartit ainsi:
> (1) fonds de revenus complémentaires des travailleurs.
> (2) quote-part de contribution aux charges de l'Etat.
> (3) quote-part affectée au patrimoine de l'entreprise.
>
> Art. 84--Il est créé un fonds de revenus complémentaires des travailleurs de l'entreprise ou de l'unité, alimenté par une quote-part prélevée sur les résultats nets globaux de l'entreprise ou de l'unité, selon un taux variable par branches d'activité. (*Charte Socialiste des Entreprises*, 1971, p. 27)

The amount allotted to workers is considered as a complementary income, which workers receive at the end of the year. The condition under which the workers receive a complementary income is described in *Circular 932*:

> Le principe qui présidera à la répartition sera celui de la répartition à parts égales à tous les travailleurs, en exonération des droits et taxes.
>
> Seuls les membres de l'unité à la date de la dite répartition y ayant travaillé pendant une période égale ou supérieure à six mois et n'ayant pas fait l'objet d'une sanction prononcée par la commission de discipline pendant l'exercice considéré

> auront le droit de bénéficier de ces revenus complémentaires.
>
> Les personnes ayant travaillé dans une unité bénéficiaire pendant six mois ou plus et moins d'un an au course de cet exercice ainsi que celles qui se seront absentées pour quelque motif que ce soit, à l'exclusion des missions dans le cadre de leurs activités professionnelles, participeront à la distribution des revenus au prorata de leur temps effectif de présence. (*Circular 932*, 1976, p. 4)

The conditions under which a worker loses his or her right to obtain a complementary income are absenteeism, disciplinary action, and when the worker was employed in the enterprise less than six months. Before any person can be sanctioned, a dialogue must take place. After that, the matter is referred to a disciplinary committee. Absenteeism is not an uncommon thing: it occurs frequently in Algeria. Both the government and the workers' organizations carry on an ideological combat to eliminate absenteeism and waste and to promote what they call production and productivity. Despite this concern, absenteeism exists, as this interview with the director of personnel of SONOCOMBE (Société Nationale Automobile) indicates:

> Il n'existe pas beaucoup d'absentéisme. La direction générale ne dépasse jamais 5%. La direction fabrication peut dépasser 5%, la direction des achats 5%, la direction personnel 5%, la direction technique 5 et 6%. L'absentéisme varie entre 5 et 10%. (Abucar, field notes, 1976)

Absenteeism is not uniform in all industrial enterprises: some enterprises have higher than ten percent. This constitutes a problem because production decreases. Workers' production becomes an important factor in determining the success or failure of an enterprise. It is also a factor in widening of the gap between the workers--some will obtain more income than others. Here it is not so much the individual gain but rather the gain of the collectivity which determines the success of the enterprise. This can be achieved if the efforts of the individual and the collectivity are coordinated. *Circulaire 932* states as follows:

> En premier lieu la mise en place d'un tel système suppose au préalable que des règles de fonctionnement, des normes et des éléments de pondération soient adoptés afin de pouvoir apprécier de façon cohérente le résultat dégagé. En effet, le résultat financier n'est pas toujours le signe de l'efficience ou d'un accroissement de la productivité globale de l'unité ou de l'entreprise.
>
> La première mesure à adopter par conséquent, devra porter sur l'intégration du résultat dans un système complet et cohérent d'évaluation et de sanction de l'effort individuel et collectif apprécié par rapport au rôle de l'entreprise dans le développement planifié de l'économie.
>
> Il convient par là d'éviter d'une part, que la recherche du seul résultat financier ne détourne les entreprises des objectifs planifiés, et d'autre part, de créer des faux clivages tant au sein des collectifs de travail que dans l'appréciation de l'efficience économique du système. Une telle situation peut être évitée si l'ensemble des dispositions règlementaires concernant la mise en place des instruments de direction, d'encadrement et de stimulation de l'économie sont réexaminés à la lumière des dispositions de l'ordonnance portant gestion socialiste des entreprises, et tenant compte de la nécessité de renforcer le développement socialiste de notre économie. (*Circulaire 932*, 1976, p. 2)

If workers do not receive their share of profit, a siege in opposition is practised instead of a strike, because in Algeria strikes, as practised in capitalist societies, are not allowed. The siege in opposition consists of lowering the level of production, without locking the factory. During the siege in opposition, the whole nation is alarmed; meetings are held to deal with the situation. The workers call a general meeting of all workers, and they declare themselves not responsible for the production until their claims are met. The director of the enterprise in such issues is with the workers, but the general meeting is presided over by the president of the Workers' General Assembly. In this meeting, petitions are drawn up to the President of the Republic.

The government never uses the police or the army to intervene. But the Party (FLN), the UGTA, and the Commission Nationale des Entreprises Socialistes (CNES) are called upon to mediate the disputing parties; the situation is kept within the structures of political and labour organizations. Neither the government nor the UGTA turn the issue into a public forum.

Conflict over distribution of profits is due to bad management practised within the enterprises or the main office of the National Company, to price structures and the accounting system, and sometimes to personality conflicts.

The Party and the UGTA can solve only the political aspects of a problem, not the technical aspects. For example, the accounting system of a unit of production in industry is kept in the main office of the National Company. The bank next to the enterprise units and the enterprise unit have their own accounting systems. If the enterprise employs more than a thousand workers, normally it has a huge bureaucratic office.

The FLN has special departments dealing with agricultural and industrial enterprise. They concentrate their efforts on political issues. The ministers concerned have a research centre, dealing only with technical problems. Workers' influence at the ministerial level is very limited. Therefore, if the issues in dispute are given a technical solution, the workers are at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the main office of the National Company.

A conscious effort is made by all parts of government to improve the socio-economic and cultural development of Algerian workers, despite these problems.

In 1976, the government took a strong position to increase wages in relation to production. *Circulaire 932* states as follows:

> Cependant, le résultat de l'entreprise ou de l'unité, pour revêtir sa pleine signification, doit également être précédée d'une définition complète d'une politique des salaires liée directement à l'accroissement de la production et de la productivité.
>
> En aucun cas l'intéressement aux résultats ne devra se réduire ou se confondre avec les primes de rendement et de productivité telles qu'elles existent dans les entreprises. Il ne peut non plus se confondre avec la pratique anormale des mois supplémentaires de salaries s'ajoutant à l'année calendaire. Le système à mettre en place est un système qui à chaque étape doit permettre de constater que l'activité de production, de gestion et de satisfaction des besoins s'est améliorée et accrue à tous les niveaux et répond aux objectifs planifiés, sur le plan qualitatif et quantitatif. (*Circulaire 932*, 1976, p. 3)

The overall increase in basic salary based on the achievement of the plan represents a new stage of development achieved through collective effort. This increment in wages implies distribution of national income; therefore, each worker receives his or her share, regardless of individual output or enterprise productivity. This, however, seems to be considered as a moral incentive based on broad principles of equality in sharing wealth created by the collectivity. The Algerian government pays attention also to incentives of a material character. The individuals' different capacities for production are recognized, each according to his performance. The first criterion for such arrangements reflects professional qualification, experience, and political commitment. Those workers who possess these qualifications are remunerated more than others (see Table 59, section C).

The evaluation of performance takes into consideration two important elements, the accomplishment of plan targets and ratings based on the number of extra points accumulated during the year. Price structure may upset the individual's and the enterprise's gain, due to the effect of the fluctuation in prices of raw materials and transport costs on the overall performance of the société nationale. Since material incentives take place in the context of production units, these units are interdependent: if half of these units succeed and the other half fail to meet targets, what one unit can achieve in performance depends on the total performance of the société nationale.

D. SOCIAL CHANGE

The colonial system undoubtedly creates its own contradictions, as history suggests, which promote large-scale social change because of conditions of marginalization, uneven regional development, and social and cultural involution. These conditions lead towards macro-social change. However, social and cultural involution is a by-product of genuine national development. In Algeria, the creation of a self-centered system has created an evolutionary pattern of social change. This type of social change is different from what Algeria experienced during the colonial period (see Chapter 8).

Clifford Geertz used the concept of social involution to denote a situation in which a society is involved in itself, because of ecological constraints. Such a society, according to him, will develop a system in which "all is an effort to provide everyone with some niche, however small, in the overall system" (Geertz, 1963, p. 82). The same concept was used by Golden Weiser (1935), demonstrating cultural involution, then social, in a different sense.

The phenomenon of social or cultural involution occurs in a situation of dependency--whether it is political, economic, or cultural--which has persisted in a society for a long period of time. This type of society develops a certain technique of survival in the face of the dependency relationship. The system of poverty sharing, for example, was practised in Algeria during the period of French colonialization, because of the constraints imposed upon the colonial system, which only accommodated a few Algerians; the broad mass of the people remained outside of the colonial system. This group, who were not within the colonial system, were the backbone of the Algerian revolution.

For Wertheim (1974), the pre-condition of evolution is involution, because involution creates the conditions for social change:

> Where involution has taken place, there will be a moment when a breaking-point is reached. The relative stagnation and backwardness associated with involutional processes will eventually result in a crisis expressing itself in serious dissatisfaction and restiveness among significant sections of the population. As soon as the dead end produced by over-specialization is reached, only a forceful and cataclysmic breakthrough can produce a reversal of the involutionary trends. Previous retardation tion thus produces acceleration in the further course of evolution. We could deduce from this that revolution is most likely to become the obvious way out. There remain, however, a few basic questions. (Wertheim, 1974, p. 75)

Contemporary Algerian national development and the organization of Algerian society is due to the development of the Algerian revolution. The historical development of Algerian national liberation was discussed in Chapters 4 and 8, and we have analyzed the process of involution in Algerian society, based on the transformation of the means of production and the creation of an economic model oriented towards inward movement. This macro-approach to social change was the outcome of the Algerian revolution. Further development of social change will be discussed in the next chapter; it is sufficient here to analyze briefly how the factory system has had an impact on Algerian social structures, namely the social involution of Algerian society in this connection. Three factors will be considered: the family, group solidarity, and the national bourgeoisie.

The Algerian family is moving from complex institutions to simple institutions (see Chapter 3). The extended family was subject to external influence and transformation for a long period of time. These influences have not led to an evolution of patterns of social change but rather to social dislocation and social involution. The outcome of social involution was not due to democratic factors but to constraints created by colonial dependence, because Algeria has not experienced, as Algerian history suggests, higher population growth during the colonial period, but rather a slow-down of population growth (see Chapter 3).

In 1967, an economic structure came into existence to replace the colonial structure; the effect of this economic structure upon the social structure has been felt in recent years. The more people employed in nationalized enterprises, the more Algerian family structures began to change from complex to simple institutions.

The working population of Algeria increased tremendously, compared to the colonial period. At present, in the public sector alone, more than 2,335,200 individuals are employed. Thus, most of the people want to establish their own families; this will diminish the extended family in importance and give rise to new family structures, which have begun to emerge. There are several factors that contributed to these changes.

First of all, education is open to all Algerian citizens at present; this will provide them the opportunity to acquire skills. It is estimated that by 1990 Algeria will have 2,774,000 specialized workers (see Table 61). Secondly, in-service training is encouraged as a means for further occupational mobility; this tends to have the effect of transforming the family structure. At the same time, undesirable situations are taking place; the high incidences of divorce and alcoholism have become major preoccupations of the government. The film industry in Algeria is geared towards the elimination of these social problems, by educating the people to become aware of the social consequences of divorce and alcoholism.

A secondary factor relevant to changing Algerian social structures is the development of new social solidarity based on the factory system. Tables 62 and 63 provide an indication of how group solidarity at the workplace is growing and how family ties are weakening.

These tables reflect the result of interviews I carried out in Algeria and Annaba, of Algerian workers in agriculture and in industry. The first question was as follows:

A. Que faites-vous si un de vos collègues de travail est malade?

	oui	non
- vous faites son travail	_____	_____
- vous laissez son travail jusqu'à son retour	_____	_____
- vous demandez qu'un autre vienne aider	_____	_____

A total of 96.9 percent of agricultural workers said "yes, if my colleague is sick I will do his work," compared to 91.9 percent of industrial workers. A negative reply was pronounced by 3.1 percent

TABLE 61

TOTAL DES BESOINS EN MAIN D'OUVRIERS QUALIFIES PAR SPECIALITE ET NIVEAU ET QUALIFICATION, 1972-1990

[illegible]	Spécialité	[illegible]	Valeur du [illegible] 1972 [illegible]	[illegible] 1990 prévue	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] prof.	[illegible] en 72	Total [illegible]
a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j
1	Agricoles	5	1000	4600	3600	190	510	750	5050
		5	200	7170	6970	180	370	-	[illegible]
		4	1000	17090	16090	640	1480	-	18210
		3	4000	60750	56750	2000	3140	-	61890
2 3 4	Technique et assimilées	6	9650	23550	13900	1200	-350	5240	19990
		5	1510	27630	26120	920	-1160	-	25880
		4	21010	79070	58060	5600	1500	1500	66660
		3	67530	253810	186280	17400	5230	-	208910
5 7	Economiques et assimilées	6	15110	22250	7140	3100	-420	350	10170
		5	2710	27370	24660	1160	-350	-	[illegible]
		4	31590	158630	127040	3960	3420	-	129360
		3	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	47760	-	[illegible]
6	Juridiques	6	2610	7000	5000	700	250	-	5960
		5	300	1000	700	80	30	-	810
		4	3000	5000	2000	700	-130	-	2570
		3	3000	5000	2000	900	420	-	3320
8	Pédagogiques littéraires et scientifiques pures	[illegible]	3010	14950	12980	470	1320	1920	16270
		[illegible]	4230	14050	9820	620	1690	1940	13470
		[illegible]	2650	21070	18420	820	2900	1100	23240
		[illegible]	7070	[illegible]	35280	1540	6820	4100	47740
		[illegible]	55900	132100	76200	11930	16400	5400	109930
		3	—	—	—	—	—	-	—
9	Médicales	6	2100	17410	15310	520	20	4200	20050
		5	600	9130	8530	300	2110	-	10940
		4	3500	28360	24860	1160	15020	400	41040
		3	5500	12360	6860	3370	2200	-	12430
10-11	Sciences humaines et divers	6	365	2390	2025	275	- 110	-	2190
		5	620	2370	1700	170	- 900	-	970
		4	1200	2600	1400	760	-1020	-	1140
		3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
11	Total	6	37835	107710	69875	7235	2720	10640	90270
		5	16460	138940	122480	5110	10410	5100	143100
		4	132190	432540	[illegible]	24510	31050	7100	363110
		3	159110	[illegible]	474430	[illegible]	50530	-	579300
12	Avec formation courte ou sans formation	2-1	2061005	3176520	1115515	437405	0	0	1552920
1-12	Total général	6-1	2537000	4460000	2073000	559650	108210	23140	2774000

Source: Remili, 1975, p. 225.

TABLE 62

GROUP SOLIDARITY AT THE WORKPLACE

(responses to question A)

Choice of Answer	Agriculture			Industry		
	N	Percent "Yes"	Percent "No"	N	Percent "Yes"	Percent "No"
Item 1	98	96.9	3.1	123	91.9	8.1
Item 2	23	17	82	56	16.1	83.9
Item 3	29	38	37	94	69.1	30.9
Total	150			273		

Source: M. Abucar, field notes, 1976.

Note: Frequencies and percentages do not total because some respondents mentioned more than one reason.

TABLE 63

COMPARISON BETWEEN TIES: FAMILY AND COLLEAGUES AT WORK

(responses to question B)

Choice of Answer	Agriculture			Industry		
	N	Percent "Yes"	Percent "No"	N	Percent "Yes"	Percent "No"
Item 1	65	98.5	1.5	87	89.7	10.3
Item 2	53	100.0	0.0	69	92.8	7.2
Item 3	15	100.0	0.0	49	98.8	10.2
Total	133			205		

Source: M. Abucar, field notes, 1976.

Note: Frequency and percentages do not total because some respondents mentioned more than one reason.

of agricultural workers, compared to 8.1 percent of industrial workers. Group solidarity between workers is higher in agriculture and slightly lower in industry. However, this difference may well be attributed to the degree of specialization, because the division of labour is more complex in industry than in agriculture.

The second question was as follows:

B. Si vous avez des difficultés (de n'importe quel ordre) où cherchez-vous du soutien moral et matériel?

	oui	non
- dans votre famille surtout	_____	_____
- auprès de vos camarades de travail	_____	_____
- auprès d'autres personnes que vous connaissez	_____	_____

Both agricultural and industrial workers seek more moral and material help from their colleagues at work and persons they know than their own families. Table 63 indicates that 100 percent of agricultural workers seek help and advice from their colleagues and people they know, compared to 92.8 percent for industrial workers.

Workers' conditions set up a new structure of relationships between the workers. In the case of marriage or sickness, a worker's colleagues provide the necessary assistance. If both couples who are getting married work in the same enterprise, they receive 1,000 AD each, free, plus they are allowed to borrow up to 3,000 AD from the social fund. Most socialized enterprises operate a cooperative shop, belonging to the workers. Each worker is permitted to buy basic needs (food, clothing, soap, and luxury goods such as TVs, bicycles, and radios) at lower prices than in the market.

Most of the functions the family used to carry out for the individual are taken over by the work group or the factory to assist individual needs. Housing is built for workers with social funds created by the collective producers. In each factory there is a full-time social worker to deal with family problems; if anyone in the family is sick, the social worker provides the necessary arrangements for taking care of the worker's family while he is at work. The service is provided free.

Talking to the group of workers in industry and in agriculture at Annaba, I was told that the present national bourgeoisie is different from the one in place during the colonial period. Algerian colonial bourgeoisie no longer have bourgeois ideas; it is the bourgeoisie created after independence which has the bourgeois mentality and ideas. The main difference between the two is that the national bourgeoisie during the colonial period was a merchant class (or middlemen) who traded between the European bourgeoisie and the masses. But those in the post-independence situation are captains of industry. Most of the latter category of national bourgeoisie are owners of small- and medium-sized factories in the light industry sector. A national bourgeoisie has emerged in Algeria after independence. This group has control of the means of production. In contrast, the colonial national bourgeoisie did possess ownership and control of the means of production, as this quotation illustrates:

> At the same time, the rise of a mercantile bourgeoisie which took advantage of the new capitalist approach to production was stunted in its growth. The systematic production of wheat and raw materials for export to France and the new import possibilities were the monopoly of French traders, who, here and there, tolerated the existence of a few Algerians. Thus, urban

> merchants and rural bourgeoisie held a position in the production process without playing the socio-political role that this position would normally bring to it. In other words, they had the ownership but not the control of their means of production. (Lazreg, 1976, p. 186)

There is a contrast between the colonial national bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie of contemporary Algerian society, in terms of their attitude towards Algerian national interests. The former were predominantly rural oriented (such as landlords, traders, or merchants in urban centres), seeking concessions from the colonial system and never asserting an independent role.

The latter assert an independent role if the chance arises. Indirectly, the new national bourgeoisie attempts to compete with the public sector in terms of efficiency, performance, and incentive. I was told by this class that they were very productive; similarly, the senior executives of private enterprises repeatedly told me, "We do not have bureaucratic red tape here. Things move very fast." But the worker in the private sector is not happy and would like very much to see the private sector abolished.

However, major differences exist here, because both national bourgeoisies have emerged in two different periods of Algerian history (colonial and post-independence); to be Algerian, for a native at present, carries a lot of weight, more than under the colonial situation. This is the driving force of the new national bourgeoisie of Algeria.

The creation of national enterprise industries was the main factor that contributed to changing attitudes in the contemporary Algerian national bourgeoisie. Ideologically, this group resembles other social classes, as far as the national interest is concerned. They are anti-imperialist oriented, and because of the social and political role given to them by the state they claim to perform a national duty, as any other social class. However, their personal interests differ from other social classes such as the workers, farmers, and petite bourgeoisie. The next chapter will deal with the social process of these classes in the context of present Algerian national development.

CHAPTER 11

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL PROCESS: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The political changes that took place in Africa in the last two decades have brought certain changes of a social and economic nature. These changes were not uniform throughout the African continent; political and social changes were more common than economic changes. The Algerian experience suggests that political change was concomitant with large-scale social and economic changes. Social change occurred on a large scale in the post-independence situation: changes in family ties, group solidarity, and the national bourgeoisie (see Chapter 10). The rate of urbanization and the rate of population growth are higher in the post-independence situation than they were in the colonial period (see Chapter 3, section C).

The economic transformation of Algerian society started in 1830 under the colonial settlement, which has established a capitalist-colonial agrarian economy in order to transform the pre-colonial structure. However, this system created a major social and economic dislocation of Algerian society. Chapter 6 provides the analysis of the capitalist-colonial development and class relations in Algerian society.

Because of the political changes which took place in 1962 due to the liberation movement, the whole system began to disintegrate gradually, giving rise to a new self-centered system (examined in Chapter 8) and a new relationship towards production (examined in Chapter 9). Thus, large-scale socio-economic changes occurred in the decolonization of the national economy, due to the transformation of the means of production (see Chapter 10). This economic transformation created the necessary conditions for further development of Algerian society and laid down the correct foundation for Algeriman social evolution.

It has been sixteen years since Algeria became independent. During this period a total improvement of the society has been made, despite the change of leadership which took place in 1965. The overall orientation of national development is that of creating a socialist society in Algeria. It has been so since independence. The national policy for social and economic reconstruction started in 1962 in the modern sector of agriculture, inherited from the settlers. The political leadership accepted in principle in 1962 that agriculture will constitute the base of Algerian industrialization and that the agricultural sector will accumulate the necessary capital needed for industrialization in Algeria.

The reason for the change in policy from agriculture to resource control as the basis of accumulation of capital has been examined in Chapter 8, section A. However, it took some time before the Algerian leaders began to realize that agriculture could not constitute the base for Algerian industrialization. Algeria has oil, gas, steel, and mining. In the nationalization of industries, financial institutions, and transport, Algeria was able to reorganize her priorities for national development; thus heavy industry over agriculture was a decisive factor in Algerian national development because it enabled agriculture to be independent from the outside in terms of tools and equipment, tractors and fertilizers.

This move, however, has been heavily critized, as this quotation indicates:

> La plupart des investissements ont été réalisés dans les domaines de la sidérurgie et de la pétrochimie, alors que dans ce dernier secteur, la création d'un emploi suppose, en moyenne, l'immobilisation d'un million de francs "lourds."
>
> Dans les domaines plus fournisseurs d'emplois--la mécanique, par exemple--on s'est efforcé d'acquérir le *nec plus ultra* de la technologie occidentale mais sans pouvoir se fixer--sinon verbalement et pour prévenir les critiques--un objectif supérieur à la satisfaction des besoins intérieurs, de sorte que le choix super-capitalistique ne peut guère se justifier par la nécessité d'affronter la concurrence internationale. (Mallarde, 1975, p. 213)

According to Etienne Mallarde, heavy industry requires a lot of investment in order to create employment. The technology which is acquired from European capitalism will further dependency and promote a higher rate of unemployment. For the Algerians, it was perceived that industrialization based on heavy industry would create the conditions necessary for their economic independence. In Chapter 8 we examined the relationship between heavy industry and other industries such as the transport industry and light industry. The problem of present Algerian development is not so much the choices between various industries or agriculture but rather the balance between economic and political education. The option Algeria has taken for national development has concentrated more on the economic factor and has neglected the political education of the masses. It became a major preoccupation of the most enlightened segment of Algerian society in recent years to seek a solution to the pressing need for political education. The political elite assumed that economic factors would create the conditions necessary for political consciousness. In Chapter 7 we examined the socio-political heterogeneity of Algerian society. The current direction of cultural development is still inconsistent with the degree of economic development achieved. One is tempted to come to the conclusion that despite the growth of class structure in Algeria the political and cultural content of national development gives higher priority to nationalistic ideology, which has little relevance to the shape of present Algerian development because it obscures the inherent contradiction of Algerian society.

For example, the position of women in society is far from having been transformed, even though the economic structure has brought improvement in the overall standard of life. The position of women is tied up with the norms and values of pre-colonial society. The existence of private and public sectors is inconsistent with the development of socialism. The higher growth of productive force is associated with the development of the public sector rather than the private sector. The coexistence of two modes of production will promote this contradiction and hinder the future development of a socialist economy.

The Algerian approach to national development is divorced from political ideology, which fosters class consciousness. One explanation of the national development situation is that it is due to the desire of the leaders to keep unity at all cost, vis-à-vis the external influence of imperialism, and to unite the people for an immediate possibility of economic independence. Another explanation of the situation is that the leaders have taken for granted that the transformation of means of ownership will eventually create the conditions of class consciousness. The position of Lenin (1971) on class consciousness is well known. In his famous book *What Is To Be Done?*, he stated as follows:

> In order to explain the point more concretely we shall approach the subject from an aspect that is "nearest" to the Economist, namely, from the practical aspect. "Everyone agrees" that it is necessary to develop the political consciousness of the working class. The question is, *how* that is to be done and what is required to do it. The economic struggle merely "impels" the workers to realise the government's attitude towards the working class. Consequently, *however much we may try* to "lend the economic struggle itself a political character," we *shall never be able* to develop the political consciousness of the workers (to the level of Social-Democratic political consciousness) by keeping within the framework of the economic struggle, for *that framework is too narrow*. The Martynov formula has some value for us, not because it illustrates Martynov's aptitude for confusing things, but because it pointedly expresses the basic error that all the Economists commit, namely, their conviction that it is possible to develop the class political consciousness of the workers *from within*, so to speak, from their economic struggle, i.e., by making this struggle the exclusive (or, at least, the main) starting-point, by making it the exclusive (or at least, the main) basis. Such a view is radically wrong. Piqued by our polemics against them, the Economists refuse to ponder deeply over the origins of these disagreements, with the result that we simply cannot understand one another. It is as if we spoke in different tongues. (Lenin, 1971, p. 78)

This, however, was the Russian experience, and it suggests that the institutionalization of public sector workers without political education will promote confrontation between the state and the workers, rather than the fundamental contradiction between the public and private sectors. For the workers to realize the fundamental contradiction, they must acquire class consciousness. According to Lenin, economic struggle is not enough to create political consciousness. For him,

> Class political consciousness can be brought to the workers *only from without*, that is, only from outside the economic struggle, from outside the sphere of relations between workers and employers. The sphere from which alone it is possible to obtain this knowledge is the sphere of relationships of *all* classes and strata to the state and the government, the sphere of the interrelations between *all* classes. For that reason,

> the reply to the question as to what must be done to bring political knowledge to the workers cannot be merely the answer with which, in the majority of cases, the practical workers, especially those inclined towards Economism, mostly content themselves, namely: "To go among the workers." To bring political knowledge to the *workers* the Social-Democrats must *go among all classes of the population*; they must dispatch units of their army *in all directions*. (Lenin, 1971, pp. 77-8)

The one-sidedness of the Algerian approach to national development also is due partly to the Algerian leaders' reliance on "administrative order" as the sole means of organizing labour and the economy. This is obvious in the way in which the structure of national enterprise is set up (see Chapter 9). The director general of national enterprise has the power guardianship, rather than the party (FLN). The absence of a party role in the national economic situation furthers this apparent contradiction in Algerian national development.

Despite this shortcoming of the Algerian option for national development, the economic structure has created the conditions necessary for the development of socialism or capitalism in Algeria. As we have examined in many parts of this study, the public and private sectors coexist within the system. Because of this coexistence, the Algerian workers are divided into two different modes of production.

The national bourgeoisie are more consciousness of their class than the Algerian workers because of their relationship with the public sector, who are controlled by a petite bourgeoisie. The national bourgeoisie would like to have the upper hand in the national economy. The outcome of this struggle between the public and private sectors will determine the future direction of Algerian national development. Both sectors were associated with the development of the Algerian option for national development. The public sector participates in economic matters. The conditions that led to this economic participation will now be examined.

The workers' self-management or participation became a matter of necessity for the organization of Algerian workers. Historically, decolonization and nationalization led to the establishment of alternative approaches to labour organization in Algeria. The transformation of the means of production from private to public ownership was the first step. The state assumed control of the national economy on the behalf of collectivity.

The second important condition leading to the economic participation of the public sector is the social dimension of the Algerian revolution, which has given priority to collectivity over the "individual rights" as a means of creating unity within Algerian society. For example, if the land appropriated from settlers had been distributed to the farmers, there would have been more divisions among those participating in the Algerian revolutions. The collectivized ownership of the means of production and the creation of the production unit became matters of necessity for the continuation of the struggle for Algerian economic independence.

The third condition that promoted the economic participation of the public sector in agriculture and industry is productivity. In order to promote productivity in agriculture and industry, economic participation can be translated into incentives enhancing the principle of profit sharing by the state and the workers. The way in which profit sharing operates in Algeria is described in Chapter 10, section B.

It is sufficient here to state that productivity, and thus the total economic system, is becoming increasingly dependent on the power of labour. Production can only be hoped to increase if labour's share in the profit is met and if labour is installed as the dominant force in the political life of Algeria. However, because of the absence of party leadership in the national economy, the possibility of establishing a proletarian dictatorship is unlikely. The third condition is the struggle for economic independence and Algerian hegemony in Africa and the Arab world. The characteristic of underdevelopment inherited from colonialism created in Algeria a driving force to create conditions for a state of development comparable to advanced industrial societies. The promotion of a high level of public sector participation in the national economy has become a national commitment of paramount political importance. When the government inaugurates a new plant, major national and local newspapers carry the headline "This Is the Largest Industrial Plant in Africa or the Near East."

China has set up a different type of workers' organization from that that of Algeria. In China, democratic centralization is the principle under which the workers are organized. This principle means that decisions are made collectively but that management rests on the responsibility of the party-appointed manager, who implements the decision. The difference between Algeria and China is that in Algeria the state is the institution within which various interest groups in society articulate. In China, the party is the major institution carrying out this function. There also are other differences between China and Algeria in terms of the organization of workers. The party plays an important role in the leadership of the enterprise, as the following quotation describes:

> The Party committee in an enterprise is the core of leadership of all the work of the enterprise. In the production and management work of the enterprise, we have adopted the system whereby the director assumes full responsibility under the leadership of the enterprise's Party committee. This system of leadership requires that all major questions in the enterprise should be discussed and decided collectively by the Party committee, while the director is responsible for carrying out the work of production and management. This system of leadership, on the one hand, inherits the effective and traditional system of leadership of our Party which integrates collective leadership with individual responsibility. On the other hand, this system also suits the nature of modern industrial enterprises which need highly centralized and unified direction. The adoption of this system not only ensures the leadership of the Party committee in production and management, but also brings the roles of the leading members of the management and the management departments into full play. It also ensures that no errors or at least less errors are made by the leading members of enterprises in deciding important problems; it also makes it relatively easier for them to correct errors when they occur.
>
> The leadership of our Party is built on the basis of the mass line, which is the correct method of leadership based on the principle of "from the masses, to the masses" consistently adhered to by our Party during the prolonged revolutionary struggle. This method of leadership has been further developed in the practice of our socialist industrialization. (Po, 1964, p. 20)

In Algeria, the FLN does not play a leading role in the organization of national enterprises. However, it has an organizational role in the supervision of elections and the nomination of the candidates who represent the workers in national enterprises and in national and local collective political organizations. The organization of the work in the national enterprise is carried out by the elected representative of the workers and the director appointed by the director general of national enterprise. Table 64 indicates the distribution of party and UGTA membership of agricultural and industrial workers. Party membership is higher in agricultural workers (35.1 percent compared to 8.3 percent for industrial workers). Affiliation with trade unions (UGTA)

TABLE 64

DISTRIBUTION OF SELECTED MEMBERSHIP IN TRADE UNIONS AND PARTY OF AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL WORKERS

	Agriculture		Industry	
Institution	N	%	N	%
UGTA	19	20.2	41	30.8
FLN	33	35.1	11	8.3
Both	22	23.4	21	15.8
Neither	20	21.3	60	45.0
Total	94		133	

Source: M. Abucar, field notes, 1976.

is higher in industrial workers (30.8 percent compared to 20.2 percent for agricultural workers). Non-membership in both organizations is higher in industrial workers (45.0 percent compared to 21.3 percent in agricultural workers). Membership in both organizations is higher in agricultural workers (23.3 percent compared to 15.8 percent in industrial workers).

When it comes to the question of preference between the UGTA and the party (FLN), the majority of workers prefer to join the party (FLN) rather than the UGTA. Table 65 shows that industrial workers prefer the UGTA over the FLN, while the agricultural workers are inclined more towards the party than towards the UGTA; 53.7 percent of agricultural workers prefer to join the party compared to 40.0 percent of industrial workers. Only 28.0 percent of agricultural workers admitted that they would like to be members of the UGTA compared to 43.0 percent of

TABLE 65

PREFERENCE OF MEMBERSHIP IN UGTA AND PARTY (FLN) OF AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL WORKERS

	Agriculture		Industry	
Institution	N	%	N	%
UGTA	23	28.0	58	43.0
FLN	44	53.7	54	40.0
Both	13	15.9	13	9.6
Neither	2	2.4	10	7.4
Total	82		135	

Source: M. Abucar, field notes, 1976.

industrial workers. The difference can be traced back in the Algerian liberation movement to when the majority members of the FLN were peasants and the UGTA was exclusively for urban workers. The organization of the agricultural workers within the UGTA took place after independence.

The party (FLN) is a centre for recruitment of cadres in industry and agriculture, and it plays a role of consultation between workers and management. The leadership of agricultural and industrial enterprises is in the hands of members of the government and administrative officers. Economic participation in China and Algeria differs in method and organization, as the following quotation demonstrates.

> The democracy being carried out in our enterprises is democracy under centralized guidance; it is opposed to that false slogan and mistaken practice of "workers' self-rule"; our centralization is based on democracy, and is radically different from the practice

> that relies solely on administrative orders and is divorced from the Party leadership and the masses.
>
> In all enterprises we follow the "three-in-one" method of combining the efforts of leading personnel, technicians (including specialized management staff) and the masses of workers so as to bring together leading personnel with the masses, and link technical theoretical knowledge with working practice, and political and ideological work with economic work. This is an important aspect of implementing the mass line.
>
> In practising the "three-in-one" method, leading cadres and administrative cadres participate partly in productive labour while workers participate partly in day-to-day management. (Po, 1964, p. 16)

Worker self-management and participation, as practised in Yugoslavia and Algeria, are not the only alternatives for the organization of workers. Democratic centralization and party leadership based on the unified efforts of the "three-in-one" may well be another alternative form of workers' organization. These alternative approaches to the organization of workers are commonly found in socialist societies. The differences in methods of organization within enterprises are due to the historical conditions in effect within each country and party, to political leadership, and to economic organization. In Algeria, the emphasis is more on the economic structure as a means to create a collective consciousness than the ideological orientation. The economic system is divorced from political ideology.

In the foregoing discussion, it became apparent that in the Algerian option for national development and the organization of Algerian workers the party (FLN) is given a secondary rather than a primary role of leadership. The reason for this is not clear, but the African experience suggests that once a national state is created the party loses its importance in articulating or mobilizing various forces in society and becomes the centre of conflict between factions based on ethnicity, religion, and ideology. Secondly, in post-independence society the party is not the only organization which has power; bureaucratic institutions such as the army and the administration assume more important roles because of the positions they occupy in the economy.

In Algeria, bureaucratic institutions emerged as soon as the FLN established in 1958 a provisional government in exile. The army gradually developed as a strong force within the FLN. Soon after independence, with the establishment of the Republic of Algeria, it became the major organized group, capable of upsetting the internal political structure. It did so in the 1965 coup d'état, when it replaced Ben Bella and installed Boumédienne on behalf of the Algerian revolution.

The politics of the petite bourgeoisie is a major factor behind the "administrative order" which exists in Algeria rather than the party leadership in socialized enterprise. The petite bourgeoisie cannot control the country without an alliance with the peasants and the working class. The factor that reinforces this trend towards collaboration at this stage of Algeria's development is the national development question and the international order. Of course, all the social strata of Algerian society are committed to preserving the political independence they have achieved and to fostering economic independence. The international order can create conditions conducive to a desirable Algerian evolution, or it can create conditions of regress if the neo-colonialists become strong. These issues are not separate from each other, due to the interdependence of nations. In neo-colonial relations, the advance of one nation is the underdevelopment of the other. A struggle for unity of the petite bourgeoisie, peasant, and worker, rather than their relationship of dependent opposition, is the way out of this dilemma--the establishment, as in Algeria, of a self-centered system which will create the conditions for the development of productive forces capable of transforming society into a socialist state. However, we must keep in mind that the development of a working class and national bourgeoisie, which at the present time coexist under the administrative order of the petite bourgeoisie, will bring a change in the direction of Algeria's development. One can hardly predict what the new direction may be.

The alternative approach to organizational management is commonly encountered in a society where public ownership is the rule and the most dominant form of production in that society is socialist or non-capitalistic. The non-capitalistic mode of production is a system which is somewhere between capitalism and socialism but is closer to the latter in the sense it creates the conditions necessary for socialist development. The state assumes the control of the economy and attempts to transform society from a colonial to a socialist economy. There are diverging views on the concept of state capitalism, but whenever such a system is established a new social evolution will emerge different from that of pure capitalism, as the following quotation indicates:

> Since Stalin's death, however, it has become increasingly uncertain how far the Soviets still believe in revolution--leaving aside the question of whether it should be an agrarian, or a proletarian one--as a precondition for a socialist society as far as the Third World is concerned. In the early sixties they developed a kind of "new look" version of Marxist theory according to which a peaceful transition towards socialism would become a real possibility, through the existence of a powerful Soviet bloc. There are two basic elements in the new Soviet theory: the concept of national democracy, held to be valid for some of the countries of the Third World and, in close connection with it, the concept of state capitalism which implies that in countries where this type of capitalism prevails both the actual situation and the potential for the future would be different from those in countries dominated by true capitalism. (Wertheim, 1974, pp. 296-97)

Some writers on North Africa felt it easy to refer to Algerian paths to national development as paths to state capitalism. This may have well been true in the early years, when the state suddenly assumed control of the national economy. As I have demonstrated in many parts of this study, the workers and the national bourgeoisie also play important roles in the national economy. It seems, however, that the role of the state in the economy is relegated to the regulation of the relationship between the national collectivity and the interest of workers in the socialist enterprise and the national bourgeoisie. The accumulation of capital with which the state fosters development creates the necessary conditions for contradiction between the two classes. As we will examine shortly, the option of Algeria for national development has created its own contradiction. Because of the development of two distinctive classes in less than two decades, in my view the present system fosters a national democracy rather than state capitalism. What is national democracy? In this connection I quote V. I. Pavlov:

> The people may enter the non-capitalist path of development only as a result of active struggle on the part of the working class and the toiling masses, of an alliance of all democratic and patriotic forces in a broad national front. National democracy is a form of government in which the unification of all the sound forces of a nation can be most successfully achieved. Reflecting as it does the interests not of any one particular class but of broad strata of people, a state of this type is called upon to consummate the objectives of the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, democratic revolution. (Wertheim, 1974, p. 298)

In the national charter, which was adopted in 1976, no mention is made of the national bourgeoisie as a "sound force" of the nation. The national forces according to the charter are: the peasants, the workers, and the women. The political leadership of Algeria is in the hands of the petite bourgeoisie class, who mistrust the national bourgeoisie and try to ally with the working class.

This alliance can well be seen in the progressive measure the "pouvoir politic" has taken in favour of the workers and peasants. These measures are: land reform programmes (which were successfully adapted in 1972), the construction of socialist villages for the low-income farmers, the creation of socialist sectors in agriculture and in industry where the workers of both enterprises enjoy relative autonomy, the increase of wages and income, and the better distribution of national income. The political and social base of the petite bourgeoisie is the workers and peasants, without whom they would never have been able to remain in power. The survival of the system dictates the necessity for the intensification of this alliance.

At present there is a great need for increasing the productivity of the system. This depends upon the willingness of the workers and the peasants to assume that responsibility. There are at the present stage of Algerian development trends and conflicts derived from the several modes of production which coexist: the pre-colonial mode of production, known as the traditional sector; the public sector, known as the socialized sector; and the private sector. The coexistence of the latter two modes of production is the primary contradiction in Algerian society. On this issue, the Algerians are divided into two irreconcilable groups: those who support private ownership, and those who are against private ownership and in favour of the public sector. This division became apparent in the debate on the national charter, held in 1976. The workers, peasants, and women's organizations have taken strong positions against private ownership. These groups represent the [illegible] enlightened segment of Algerian society. However, there is still a very minor group who told me that private ownership is more rewarding to the individual than public ownership. This group constitutes the qualified workers, some segments of the national bureaucracy, and the national bourgeoisie.

The second set of trends and conflicts in Algerian national development exist between the workers and the state over technical control (see Chapter 9). Technical control is in the hands of administrative officers at the national and local levels. But the principal guideline of technical control is determined by the "pouvoir politic" (See Chapter 8, section B). The administrators are called upon to implement policy created by the "pouvoir politic." As I have mentioned earlier, leadership is in the hands of the petite bourgeoisie. The existence of this set of trends and conflicts is a secondary contradiction at the present stage of Algerian development. It may well develop in the future to a primary contradiction if an alliance is formed between the bureaucrats and the national bourgeoisie.

The state administrators are one aspect of the bureaucratization of Algerian society. This group has attracted the attention of many scholars in the last decade. Some of these scholars have come to the conclusion that the bureaucrats (administrators) constitute a class. But the question of what class the bureaucrats belong to has hardly been answered. Marnia Lazreg, in her last article, "Bureaucracy and Class, the Algerian Dialectic," maintains that although Algerian administrators, particularly those on the top of the hierarchy of the administration, enjoy certain privileged positions in the national enterprises, they do not constitute a class, but bureaucracy under the Algerian national development may:

> 1. Seek to reproduce itself as a social category, thereby insuring the perpetuation of its condition of existence.
>
> 2. Promote the interest of the social forces from which it issued or with which it is affiliated, enabling *these* to emerge as full-fledged classes.
>
> 3. Seek political bargaining power by making it possible for new classes or fractions of classes to emerge. This is facilitated, in the case of Algeria, by the specific socioeconomic configurations of a post-colonial society that claims to be building socialism. There is room for the manipulation of the state apparatus for purposes other than that of the public good. (Lazreg, 1977, p. 162)

The bureaucracy has no autonomy of its own but acts consciously or unconsciously to operate state institutions. Where the Algerians are politically conscious and aware of their responsibilities vis-à-vis the collectivity, it is possible to discover uniform political conduct. My experience suggests that although Algerian bureaucrats are predominantly conscious of their role in nation building, it is possible to encounter unconscious minds which act in the opposite direction. This heterogeneous character of Algerian bureaucrats is due to the imposition of the Algerian administration and to their training backgrounds. As Table 66 indicates, Algeria inherited from the colonial administration large numbers of administrative officers.

TABLE 66

MEMBERS OF ALGERIAN ADMINISTRATION EARLY IN 1963

Category	Percentage of Members in Colonial Administration
A	43
B	77
C	12
D	3

Source: I. Clegg, 1970, p. 113.

The structure of Algerian administration has changed since independence. A new industrial sector has emerged, both in heavy and light industry. The A and B categories are now staffed by new graduates from Algerian universities and training institutes, and militant Algerian graduates from abroad. However, there is no doubt that some of the old colonial administrative officers remain as a minority group within the administration. The ex-colonial administrators are centered more in the agriculture ministry and have direct relation with workers' self-management enterprises. At present there is less conflict between the workers' self-management and the ex-colonial administrative officers, and there is more conflict between newly graduated agronomists and agricultural engineers and the administrators of agricultural enterprises and cooperatives. This conflict arises from the division of responsibility between these two elements. Because of this conflict, the agronomists and engineers are not properly employed in the field, due to the unwillingness of the administrators to cooperate with the newly graduated agricultural experts. Therefore there is constant hostility between the two social categories.

The state administrators are not the only bureaucrats in Algeria. The party (FLN) and the UGTA have their own bureaucrats. Both these institutions have a structure comparable to that of the state enterprises. The size of these institutions is increasing, and they are becoming more complex. The only difference between the state enterprises and these institutions is in function: the bureaucrats in the state enterprises have a technical control, while the party and the UGTA have political control over the means of production and the nomination of candidates at the local and national levels by which will be established the new order of popular control (see Chapter 9).

The Algerian bureaucrats are heterogeneous in character, consisting of people with different backgrounds, training, languages, and ideologies, as well as regional differences. Ideologically, these groups can be divided into liberal and conservative.

The traditional conservative group are those who maintain Islam is the sole religion and interest to the Algerian and maintain Algeria's past Islamic tradition. The liberal conservatives, while upholding the same principle as the traditional conservatives, are inclined to maintain an open-door policy towards the outside world. The dominant political group within the Algerian bureaucracy is that of radical nationalism. This type of bureaucrat is more dominant in the party (FLN), the UGTA and state enterprises, and the army. The liberal conservative group has alliances with the national bourgeoisie and would like to see private ownership become the dominant mode of production in Algeria, while the radicals are in favour of the growth of the public sector and the gradual disappearance of the private sector. The struggle between these factions is not so much on individual interest but rather class interest.

At the present stage of Algerian social evolution, there are four classes, based on the position they occupy in the national economy. These classes are: the petite bourgeoisie,* national bourgeoisie, workers (in agriculture and industry), and peasants (cooperative farmers, small farmers). (See Table 67.)

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*Mohamaud Hussein defines petite bourgeoisie as follows: "La petite bourgeoisie est un groupe hétérogène de couches sociales, qui se définit par la position qu'il occupe entre, d'une part, les classes (dominantes ou pas) vivant de l'exploitation des autres et, d'autre part, les classes vivant de la vente de leur force de travail. La petite bourgeoisie groupe donc toutes les couches possédant un petit capital, un petit lopin de terre, une formation spécialisée ou un niveau de culture qui--dans le contexte historique--leur permet de vivre de leur travail,

TABLE 67

SOCIO-POLITICAL CHARTER

ANP	Pouvoir Politic	
FLN		Bureaucratie nationale
		Bourgeoisie nationale
		Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens (UGTA)
Fellah		Travailleurs

Source: M. Abucar, field notes, 1976.

In 1958 there were three major Algerian institutions: the party (FLN), the ALN, and the GPRA. These institutions developed outside the colonial settlement. The purpose of these institutions was to bring political independence to Algeria. After political independence, the members of these institutions were given privileged positions, derived from their participation in the liberation movement. Most members of

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en exploitant leur moyen de travail, financier, technique ou intellectuel--sans avoir besoin de vendre leur force de travail et sans acheter la force de travail des autres--sinon de façon secondaire" (Hussein, 1974, p. 19). This definition is not totally applicable to the Algerian situation, since the petite bourgeoisie is allied with the working class and peasants, although it stands between two classes: the peasant and working class on the one hand and the national bourgeoisie on the other.

"pouvoir politic" are recruited from these institutions. At present this group constitutes the contemporary Algerian petite bourgeoisie, which Fanon refers to as the national middle class.

> The national middle class which takes over power at the end of the colonial regime is an underdeveloped middle class. It has practically no economic power, and in any case is in no way commensurate with the bourgeoisie of the mother country which it hopes to replace. In its narcissism, the national middle class is easily convinced that it can advantageously replace the middle class of the mother country. But that same independence which literally drives it into a corner will give rise within its ranks to catastrophic reactions, and will oblige it to send out frenzied appeals for help to the former mother country. The university and merchant classes which make up the most enlightened section of the new state are in fact characterized by the smallness of their number and their being concentrated in the capital, and the type of activities in which they are engaged: business, agriculture, and the liberal professions. Neither financiers nor industrial magnates are to be formed within this national middle class. (Fanon, 1968, p. 149)

Unlike the middle class in the new states, the Algerian petite bourgeoisie has broad-based mass support and had developed political, administrative, and military skills through their participation in the liberation movement. The Algerian petite bourgeoisie is a different class than encountered in most of the African continent. Unlike many African countries, Algeria's political independence was not a matter of constitutional development; rather it was obtained through army struggle. The Algerian petite bourgeoisie have taken advantage of their underdevelopment in terms of class by seizing control of natural resources for the transformation of their society rather than for the advancement of their own class. This social class asserts its economic independence vis-à-vis the metropolis, and they attempt to establish their own economic independence.

In the present political structure, the petite bourgeoisie occupy positions of political power, such as members of political bureaus, governments, higher echelons of the party, the army, the bureaucracy, and the UGTA. The contemporary petite bourgeoisie in Algeria has developed during the period 1954-1962. In 1954 the party (FLN) emerged as the sole legitimate institution of the people of Algeria. (For more detailed analysis see Chapter 4, sections F, G, and H.) The leadership of the party was in the hands of the petite bourgeoisie, allied with workers and peasants. The party became an exclusive association after independence, open only to those individuals who participated in the War of Liberation movement. This point is illustrated by Marnia Lazreg:

> Under the first Algerian government, headed by Ben Bella between 1962-1965, the debate over the party centered around the issue of its membership. While Ben Bella favored a membership restricted to those who had taken part in the revolution, his opponents advocated a party open to the masses. After the 1965 coup that brought Colonel Boumédienne to power, the party was opened to all those who accepted the new president's policies. (Lazreg, 1972, p. 297)

Despite the change in party membership, those who joined the liberation movement during the war enjoyed a more privileged position than the new members. However, the old members of the party have not received equal reward; some have received more than others.

The second institution which played an important role during this period was the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN). The peasants contributed the majority, although the workers took part in the army struggle (see Chapter 4). Historically, the working class in Algeria has developed along different lines than did the petite bourgeoisie, because the UGTA existed prior to the organization of the liberation movement. During the colonial period, the UGTA was affiliated with the CGT, the labour arm of the French communist party. Prior to political independence, the UGTA had an organization comparable to the FLN, ANP, and GPRA, as the following quotation demonstrates:

> The Algerian trade union organization, the UGTA, was the one powerful civilian institution to emerge from the war of independence. In contrast to the wartorn FLN, the UGTA maintained well-organized, cohesive cadres, and was excelled only by the ANP in terms of institutional force. The trade union's organizers and leaders were among Algeria's most competent and ideologically sophisticated elites. With 500 syndicates, the UGTA represented 250,000 urban workers, all of whom were in skilled or semi-skilled occupations. These considerable assets stimulated the Political Bureau to focus on the UGTA in the first phase of its "politics of cohesion," or the integration of diverse socioeconomic groups into the FLN. (Jackson, 1972, p. 112)

From 1944 to 1956, the UGTA developed a very strong trade union consciousness. In 1956 and 1957, the UGTA set a wave of strikes in which the organization demonstrated its ability to control the rank and file. The UGTA fought side by side with the FLN and followed the directions given by the party. But after independence the UGTA attempted to seek independence from the party by claiming an autonomous status. It was only in the last ten years that this problem has been settled. (A more detailed analysis of the relationship of the party and the UGTA was presented in Chapter 9.)

At present, the Algerian workers are conscious of their role in nation building; their position within the economy creates the conditions necessary for this consciousness. Despite the workers' national commitment for nation building, there is a tendency for some segments of Algerian workers to subscribe strongly to the trade unions' interest. When it comes to a choice between the party (FLN) and the UGTA, they are more likely to support the UGTA.

There is no doubt, however, that the Algerian option for national development created the conditions conducive to class consciousness. Increasingly, the peasant economy is being transformed, and the peasants are moving off the land and entering the new areas of production created after political independence. As a higher percentage of Algerian industrial workers come from rural backgrounds, it takes a longer time for them to realize their historical mission to establish a proletarian dictatorship.

Marx distinguishes between class "in itself" and class "for itself." For him, a class in itself occurs when various social categories, engaged in different divisions of labour, are united by their broad social and economic ties: because of large-scale industry, they form a class against capital but coexist without being aware of the antagonistic relationship with an oppressing class. In contrast, a class for itself occurs when the antagonistic relationship is felt by the class in itself and they develop a class consciousness and the means to defend their interests. According to Marx,

> An oppressed class is the vital condition for every society founded on the antagonism of classes. The emancipation of the oppressed class thus implies necessarily the creation of a new society. For the oppressed class to be able to emancipate itself it is necessary that the productive powers already acquired and the existing social relations should no longer be capable of existing side by side. Of all the instruments of production, the greatest productive power is the revolutionary class itself. (Mosher, n.d., pp. 173-74)

In the Algerian situation, despite the historical mystification of the relationship and despite the national ideology favouring unity over internal struggle between the various classes, definite antagonistic relationships exist between:

(1) The petite bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie;

(2) The national bourgeoisie and the working class; and

(3) The petite bourgeoisie and the working class.

The petite bourgeoisie is the dominant class, with the alliance of working class and peasants subordinate to the national bourgeoisie. Unlike Algeria, in Latin America, with the exception of Cuba, there is an alliance between the petite bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie, and the international consortium. In the Algerian situation, two classes are capable of bringing a change: the working class and the national bourgeoisie.

The petite bourgeoisie is the dominant class in Algeria and has been in power for more than two decades. Historically, the modern African petite bourgeoisie allied with peasants and workers against the colonial settlement. In that sense, the modern Algerian petite bourgeoisie is different from the colonial petite bourgeoisie, who were interested in obtaining special concessions from the colonial settlement. The new alliance between the petite bourgeoisie and the working class in the modern agricultural and industrial sectors is based on Algeria's desire to be economically independent.

This ideal state is agreed upon by all classes, but economic independence requires large-scale industry and thus naturally brings together different groups of workers and different units of production vis-à-vis the dominant class. In the public sector, the dominant class is the petite bourgeoisie, and in the private sector the national bourgeoisie is the dominant class. There is an antagonistic relationship between these classes. The workers in industry and in agriculture are caught between the petite bourgeoisie, who have political and technical control of the national economy, and the national bourgeoisie, who own the means of production in the private sector. Under this condition, the workers in the private sector as a class "for itself."

My experience suggests that workers in the private sector are well aware of the increasing wealth of the national bourgeoisie. The workers also are aware how the national bourgeoisie developed, where they got their money, what they were ten years ago, and what relationship they have with the state enterprises. The antagonistic relationship in the private sector between the workers and the national bourgeoisie is a primary contradiction, and the workers would like to see the nationalization of private enterprise.

However, there is an antagonistic relationshio between the workers in the public sector and the "administrative order" of the state. This antagonism is a secondary contradiction. The workers in the public sector would like to have more autonomy and an equal share of the profit. This sector represents the largest number of Algerian workers and is a class "in itself." The transformation of the peasant class which started during the colonial period was reorganized after independence, and the bulk of the industrial working class are peasant in origin. The last transformation has occurred since 1967. What is still left of the peasant class in the rural areas has been organized as cooperative societies since 1972. The rural national bourgeoisie has been reduced gradually, but they still constitute the highest income group in rural Algeria.

We now leave Algeria. This thesis has attempted to review the basic class, social, historical, economic, and political changes and forces that have contributed and are contributing to the ongoing transformations in Algerian society. We hope that readers may have found herein some aids to greater understanding of an innovating and significant case of national development.

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APPENDIX A

QUESTIONNAIRE

:

Votre âge :

Votre type de travail : Agricole ______

Industriel ______

Région où vous travaillez? Alger ______

Annaba ______

Votre qualification professionnelle :

- Etes marié? Oui ______ Non ______

- Combien d'enfants avez-vous?

A. Que faites-vous si un de vos collègues de travail est malade?

	Oui	Non
- vous faites son travail	______	______
- vous laissez son travail jusqu'à son retour	______	______
- vous demandez qu'un autre vienne aider ...	______	______

B. Si vous étiez élu pour représenter les travailleurs qu'est-ce-que vous penseriez?

- vous voulez représenter les intérêts de tous les travailleurs en général	______	______
- vous voulez représenter les intérêts *exclusivement* de l'unité qui vous a élu	______	______
- vous voulez représenter les intérêts de la nation toute entière	______	______

C. Si vous avez des difficultés (de n'importe quel ordre) où cherchez-vous du soutien moral et matériel?

- dans votre famille surtout .... ______ ______

Oui Non

- auprès de vos camarades de travail .... ______ ______
- auprès d'autres personnes que vous connaissez .... ______ ______

C. Etes-vous membres de l'une ou l'autres organisation suivante?

- UGTA .... ______ ______
- FLN .... ______ ______

Quelles sont les raisons qui vous ont poussé à entrer dans ces organisations?

____

____

____

E. Si vous aviez à choisir entre les deux, à laquelle de ces organisations préfériez-vous adhérer?

- UGTA .... ______ ______
- ou FLN .... ______ ______

F. Pour quelles raisons désirez-vous que la production augmente? (une seule réponse)

- pour obtenir plus de bénéfice? .... ______ ______
- pour créer plus d'industries? .... ______ ______
- pour aider ceux qui n'ont rien? .... ______ ______

G. Pourquoi le néo-colonialisme, à votre avis, est un obstacle au développement? (une seule réponse)

- parce qu'il va contre l'intérêt des travailleurs algériens .... ______ ______
  Oui Non
- parce qu'il est unobstacle au développement de la nation .... ______ ______
- parce qu'il est l'ennemi de la classe des travailleurs dans le monde entier .... ______ ______

H. Est-ce que vous pensez que la Bureaucratie va contre les intérêts? (une seule réponse)

- d'abord du travail productif .... ______ ______
- d'abord du travail non productif .... ______ ______
- d'abord du socialisme (participation des travailleurs) .... ______ ______

I. Si il y a des conflits entre les travailleurs et les cadres à votre avis, ces conflits proviennent? (une seule réponse)

- de différences idéologies .... ______ ______
- d'un manque de responsabilité .... ______ ______
- d'un manque de compréhension personnel .... ______ ______

APPENDIX B

INSTITUTIONS

1. Gestion Socialiste
2. Autogestion
3. CAPRA (cooperative)
4. Private enterprise
5. Training Institute
6. Cooperative Society
7. CAPSC (marketing board)
8. Petite Fellah
9. El-Moujahidin (CAPAM)
10. Société Nationale Métal
11. SONOCOMBE
12. APCE (local authority)
13. OFLA (external trade)
14. COFEL (regional)
15. CFATA (cadres; regional)
16. Centre de Formation Professionnelle Agricole (workers; regional)
17. Office National de Gestion Socialiste (national)
18. Office National d'Autogestion (national)
19. UGTA (trade union; national)
20. Labour Institute
21. Centre de Formation Professionnelle (Société Nationale Métal; regional)

22. Animation Rurale (school)
23. Research Group (at factory)
24. Infirmary
25. Bureau Syndical
26. Planning Institution
27. UNDP
28. Direction Générale Administrative
29. Direction de Production
30. Direction de Commercialisation
31. Direction de Formation Professionnelle
32. Conseil de Direction
33. Assemblée des Travailleurs
34. Commission d'Hygiène et de Sécurité
35. Commission de Discipline
36. Commission Economique et Financière
37. Commission Sociale et Culturelle, Oeuvres Sociales
38. Commission Personnel et Formation
39. Conseil des Travailleurs
40. Comité de Gestion
41. Planning Group
42. INPED
43. FLN

APPENDIX C

MACRO-LEVEL CONTENT AND INFORMATION (RECORDED)

- Algerian society: pre-colonial period
- Tribal institutions: social and economic aspect
- Tribal unit and wealth
- Leadership and economic status
- Marriage and tribal alliance
- Colonialism: the interruption of Algerian social evolution
- Expropriation of land
- Peasant revolt
- National movements
- Cultural identity
- Colonial culture
- Socialist culture
- The origin of leadership (FLN)
- National planning
- Strategies of development
- Transformation and economic independence
- Coordination of economic activities
- Education and training--middle level
- Distribution of national income
- Decentralization of political and economic power
- Nationalization of private enterprises
- Organization of the workers and elections

- Workers in the private sector
- Workers in the public sector
- Role of the UGTA
- General situation of the workers in private and public sectors
- Islam and socialism
- Agrarian revolution and the agricultural workers
- Income and land distribution
- Industrial workers and their background
- Alliance between the agricultural and industrial workers
- Social and economic condition of the workers before 1965
- Contemporary problems: social, economic conditions, raw materials, and technology
- North and South dialogue and the Algerian situation
- Demographic factors
- Nationale debates: *Charte Nationale*
- Referendum

APPENDIX D

MICRO-LEVEL: CONTENT INFORMATION (RECORDED)

- Organizations--national and local levels: National Enterprise Branches
- Elections: economic participation
- Political participation: situation of power
- Control and supervision
- Planning and implementation
- Production
- "Gaspillage" (wastage)
- Wage policies for agricultural and industrial workers and cadres
- Salary scale and income distribution
- Benefits and their distribution
- Social surplus
- Methods of incentive
- Alliance: agricultural and industrial workers
- Labour intensive
- Capital intensive
- Cooperation between enterprises
- Cooperation between industry and agriculture
- Socio-economic conditions of the workers
- Workers in private sectors
- Permanent and seasonal workers
- Female workers
- Cadres

- Expansion of domestic product
- Change in export economy
- Specialization
- Cooperative society
- Infirmary
- Arabization and alphabetism
- Social insurance
- Animation school for the children of agricultural workers
- Social change at the factory level
- Environmental problems
- Technology and its problems

PROBLEMS

- Manpower
- Social
- Cost of living
- Group interest
- Absenteeism
- Problem of division of labour in agriculture and industry
- Nepotism
- Corruption
- Housing
- Transport
- Component of age group in the working class
- Social involution
- Cultural involution
- New classes: struggle and change

- Internal labour migration
- Environmental
- Fertility
- Dropout--school

APPENDIX E

CONTENT ANALYSIS

1. Entre l'agriculture et l'industrie
2. Bidonvilles
3. Equilibre régional
4. Distribution de bénéfices aux travailleurs
5. FLN
6. Pensée islamique
7. Cadres
8. Culture
9. Coopération entre régions
10. Election: GSE (Socialist Enterprises)
11. GSE (Socialist Enterprises)
12. Des pays en voie de développement
13. UGTA
14. Le phénomène bureaucratique
15. Conflit de générations
16. Corruption
17. Contrôle populaire
18. Petites Fellahs
19. Pétrole (Algérie)
20. Travailleurs algériens en Europe
21. OAIL
22. Comité National des Prix

23. Problème--agriculture
24. Révolution: culture et agriculture
25. APC (Assemblée Populaire des Communes)
26. Production
27. Commercialisation
28. *Charte Nationale*: débats
29. Volontariat
30. Constitution: débats

APPENDIX F

SIZE OF THE SAMPLE: 250 WORKERS

	Workers and Cadres
Annaba (East)	
Algiers (Central)	
Agriculture	100
Industry	150

APPENDIX G

TYPOLOGY OF SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION

Social and Economic Characteristics

Institutions	Social Dislocation	Dependent Economy	Independent Economy	Parasite Classes	Dynamic Classes	Self-Centered	Few Benefit	Mass Benefit
Colonial	X	X		X			X	
National neo-colonial	X	X		X			X	
National independent			X		X	X		X

Note: X indicates the socio-economic characteristics of each institution.

APPENDIX H

PRE-CONDITIONS OF WORKER'S PARTICIPATION AND SELF-MANAGEMENT

Characteristics, Political and Economic	Mode of Production	
	Non-capitalist	Socialist
Independent economy	X	X
Self-centered system	X	X
Administrative order	X	
Party leadership		X
Classes	X	X
Popular control (embryonic)	X	
National consciousness	X	
Class consciousness		X

APPENDIX I

SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS

Conflict and Class Struggle

Sector	Wages	Social Benefit	National Bourgeoisie		Petite Bourgeoisie	Workers and Peasants	Mode of Production
			Rural	Urban			
Public		X			X	X	X
Private	X			X		X	X
Traditional			X				X

Note: X indicates socio-economic characteristics.

APPENDIX J

INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION PROJECTIONS AND NATURAL GAS SALES

TABLE J-1

ALGERIA:
INCREASE IN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION, 1969-1980 (PROJECTIONS)

Products	Units	1969	1973	1977	1980
Hydrocarbons					
Crude oil	million metric tons	42.7	60.9	72.0	80.0
Natural gas	million cubic metres	3.2	9.3	25.0	42.0
Mining					
Iron ore	thousand metric tons	3,198.0	3,700.0	4,000.0	11,000.0
Calcium phosphate	thousand metric tons	410.7	580.0	700.0	200.0
Other phosphates	thousand metric tons	-	550.0	1,000.0	1,000.0
Electricity	million kilowatts	1,477.0	2,890.0	4,600.0	6,500.0
Iron and Steel					
Steel-pounding	thousand metric tons	189.3	430.0	900.0	1,550.0
Crude-steel	thousand metric tons	-	480.0	1,000.0	1,770.0
Hot-rolled steel	thousand metric tons	-	300.0	800.0	1,000.0
Cold-rolled steel	thousand metric tons	-	-	150.0	270.0
Reinforcing iron bars	thousand metric tons	42.5	48.0	340.0	840.0
Mechanical and Electrical Industries					
Carpentry	thousand metric tons	19.9	48.0	75.0	100.0
Boilers and copper products	thousand metric tons	6.6	20.0	38.0	50.0
Diesel motors	units	-	2,500.0	9,000.0	13,000.0
Wheeled tractors	units	-	700.0	4,000.0	4,800.0
Tracked tractors	units	-	150.0	1,000.0	1,300.0
Cycles	units	-	3,000.0	15,000.0	15,000.0
Motorcycles	units	-	4,500.0	30,000.0	30,000.0
Pumps	units	6,300.0	7,500.0	16,000.0	32,000.0
Piers	units	-	4,000.0	39,000.0	65,000.0
Electric lamps	thousand units	-	-	9,000.0	17,000.0
Chemical Industries					
Sulphuric acid	thousand metric tons	61.0	260.0	750.0	850.0
Ammonia	thousand metric tons	-	250.0	350.0	550.0
Nitrogenous fertilizers	thousand metric tons	-	10.0	50.0	180.0
Phosphate fertilizers	thousand metric tons	-	180.0	180.0	240.0
Construction materials					
Cement	thousand metric tons	924.0	1,250.0	3,300.0	4,300.0
Prefabricated buildings	thousand square metres	-	20.0	400.0	800.0
Plate glass	thousand metric tons	-	4.5	12.0	19.0
Foodstuffs					
Flour and semolina	thousand metric tons	806.8	1,130.0	1,350.0	1,700.0
Refined sugar	thousand metric tons	11.0	206.0	230.0	235.0

Source: *Middle East Economic Digest*, 9 November, 1973.

TABLE J-2

ALGERIA:
LONG-TERM LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS SALES

	Deliveries			
	Million Cubic Feet/Day	Million Cubic Metres/Year	Duration (years)	Start-up Date
Europe	3,200	32,000	15	
British Methane	100	1,000	15	1964
Gaz de France (Le Havre)	50	500	15	1965
Gaz de France (Fos)	350	3,500	20	1972
European consortium* (Fos/Monfalcone)	1,550	15,500	20	(1977/78)
Gaz National (Spain)	50-150	500-1,500	20	(1974/79)
Ruhrgas+	1,000	10,000	20	(1979)
USA	3,220	32,200		
Distrigas	50	500	20	1971
Distrigas	120	1,200	20	(1975)
El Paso	1,000	10,000	20	(1976/77)
El Paso	1,000	10,000	20	(1978)
Eascogas	600	6,000	20	(1975/76)
Panhandle Eastern	450	4,500	20	(1979)
TOTAL	6,420	64,400		
Under negotiation				
ENI (Italy)	-			

Source: *Middle East Economic Digest*, 9 November, 1973.

*European consortium includes: Bauerische Feingas, Garver Zorgung Suddendeutschland and Saar Feingas of West Germany, Gaz de France, Distrigaz of Belgium, Swissgas, and Feingas of Austria.

+ Ruhrgas has the option to increase its purchase of LNG to 12,000 million cubic feet.

TABLE J-3

ALGERIA:
PROJECTED DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURES FOR 1974-1977 AND 1978-1980

(in millions of Algerian Dinars)

Sector	Second Four-Year Plan 1974-1977	Forecast 1978-1980	Total 1974-1980
Industry	23,800	16,600	40,400
Industrial plants	21,500	15,500	37,000
Research	1,900	800	2,700
Industrial zones	400	300	700
Agriculture	7,000	6,700	13,700
Agriculture	4,900	3,900	8,800
Water and research	1,300	1,900	3,200
Dams and wells	800	900	1,700
General Infrastructure	6,800	6,800	13,600
Transport	1,200	1,200	2,400
Communications and telecommunications	2,000	2,200	4,200
Collective equipment	1,000	1,200	2,200
Administrative equipment	600	600	1,200
Stock distribution and follow-up	1,200	1,300	2,500
Electrification	800	300	1,100
Education and Social Welfare	13,200	18,800	32,000
Education, training, and culture	4,000	3,700	7,700
Health, youth, and sports	1,100	1,200	2,300
Housing	6,000	10,800	16,800
Replacement	1,000	2,000	3,000
Unforeseen expenditure	1,100	1,100	2,200
Tourism	700	600	1,300
Centrally Planned Investments	51,500	49,500	101,000
Local general	400	300	700
Specific	2,100	1,400	3,500
TOTAL	54,000	51,200	105,200

Source: *Middle East Economic Digest*, 9 November, 1973.

TABLE J-4

ALGERIA: PLANNED GROWTH IN GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT

(in millions of Algerian Dinars)

Sector	1973	1977	Percent Increase 1973-77	1980	Percent Increase 1973-80
Agriculture	2,506	2,810	3.0	3,070	3.0
Industry (non-oil)	4,435	6,520	14.3	9,150	13.9
Agriculture and food processing	1,300	1,835	8.4	2,030	6.1
Iron and steel	525	680	5.9	1,350	14.4
Mechanical and electrical	385	1,190	31.0	2,130	27.6
Chemical	650	1,070	13.2	1,700	14.7
Textiles and skins	665	1,075	14.1	1,300	10.8
Construction materials	300	695	23.1	1,000	18.8
Mining	250	250	-	310	3.2
Industry	300	510	9.0	680	9.0
Hydrocarbons	5,870	7,870	7.6	9,500	7.1
TOTAL INDUSTRY	10,305	15,150	10.2	19,980	10.0
Public Works and Buildings	3,050	4,300	9.0	5,890	9.8
Transport	1,070	1,510	9.0	1,960	9.0
Services	3,000	4,080	8.0	5,146	8.0
Trade	4,400	5,760	7.0	7,060	7.0
Value added,	24,325	33,610	8.3	43,100	8.5
including fares	1,200	1,200	-	1,200	-
TOTAL GDP	25,525	34,810	8.0	44,300	8.2

Source: *Middle East Economic Digest*, 9 November, 1973.